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2Abstract
This thesis examines the political role of the 
Native Commissioners' and Chiefs' courts in Southern 
Rhodesia on two levels: the macro-political level of 
state hegemony and the micro-political level of district 
relations. Thus two chapters are devoted to a focus on 
Sipolilo District, and the remainder of the thesis sets 
this in the wider national and historical context, 
examining the implications of the Sipolilo study for the 
larger setting.
The reasons for the initial integration of the 
"traditional" authorities into the state through the 
recognition and regulation of existing courts is 
considered. The means by which this progressed first 
institutionally and later ideologically is traced through 
twenty-five years. A further move to integrate the 
Chiefs occurred in the early 1960s, and the changed 
circumstances are examined.
In both these phases of integration the 
"traditional" authorities played an active role in 
staking their claim to control these proceedings. The 
thesis will examine why both the state and Chiefs were 
eager to control these proceedings and consider how each 
made use of the power gained from this control.
The role of the lower courts in extending and 
consolidating the cash economy and producing other norms 
is considered. The local nature of these courts made 
them sensitive to local conditions but the appeal court 
also extended the normative nature of some of the 
decisions.
3The regional context of the policy to integrate the 
Chiefs through the recognition of judicial power is 
considered by contrasting the relevant pieces of 
legislation from East, Central, and South Africa.
The time period for the dissertation is based on the 
drafting of the Native Law and Courts Act (1937), the 
first of its kind in Southern Rhodesia, and the 
implementation of the African Law and Tribal Courts Act 
(1969), the last of its kind in the colonial period.
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Introduction 
Judicial and Political Authority
It is only in the last thirty years that historians 
of Southern Rhodesia and Zimbabwe have considered chiefs 
to be lackeys of the government. This interpretation of 
official and semi-official sources has been misleading.
To some extent it has been naive, over-reliant on 
"chiefs" as passive and exploitable characters. While it 
is true that the Southern Rhodesian government played a 
large role in the construction of the office of "chief", 
bolstering and creating a great deal of "tradition" to 
accompany the "chief", these men (no chieftainesses were 
recognised by the government) played important roles and 
many were indeed perceived as crucial allies at key 
moments in Southern Rhodesian history. In the 1920s the 
Native Affairs Department sought the support of powerful 
African men who could fit into the "traditional" role 
considered by the government to represent "legitimacy". 
More clearly, in the late 1950s and early 1960s both
nationalists and the government actively sought the
support of chiefs.
The extent to which judicial and political authority 
go hand in hand, and indeed the question of how one
relates to the other will be a theme running throughout
this thesis. Ladley, analysing the post-Independence 
period, has argued that the exercise of judicial office 
generates authority that is transferable to the political
sphere. Indeed, the records of the Native Affairs 
Department suggests it supported such an analysis 
throughout the twentieth century. "Chiefs" perceived 
judicial power as something they could reasonably demand 
from the colonial state, and did so throughout its 
existence. This thesis will attempt to show how the two 
relate within complex political relationships where 
judicial authority was but a small part of the whole 
picture.
Some argue that legal change "lags" behind social 
and economic change: classical marxists, in particular, 
argue that law is simply superstructural. Other legal 
theorists argue that legislation can have a directive 
role in both social and economic spheres. Throughout 
this thesis it will be demonstrated that the legal, 
social, political and economic spheres exist in much more 
complex and involved relationships than proponents of the 
above arguments are willing to concede.
Under the colonial regime we find both dominant and 
subordinate legal systems operating. Clearly there is a 
fissure or disparity between the two; however, each 
affects the other.1 The relative strengths of the
1 See J.F. Holleman, "Disparities and Uncertainties in 
African Law and Judicial Authority: A Rhodesian Case Study", 
African Law Studies, no.17 (1979), in which Holleman 
demonstrates the persistent disparities between "customary" 
and statutory law. He also looks at the competing 
jurisdictions of Native Commissioners' and chiefs' courts and 
argues that ambiguities engendered by this led to confusion 
over the locus of authority in the 1970s with political
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dominant and subordinate are, at any given time, 
dependent upon diverse elements, demonstrating that law 
is never divorced from social, economic and political 
conditions that obtain. Sally Falk Moore has made an 
exceptionally clear statement regarding the relationship 
between the dominant and subordinate legal systems under 
the colonial regime. Writing of Tanzania she explains,
From the beginning of the colonial period 
the legal system on Kilimanjaro must be 
conceived as having two dimensions. One 
includes all that came under the immediate 
direction of government and administration, the 
other the residual part left to the Chagga to 
administer. The two were, of course, 
interdigitated and interrelated in reality, and 
each affected the other. The residual part 
was, obviously, historically linked to 
precolonial "customary law", but from the start 
was only a segment of the precolonial Chagga 
system of law-government. Attached to a 
political order quite differently constituted 
from that to which it was originally hitched 
and operating in the framework of a different 
economy, residual "customary law" was an 
altered entity from the very beginning.2
Those arguing against the concept of a dominant 
ideology3 suggest that any such ideology must be all- 
pervasive and inflexible. On the contrary, dominant 
ideologies are overarching ideologies that are flexible
consequences.
2 Sally Falk Moore, Social.Facts and Fabrications:
"Customary" law on Kilimanjaro. 1880-1980 f Cambridge: 1986,
p.95 .
3 See, for example, N. Abercrombie, S. Hill and B.S. 
Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis. London: 1980.
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and sufficiently plastic to withstand the pressures of 
dissent exerted by subordinate ideologies. Through the 
process of contestation the more dissonant elements of 
the subordinate are smoothed over to be consonant with 
the dominant.4
In our context the transmission of an emergent or 
newly dominant ideology arriving with colonialism was 
hindered by many factors. Indeed, such transmissions are 
never simple. In Southern Rhodesia colonization was 
sparse in many districts for several decades following 
conquest, leading to very little transmission of colonial 
ideas. Such areas were routinely described by Native 
Commissioners as remote or "backward". In those areas 
where there was a substantial colonial presence so much 
was contested that social upheaval continued for an 
extended period. As new elites emerged, the interests 
they represented were increasingly consonant with 
government or colonial interests.
Control of, or at the very least influence upon, the 
wider cultural domain is a specific component of legal 
disputing. Studies of Southern Rhodesia by Jeater5 and
4 An interesting exploration of this theme is found in, 
Dick Hebdige, Subculture: The Meaning of Style. London: 1979.
5 Diana Jeater, Marriage. Perversion and Power: the 
construction of moral discourse in Southern Rhodesia. 1890- 
1930. Oxford: 1993.
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Schmidt6 have demonstrated this for the era prior to the 
1930s. Throughout the colonial period the state 
attempted to control marriage, divorce, lobola transfers, 
women and emerging commercial relations amongst Africans. 
One tool that was deployed was the courts. That the 
disputes concerning these issues were largely between 
Africans in the period dealt with in this thesis 
highlights two important aspects of civil disputing.
First, it involves the relations of power: the successful 
litigant in a case gains the backing of the state. 
Secondly, disputes fulfil a pedagogical role. It is this 
second role that is particularly significant in the 
transmission of ideas.
In the struggle to control dispute proceedings in 
Southern Rhodesia, senior African men demanded official 
recognition and state backing for the courts they 
operated, and thereby for the norms they were attempting 
to instil. In short, they were seeking the state's 
coercive power to promote their interests. The Southern 
Rhodesian government, on the other hand, sought an 
organic connection with the African population by which 
ideology consonant with colonial interests could be 
transmitted to the African population more effectively.
The government considered courts could fulfil such a 
function, at least in part.
6 Elizabeth Schmidt, Peasants. Traders, and Wives: Shona 
Women in the History of Zimbabwe. 1870-1939. London: 1992.
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Recently several historians of Africa have grappled 
with issues of the law and the judiciary. Some of these 
historians have been excited by the untapped material 
found in legal records, primarily of criminal 
proceedings. The present thesis differs from these 
recent studies in a number of important ways. Firstly, I 
concentrate almost exclusively on civil disputing. I do 
this for two reasons: in civil disputes we are offered a 
window upon the issues Africans contested and the means 
they deployed to do so, while the range of judicial 
proceedings controlled to some degree by Africans in 
Southern Rhodesia did not extend to criminal disputes.
The second point of novelty in the present study is that 
it considers the struggle to control dispute proceedings 
in the colonial era as central to the larger contest 
between the colonized and the colonizer. This was by no 
means a simple contest: many layers of interaction 
influenced positions, events and outcomes.
This thesis sets out to demonstrate a number of 
points. First, Africans considered that the control of 
judicial institutions conferred power; it was 
correspondingly important to gain official or state 
recognition. This is apparent throughout the period in 
question, from the time of the Native Boards in the 1930s 
when Africans across the country were demanding 
officially-recognised jurisdiction, to the destruction of
16
the chief's court house in Sipolilo in the late 1970s and 
indeed beyond. Secondly, in order to "retribalise" 
Africans and establish the authority of "traditional" 
leaders the Native Affairs Department considered the 
cession of limited judicial powers the appropriate act.
But this was not a grant of powers, as the official 
documents and reports suggest; it was, rather, a cession 
of powers. The Native Affairs Department appears to have 
considered the delegation of judicial powers to be a 
safer option than devolving powers of land allocation or 
extending the franchise to Africans. The Native Affairs 
Department and the Chiefs believed that the control of 
judicial powers generated wider political power as well 
as greater legitimacy and authority.
Thirdly, the control of the courts gave the 
institutionalised personnel, especially "chiefs", and 
powerful men of the community, especially storekeepers, 
remarkable powers in the construction of norms and local 
"common law". However, this was not done without 
reference to the state and as such the colonial regime 
was an interested party in the norms under construction.
As a result the ideology of the colonial regime 
interacted at a very local level with Africans of the 
area. As the chief and the storekeepers brought 
pressures to bear upon the population of the reserves, 
backed by the colonial courts, an explosion of litigation 
occurred in the Native Commissioners' and chiefs' courts:
17
Africans were thus propelled into conflict with one 
another in the courtroom in order to establish their 
positions with some certitude.
Literature Review
Recently scholars have been taking a closer look at 
the history of law in Central and Southern Africa.7 The 
role of courts in the implementation of law and the 
legitimation of the colonial state is crucial to this 
history and in the past few years this topic has been 
attracting increasing attention. To date, however, the 
local courts in Southern Rhodesia have not been a focus 
of an extended historical study.
This literature review comprises two parts. The 
first considers the amateur ethnographies with easy 
access to the official domain. Some of the works 
included here were written by native commissioners, 
others for those dealing with "native law and custom" . 
The first part aims to provide a sketch of the
7 For examples see Sally Falk Moore, Social Facts & 
Fabrications; Martin Chanock, Law. Custom and Social Order: 
The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia. London: 1985; 
A.S. Ladley, "Courts and Authority: A Shona village court", 
PhD Thesis (Laws), London: 1985; Raymond Suttner, "African 
Customary Law - Its Social and Ideological Function in South 
Africa", in Lodge, T. (ed.), Resistance and Ideology in 
Settler Societies. Johannesburg: 1986; K. Mann, and R. 
Roberts, (eds.), Law in Colonial Africa. London:1991 and 
Margaret Jean Hay and Marcia
Wright, (eds.). African Women and the Law: Historical 
Perspectives. Boston: 1982.
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development of ideas among the officials administering 
Africans in Southern Rhodesia. The material that these 
administrators left us is as interesting for what it 
reveals about themselves as for what it tells us about 
African life at the time. The second part provides a 
wider framework for the issues raised in this thesis. It 
considers academic and professional works by- 
anthropologists, historians and lawyers. In order to 
construct the framework it has been necessary to go 
beyond Zimbabwe, and indeed Africa. I have, however, 
restricted myself to contemporary works and have not 
tried to survey the historical development of African 
legal studies as this has been done elsewhere.8
This distinction is not clear-cut. In Southern 
Rhodesia it is blurred by two men, Roger Howman9 and J.F.
8 See Martin Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order, 
especially Chapters 1-3; Sally Falk Moore, Social Facts and 
Fabrications, pp. 6-10.
9 Howmanfs regard for anthropology stemmed from his 
experience at the LSE under Malinowski. But he was critical 
of Malinowski's approach. Malinowski, Howman tells us, "used 
to spend his time drumming it into our heads: There is the 
form, you must find the function and the functions is part of 
our whole series of functions that you've got to be able to 
follow up till you've got a whole institution and all the 
institutions have to come together in a big society.... I 
said to him one day if you come...if you got to describe 
what's inside our African hut and there happens to be a 
paraffin tin that's taken the place of the pot I said what 
would you do with it. He said, "I would remove
it...(laughter)...it's not from the African culture." I said, 
"But this is not the problem. We are dealing with a 
people...at least I am interested in...who are changing almost 
every year and we want to see what happens." Roger Howman,
19
Holleman. These two men also represent the bridge 
between the official, amateur ethnographies and the 
professional, academic anthropology and history that is 
the focus of the second part of this review. Howman,
(who does not figure in this literature review) served in 
the Native Affairs Department in several posts, while his 
colleague and friend Holleman, an academic anthropologist 
did not. However, both influenced one another and 
therefore should be noted.10 Howman wrote several 
official reports and drafted the African Law and Tribal 
Courts Act (1969), as well as the occasional article for 
the Native Affairs Department Annual (NAPA). Holleman, 
for his part, operated in an official capacity, sitting 
on the Mangwende Commission (1961), writing its report 
and later publishing this, in a revised form, as Chief. 
Council jinfl^-CommissiQner. These two men were the leading 
lights in the study of African "customary" law and 
chiefs' courts in Southern Rhodesia between 1945 and 
1970. Each contributed to the debate concerning the 
jurisdiction of chiefs' courts and the value of 
"customary" law. Both were consciously engaged in the 
politics of these issues.11
Harare, 1 August 1991.
10 Roger Howman, Harare, 1 August 1991.
11 See J.F. Holleman, Chief Council and Commissioner, 
Assen: 1969, and interview with Roger Howman, Harare, 1 August
1991.
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The work of J.F. Holleman is included here and is of 
particular significance because of his standing as a 
professional anthropologist and the interest his early- 
work attracted from the Native Affairs Department and the 
close ties he had with the Southern Rhodesian government. 
Howman remembers that Holleman's Shona Customary Law was, 
like Charles Bullock's works earlier, "pushed into every 
Native Commissioner's hands".12 However, Holleman was 
critical of government policy, particularly the Native 
Marriage Act (1950),13 Howman and Holleman first met when 
Holleman was doing research for this book in Wedza 
District, in the late 1940s, where Howman was stationed 
as Assistant Native Commissioner.
Roger Howman was an academically trained 
anthropologist. He received part of his training at the 
LSE under Malinowski in the 1930s, but considered it 
unsatisfactory, mainly because the issues he felt were 
important, i.e. administrative questions, were not being 
addressed by the social anthropologists. Howman's 
father, E.G. Howman, was a Native Commissioner and Roger 
Howman remained more interested in "practical issues" of 
administration. He had studied anthropology, at least in
12 Roger Howman, Harare, 1 August 1991, see p.28 below.
13 Prof. Holleman kindly loaned me his copy of a
memorandum entitled "Memorandum on Certain Aspects of the 
Native Marriages Act, 1950", dated November 1950. This
document was prepared at the request of L. Powys-Jones, CNC.
A copy will be placed with the Britain-Zimbabwe Society 
archives.
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part, because he believed it could inform better
administration. What he did find useful, however, in his
studies in Britain was his exposure to the sociology of 
Karl Mannheim. He gave further indication of his 
interest in administration, rather than social 
anthropology during his study tour, in the mid-1930s, of 
the United States, where his hosts had arranged meetings 
with Black Americans. These he requested be limited to a
few; his interest was in Native Americans as their
conditions appeared more relevant to those of Africans in 
Southern Rhodesia.14
The influences upon J.F. Holleman were diverse. He 
was born in Java and his "home background...acquainted 
[him] with some of the work of the Dutch scholars on 
Indonesian adat law."15 His father introduced him to 
anthropological fieldwork in Malaysia. He moved to South 
Africa where he studied law and anthropology at 
Stellenbosch and later with Isaac Schapera at the 
University of Cape Town. Subsequently, he spent six 
years with the Department of Justice in the south-western 
Cape, despite his desire to work in Native Affairs. In 
1947 he was appointed a research officer of the Rhodes- 
Livingstone Institute. Although he was attached to the
14 Roger Howman, Harare, 1 August 1991.
15 John Griffiths,"Recent anthropology of law in the 
Netherlands and its historical background", in Keebet von 
Benda-Beckmann and Fons Strijbosch, (eds.), Anthropology of 
Law in the Netherlands. Dordrecht: 1986, p.34.
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Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in Livingstone from 1947 to 
1952, his association with the Max Gluckman was loose.
The Preface to Seven Tribes of British Central Africa 
makes it apparent that at key moments Holleman was not 
with the other RLI officers: "Holleman was not at Oxford
with the rest of the Institute team when the book was 
planned and much of the writing for it was done."16 
Looking back over his own career, Holleman notes his 
major influences as Hoebel, Llewellyn, Schapera and Van 
Vollenhoven, the Dutch pioneer in the study of adat law.
Mann and Roberts have recently asserted17 that as 
colonial officials came to view law as a potential 
instrument of social change they also adopted the 
evolutionary paradigm employed by the anthropologists 
Rattray and Meek. In so doing these administrators also 
expected that through the codification of "customary" law 
they could "modernize it and incorporate it in a 
pluralist colonial state or later a modern nation 
state."18 This does not hold true in Southern Rhodesia. 
The copious articles concerning "native law and custom" 
that appeared in NAPA19 suggest strongly that the
16 Elizabeth Colson and Max Gluckman (eds.), Seven Tribes 
of British Central Africa. London: 1951, p. viii.
17 K. Mann and R. Roberts (eds.), Law in Colonial Africa.
18 Ibid. , p. 5 .
19 NAPA began publication in 1923 its name is from the 
acronym of Native Affairs Dept Annual. Its articles were 
written almost exclusively by NAD officials. Without doubt it
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colonial officials in Southern Rhodesia generally viewed 
"customary" law as expressive of social norms rather than 
directive in the formulation of such norms. It was not 
until the late 1940s that anyone in the Southern Rhodesia 
administration argued that "customary" law possessed a 
directive potential,20 and even then it does not appear to 
have received serious attention. However, colonial 
administrators seem to have considered statutory law, 
e.g. the Native Adultery Ordinance (1916) as directive 
and "customary" law as simply "natural". However, this 
is not to assert that "customary" law was accepted by the 
colonial authorities, on the contrary. The enactment of 
legislation regarding African marriage and the ever­
present "repugnancy" clause, which obliged the Southern 
Rhodesian government not to recognize as law pre-colonial 
practises if they were considered "repugnant" to natural 
justice, is evidence of this.
The early published ethnographic works concerning 
African courts were written by two prominent Native 
Commissioners, Charles Bullock and F.W.T. Posselt.21
provides greater insight into the official mind than the 
African communities so many of its articles are concerned 
with.
20 Roger Howman, "The Significance of Law for native 
administration in Africa", Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, no.8
(1949)  .
21 Posselt was one of the Native Commissioners who was 
recruited from the Natal service. He took up his post with 
the Native Department, Southern Rhodesia in September, 1908.
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Their descriptions of courts prior to the promulgation of 
the Native Law and Courts Act (1937) complement each 
other, but more significantly they give us insight into 
the views of two of the most important administrators 
proposing official recognition for chiefs' courts. 
Posselt's book, Fact and Fiction (1935), is important, 
not only because it is one of the earliest studies of 
African law and courts in Southern Rhodesia, but also 
because it was Posselt who, as Acting Chief Native 
Commissioner in 1934, drafted the Native Law and Courts 
Act (1937) which was designed "'to give scope to the 
inherent capacity of a people to be controlled by their 
own institutions and through their own recognised lead­
ers'."22 Bullock's contribution is also important as he 
was the Chief Native Commissioner in 193 7 when the law 
was enacted. Thus we are able to gain some insight into 
the understanding of African law and courts which 
prevailed within official circles in this period, and 
which found official expression in legislation and 
policy.
Roger Howman writes in the foreword to the reprint
edition of Fact and Fiction;
It is instructive to contrast Posselt with 
Bullock, his contemporary. The latter, in 
1913, considered that the Mashona may well have 
been degenerating before contact with
22 Roger Howman, in the Foreword to the reprint edition, 
F.W.T. Posselt, Fact and Fiction. 1978. (originally published 
in 1935)
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civilization so he had no scruples about 
mission work, legislation and the pax 
Britannica. Posselt, on the contrary, 
painfully reflected that a primitive people was 
usually demoralised and debased by its first 
contact with civilization and, seeing "the good 
contained in the social and ethical structure", 
he asked why this good had to be destroyed? As 
a consequence he was highly critical of 
Education (evangelical), The Law Department 
(judicial and punishment) and trends he 
visualised as promoting "a demoralised mob, 
unrestrained by ethical influences, insolent, 
factious and vicious".23
The most striking characteristic of this collection 
of essays is that Posselt avoids the ahistorical stance 
of social anthropology in the 1930s, choosing instead to 
intersperse historical and anthropological essays, 
maintaining a degree of historicity throughout. His 
major shortcoming is, clearly, an avoidance of economic 
issues, and the changes they wrought on African life in 
the colony. However, it is in this respect that we see 
most clearly that Posselt was pursuing an agenda that had 
at its head 'traditional' African institutions. One of 
his aims, stated in the original introduction to the 
volume, was "to throw some light on their history; to 
afford the means of appreciating their laws and religious 
beliefs and culture."24 Although Posselt acknowledges 
that social change occurs, "The process of tribal 
disintegration, disruption, and fusion is still
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., introduction.
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operative, though now due to other causes",25 he 
frequently harkens back to an earlier age when the 
'tribal system' was stronger.
To some extent the chapter entitled "An Outline of 
the Legal Ideas of the Vazezuru" is Posselt's attempt to 
lay a basis for the codification of 'customary' law. He 
reviews here the jurisprudential aspects of 'law and 
custom'; the judicial machinery of the Zezuru; and the 
forms of evidence and the relative weight they carry.
There follows a brief review of criminal and civil law, 
each of these having subsections dedicated to specific 
'laws'.
Posselt fails to enquire how these "customary" laws 
might change. His analysis suffers from inherent 
conservatism, a belief that things should not change, 
unless they are being restored to their original state. 
Within this framework he gives no consideration to the 
formation of "customary" law, or its adaptation to the 
radically changing environment in which it is meant to 
operate. For Posselt it is simply there to be 
discovered, described and deployed.
Although Posselt clearly distinguishes between 
criminal and civil law, establishing sections for each, 
he admits in his first sentence that this is a false 
dichotomy: "There is no clear division between criminal
25 Ibid.
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and civil law."26 In the treatment of individual 'laws',
his tenor appears to be a comparison and contrast with
similar Western laws. Unfortunately, he does not
consider the laws in their own context, nor does he
describe them in a systematic manner. For some of these
laws he provides a short description of who is held
responsible, an example of the delict, and the penalty
received. But apart from the definition, the other
elements are treated as non-essential, and they are only
sometimes included. Posselt confines his discussion to
civil law, or more precisely to marriage, divorce,
*
succession and inheritance. These are the same issues to 
which J.F. Holleman confines his study, Shona Customary 
Law.27 which I shall discuss later. This choice of 
material is largely due to the fact that the overwhelming 
majority of cases to reach the Native Commissioners' 
courts were centred precisely upon these issues. The 
apparent shallowness of the material suggests to some 
extent the position of Native Commissioners hearing cases 
in this period, especially given that they were directed 
to follow "native law".28 This position could only have 
left them susceptible to manipulation by interested 
parties.
26 Ibid. , p . 54.
27 J.F. Holleman, Shona Customary Law. London: 1952.
28 Order-in-Council, 1898, art.50.
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In the section devoted to courts, Posselt again 
describes the Shona system in a Western paradigm. To 
some extent this seems to obscure the process followed. 
Posselt describes the different courts that operated 
amongst the Vazezuru: the village court; the court of the 
district headman; and the court of the "tribal" chief; 
the jurisdiction of each, and their relationship to one 
another. But as throughout the section on the legal 
ideas of the Vazezuru, the descriptions seek to be 
normative rather than highlight exceptions or anomalies 
arising out of contrasting social or political 
conditions.
Posselt's contemporary and colleague, Charles 
Bullock,29 wrote about the courts operating in Mashonaland 
for similar reasons. His book, The Mashona. was 
favourably received, the Native Affairs Department even 
putting up a £3 00 guarantee for any losses the publishers 
might incur.30 Although Jackson had expressed some 
misgivings concerning the book to the Prime Minister: 
"however able [Bullock] may be, [the book] cannot be 
accepted as finally authoritative on all points"; he did
29 Charles Bullock, The Mashona. Cape Town: 1927.
30 H.M.G. Jackson, CNC, to C. Bullock, NC, 20/2/1928, 
S 138/10.
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consider it would be of great value to the training of 
NAD officials.31
Bullock devotes some ninety pages to the law 
pertaining to Africans of Mashonaland. That is, "the 
scope of our discussion ...is...the interaction of 
European and Native law."32 For the most part this is a 
discussion of how and why, legally speaking, traditional 
ways of dealing with disputes were displaced by European 
law. The precedents of High Court decisions are cited 
throughout the legal section. We are left with the 
impression that Bullock, described on the frontispiece as 
"Native Commissioner, and Examiner in Native Customs and 
Administration, S. Rhodesia", has written an 
administrative textbook rather than an ethnography.
Bullock was clearly neither as enthusiastic about 
the establishment of chiefs' courts as Posselt, nor as 
romantic about their past. Nevertheless he was willing 
to state clearly that African courts continued to operate 
although "they do not form part of our judicial machine­
ry".33 Bullock's description of the courts and their 
proceedings is not comparative like Posselt's, but he 
does include two examples of cases in the chapter he 
devotes to 'Native Tribunals'. Furthermore, Bullock
31 H.M.G. Jackson, Asst CNC, to the Prime Minister, 
9/1/28, S 138/10.
32 Ibid. , p. 312 .
33 Ibid. p . 383 .
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discusses the 'Native tribunals' and the limits of 
tolerance they enjoyed:
We may...state the extent to which Native law 
is operative today. Briefly, it is that there 
is no recognition of Native criminal law, nor 
of the competency of Native tribunals to punish 
crime.34
This is a vital insight to the unofficial African courts 
in the pre-193 7 era.
It was another sixteen years before J.F. Holleman 
began publishing his works on Shona ethnography.35 
Although his treatment of the material is ahistorical, it 
is a useful source for social history. The greatest 
limitation of Shona Customary Law is its restriction to 
that which was legally permitted by the Native Law and 
Courts Act (1937). Considering that at the time of 
research there were no more than 17336 recognised courts 
operating, it seems unlikely that Holleman did not come 
into contact with any unrecognised courts or recognised 
courts exercising jurisdiction beyond that conferred 
through legislation; indeed he alludes to their 
existence.37 In 1960 unrecognised courts were found to
34 Ibid. , p. 295.
35 J.F. Holleman, "Some 'Shona' Tribes of Southern 
Rhodesia", in E. Colson, and M. Gluckman, (eds.) Seven Tribes 
of British Central Africa, pp.354-395, and Shona, Customary 
Law.
36 Report of the Secretary of Native Affairs and the Chief 
Native Commissioner for the Year 1949. Salisbury: 1950, p. 24.
37 Holleman, Shona Customary Law, p.13.
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continue to outnumber the officially sanctioned Native
Chiefs’ Courts, and the attempt to restrict their
jurisdiction had been deemed a failure.38 So it is
unfortunate that Holleman limited his work to that which
was constitutionally acceptable to the Southern Rhodesian
state. This may be accounted for by the fact that
Mr. H. Simmonds, then Chief Native 
Commissioner, convinced [the author] that there 
was a keenly felt need for a systematic and up- 
to-date account of Shona customary law, in 
particular marriage and family law.39
The positivist methodology Holleman uses to approach
"customary" law underlines his belief that it is simply
there to be discovered. Holleman gathered together the
senior elders in a number of different districts and
interviewed them extensively. The view, therefore, that
Holleman received was undoubtedly the dominant one,
without identifying any of the contested areas.40 This
interpretation of law did not account for the growing
contestation by those challenging patriarchal control.41
38 Report of the Commission appointed into inquire into 
and Report on Administrative and Judicial Functions in the 
Native Affairs and District Courts Departments. (Chair: Sir 
Victor Robinson), Salisbury:1961, referred to as the 'Robinson 
Commission'.
39 Holleman, Shona Customary Law, p. ix.
40 Holleman, Shona Customary Law, p.x; also personal 
communication.
41 An excellent example of such contestation was found in 
the case Sipolilo Civil Record 12/54, "Stebiya N.F. (assisted 
by her father SAMU X1145 Sipolilo) versus Ranjisi X8596 
Sipolilo", 11-17 May 1954, NAZ S 2033. Here the woman,
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As Martin Chanock later noted, the manner in which such
information was collected "must be seen...not as part of
the process of discovering the rules of customary law but
as a vital part of the rule-making process."42 Thus, it
may be argued that Holleman's research adopted colonial
understandings and assumptions of "customary" law, and
failed to challenge it.
Despite these limitations, Holleman does provide
valuable information concerning the functioning of courts
and particularly the relationship between the different
'levels' - village headman, ward headman and chief's
courts. The material presented be treated with some
caution. For example, he writes,
The functions of the chief are essentially the 
same as those mentioned in connexion with the 
ward headman, but, obviously, his authority is 
much greater. Under tribal law the chief's 
court had full jurisdiction over members under 
control of the chief. It acted as a court of 
first instance in matters so serious that their 
impact was considered to affect the whole 
tribal community, such as homicide, witchcraft, 
and offenses against the chief's person. It 
acted as a final court of appeal in connexion 
with all disputes and offenses which failed to
Stebiya argues her own case (only nominally assisted by her 
father in order to fulfil legal requirements). Ranjisi 
contests even a woman's right to do so. Several other 
arguments concerning the procedure of "native custom" were 
deployed by Ranjisi to rebut Stebiya's claims. However, on 
this occasion they were unsuccessful.
42 Martin Chanock, "Making Customary Law: Men, Women and 
the Law in colonial Northern Rhodesia", in Margaret Jean Hay 
and Marcia Wright (eds.), African Women and the Law: 
Historical Perspectives, p.65.
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reach a satisfactory solution in the courts of 
the ward headmen. Nowadays, the jurisdiction 
of the chief, in so far as his courts has been 
constituted under the provisions of the Native 
law and Courts Act, is severely curtailed. He 
still has considerable jurisdiction in civil 
cases to which Shona law is applicable, but no 
criminal jurisdiction.43
In an article published the previous year44, Holleman
makes the point that not all chieftainships have such an
'obvious' hierarchy, either political or judicial. In
one case, we are told, a ruling house "had to pay a price
for the exclusiveness of its chieftainship":45 the chief's
court was not recognized as a court of appeal. The
manipulation and politics of succession make such
normative statements far from obvious. Unfortunately,
Holleman's study lacks the rigour that Gluckman applied
to the study of the "rituals of conflict".46
Shona Customary Law leaves the reader with the
impression that, perhaps, no colonial power was present
in the region and therefore there had been no "external"
factors shaping "customary" law and its implementation.
Holleman's later works contain greater context and
provide finer texture to his studies. It appears that
his experience as a commissioner in the Mangwende Inquiry
43 Holleman, Shona Customary Law, p.17.
44 Holleman, "Some Shona Tribes...", pp.354-395.
45 Ibid. , p. 390.
46 A. Kuper, Anthropology and Anthropologists. London:
1983, p.139.
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(1961) forced him to give greater consideration to power
relations surrounding legal disputing and the effect they
had upon judicial authority and "customary" law. The
Mangwende Commission was appointed to inquire into the
problem of conflict between local colonial authority (the
Native Commissioner) and African authority (Chief
Mangwende). Holleman's experience on this commission led
to the publication of Chief. Council and Commissioner.
which draws largely on the commission's report. In an
article published nearly a decade later, Holleman takes
into account social and economic factors, "especially
education, money economy and labor migrancy", in his
analysis of the changing authority structures under
Rhodesian rule.47 To underline Holleman's shift in
outlook it is worth quoting him:
...the subsequent exaltation of "traditional" 
chieftainship [that accompanied community 
development] as the mainstay of both the old 
and the new tribal order is as historically 
paradoxical as it is politically misleading.
Some three-quarters of a century of European 
political dominance and cultural enterprise 
(mainly in economics and education) had 
profoundly changed and in many respects 
seriously weakened the fabric of tribal 
society. It had not only progressively 
undermined the traditional basis of tribal 
authority but changed its very nature and 
function by imposing upon it a host of duties 
and responsibilities that are anything but 
traditional.48
47 J.F. Holleman, "Disparities and Uncertainties..." p.10.
48 Ibid. , p. 15 .
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It is clear that Holleman's ideas developed over his 
thirty years of writing.
So far we have looked at the four men with the most 
influence in the shaping of policy regarding African 
courts in Southern Rhodesia. The next work that requires 
some attention is African Law and Custom in Rhodesia, by 
Bennie Goldin and Michael Gelfand. This is, it must be 
said, a peculiar work published in 1975 and out of step 
with legal anthropology being pursued at that time.
Goldin was a lawyer and Gelfand a physician with many 
publications on Shona ethnography. Their main object in 
writing the book, we are told, "has been to expound and 
explain African or customary law in Rhodesia as a 
comprehensive and coherent system.1,49
Its presentation, including a table of cases, but no 
footnotes or bibliography, suggests that it had two other 
aims: to be a textbook on "customary" law for the law
student, and to be an unofficial codification of that 
law. Legalistic chapters dealing with, for example, 
chiefs and headmen cite the legislative provisions for 
their appointment, removal and duties. These are 
interspersed with anthropological and quasi-historical 
chapters dealing with the chiefly succession and their 
functions. The conflict of these two positions is never 
dealt with. It is, however, an interesting pointer to
49 B. Goldin and M. Gelfand African Law and Custom in 
Rhodesia. Cape Town: 1975, p. v.
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the difficult position in which the chief found himself 
in the 1960s: on the one hand he was a government 
representative, while on the other Africans made demands 
and shaped the way they acted.
On the subject of courts, this book does make some 
interesting observations, including an explanation of the 
persistence of unofficial courts. Goldin and Gelfand 
remark that
In serious disputes which generate ill-feeling 
or are likely to disturb the peace of the tribe 
the parties rely on the chief or headman to 
settle the dispute speedily, informally, 
privately and justly. Such disputes are 
settled in a manner comparable to the concept 
of arbitration....
The existence of the arbitrative system 
explains the survival of the dare among the 
Shona or the enkundeleni of the Ndebele before 
tribal courts were established and recognized 
by law in 1937. The system still exists 
concurrently with and as an alternative to 
tribal courts as provided for and constituted 
by legislation. Thus chiefs or headmen who may 
exercise judicial functions under legislation 
also settle disputes but they do so as arbi­
trators and not by virtue of appointment by the 
Minister of Internal Affairs (section 6 of Act 
24 of 1969) .50
The most important contribution of this book is as an 
indicator of the perceptions among the legal profession 
of African law and custom in the late 1960s when the 
material was being researched.
The second category of works we need to review here, 
those published by the professional academics, begins
50 Ibid. , p.119.
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with The Shona Peoples (1976) by M.F.C. Bourdillon, based 
on fieldwork carried out over a year and a half in 1969- 
70. The themes Bourdillon deals with are those of 
culture clashes and social change. He aims to follow in 
the tradition of Evans-Pritchard51 and the historical 
approach he adopts is evidence of this. In this way, 
this book is a significant departure from Holleman's 
work. Bourdillon deals with the traditional anthro­
pological issues of kinship and village organisation but 
also provides an historical background spanning five 
centuries. He includes chapters on economic change and 
urbanisation as well as traditional and new religions; 
there are also chapters on courts and on chiefship.
Regarding chiefship, Bourdillon outlines clearly the 
theory and practice concerning succession and the 
disparities between the two that allow for disputes.
Those disputes, he suggests, allow a "suitable and 
popular candidate" to gain "popular consent" and thus 
legitimacy.52 This perhaps indicates a shortcoming of his 
analysis. Power relations appear to play a very small 
role in this. His description of the power struggle for 
succession as "practical democracy", merely glossed as 
power struggles between the ancestral spirits, seems to 
be tinged with idealism.
51 M.F.C. Bourdillon, The Shona Peoples. Gwelo: 1976, p.9.
52 Ibid. , p. 128.
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Bourdillon describes both the limitations on chiefs
and the changes brought about by their changing roles and
positions. Again it is only a general outline, and this
is a second shortcoming of the book: the reader is
presented with little ethnographic detail. But we are
informed of general trends such as the modern preference
for younger chiefs able to deal with new representative
roles in lobbying for schools, clinics and roads from the
Rhodesian administration.
This is an adaptation of, rather than a 
complete breakdown from, the traditional 
fatherly chief: the chief is still expected to 
represent his people with respect to the 
government and to care for all the needs of his 
people.53
We are also told that the modern chief receives a 
government salary exceeding "the average earnings of 
black workers in Rhodesia".54
The chapter on courts is probably his weakest in 
historical content. But Bourdillon states clearly that 
"the function of the traditional [court] system does not 
depend on government recognition"55 and that courts 
operated throughout the period prior to the Native Law 
and Courts Act (1937). He notes that the courts' 
application of statutory law following the African Law 
and Tribal Courts Act (1969) belied any claims of the
53 Ibid. , p . 134.
54 Ibid. , p. 134 ff.
55 Ibid. , p . 161.
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courts to be 'customary'. He also refers to the role of 
spirit mediums in disputes, urban Africans' perception of 
"customary" law and courts and the ways in which 
independent churches deal with disputes between their 
members.
Claire Palley's formidable work, The Constitutional 
History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965 with 
special reference to Imperial Control, was written in the 
early 1960s and appears to have been an attempt to inform 
the constitutional debates of the time with a liberal and 
historical base. Of course, the Smith regime, and the 
subsequent UDI made shortly after she completed the 
thesis, meant it had little time to do so. But this book 
is a valuable survey of all constitutional acts in 
Southern Rhodesia from Orders-in-Council, Letters Patent 
to specific pieces of legislation dealing with the 
judiciary. It is presented in an accessible and 
historical format and should be used as a reference by 
any scholar requiring an understanding of legal 
instruments in Southern Rhodesia.
Despite her declaration to eschew political 
analysis,56 Palley's sociological comment is apparent on a 
number of occasions. For example, she points out that 
the development of the cash economy in Southern Rhodesia 
led to changes in African practices not taken account of
56 Claire Palley, The Constitutional History and Law of 
Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965 with special reference to Imperial 
Control. Oxford: 1966, p.vii.
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in the state recognised "customary" law.S7 Another
important point which Palley makes absolutely clear is
that all the practices that fell within the realm of
"customary" law in Southern Rhodesia, did not do so
consistently.58 Thus one court in one part of the country
may consider a "custom" to be repugnant to natural
justice, while another may easily accept it. The
conclusion drawn is that a body of "customary" law was
never defined in Southern Rhodesia.
A second legalistic study of note is Emmet
Mittlebeeler's African Law and Western Custom. The
research for this study was done in 1962-63, but the book
did not appear until 1976. This time-lapse made a
potentially innovative book look out of date and indeed
in certain particulars simply inaccurate. However, it is
an ambitious study which takes as its premise that in
Western society, law and popular custom exist in relative
harmony, but that in Southern Rhodesia this was lacking.59
Following from this, the study sets out to investigate
the interplay between African custom and Western law. In
the concluding chapter Mittlebeeler states:
Execution of public policy toward real or 
assumed African custom in Southern Rhodesia has 
not been uniform. Approach has varied with the 
situation, so that some customs have been
57 Ibid. , p . 541.
58 Ibid. , pp. 508-511.
59 Ibid. , p . 2 .
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supported, some condemned, and some made the
subject of compromise.60
This book devotes two chapters to the changes which 
colonization brought to the judicial powers of Chiefs. 
Another two chapters are devoted to the regulation of 
marriage and sexual offenses. The two remaining 
substantive chapters consider witchcraft and homicide.
The greatest weakness of African Custom and Western Law 
is that it relies heavily upon court records for evidence 
of actual practice. For example, although Mittlebeeler 
is correct to note that some chiefs were charged with 
extortion for holding courts prior to 1937,61 he fails to 
point out that the vast majority of Chiefs were able to 
carry on hearing cases with little interference. African 
Custom and Western Law provides, with Palley's 
Constitutional History and Law, a useful legal basis for 
social scientists and historians to further 
investigations in social and historical legal studies in 
Southern Rhodesia.
The most impressive work on "customary" law in 
Central Africa is Martin Chanock's Law. Custom and Social 
Order; The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia.
Unlike the other studies reviewed here, it is primarily a 
work of analysis rather than description. It also
60 Emmet V. Mittlebeeler, African Custom and Western Law: 
The Development of the Rhodesian Criminal Law for Africans. 
London; 1976, p.197.
61 Ibid. , pp . 25-38 .
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differs from them in that it is a work of history.
Indeed, Chanock uses the material of the Rhodes-Living­
stone anthropologists as a source of social history. In 
a three-chapter review of material on African law,
Chanock takes historians, anthropologists and lawyers to 
task for their shortcomings in the understanding of 
'tradition' and its construction. He declares in the 
introduction that he will examine the ways in which 
"traditions are maintained, manufactured and presented"62, 
in what circumstances, and by whom. Thus he sets out to 
introduce history and historicity to the treatment of 
material in which it has been so lacking. The 
responsibility for this essentially ahistorical 
understanding of "customary" law he lays at the feet of 
the English judiciary and British functionalist 
anthropologists. His intention is "to occupy this 
terrain for historical study, and to reunite the subject 
of law with the economic, social and political history of 
colonialism in Malawi and Zambia."63 This work is a 
powerful analysis of the concepts of 'tradition' and' 
'custom' and the ways they were manipulated in Central 
Africa.
From the outset Chanock looks at the transformations 
wrought by economic change in the region. The two major 
economic innovations that accompanied colonialism were
62 M. Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order, p.3.
63 Ibid. , p . 4 .
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cash-cropping and labour migrancy. The percolation of
cash eroded both the kinship relations and the
ideological framework which obtained among Africans.
Cash-cropping demanded that peasants work to strict
economies thus pushing people away from kinship demands
towards leaner contractual relations. Furthermore, the
labour required for such production outstripped that
which the household could provide. As Chanock notes,
this was a transition from one form of labour to another,
Commercially oriented farmers needed both to 
cut themselves off from the larger kin group in 
order to maximise their own control of capital, 
production and profit, and at the same time 
mobilise labour from among their close kin.. . ,64
Later, these farmers used the same ingredients but in a
different mix. Norman Long, writing of the 1960s,
observed that when such farmers,
'did utilise kinship or affinal ties to acquire 
extra hands...they tried to avoid the buildup 
of a series of potentially burdensome reciproc­
al obligations by treating them as ties of a 
strictly contractual nature.'65
But this transition fuelled a further, deeper
transformation.
Labour migrancy challenged the elders' control of
women and therefore the basis of production as well as
reproduction. Young men who were earning cash away from
64 Ibid. , p . 14 .
65 Ibid., p.14, citing N. Long, Social Change and the 
Individual. Manchester:1968, p.222.
44
the family home acquired the means to substitute cash for 
bride service. The local shortages of labour, exacer­
bated by migrancy, undermined the control of elders over 
potential wives and therefore over the labour of young 
men. "This challenge to the political economy run by the 
elders was intensified when young women started to follow 
men to the towns."66 Their dominance in the agricultural 
economy was threatened and the changing economy altered 
patterns of settlement.
The development of "customary" law was in response 
to this social dislocation. As "customary" law was 
controlled largely by the elders, it is not surprising 
that, as Chanock remarks,
It was defensive in spirit, defensive not only 
against British rulers but against those 
Africans whose growing involvement in wage 
labour and market agriculture was leading 
towards different interpretations of 
obligations and proprieties.67
Chanock shows how the Native Authority Courts in 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were established as a 
means of bolstering the authority of the 'chiefs' and of 
carrying out routine "administrative discipline",68 and
66 Chanock, Law. Custom and Social Order, p.15.
67 Ibid. , p .4 .
68 Ibid. , p.116.
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how these courts competed with unrecognised courts as
they attempted to assert an exclusive jurisdiction. He
also demonstrates how custom was promoted selectively to
the status of "customary law", having been vetted by
European interests or concerns of the day. But this was
not a simple, or mechanical process. In the changing
economic and political conditions
an emerging class conflict, conflict between 
generations and between genders are all 
apparent, and claims about custom were a way of 
legitimating positions in all three.69
Integral to the struggle to define customary laws 
was the control of the judicial process. In Nyasaland, 
in 1929, prior to the formal recognition of courts run by 
Africans, the West Nyasa Association demanded that "'all 
cases, civil and criminal, with the exception of murder, 
should be settled by the chiefs.'"70 There was also a 
struggle between courts, recognised and unrecognised, as 
different parties attempted to have their interpretation 
of 'customary law' regularised and accepted by the 
authorities. In his concluding remarks, Chanock under­
lines the historical setting in which customary law 
emerged:
In Central Africa developed law came first, 
while the elaborated customary law came 
afterwards, not an embryonic form of, but a
69 Ibid. , p.236 .
70 Ibid. , p.138.
product of, the western legal form, the 
colonial state, and its economy.71
Sally Falk Moore's Social Facts and Fabrications;
"Customary" law on Kilimanjaro. 188Q-198072 benefits from
a dimension lacking in Chanock1s work: fieldwork and oral
data. Chanock's is a work of history, Moore is working
as a "time-conscious anthropologist".73 One of the
benefits of Moore's approach is that it provides the
reader with a view, if not "from below" at least
significantly lower down that Chanock's archival study.
This work further complements Chanock's in that it is a
local study of three villages on Kilimanjaro in Tanzania.
Moore's study is an investigation into the Chagga's use
of "customary" law in changing contexts.
Moore makes the analysis that,
Chagga law once was an integral dimension of a 
political totality, the precolonial chief. The 
entity called 'customary' law was constituted 
out of residue left after the colonial 
modification of the Chagga polity.74
The "residue" was never fully detailed, chiefship was
modified by the colonial state and the "customary" law of
71 Ibid. , p.238 .
72 Sally Falk Moore, Social Facts & Fabrications: 
"Customary" law on Kilimanjaro. 1880-1980. London: 1986.
73 S.F. Moore, "From Giving and Lending to Selling: 
Property Transactions Reflecting Historical Changes on 
Kilimanjaro", in Mann and Roberts (eds.) Law in Colonial 
Africa, p.108.
74 Moore, Social Facts and Fabrications, p.317.
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the Chagga was marginalised by the colonial state.
Despite such interventions by the colonial state, Moore
argues that at an unofficial level "customary" law
remained a critical element of rural life because "it
determined access to land, and because it framed the
structure of family and lineage on which the whole system
of social support was founded."75
It is now accepted that "customary" law is fluid
rather than static. But what Moore has attempted to show
in an extremely detailed study, by following a single
lineage, is how "customary" law has been deployed in
changing contexts and how it was thus changed. If
anything is wanting in this study it is, perhaps, a more
extensive discussion of the larger movements of
"customary" law amongst the Chagga.
Mann and Roberts' recent volume, Law in Colonial
Africa. representatively brings together anthropologists,
historians and lawyers under the same cover. Their
stated perception of law is similar to my own. The
editors outline this in the Introduction: the
contributors view law
not as a body of immutable rules, institutions, 
and procedures but as a dynamic historical 
formation which at once shapes and is shaped by 
economic, political and social processes. They 
treat law not as an impartial arbiter guided by 
fixed rules and procedures but as resource that
75 Ibid.
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is used in struggles over property, labor, 
power and authority.76
It is precisely this dynamic complexity that requires
further historical study.
Law in Colonial Africa covers three broad areas: the
transformation of concepts of property, the association
of power and authority with law, and finally strategies
deployed in legal disputing. Sally Falk Moore's
contribution, "From Giving and Lending to Selling:
Property Transactions Reflecting Historical Changes on
Kilimanjaro",77 is most relevant to the processes
examined in Chapter Five below. David Groff's
contribution78 is also of particular interest as it
illustrates the contest over judicial proceedings in the
Cote d'Ivoire. However, he argues the colonial
authorities deploy the rule of law as a means of
"external legitimation"79 whereas I emphasise that
customary law courts were exploited as a source of
internal legitimacy. The contrast is useful for
76 K. Mann and R. Roberts, (eds.), Law in Colonial Africa.
p.8.
77 Sally Falk Moore, "From Giving and Lending to Selling", 
K. Mann, and R. Roberts, (eds.), Law in Colonial Africa, pp. 
108-127.
78 David Groff, "The Dynamics of Collaboration and the
Rule of Law in French West Africa: The Case of Kwame Kangah of 
Assikasso (Cote d'Ivoire), 1898-1922", pp.146-166.
79 Ibid. , p . 147 .
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providing context and the perspectives achieved from 
different studies.
There exists one thesis on the subject of Shona 
courts, that by Andrew Ladley, "Courts and Authority".80 
This deserves some attention here. Ladley conducted his 
study as a lawyer with anthropological training. The 
work is primarily focused upon the courts established by 
virtue of the Customary Law and Primary Courts Act 
(1981), but also gives a broad survey of the history of 
judicial powers in Southern Rhodesia.
The main thesis that Ladley argues is that by 
presiding over judicial proceedings the "judge" acquires 
social authority. This is not a new assertion. Indeed, 
the Native Affairs Department considered this to be the 
case in the 1930s when it believed that "traditional" 
leaders could be propped up by the Native Law and Courts 
Act (1937) then being drafted. However, Ladley seeks to 
explain the dynamic by which social authority is 
generated, a process he terms "interactive causation".81 
This is a process in which both the subjects and the 
rulers have power, subjects exerting "upward control" on 
the rulers, and rulers exerting "downward control" on the 
subjects.82 Ladley asserts that the dynamic tension of
80 Andrew S. Ladley, "Courts and Authority: A Shona 
village court", Ph.D. Thesis (Laws), London: 1985.
81 Ibid. , p.53 .
92 Ibid. , p. 59.
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"upward" and "downward" control is a source of social
authority, while he remains mindful of the myriad
external forces that enter the "crucible of an actual
hearing".83 The major limitation of this thesis for the
student of the colonial period is that it does not
confront the peculiar intercalary position of "chiefs"
and the courts they controlled under that regime.
From Francis Snyder's Capitalism and Legal Change.84
a study of land tenure in Senegal, I draw the notion of
subsumption. This concept comes from the sociologist
Galeski who states that subsumption
signifies the subordination of economic 
activity in the economic system to principles 
determining the functioning of the economy as a 
whole. The peasant farm, under the conditions 
of a capitalist economic order, is usually 
cited as an example of a subsumed system. This 
implies that (1) the peasant farm lacks the 
basic characteristics of a capitalist 
enterprise, (2) changes in the mode of peasant 
farming are determined by the laws governing 
the functioning of the capitalist economic 
system as a whole, and (3) the peasant farm is 
acquiring certain features specific to the 
capitalist enterprise.85
Snyder's use of the concept in relation to legal change
is based on his marxist conception of law. However, this
83 Personal communication, April 5, 1990.
84 F. Snyder, Capitalism and Legal Change: An African 
Transformation. New York: 1981.
85 Snyder citing B. Galeski, Basic concepts of rural 
sociology, edited by T. Shanin and P. Worsley, translated by 
H.C. Stevens, Manchester: 1972, p.22.
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concept can be valuably extended to those situations in 
which there are competing forms of law, as I describe 
above in terms of dominant and subordinate forms. Snyder 
argues
that the concept of subsumption and the 
conception of a transition from one historical 
form of production to another provide a more 
useful explanatory framework than would a 
conception of the articulation of modes of 
production. The study therefore defined its 
basic concepts such as mode of production, 
social formation, and law so as to facilitate a 
particular historical analysis, namely one that 
could elucidate the emergence or combination of 
concrete legal forms and show how such legal 
changes formed part of a more general 
transformation.86
The reshaping of relationships concomitant with changing
economic and political processes was often made evident
in the lower courts of Southern Rhodesia. This I argue
is part of a larger process of a transformation taking
place in the economic and legal domains. But I would
also argue that it is much more than economic
determinism. In Chapter Five below, I demonstrate the
interaction between economic change and the modification
of legal concepts not immediately related. Thus we are
able to examine a case of how economic, legal and
ideological change takes place.
The final work I wish to review here does not fit
into either of the categories above. Katherine Newman's
86 Snyder, Capitalism and, Legal Change, p.292.
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Law and Economic Organization87 is a work of theoretical
anthropology written solidly within a marxist framework.
The main drawbacks of her book are that it is heavily
evolutionist and lacks historicity. But I found it to be
a useful antidote to the functionalist analysis upon
which so much of legal anthropology has relied. "From
Malinowski on," writes Newman, "anthropologists have
relied upon a functionalist explanation of law, that law
reduces conflict in a society, that it restores
equilibrium when the social fabric is torn."88
Newman argues that interaction between the forces
and social relations of production and social
stratification produces social conflict demanding the
development of law. The greater the social
stratification, the greater the social conflict and the
more elaborate the legal system in a given society.89
Much of the book follows such a deterministic line of
argument. However, she does manage to break from this to
some degree. In one passage she writes,
Ideological... representations, including law, 
should not be understood as simple, passive 
reflections of economic organization. The 
historical-materialist position is that they 
are active (indeed, for Althusserians, semi- 
autonomous) realms that both justify and
87 Katherine S. Newman, Law and Economic Organization: a 
comparative study of preindustrial societies. Cambridge: 1983.
88 Ibid. , pp. 2-3 .
89 Ibid., pp.109-110, p.205.
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continuously re-create the economic base that
gives rise to them.90
Although Newman's assertions lack the "time- 
consciousness" of Moore's or Snyder's works, historical 
investigations of her thesis would prove fascinating.
These works constitute first, those studies of 
"customary" law written with historical depth and 
secondly the studies of the lower courts in Southern 
Rhodesia and Zimbabwe. They represent the main academic 
influences upon this thesis from contemporary legal 
studies.
Thesis structure
The tensions in the structure of this thesis that 
will become apparent to the reader in themselves reflect 
the discrepancies that existed in the official and 
unofficial fields of the African courts. There has 
always been, as a result of these wider tensions, 
tensions between the centre and the periphery of the 
state. This thesis cannot tackle all of these tensions, 
but I hope that these can be exposed here. I ask the 
reader to be tolerant of what some may consider, the 
peculiar structure found here, keep the above points in 
mind and use the following guide to see the logic in the 
structure.
90 Ibid. , p.109.
The thesis is largely chronological in its layout.
It comprises two parts, but these are not sequentially 
laid out. One part takes a broad perspective looking at 
the country-wide and international terrain. Chapters 
One, Two, Three, Six and the Afterword make up this part. 
The other part focuses sharply on one locality, Sipolilo, 
in northern Zimbabwe. Chapters Four and Five constitute 
a case study of sorts. There seems no way to reconcile 
the local study within the larger study while maintaining 
the chronological flow. However, it does appear logical 
to place that local study within the overarching 
developments in Southern Rhodesia and beyond. The 
diverse threads emerging from chapters One through Three 
are set against the local experience in the following two 
chapters while Chapter Six considers the implications of 
that which preceded it at the local and national levels, 
looking at how they developed. The Afterword 
demonstrates that the issues raised in this thesis have 
continued to be important, politically, despite the war 
and independence.
Chapter One presents the historical setting which 
lay the foundations for the struggle to control dispute 
proceedings in Southern Rhodesia. It examines the themes 
relevant to my argument, but deals with the period pre­
dating the more open struggle by Africans to regain 
control and recognition for the courts and law that 
concerned them most. It presents the social and economic
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transformations that were affecting Africans in this 
period and administrative history of the Southern 
Rhodesian state in particular the Native Department, 
later renamed the Native Affairs Department.
The second chapter provides a very different type of 
setting. There we analyze the evolution of the Native 
Law and Courts Act (1937) from the early demands for such 
an act to its passage through the legislature. In this 
chapter we also compare the laws establishing Native 
courts or tribunals in East, Central and South Africa. 
Sections are also devoted to two other key laws passed in 
the period 1927 to 1937, the Native Affairs Act (1927) 
and the Native Councils Act (1937). Both of these sought 
to formalise relations between administrators and African 
potentates.
The third chapter looks at the relations between 
Native Commissioners and the "traditional" leaders 
throughout the period and seeks a periodization. This 
is, by its very nature, a difficult topic to pin down. 
However, the relationship between these two offices was 
of key importance and, it was felt, required 
investigation.
Chapter Four is a local history, providing the 
social, economic and political setting for Chapter Five. 
But it also gives the reader a greater sense of local 
issues. It looks at how the colonial state came into
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contact with the region and how the locality interacted 
with the colonial regime.
Chapter Five focuses most intensely upon the 
workings of the two courts under examination here, the 
Chiefs' courts and the Native Commissioners' courts. But 
this is done within the larger social context to display 
how the operation of the courts, and the law implemented 
there, may have an impact on community at large, creating 
and indeed changing norms. To do so, a large section of 
the chapter is devoted to explaining the bridewealth 
system, roora.
Chapter Six analyzes the role of judicial authority 
in the relationship of the Chiefs to the state in the 
period 1950 to 1970. In this period we see the 
introduction of a third force that challenges this 
relationship: the nationalist challenge. This three-way 
tension roughly paralleled the political situation that 
obtained in the 1920s involving the Southern Rhodesian 
Missionary Conference, the "traditional" leaders and the 
Government. In this chapter the extent to which the 
chiefs had been meaningfully integrated into state 
structures is assessed and we look at how they acted as a 
body, perhaps for the first time. We also consider the 
demands that chiefs are making and the government's 
reactions to these. Throughout the period there is 
consideration given to the extension of judicial powers 
for approved chiefs' courts. Despite the internal NAD
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discussions, papers, reports and recommendations drafting 
of the African Law and Tribal Courts Act (1969) only 
began in 1962. Furthermore, it is likely that it was 
enacted solely through the efforts of one man, Roger 
Howman, who retired almost immediately after its 
promulgation.
The Conclusion should speak for itself, but the 
Afterword needs some explanation. The period for this 
thesis ends with the enactment of the African Law and 
Tribal Courts Act (1969) which fits neatly with the 
growing war that changed the circumstances radically. 
Ladley's thesis, "Courts and Authority" focuses upon the 
Customary Law and Primary Courts Act (1981), and he makes 
a strong case for the displacement of chiefs by the new 
order. But since then wholly unexpected events have 
occurred: chiefs and headmen have regained control of the 
primary courts and the government has had to negotiate an 
uneasy division of jurisdiction with these men who have a 
peculiar position of being not wholly in the state, nor 
entirely outside it. Clearly, the control of courts was 
not only a point of political contestation in the 
colonial era, but continues to be one today.
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Chapter One
New Directions
Introduction
In the period 1890 to 1935 the social relations of 
Africans in Southern Rhodesia were radically altered. 
Transforming influences touched all spheres of life. The 
development of capitalism in South Africa had had an 
impact upon the entire sub-continent and as the search 
for primary resources extended into areas north of the 
Limpopo, and later the Zambezi River, local economies 
were re-ordered. However, the impact of the penetration 
of capital was extremely uneven over time, region and the 
different strata of societies. The colonists' mines and 
farms created new demands for labour but also new demands 
for food produce. While much labour was drawn out of the 
pre-colonial economy, many African farmers found the 
advent of new markets brought new prosperity. Africans 
were not wholly excluded from these markets in the early 
years. However, successful mines and farms were not 
established in all regions and these opportunities were 
not open to all Africans alike.
Forced labour, which became known as chibharo,1 and 
taxation were two instruments employed by the state from 
the mid-1890s to compel Africans to become involved in
1 I follow the standard Shona orthography, whereas Charles 
van Onselen, Chibaro. London: 1976, followed the standard 
spelling as it appeared in colonial official reports and 
correspondence.
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the cash economy, but in some areas this simply was not 
enough. The collection of taxes was patchy, in many 
areas, for several decades after the founding of Southern 
Rhodesia. Labour recruitment bureaux also found it 
easier and more profitable to siphon off coercively 
African migrant workers heading for South Africa from 
north of the Zambezi.2 Both these factors contributed to 
some areas within Southern Rhodesia becoming quite 
peripheral to the economic activity of the newly defined 
"centre" of Salisbury and Bulawayo.
The distribution of political power in the colony 
was significantly affected by conquest and the economic 
changes that followed. Conquest took, effectively, over 
seven years to complete. Although the Pioneer Column 
entered the region in 1890, and Southern Rhodesia was 
founded then, two wars followed: the first in 1893, known 
by whites as the Matabele War and the second in 1896-7, 
known by Africans as the Chimurenga.3 Pre-colonial 
raiding by the Ndebele in Shona districts ended with the 
conquest of Lobengula and the Ndebele state in 1893 by 
the British South Africa Co. (BSA CO.) .4 The purpose of
2 NC Mrewa, AR 1933, S 235/511; see also van Onselen, 
Chibaro, p.107.
3 Chimurenga is defined in the Standard Shona Dictionary 
as l.Riot, 2. Fighting in which everyone joins in. It came to 
be used to refer both to the Risings of 1896-7 and the 
guerrilla war of the 1960s and 1970s.
4 The BSA Co. was the chartered company of Cecil Rhodes 
which ruled Southern Rhodesia from 1890 to the achievement of
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the Ndebele raids had been to impose tributary relations, 
paid in service, tobacco or young people, with the 
further strategic aim of controlling the all-important 
trade routes through to the Zambezi.5 In the pre-colonial 
period, external trade was largely conducted via the 
Zambezi Valley. Following conquest, trade was 
increasingly oriented towards the south.
The raiders who replaced the Ndebele in the Shona- 
speaking regions came in search of labour. The removal 
of young, active men from the local economic and 
political structures changed those structures themselves. 
Young men had an opportunity to remove themselves from 
the spheres of patriarchal control as they could 
establish an independent livelihood through entering the 
wage labour market. Young women also found some 
attraction in the mining compounds and went to them.
Some gained their livelihood from selling beer, others 
through the patronage of foreign African workers. Still 
others made their living through prostitution.6 The 
mining compounds represented a social space "outside
responsible government in 1923.
5 D.N. Beach, "The Shona, and Ndebele Power, 1840-1893" 
in Beach, War and Politics in Zimbabwe. 1840-1900. Gweru: 
1986 .
6 E. Schmidt, Peasants. Traders, and Wives: Shona Women 
in the History of Zimbabwe. 1870-1939. London:1992, pp.92-94.
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lineage control entirely."7 This challenge to patriarchal 
control was not the result of a temporary disruption of 
power. Schmidt notes that "Despite the attempt by senior 
African men and the state to increase patriarchal control 
in the 192 0s and 1930s, African women continued to break 
these bonds."8
At the local level, powerful men exploited, to 
varying degrees of success, the presence of the new white 
overrulers in order to enhance their personal positions. 
This was done in several ways: collaboration, resistance 
or involvement in the growing peasant economy. In one 
notable case dating from the 1890s, cunning, guile and 
deceit were used to depose the local potentate and 
institute the new one, a renowned ivory hunter and 
trader, backed by the Southern Rhodesian government.9
The judicial authority of Africans varied between 
1890 and the 1930s, but it is questionable to what extent 
judicial practice altered accordingly. However, it is 
clear that the presence of state judicial authorities, 
such as Native Commissioners and Magistrates, provided
7 Diana Jeater, Marriage. Perversion and Power: the 
construction of moral discourse in Southern Rhodesia, 1890- 
1930. Oxford: 1993, p. 86.
8 Schmidt, Peasants. Traders and Wives, p.121; see also 
Jeater, Marriage. Perversion and Power.
9 B.P. Kaschula, Delineation Officer, "Notes on Some of 
the Mhondoros (Spirit Mediums) in the Sipolilo District of 
Rhodesia", 13 October, 1965, p. 9, in PER 5 CHIPURIRO, Guruve 
District Administration.
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many Africans with a new avenue to pursue "justice", 
though some regions remained beyond practical access to 
the colonial state. Some Africans appear to have 
preferred the treatment they received from the Native 
Commissioners. The different interpretations of "native 
law and custom" remained a point of friction between 
Native Commissioners and "traditional" leaders for much 
of the period under consideration.
Policy regarding the administration of Africans in 
this early period was in flux. Beyond the overriding 
tasks of thwarting incipient rebellion and collecting 
taxes, the Native Department (ND) made policy on the hoof 
and local officials implemented it according to the 
resources at hand. Within the ND there was one 
persistent policy debate. This debate was framed by the 
following question: "What role should there be for 
chiefs?" The Native Department officials made many 
assumptions about African life in posing such a question. 
But those assumptions remained. These included the 
assumptions that "chiefs" existed, that they were 
important, and that the colonial government could direct 
their roles. In different periods it was believed that 
the government could either see to it that the "chief's" 
authority would wither away, or that it could be 
bolstered and re-asserted.
The direction of policy in Southern Rhodesia was 
also juxtaposed with those policies in South Africa, the
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British East African colonies and those north of the 
Zambezi. As a consequence the debate was later framed by 
Native Department officials and politicians as one 
concerning Indirect Rule which was considered undesirable 
in Southern Rhodesia. But as we shall see, in many 
respects the debate over grand policy obscured the 
developments on the ground.
This chapter will review the changes that took place 
in the period 1890 to the early 1930s in order to give 
context to the contestation for control of the courts 
that developed subsequently.
Social Transformation
Political conquest, and the rapid transformation of 
the economy that followed, resulted in social upheaval in 
African life in Southern Rhodesia. The breaking of 
Ndebele power by the British South Africa Company in the 
Matabele War (1893) ended Ndebele raiding in Shona 
communities but, as noted above, a new form of raiding 
began as the demand for labour grew, primarily on the 
mines.10 Pressures placed on African life by the new 
regime included taxation, and the expropriation of cattle 
and of land, as prospectors, miners and farmers settled 
in the new colony. The new settlers demanded material 
support from the government in order to make the new 
colony a success. In the period 1890-1930 these came
10 van Onselen, Chibaro, p . 14 .
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mainly in the form of land rights and sufficient labour 
supplies. Later the demands would include the protection 
of agricultural markets against local African producers.
The disruption of African political organization 
that resulted from Rhodesian rule began early. David 
Beach has recorded instances of this disruption.11 From 
1890 economic activities began to be re-oriented by the 
new Southern Rhodesian settlers away from the prazo 
holders (the Portuguese settlers in Portuguese East 
Africa) along the Zambezi towards the Cape or Natal as 
overland communications developed. The combination of 
changing economic and changing political circumstances 
affected apparently resilient African dynasties. Beach 
cites the case of the Kanota Kasekete dynasty which had 
remained intact despite the collapse, in the 1870s, of 
the Mutapa state around it. However, following the BSA 
Co. conquest, "its southern house took advantage of the 
onset of Rhodesian rule and the geographical barriers to 
found the independent Chiweshe nzou dynasty."12
Labour recruitment began prior to the establishment 
of the Native Department in 1894, and "headmen" were 
involved in the process.13 It is clear that compulsion
11 See especially David Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe. 
900-1850, Gweru: 1980.
12 Ibid., pp. 146-47.
13 Robin Palmer, Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia, 
London: 1977, p .4 3.
was exerted from a significantly high level in the 
Administration: in the first years of the century the 
Chief Native Commissioner, Mashonaland, had "indicated to 
African Chiefs that they were expected to provide 
labour."14 The African police force was used to recruit 
labour,15 and the newly instituted Native Commissioners 
were also active even though this lay beyond their brief, 
which centred on the collection of taxes. Their 
brutality has been detailed elsewhere.16 The Imperial 
authorities retained supervision of labour legislation 
and administration and in late 1901 the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies barred Native Commissioners from 
"direct involvement in labour recruitment."17 But 
throughout the existence of the Native and Native Affairs 
Departments they were involved to greater or lesser 
extent in labour recruitment.18
14 Palley, Constitutional History and Law of Southern 
Rhodesia, p.177.
15 Ibid.
16 Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p.43. See also 
van Onselen, Chibaro. p.80.
17 Ian Phimister, An Economic and Social History of 
Zimbabwe. 1890-1948. London: 1988, p.26. See also van 
Onselen, Chibaro. p.80 and Palley, Constitutional History and 
Law, pp.176-8.
18 van Onselen, Chibaro: David Johnson, "The Impact of 
the Second World War on Southern Rhodesia, with Special 
Reference to African Labour, 1939-48", Ph.D. thesis, London: 
1989 .
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The mining industry relied most upon forced labour 
in the decade 1903 to 1912.19 However, the social impact 
within Southern Rhodesia is difficult to assess as the 
labour that was supplied to the Southern Rhodesian mines 
did not come exclusively from Southern Rhodesia. 
Consequently, it was possible for some districts in the 
colony to remain relatively unscathed by chibharo.
Van Onselen has argued that "the relative absence of 
rural poverty... south of the Zambezi"20 made Southern 
Rhodesia a relatively poor recruiting ground for the 
Rhodesian Native Labour Board. The growth of peasant 
markets allowed Southern Rhodesian Africans to be a 
little more discriminating when it came to choosing where 
and when to enter wage labour. Both the mines and white 
farmers relied heavily on chibharo from the colonies to 
the north and Mozambique.21 For example, the Rhodesian 
Native Labour Board (RNLB) recruiters established 
themselves in strategic locations, such as ferry 
crossings on large east-west rivers. There, they 
"obtained the services of...[Africans]... making their 
way south."22 One such ferry crossing was Kanyemba on the 
Zambezi River in Sipolilo District, and in 1909 the RNLB
19 van Onselen, Chibaro. p. 117.
20 van Onselen, Chibaro. p. 111.
21 Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p.65; van Onselen, 
Chibaro. pp.104-5.
22 Ibid. , p. 107 .
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recruited "well over 2,000 'independent natives'" there.23 
But it seems likely that the RNLB "recruits" were taken 
to labour centres via routes that by-passed the plateau 
region of Sipolilo District by some 100 km, going more 
directly to the mining centres of Sinoia and Hartley. 
Sipolilo District does not appear to have suffered the 
disruption to which some other areas were exposed. 
Africans in Makoni District, for instance, were required 
to supply vast amounts of chibharo labour in the closing 
years of the nineteenth century. "Chiefs" in that 
district were instrumental in supplying labour for 
railway construction. Resistance to this coercion was 
made possible through the "determined self-peasantization 
of most of the African population of the district."24 
External demands resulted in Africans self-consciously 
transforming the organization of the economy they were 
involved in. In part, this was an outright rejection of 
the economy dominated by Europeans in which the role of 
Africans was rarely anything better than cheap labour.
Not surprisingly, in the first decade of this century the 
R.N.L.B. "overworked" regions in Northern and Southern 
Rhodesia.25 This resulted in a pattern in which 
recruitment focused on an area, and then moved on to
23 Ibid.
24 Terence Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla 
War in Zimbabwe. London: 1985, pp.29-31.
25 van Onselen, Chibaro. pp.110-111.
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another within a couple of years. The demands placed on 
a given district were thus extremely uneven over time.
The uneven impact of mining capital upon African 
communities is witnessed by the fact that many 
communities, especially those situated close to the 
mines, responded to the incursion of capital not by 
selling their labour power but by developing agricultural 
production to supply the needs of the mine compounds to 
obtain foodstuffs cheaply. The peasant prosperity that 
resulted has been acknowledged, but its duration 
disputed.26 The emergence of a peasant economy resulted 
in shifts in local power distribution. Ranger has noted 
that "In becoming peasants the people of Makoni had 
decisively broken away from the old tributary system and 
the rights of chiefs to tribute produce and labour soon 
lapsed."27 The traditional order of African life in the 
region was not simply subsumed by the colonial state and 
the cash economy; it was under sustained attack.
The risings of 1896-7 led to the removal and 
replacement of many chiefs, while those who remained came 
under closer supervision by the Native Department which 
for several years remained on the alert for any signs of
26 See Palmer, Land and Racial Domination; Ranger, .Peasant 
Consciousness: and Benjamin Davis and Wolfgang Dopcke,
"Survival and Accumulation in Gutu: Class Formation and the 
Rise of the State in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1900-1939", Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 14, 1, 1988, pp.64-98.
27 Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, p.44.
political agitation and civil strife. However, the 
relations between Native Commissioners and the local 
African communities were extremely varied.28 Some Native 
Commissioners attempted to exclude chiefs from any role 
of authority. Others demanded they assist in the 
collection of taxes, gave them constabulary powers and 
duties, and allowed them to exercise judicial authority, 
thereby decreasing the workload of the Native 
Commissioner. One effect of this collaboration between 
Native Commissioner and chief was that "chiefs" became 
increasingly dependent upon the colonial administration 
for patronage and authority.29 Traditional sources of 
authority diminished in importance in the new context. 
The Native Regulations, Proclamation 55 of 1910, 
established for the first time a statutory hierarchy of 
African offices.30 Although chiefs gained the statutory 
power to act as constables, and more importantly to 
prosecute any other African for "insolence or 
contemptuous behaviour",31 chiefs were denied the powers 
to allocate land. Chiefs were also required to collect
28 Chapter 3, below, makes an attempt to periodize Native 
Commissioner - Chief relations. Although this exercise 
remains, by necessity, in the sphere of generalisations I 
believe these are useful for the understanding of African 
administrative policy in Southern Rhodesia.
29 Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, p.44.
30 Proclamation 55, 1910, Part 1, Art. 2.
31 Proclamation 55, 1910, Art. 48.
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taxes. Headmen, likewise ranking as constables, were 
allowed a very small role in the control of land 
distribution within the reserves. The Regulations stated 
that "Headmen shall prevent the settlement of fresh 
kraals in, or the removal of existing kraals from, their 
sectional areas without proper authority."32 As such, 
headmen achieved some authority over land, something 
chiefs lacked altogether.
The idea of hierarchical "tribes" was, itself, 
contested terrain over the period 1890 to the 1920s. The 
idea, which may or may not have prevailed amongst 
Africans in Southern Rhodesia at the time of occupation, 
was, after the 1986-97 revolt, clearly attacked by the 
overall Administration, its Native Department and the 
missionaries alike. But in time this consensus 
disintegrated: the mission schools pursued educated 
enlightenment, which had no place for "tribal" control, 
the Native Department sought to bolster the "traditional" 
leaders in an attempt to assert "tribal" control and 
actively construct a "tribal" ideology, and the 
Administration mistrusted the pursuits of either the 
missions or the Native Department.
In 1911 the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry 
resolved
a) That it is desirable to control the natives 
as much as possible through their own chiefs 
and headmen. The power of arbitrament amongst
32 Proclamation 55, 1910, Art. 40.
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their own people at present exercised by chiefs 
should be recognised; such powers should be 
recognised under the control of the Native 
Commissioner or other District Officer;
b) All chiefs should be subsidised;
c) The rule of succession to chieftainship in 
force among the Matabele should be introduced 
as opportunity arises throughout Southern 
Rhodesia. But the Administrator should have 
power to refuse to recognise an heir who is, in 
his opinion, unfit for such a position, and 
appoint some other suitable person in his 
stead, adhering, as nearly as possible, to the 
prescribed rule of succession.33
This was a strong plea for making use of chiefs’ power,
the first such statement in Southern Rhodesia. However,
the Committee was not hesitant to shape established
practices, such as that of collateral succession of
chiefs amongst the Shona, to resemble those easily
understood by Europeans: the primogeniture of the
Ndebele. Those whites concerned with African
administration believed that collateral succession
resulted in too many ignorant, doddering old men holding
chiefly office to make Shona chiefs of any use to the
Administration. Progress lay in changing this practice.
Traditional sources of authority did not rank uppermost
in the Committee's consideration of what made a candidate
fit for office. These resolutions, however, were not
adopted by the Native Department, but the central thrust,
that more use could be made of chiefs, was slowly gaining
acceptance. It also marked the first suggestion by
33 Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 
1910-11. p.8, para.49, SRG 4.
72
officials from beyond the Native Affairs Department that 
judicial powers of chiefs, officially removed in 1898, 
should be restored.
The intense contestation of judicial authority 
followed, to a degree, the level of support afforded the 
"traditional" leaders at any given time. From the 
earliest days of the colony, the BSA Co. administration 
tried to minimise its costs; it was not interested in 
governing Africans in any but the most limited ways. The 
British government, meanwhile, was eager to see Southern 
Rhodesian Africans treated in a fashion similar to 
Africans in Natal. The Native Department had at its 
core, from the time of its establishment, officials who 
had been trained by and worked in the Natal Civil 
Service. These men "set the tone of Rhodesia's Native 
policy, importing the firm paternalism and close 
supervision that characterised the Natal system."34 The 
first four CNCs were amongst the Natal recruits. The 
training given in Natal treated "customary law" as a key 
component of Native administration.35
Although gold had been the primary motive for the 
occupation of Southern Rhodesia, farm land was considered 
an important, if secondary, interest. The members of the
34 M.C. Steele, "The Foundations of a 'Native' Policy: 
Southern Rhodesia, 1923-33", Ph.D. thesis, Simon Fraser
University, 1972, p.6.
35 Roger Howman, ORAL/HO3 , p. 2.
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Pioneer Column were "promised verbally a free farm of 
1,500 morgen (3,175 acres) and 15 reef claims of 400 by 
150 feet" but many of these farms were sold to 
speculators before they were even taken up.36 As it 
became increasingly obvious that Southern Rhodesia did 
not possess the gold deposits so many had dreamt of, land 
for farming and ranching purposes grew in importance.
Also, the restriction of African landholding to 
demarcated reserves served the interests of the emerging 
capitalist economy.
The initial creation of "native reserves" in 189437 
was intended to "afford [Africans] some degree of 
protection against European acquisitiveness."38 Nor were 
they meant to be permanent institutions. In late 1902,
96 reserves comprising 24.8 million acres (one-quarter of 
the territory) received approval in Executive Council, 
though formal approval from the Colonial Secretary did 
not come until 1908.39 As earlier attempts to push 
Africans off the land and into wage labour had met with 
little success, the BSA Co. took a number of steps to 
ensure that the supply of labour went some way towards 
meeting demand. African access to land was limited 
further in an attempt to curtail the expanding peasantry.
36 Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p.26.
37 Ibid. , p . 30 .
30 Ibid. , p.57 .
39 Ibid. , pp.59-60 .
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At the same time taxes were raised in order to increase 
Africans' needs for cash earnings. However, the wages 
paid by mines were too low for workers to meet their cash 
requirements solely through these earnings. Peasants 
responded by increasing the amount of land under 
cultivation. The tensions inherent in this situation 
resulted in great fluctuations in the labour supply.40
The Native Reserves Commission of 1914-15 
reiterated the professed view of the BSA Co that the 
reserves were to cushion the impact of European 
settlement and the cash economy upon Africans. The 
Commission believed that "as education broke down the 
tribal system, the need for reserves would diminish."41 
In accordance with this belief, the Commission reduced 
the total acreage of the Reserves by more than 1,000,000. 
But it was not only the quantity that was significant, it 
was also the quality of soil and the location of the 
reserves. As Palmer notes, the Native Reserves 
Commission
cut down many reserves within easy access of 
the main markets and therefore intensified the 
squeeze on the African peasantry; while it also 
reduced some of the larger reserves in the 
outlying districts, in what was clearly an 
attempt to curb the 'idleness' and overcome the 
reluctance of Rhodesian Africans to seek wage- 
labour within the country.42
40 van Onselen, Chibaro. p. 91.
41 Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p.108.
42 Ibid. , p.125 .
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By 1920, when the Native Reserves Order in Council was
passed, the thinking regarding the purpose of reserves
had changed significantly. Segregation, rather than
"economic development" that envisaged a diminishing need
for reserves, emerged as the dominant view in official
circles. In 1923 an article in the first Native Affairs
Department Annual claimed that Southern Rhodesia's
"native policy" was intended to ensure
the development of the native in such a way 
that he will come as little as possible in 
conflict or competition with the white man 
socially, economically and politically.43
This further shift in objectives led to the Land
Commission of 1925 and ultimately the Land Apportionment
Act (1930) .
The Land Apportionment Act (1930) set Southern 
Rhodesian African policy on a segregationist course. The 
Act itself established a firmer division of land along 
racial lines and made it more difficult, and later 
illegal, for Africans to live as farming tenants in 
"European" areas. By the 1930s the peasantry was not 
destroyed, but it had undergone radical changes. The 
Maize Control Act had created a monopsony that suppressed
43 N.H. Wilson, "The Development of Native Reserves", 
NAPA. 1923, p.88.
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the prices received by Africans for their maize.44 In 
1933 Chief Mangwende explained "that a great number of 
natives depended on their sale of cattle to meet their 
obligations",45 such as taxes. That same year labour was 
reported to be plentiful. Forty years after Occupation, 
the peasantry was under severe pressure but not broken.
The peasants found ways to cope with statutory 
discrimination. However, the end result was that "'a 
substantial number of groups was drawn much deeper into 
migrant labour. 1 1146
Clearly segregationist ideology was developing and 
increasingly Africans were being excluded from the 
agricultural markets. Although the 1898 Order-in- 
Council had proclaimed the right of Africans to "acquire, 
hold, encumber, and dispose of land on the same 
conditions as a person who is not a native", by 1925 only 
fourteen farms had been bought by Africans - seven from 
Southern Rhodesia and seven from South Africa. With the
44 Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, p.67.
45 Mrewa Native Board meeting minutes, 6/6/33, S 1542/N2
M.
46 Wolfgang Dopcke, "'Magamo's Maize': State and Peasants 
during the Depression in Colonial Zimbabwe", in Ian Brown 
(ed.), The Economies of Africa and Asia in the Inter-War 
Depression. London: 1989, pp. 29-58.
advent of the Land Apportionment Act (1930), nine of 
these were designated as being within the European Area 
and the other five incorporated into the new Native 
Purchase Areas.47
The logic of segregationist ideology in Africa 
required that segregation extend beyond simply land 
allocation. In Southern Rhodesia in the 1920s policy 
regarding the governance of Africans began to shift 
towards an extremely limited form of local government and 
civil jurisdiction.48
Judicial Authority and Practice
Despite the radical changes that occurred between 
the 1890s and 1930s, many Shona and Ndebele institutions 
survived basically intact. The institutions of "chiefs" 
and chiefly courts (Shona: dare, pi. matare) persisted 
and were to regain prominence, albeit altered and serving 
new functions as the powerful men of these communities 
exploited opportunities arising from weaknesses of the 
colonial state. In Ndebele society, it has been 
observed, the patterns of settlement and basic
47 Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, pp.279-81.
40 See pp.99-101 below.
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institutions remained intact following the defeat of 
Lobengula in 18 9 3 . 49 This observation holds time for much 
of African society in Southern Rhodesia following 
conquest.
The Shona-speaking peoples continued to hold 
judicial courts, settling disputes throughout the 
colonial period, although we can see clearly that the 
attitude of the state towards African courts changed over 
time. Officially, the possibility of recognising such 
courts was allowed in 1891 and then withdrawn in 1898 as 
a consequence of the revolt of
1896-7. Later African courts were "established" by the 
state with the promulgation of the Native Law and Courts 
Act of 19 3 7 . 50 In 1960 the Robinson Commission 
recommended recognition of the unofficial courts which, 
it found, continued to outnumber those established under 
this Act.51 This prompted further debate which produced 
another piece of legislation - the African Law and Tribal 
Courts Act of 1969.52 Two more pieces of legislation
49 Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe.
p.17.
50 See Chapter 2 below.
51 See the Robinson Report.
52 See Chapter 6 below.
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concerning the lower courts have been passed since 
independence and the struggle over dispute proceedings is 
one that continues today.53
The colonial state struggled to control, in some 
meaningful sense, the realm of dispute settlement from 
the time of conquest. However, the weakness of the state 
meant that it could not suppress the exercise of judicial 
power by unauthorized persons, nor could it cope with all 
the disputes that would come to recognised personnel if 
they alone were to deal with disputes. In 1891, the High 
Commissioner's Proclamation gave the Resident 
Commissioner the power "to appoint a native chief, who 
requested to be appointed, to exercise judicial 
functions."54 This was indirect rule in all but name, 
following Shepstone's example in Natal though pre-dating 
Lugard's theories arising from his experience in Nigeria, 
and their later application in East and Central Africa. 
African institutions were being maintained and shaped, 
albeit under the new colonial power.
53 See Andrew Ladley, "Courts and Authority: A Shona 
village court", Ph.D. Thesis (Laws), London: 1985.
54 B. Goldin and M. Gelfand, African Law and Custom in 
Rhodesia, p. 20.
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These institutions were shaped by many influences,
both direct and indirect, brought about by the colonial
presence. For instance, the authority of the matare was
affected both by the increasing treatment of crimes by
the police and colonial courts and by the new option of
litigants to take civil cases to the Native Commissioner
rather than the chief. Later, more direct interventions
on behalf of the colonial government resulted in these
institutions being manipulated to elicit and construct
African consent to European overrule. But this
recognition of African institutions was more the result
of lack of resources than any developed 'native' policy.
Goldin and Gelfand state that
until 1937 Africans did not participate in 
judicial work, no African had lawful authority 
to try any civil dispute between Africans even 
when only customary law was involved, and no 
Africans were used as assessors as permitted by 
legislation.55
Palley concurs with this assertion on the whole, but
writes that not "much use was made of the
provisions... for the calling of native assessors."56 But
reality was not so neat. Several episodes indicate that
official policy may have been circumvented or regularly
55 Ibid. , p . 21.
56 Palley, Constitutional History and Law, p.514.
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breached. In 1896, the NC Chilimanzi reported that he 
sought to bolster the paramount chiefs' authority by 
allowing them to settle minor disputes, and that this was 
well received by the "people generally".57 The NC Chibi 
reported in 1898 that he was selectively recognizing 
chiefs' authority to hear cases.58 In the same year,
1898, NC Taylor, "made a tour of the [Charter] district 
and...at the same time... settled disputes about disputed 
chieftainships".59 However, such cases may have been 
interpreted as being political, rather than legal, 
disputes.
In 1899 Native Commissioners were, for the first 
time, granted judicial powers, not in their own right but 
as special Justices of the Peace. Only nine of the 
twenty-four Native Commissioners were given such powers.60 
Thus it appears not only that the NC Chibi was usurping 
the prerogative of the Resident Commissioner61 or the 
Resident Magistrate62 in appointing a chief to hear cases 
in the first place; he was also acting ultra vires at 
that time, since he was hearing cases himself.
57 NC Chilimanzi, AR 1896, p.l, N 9/1/2
58 NC Chibi, AR 1898, N 9/1/4, see pp. 2, 6, 11-12, & 16.
59 NC Charter, AR, 1898, p. 1. N 9/1/4
60 Palley, Constitutional History and Law, p.513.
61 Goldin and Gelfand, African Law and Custom, p. 20.
62 Palley, The Constitutional History and Law, p. 514.
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Palley also states that the Resident Magistrate's 
power, under the High Commissioner's Proclamation of 
1891, to appoint chiefs to exercise civil and criminal 
jurisdiction over Africans was never utilized.63 In the 
period 1891 to 1894 magistrates were not empowered to 
hear cases involving only Africans, "unless this was 
'necessary in the interests of peace or for the 
prevention or punishment of acts of violence to persons 
or property.'"64 Following the conquest of the Ndebele 
state in 1893, the jurisdiction of magistrates' courts 
was extended over everyone in Southern Rhodesia. The 
magistrates' jurisdiction was not infringed until 1899 
when some Native Commissioners were granted similar 
judicial powers as special Justices of the Peace.65
Further witness to the circumvention of official 
procedure comes again from the 1898 annual report of NC 
Chibi. In Chibi District a woman, Marudauda, was 
allegedly assaulted by her brother, Makobere. The case 
was reported to the Native Commissioner, and the alleged 
assailant arrested. The case was taken to the Resident 
Magistrate in Victoria. The NC Chibi reported that 
subsequently "Makobere was returned to me by the R.M. to 
be tried by Chief Chibi, under my supervision according 
to Native Custom and Chibi ordered him to pay one head of
63 Ibid. , p . 514 .
64 Ibid. , p.513 .
65 Ibid.
cattle to Marudauda".66 It may be argued that the
Resident Magistrate was acting ultra vires in appointing
Chief Chibi to try this particular case without the prior
approval of the High Commissioner and that therefore the
Chief's jurisdiction was unlawful- However, both Chibi
and the Native Commissioner appear to have been acting in
good faith, and since the High Commissioner was in Cape
Town, the Resident Magistrate appears to have opted for
prompt action rather than meticulous observation of
detail. This is not surprising, as the Resident
Magistrates of this early period rarely had any legal
training whatsoever.67
In 1898 provision for officially recognising African
courts was removed.68 This was in response to the
Chimurenga and the apparent political authority with
which Africans had acted. The colonial administration
was not willing to allow such authority to accrue to
Africans in such an unchecked manner again. Indeed,
Taylor has asserted that,
The continued usurpation of their [i.e. the 
chiefs'] traditional powers by the n/cs [Native 
Commissioners] was decisive. The practice of 
denying chiefs judicial authority continued but 
whereas this had been unofficially pursued 
against the original spirit of the legislation,
66 NC Chibi, AR 1898, p.2. N 9/1/4
67 Hugh Marshall Hole, Old Rhodesian Days. Reprint 
edition, Bulawayo: 1976, p. 66.
68 Southern Rhodesia Order-in-Council, 1898; see also 
Goldin and Gelfand, African Law and Custom, p.20.
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in June 1904 a ruling was handed down from the 
Attorney General stating that the practice of 
permitting chiefs to settle minor disputes 
"should be discouraged".69
However, the removal of this provision appears to have
affected the Native Commissioners in only one way. From
1898 to 1908, the Native Commissioners' reports simply
omit any mention of chiefs hearing cases. In 1936 the
Chief Native Commissioner reported that African tribunals
had been grudgingly tolerated for the previous forty
years. It appears likely that the period 1898 to 1908
was when the African courts were most discouraged.70
However, it is highly unlikely that very much changed on
the ground.
In 1909 the NC Gutu advocated the continuance of a 
system which allowed the chief and his headmen to settle 
disputes, arguing that if appeal to the Native Commis­
sioner in the first instance was open to all, the power 
of the chiefs would be curtailed.71 Involving chiefs and 
headmen in the official administration of justice in such 
a way would, he argued, also have the effect of bringing 
the chiefs and their courts much further into the ambit
69 J.J. Taylor, "The Emergence and Development of the 
Native Department in Southern Rhodesia, 1984-1914", Ph.D. 
thesis, London: 1974, pp.368-69.
70 The CNC wrote, in 193 6, that African tribunals were 
"an institution which has survived forty years of winking 
tolerance, at times veering on active discouragement." CNC, 
AR 1936, p.10.
71 NC Gutu, AR 1909, N 9/1/12.
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of the state. That same year the Conference of the 
Superintendents of Natives recommended Native 
Commissioners "to encourage the African population to 
refer petty civil disputes to their chiefs in the first 
instance".72 It is clear that the officials of the Native 
Affairs Department considered that the exercise of 
judicial authority by chiefs was a means to wider 
political authority.
The 1910 Proclamation of Native Regulations73 gave 
official recognition to the long-standing practice of 
Native Commissioners settling disputes.74 In the two 
previous years the CNC Mashonaland reported that 5,46875 
and 4,74476 civil cases respectively had been heard by the 
Native Commissioners in the nineteen districts under his 
supervision. The publication of these figures appears to 
have been a challenge to the administration in the Native 
Department's campaign for greater recognition of its 
work, and the expansion of its jurisdiction. Without 
doubt this information was considered by the Native 
Affairs Committee and led to the recommendations by
72 J.J. Taylor, "The Emergence and Development of the 
Native Department", p.374.
73 Proclamation No. 55, 1910.
74 A. Speight, The Statute Law of Southern Rhodesia From 
the Charter to 31st December 1910. Salisbury, n.d., pp. 115- 
123 .
75 CNC Mashonaland, AR 1908, p. 19, N 9/1/11.
76 CNC Mashonaland, AR 1909, N 9/1/12.
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Superintendents of Natives outlined above. Obtaining 
official status for the Native Commissioners' courts was 
something of a victory for the Native Department over the 
Law Department. In the first decade of the century the 
Law Department had rebuked the Native Department, 
reminding its officials that, "'In all native cases 
coming before you for investigation please bear in mind 
that you can not exercise any judicial authority.'"77 
Tensions between these two departments over issues of 
jurisdiction continued throughout the colonial period.
By 1910, Native Commissioners were beginning to 
despair of the role that they had envisaged for the 
chiefs. "Chiefs & Headmen", wrote the NC Hartley, "are 
of no assistance whatever in controlling Kraals, and 
although none in this District are subsidized, I do not 
think they would be any more keen if they were."78 The NC 
Hartley considered the Chiefs and Headmen to be 
intrinsically not up to the job. The NC Charter, 
however, took the view that the very reason that Chiefs 
and Headmen were of "little use or value" was that they 
were not managed effectively. The first step to putting 
this right was to eliminate the great ambiguity they were 
allowed in their positions: at times within the state, at 
others outside state structures. The NC Charter wrote:
77 Taylor, "The Emergence and Development of the Native 
Department in Southern Rhodesia", p.81.
78 NC Hartley, AR 1910, N 9/1/13.
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Chiefs have not excelled in their duties. The 
tendency is to separate lesser crimes and deal 
with them according to their own ways and laws.
The principle is 'a chief must eat', i.e., 
exact fees and fines. This is one of the 
principal causes of their unsatisfactory 
positions and failures. The subsidy they 
receive is far from equivalent to the fees and 
fines they would exact and it is advisable to 
either substantially increase their subsidy or 
grant them power to impose fines in specific 
cases. All such fines to be verified and 
executed in the presence of the N.C. Once such 
powers are granted and a Chief fails in his 
duties or abuses such power he could be 
deposed.
He concluded, "At present they are mere figureheads and 
are practically of little use or value."79 Clearly this 
refers to their official function, which broadly speaking 
was to control their 'followers'. It seems reasonable to 
assume that the courts over which they continued to 
preside fulfilled a social need, and in that sense, at 
least, were considered of some value.
It is interesting that the system proposed by the NC 
Charter would apparently have conferred criminal 
jurisdiction on the chiefs' courts. Furthermore, fines 
would have gone as payment to the chief, rather than to 
the state. This was a peculiar proposal and does not 
seem to have made much sense to other people in the 
Department at the time. Even the idea of making 
substantial concessions to the chiefs in order to make 
them more clearly controllable by, and accountable to,
79 NC Charter, AR 1910, pp.29-30, N 9/1/13.
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the state was ignored. In fact, support for the chiefs
as a meaningful part of society was waning amongst Native
Department officials. The majority of Native
Commissioners' reports over the following decade convey
the attitude that the chiefs were of little practical
value to the Department. Many years were to pass, and a
great deal of politics, before they were to find official
favour again.
In 1927 the Government passed the Native Affairs
Act.80 This Act established the framework for the
governance of Africans under the "responsible" government
achieved by settlers in 1923. This created an official
hierarchy of "traditional" offices, although it did not
cede any judicial powers to "chiefs or headmen". These
official "traditional" leaders were granted the powers of
constables.
In 1912 the CNC, Mashonaland, wrote that
Chiefs and elders of families complain that 
they no longer control their following as they 
did in the past....The increased powers granted 
to Native Commissioners have materially 
assisted in breaking up these tribal methods of 
control, and I'm glad to say the results so far 
have been satisfactory.81
This challenge to what was perceived of as "tribes" by
Europeans was motivated by a rapidly changing economic
80 See Chapter 2 below for further discussion concerning 
the Native Affairs Act (1927), especially pp.114-118.
81 Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 
citing the CNC, Mashonaland, AR 1912, p.l
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environment. In the two decades that followed the 
arrival of the Pioneer Column, commodity relations 
amongst Africans developed faster than ever before. In 
the pre-colonial era there had been intense trading with 
the Portuguese, but at comparatively distant markets.82 
The arrival of merchant capital in Southern Rhodesia 
helped develop markets closer to the point of production. 
However, as Phimister points out, the "consequences of 
merchant capital's advance were as contradictory as the 
spread of commodity relations was uneven."83 On the one 
hand, dominant classes were bolstered by the increasing 
social differentiation that developed, while on the other 
developing commodity relations undermined existing social 
relations.
The relationships between capital, wage labour and 
the traditional and neo-traditional orders are extremely 
complex and I do not intend to try to go into them fully 
here, but they were integral to the development of 
Southern Rhodesia's governance of Africans. Already by 
1893 headmen were involved in forcefully recruiting 
labour for the mines. "[0]ne headman who failed to 
deliver the required quota of labourers was given fifty 
lashes, fined six goats and three head of cattle, and had
82 Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe.
p. 14.
83 Ibid. , p . 15 .
90
his rifle confiscated.1,84 One of the means employed to 
induce Africans onto the labour market was the 
establishment of a tax collection body. In late 1894 "it 
was decided to set up a Native Department specifically 
for the purpose" of collecting the ten shilling hut tax.85 
But the Native Department was also involved in rounding 
up forced labour. A year later "at least half" the 
Native Commissioners were forcing Africans to work for 
wages. Thus it may be seen that from the beginning the 
Native Department and the colonial courts were associated 
with coercion, violence and the upsetting of existing 
social relations. This had clear consequences or the 
relationship between the local rulers, the Native 
Department officials, and the ruled. As Richard Parry 
remarks, it seems likely that as instruments of 
oppression the Native Department was "denied access to 
the inner workings of the colonised society."86 In a more 
vivid illustration of such oppression, Palmer remarks 
that from the earliest days of the Native Department the
84 Palmer, Land and Racial Discrimination, p.43.
85 Ibid. , pp. 43-44 .
86 Richard Parry, "Murder, Migrants and the Salisbury 
municipality 1907-13", paper presented to seminar on 
"Comparative Commonwealth Social History: Crime, Deviance and 
Social Control", Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University 
of London, 1984/5, p.17.
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Native Commissioners were associated with the use of the 
s j ambok.87
In this extremely fluid economic environment, the 
African peasantry enjoyed its most successful years, 
which may account for remarkable social resilience. In 
the period 1896-1908, the emergence of a successful 
peasantry amongst Shona speakers38 afforded some 
resistance to the incursion of European economic power 
and to the break-down of social relations amongst them.
The economic power of Africans at the turn of the century 
may be clearly demonstrated. Wages earned on the mines 
at this time were exceptionally high: in 1903 they ranged 
between 30/- and 80/- per month.89 This displays the 
strength of the peasant sector which Arrighi suggests 
accounted in 1903 for 70% the total cash earnings of the 
indigenous African population.90 This is not to deny that 
new commodity relations had an impact on pre-colonial 
social relations. But the avoidance of labour migrancy, 
made possible by the "minor agricultural revolution",91
87 Palmer, band and Racial J3omina.tlQn, p.43.
88 Ibid, p. 71.
89 Ian Phimister argued this in "Zimbabwean Economic and 
Social Historiography since 1970", African Affairs 73, 1974, 
p. 291.
90 Giovanni Arrighi, "Labor Supplies in Historical
Perspective: A Study of the Proletarianization of the African 
Peasantry in Rhodesia", in G. Arrighi and J. Saul, Essays on 
the Political Economy of Africa. London: 1973, p. 207.
91 Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p. 72.
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and high mine wages temporarily averted destructive 
social impoverishment. Twenty-nine years later these 
proportions had been more than turned around. In 1932 
less than 20% of African cash earnings came from the sale 
of agricultural produce.92 The social differentiation 
that took place in the intervening years is attributable 
to the incursion of capital and the spread of the cash 
economy.
In South Africa the prosperity of the mining
industry enabled it to destroy the local African
peasantry, thus creating a landless working class. In
Southern rhodesia the industry never achieved such social
dominance and the peasant option was neither eradicated
nor boosted by the course of developments on the mines.
Prior to 1910 European farmers were uncompetitive in the
Southern Rhodesian market. But by this time the myth
that Southern Rhodesia had rich gold mines simply waiting
to be discovered (the so-called 'Second Rand') had been
destroyed and settlers had to secure an income while the
BSA Co was looking to pay dividends to its shareholders.
At this point, Company and European farmers' interests
clearly coincided. To quote Phimister,
Peasant competition had to be curbed, 
distinguished visitors were told, because 'if 
he ["the native"] can work for himself to a 
great profit he is not likely to work for the 
white settler for wages'. From capital's 
perspective, the existing situation was
92 Ibid., p. 213, based on Arrighi, loc. cit, p. 207.
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intolerable.... For farmers and their allies, 
the solution was simple: 'put... the native 
cultivator... in reserves... so far away from 
railways and markets that the white trader will 
not be able to buy from him and compete with 
white farmers' .... After a half hearted attempt 
to press speculative land companies into 
releasing some of their possessions to land- 
hungry white farmers, the state concentrated 
its efforts on behalf of settler agriculture 
against African holdings.93
In 1909 a rent was imposed on unalienated land both to
increase the cost of peasant production and force
Africans off the land in order that it might be sold and
dividends paid. Grazing and dipping fees made life off
the reserves less attractive for Africans. To help
Europeans purchase farms a Land Bank offering easy credit
was established in 1912.
The Native Department and the Role of "Chiefs"
The 1910s was a decade in which questions were 
raised around which a major debate of the 1920s would 
take place. Within this larger debate concerning the 
relationship of Europeans and Africans in Southern 
Rhodesia were the related questions of bolstering chiefs, 
the strengthening of a "traditional" or "customary" order 
and the role of the African courts. Strands of this 
debate began to develop as soon as the white government
93 Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 
pp. 64-5.
94
began to take seriously the administration of the African 
population.
Once the 1896-7 Revolt had been suppressed, the 
Native Department attempted to rationalise the 
administration of Africans through a form of 
collectivisation known as ’locations'. "Once the natives 
are put into location," wrote the Acting NC Mazoe in 
1898,
I consider we will have very little trouble 
with them, as we can then deal directly with 
the headmen who will of course be responsible 
for the activities of his people. In the past 
I consider very little responsibility has 
fallen on the headmen, on account of their 
(sic) being so many petty head men. For 
instance a man is called an induna because of 
his being over 3 or 4 huts.
The locations to be established should not 
be less than 100 huts each and more when 
possible.... Very careful selections of the 
headmen must be considered [and] as far as 
possible to choose all headmen who have in 
former times had power over the natives.94
Nearly ten years later the locations had had little
success and the Clerk in Charge at Mtoko noted that
Africans continued to live "not in large kraals but in
small groups of 3 or 4 huts."95 This clerk chose to make
the "subordinate headmen... responsible for the general
control of the people" as they were already "recognised
by the natives".96 These are exactly the conditions
94 Acting NC Mazoe, AR for the Year Ending March 31st, 
1898, N9/1/4.
95 Clerk in Charge, Mtoko, AR 1907, N 9/1/10.
95
Palley described as obtaining in Southern Rhodesia after 
1898: "The Native Commissioner was the main instrument of 
governmental relations with the African population, whom 
he was to control through their Chiefs and Headman."97 
The Native Commissioner represented the main governmental 
agent in dealings with Africans. This control went 
beyond just policy as the Native Commissioners depended 
on the chiefs' work in collecting taxes, reporting crime, 
obtaining young men for wage labour and settling 
disputes. As Fields puts it in her book on Northern 
Rhodesia, the administrators who argued in the 1930s 
against the formalisation of Indirect Rule were arguing 
"for the perpetuation of a fiction.... By formalizing the 
rights and obligations of African rulers, [Lugard] merely 
integrated them into the colonial state."98 The ill- 
defined gap in the administrative hierarchy, that "space" 
between the white minority government and the African 
population, represented the domain that the "traditional" 
leaders struggled to control.
Over the first two decades of Company rule a 
'native' policy of strict economy was pursued.99 Taylor
96 Clerk in Charge, Mtoko, AR 1907, N 9/1/10.
97 Palley, The Constitutional History and Law of Southern 
Rhodesia, pp.138-9 .
98 Karen E. Fields, Revival and Rebellion in Colonial 
Central Africa. Princeton: 1985, p. 39.
99 Taylor, "The Emergence and Development of the Native 
Department in Southern Rhodesia", p.24.
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asserts that it was out of "economic necessity" that the 
BSA Co. was forced "to acknowledge the impossibility of 
ignoring the African population of Southern Rhodesia and 
to recognise their separate identity as a people."100 
The need to involve ever more Africans in the wage labour 
market combined with the southern African administrative 
experience of many within the Native Department "led to 
the adoption of Natal and Boer Republic practice" in 
Southern Rhodesia.101 As early as 1910 Native 
Commissioners' reports displayed evidence of 
contradictory trends regarding the use of African 
institutions in local government and demands for clearer 
policy in general began to appear.102 The previous year 
had foreshadowed the centrality of education in the 
debate that was to take place in Southern Rhodesia. "The 
desire for education," wrote the NC Inyanga, "is 
spreading among the younger [African] women and is the 
cause of endless disputes and it is breaking up the 
social system rapidly, whether for good or bad remains to 
be seen."103 A year later the CNC, Mashonaland, reported 
with greater certainty, "young people are breaking away 
gradually from the old tribal system of control.... and
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 CNC Mashonaland, AR 1910, N 9/1/13.
103 NC Inyanga, AR 1909, N 9/1/12.
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though chiefs and others complain, no steps should be 
taken to prevent this gradual evolution."104
In 1913 there was dissension as to which route 
should be pursued. At the Colonial Office the Permanent 
Under-Secretary wanted sufficient reserves to protect 
'tribal society' and make possible some form of local 
self-government.105 The BSA Co., on the other hand, 
argued that the reserves were only for the temporary 
respite of those who could not be quickly assimilated 
into the colonial economy. The Company took the view 
that "European civilization was inevitably bringing about 
the disintegration of the tribal system".106 In the 
second decade of this century many in the administration 
believed that this was its manifest destiny, and such a 
belief influenced the Native Reserves Commission that sat 
in 1914-15 and eventually led to the Order-in-Council of 
1920 .
In the 1920s the Native Affairs Department engaged 
with the Southern Rhodesian Missionary Conference in 
debate over policies concerning Africans. During the 
1910s there had been shifting allegiances. In 1911 many 
missions had taken it upon themselves to defend Africans 
against forced labour, in which the Native Department was
104 Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 
p. 147, citing CNC Mashonaland, AR 1912, p.l.
105 Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, pp. 85-89.
106 Ibid, p. 88.
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implicated-107 In testimony to the Native Reserves 
Commission, 1914-15, the Native Department and the 
missions were in relative agreement.108 However, 
following the Order-in-Council of 1920, the Southern 
Rhodesian Missionary Conference, an organisation 
comprising most non-Catholic denominations operating 
missions in Southern Rhodesia, began to make the most of 
what had been perceived as a curtailment of Native 
Department authority as the result of a clash with the 
Land Settlement Department. D.J. Murray has argued that 
in the 1920s the main political activity influencing the 
African sector emerged from the conflict between the 
politically ascendant Southern Rhodesian Missionary 
Conference and the apparently rather directionless Native 
Department of that decade. As a constitutionally 
separate part of the governmental system,109 the Native 
Affairs Department (renamed following the achievement of 
responsible government in 1923) had to prove its worth to 
the newly 'responsible' Southern Rhodesian government. 
Throughout the decade it was in competition with the
107 Phimister, An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe,
p. 82.
100 Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p. 121.
109 This peculiar situation ended in 193 7 through an 
amendment to the Letters Patent, "integrating the Native 
Department 'into the public administration of the colony'." 
Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, p.180.
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Missionary Conference and the Native Development 
Department.
The protagonists attempted to control the sphere of
African education. Education had been run largely by the
missions. In 1921 the Native Department began inspecting
mission schools and sending representatives of the Native
Development Department to do the same. In 1924 the
renamed Native Affairs Department began holding meetings
with chiefs and headmen110 in order to legitimise claims
to represent Africans' interests.
The Missionary Conference pursued a policy which
would have established a "distinct sub-department of
native education under the Education Department which
would operate an inspectorate of African schools".111 At
this time the Conference was in "a position of relative
strength"112 having many good connections in government,
including H.U. Moffat. In 1927, the policies pursued by
the Missionary Conference were adopted by the Prime
Minister, Moffat. Murray argues that
During the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
therefore, radical changes took place in the 
African affairs sector. The Native Education 
and Development Departments, acting with the 
missions, refashioned the administrative 
system, to suit it to the purposes of 
controlling and guiding African social and
110 CNC, AR 1924, p.2.
111 D.J. Murray, The Governmental System in Southern 
Rhodesia. Oxford: 1970, p.283.
112 Ibid. , p.285 .
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economic development in the rural areas; they 
attempted to involve themselves with conditions 
in the urban areas, and, with the organization 
of the Native Christian conference, educated 
Africans secured for themselves an accepted 
place in the political system of the sector.113
Having now gained a dominant position with the Education
and Development Departments, the missions began to
challenge the legitimacy of the Native Affairs
Department's authority over the entire African
population. The CNC in 1928-30, H.M.G. Jackson, sided
with the missions and went so far as to support "the
introduction of a system of native boards to provide the
basis for a future system of elected local government."114
Col. C.L. Carbutt succeeded Jackson as Chief Native
Commissioner, having defeated Jackson's attempt to instal
his own brother in the post. Carbutt's views were very
different and he "believed that representing African
interests involved upholding the authority of the chiefs"
and "advocated [the] despatch to separate exclusively
African colonies"115 all those Africans who secured
education and aspired to positions in European society.
After Moffat resigned from the premiership in July 1933,
Carbutt set about restructuring the Native Affairs
Department and reasserting its authority over "all
113 Ibid. , p . 288 .
114 Ibid. , p . 289 .
115 Ibid. , p.292 .
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activities concerned with Africans".116 He saw to it that 
teachers and pastors who had received favourable 
attention from the Native Development and Education 
Departments were ignored in favour of the Department's 
"agents", the chiefs and headmen. Therefore the "African 
voice" regarded as legitimate and recognisable in state 
policy-making circles ceased to be that of the mission- 
educated in the 1920s and was replaced by the "tradi­
tional" authorities in the 1930s and beyond. A deep 
dichotomy resulted within Shona-speaking regions where 
the "traditional" authorities had been less inclined to 
pursue education than their Ndebele counterparts.117
The Native Affairs Department was allied with the 
chiefs and the views of the 'traditional' society, while 
the Missionary Conference was allied with the Native 
Development Department and the 'progressive' element in 
the teachers and educational spheres. By the early 1930s 
the Missionary Conference began to lose influence, 
particularly after it discarded its President, John 
White, as his rhetoric and demands for African 
representation went beyond what Europeans in the 
territory were willing to consider, much less accept. In
116 James A. Edwards, "Southern Rhodesia: the response to 
adversity", Ph.D. thesis, London: 1978, p.109.
117 See T. 0. Ranger, "Traditional Authorities and the 
Rise of Modern Politics in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930" in 
Stokes and Brown (eds.), The Zambesian Past. Manchester: 1966, 
p. 173.
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many ways the Conference's power base was among the 
European population, although it sought to promote the 
interests of Africans.
The declining political influence of the Southern 
Rhodesian Missionary Conference reached its nadir with 
Moffat's resignation as Premier. The Native Affairs 
Department asserted its 'jurisdiction' over all aspects 
of African affairs and countered any encroachment by 
other government departments. The Native Affairs 
Department began to 'rationalise' the hierarchy of 
officials under the native commissioner and one of its 
first moves following Moffat's resignation was to insist 
on the publication of a Government Notice "under which 
teachers in kraal schools were in future to subject 
themselves to the tribal control of the kraal heads."118 
Having fought hard first to maintain its jurisdiction, 
the NAD now asserted its authority to keep African 
education under the control of "traditional" leaders.
But this also had the consequence of compelling the NAD 
to jettison its desire to see "tribal authority" 
disintegrate; rather, it was compelled to bolster chiefly 
authority. The following year Carbutt took steps to 
bolster that authority "'by establishing duly constituted 
native tribunals'."119 These views were clearly 
triumphant in the Native Affairs Department as Carbutt
118 Murray, The Governmental System, p. 292.
119 Ibid.
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was followed by two men very keen on shoring up 'tradi­
tional authority', namely, F.W.T. Posselt and Charles 
Bullock, though Posselt did not share Carbutt's more 
extreme views on segregation.
In the previous decade the missions had endeavoured 
to obtain a beginning for African democratic expression 
in the form of native boards, which "were intended as 
embryonic local government bodies".120 The membership of 
these boards had been manipulated in such a way as to 
exclude educated Africans but include chiefs and headmen, 
thus ensuring they upheld the 'tribal' order which the 
Native Affairs Department was constructing. In turn, the 
Native Boards and later Native Councils (established by 
the Native Councils Act, 1937) were seen as bodies 
legitimating the chiefs and headmen. The administration 
developed, in the 1930s, a vested interest in the 
maintenance of "traditional" law and order.
This meant supporting the authority of the 
chiefs and headmen against the subversive 
prestige of "new men" - in Rhodesia, unlike 
Kenya, most African chiefs had clung to their 
"traditional" prestations rather than 
themselves becoming the most vigorous 
entrepreneurs.121
Thus, the Native Affairs Department attempted to
subjugate all of rural African society to its control.
In the political system of the sector, the one 
recognized alternative institution to that of
120 Ibid. , p.293 .
121 Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, p. 68.
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the chiefs and Native Affairs Department 
through which Africans had had access to 
government [i.e. the Missionary Conference] had 
lost its influence and importance. The Native 
Affairs Department and the chiefs remained:
Europeans accepted that they could advance 
African interests in such a way as also to 
safeguard general European interests. The 
illusion that this was possible was due to the 
fact that Africans lacked the power to force 
access to the political system of the sector, 
and in these circumstances the Native Affairs 
Department was able to dictate the 
characteristics of the supposed interests of 
rural Africans.122
On a different level, the 1920s were also a decade 
that witnessed the emergence of new forms of organisation 
by Africans in Southern Rhodesia. At the work place, 
especially in the mine compounds where some 11,000 
Southern Rhodesian Africans were occupied annually123, 
welfare and recreational societies developed means of 
communication that were important to the co-ordination of 
protest and the organisation of trade unions.124 For our 
purposes, it is only necessary to note the Shamva strike 
of 1927. Although the majority of the miners who took 
part in it were immigrants, the strike itself does 
indicate the growth of organisational frameworks that 
presented alternatives to those experienced at home.
That same year the Rhodesian branch of the Industrial and
122 Murray, The Governmental System, p. 299.
123 T. 0. Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia. 
London: 1970, p.139.
124 Ibid., pp. 138-149; see also van Onselen, Chibaro.
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Commercial Workers Union (ICU) was established. Although 
unable to penetrate the mining compounds in Southern 
Rhodesia, the ICU reached Africans working in urban and 
rural areas.
A second influence that began to come into its own
from the 1920s was that of religion. The Watch Tower
Society spread through the Shona rural areas at much the
same time as the ICU was growing, that is in the early
1920s.125 The significance of these different movements
is effectively summarised by Ranger, commenting on the
impact of Watch Tower in the Lomagundi district in
northern Southern Rhodesia:
Watch Tower restructuring of society seems to 
have succeeded in creating united communities 
of the faithful. But it did so at the price of 
cutting the faithful off from the rest of Shona 
tribal society. Shona chiefs, whose authority 
was unrecognized by the movement, did their 
best to destroy it.126
The Zionist churches and the Apostolic churches of Johana
Maranke and Johana Masowe were others that offered new
social organisation.
It is questionable how much authority the Shona
chiefs possessed at this time. The report of the NC
Lomagundi, 1920, complains of the chiefs' total lack of
authority.127 But Watch Tower challenged the chiefs'
125 van Onselen, Chibaro. p. 209.
126 Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, p. 209.
127 NC Lomagundi, AR 1920, N 9/1/23.
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position, however weak, and threatened to displace them. 
This in turn forced the Native Department to consider 
that it must choose between allowing the emergence of 
"detribalised" Africans susceptible to the influences of 
the independent churches, or on the other hand, "re­
establishing" chiefly control.
By the end of the 1920s over 81,000 Southern 
Rhodesian Africans were working annually for wages.128 
The majority were migrant workers who had the opportunity 
to experience new forms of organisation first-hand. The 
millenarian movements, including Watch Tower, and the 
missions were much closer to the rural homesteads than 
the trade unions and other organisations experienced by 
the migrant workers away from home. But all these 
presented new means of social organisation. Ranger 
states that Watch Tower was "the first of the twentieth- 
century mass movements to demonstrate the collapse of 
chiefly power."129 Although chiefs' power waned in 
certain periods it cannot be said to have collapsed, and 
indeed has been shown to be remarkably resilient.130
128 Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 
p.139.
129 Ibid. , p. 212 .
130 Jocelyn Alexander and David Maxwell (eds.), 
forthcoming, London: 1994?. This volume reassesses the role 
of chiefs and headmen in Zimbabwean history, arguing they were 
neither stooges of the colonial regime nor irrelevances in the 
independent state, but political agents pursuing their own 
agenda.
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The belief in the Native Affairs Department that the 
"traditional" order had collapsed compelled the 
Government to decide to chart a course that would mould 
in the following decade either a neo-traditional order in 
conjunction with the emerging powerful men as a means of 
controlling Africans, or implement a more direct form of 
rule. Moves began to be made towards the construction of 
a neo-traditional order.
The policy of territorial segregation pursued by 
Southern Rhodesia was expressed in the Land Apportionment 
Act of 1930. The Act was intended to put all Africans 
either in the reserves or in the attached Native Purchase 
Areas.131 As such the reserves also served to demarcate 
the territorial limitations of chiefly power. The 
problem of dissipated chiefly control had been noted in 
earlier reports from Native Commissioners. It was 
expected that this demarcation would help shore up 
flagging chiefly power.
In the early 1930s work began on legislation that 
would result in the Native Law and Courts Act (1937) and 
the Native Councils Act (1937). The drafters of this 
legislation were eager to deal with the lack of control 
in the rural areas as well as to meet a need for a 
political pressure valve. They were, in part, responding 
to demands made by the African men who participated in
131 Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, pp. 160-187.
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the Native Board meetings throughout the 1930s.132 But 
this will be dealt with in greater detail in the 
following chapter.
Conclusion
In this period, 1890-1935, as we have seen, economic 
changes had a fundamental impact on social organisation 
among the Shona-speaking people of Southern Rhodesia. It 
was not a simple path of change but an uneven search by 
Africans for a means of survival. The peasant option was 
exploited. This had the effect of both providing an 
alternative to labour migrancy and creating a new basis 
for social differentiation within African society. The 
economic independence that Africans were able to maintain 
in this period acted as a barrier to European penetration 
into the colonised society. But by the outbreak of 
Second World War, the character of that independence had 
undeniably been altered. To be sure, Dopcke and Ranger 
have disproved Palmer claim that all vestiges of economic 
independence had been shattered by 1939. But the life of 
rural Africans, on the whole, was becoming increasingly 
difficult.133
132 See S 1542/N2. Throughout this file judicial 
authority is an issue given importance by the Africans 
attending the Native Board meetings.
133 Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p. 13; see also 
Ranger, Peasant Consciousness; Davis and Dopcke, "Survival and 
Accumulation in Gutu", Journal of Southern African Studies.
14, 1, pp.64-98/ and Dopcke, "'Magamo's Maize'", in Ian Brown
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The growing number of labour migrants put strains on 
the traditional order in a number of ways. The 
migrations resulted in local shortages of labour and an 
upset in the elders' control of men through marriage.
The migrants, overwhelmingly men, experienced new and 
alternative forms of organisation. Thus in an 
environment of transforming social relations the nascent 
trade unions and the churches offered new bases of 
organisation.
The "traditional" rulers were threatened by other 
more simple and direct means. Their authority and 
legitimacy were altered by colonial circumscription of 
their positions. Although, as I have tried to 
demonstrate, the official removal of recognition had 
little impact, more positive interventions such as the 
selective recognition and later appointments of chiefs by 
colonial administrators did alter their positions.
The Native Regulations, proclaimed in 1910, were 
important as they outlined a hierarchy of Native 
Commissioner, Chief and Headman. Thus, for the first 
time in the colonial era, chiefs were given the statutory 
right to appeal to a higher authority for action against 
an insubordinate Headman. Furthermore, the alternative 
that Native Commissioners' courts offered, even when not 
used as courts of first instance, was a means of
(ed.), The Economies of Africa and Asia in the Inter-War 
Depression , pp. 29-58.
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circumventing chiefly authority. At the same time 
legislative curtailment of the free movement of kraals 
that existed in pre-colonial times prevented Africans 
from voting with their feet. This territorial 
jurisdiction of the chiefs was further reinforced by the 
Land Apportionment Act.
We have also seen that the Native Department 
struggled to exert exclusive jurisdiction over Africans.
In asserting its authority it made demands upon those it 
perceived to be traditional African leaders. It also 
demanded that those leaders perform as it saw fit, which 
in all likelihood had little in common with historical 
forms of leadership. It made these demands while giving 
little support in return.
In part these contradictory attitudes towards the 
'traditional1 leaders were a result of confusion and 
conflict within the Native Department itself. In the 
1920s official favour tipped decisively towards the 
pursuance of policy which would make 'chiefs' and a neo- 
traditional order an integral part of the administration. 
In the 193 0s chiefs and headmen received greater 
attention from the state than at any time since the 
criminal trials that followed the Chimurenga. This volte 
face is an important element in the route towards the 
Native Law and Courts Act (193 7). The chiefs and the 
Native Affairs Department now found useful allies in one
Ill
another and the conditions obtained in which they could 
work together.
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Chapter 2
The Assertion of Rhodesian Hegemony. 1927 to 1937
"to regulate an institution 
which has survived forty years of winking tolerance"1 
Introduction
In 1927 the Native Affairs Act began to formalise 
the relationship between the state and "traditional" 
leaders; the process was continued in 1937, in the Native 
Law and Courts Act (NLCA) and the Native Councils Act.
In the intervening decade two key pieces of 
discriminatory legislation were passed, the Land 
Apportionment Act (1931) and the Maize Control Act 
(1934). The Land Apportionment Act established the 
Native Reserves, the Native Purchase Areas and required 
all Africans living under rent agreements to abandon them 
within six years. The Reserves restricted African 
agricultural production to areas remote from markets, and 
therefore made African producers less competitive. A 
further consequence of the Act was to define the 
territorial limits of African authority, which was just 
beginning to receive a helping hand from the state. The 
Maize Control Act excluded African peasant producers from 
maize markets, protecting them for the white farmers at a 
crucial point in Southern Rhodesia's history. These
1 C. Bullock, CNC, AR 1936, p.10.
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dovetailed easily with the NAD's ideal of "retribalizing" 
Africans through the bolstering of "traditional" leaders 
and chiefly authority. Keeping Africans "tribal" 
involved frustrating challenges to the shaken chiefly 
order. This process was part of the development of a 
neo-traditional order.
This chapter will look at the promulgation of the 
NLCA as part of the government1s strategy to maintain 
control over dispute proceedings and the demands made by 
Africans for their courts to be given formal recognition. 
This will be examined with relation to the surrounding 
Colonial Office territories and South Africa. The 
African courts established under various ordinances in 
these territories will be compared and contrasted. In 
Southern Rhodesia's Legislative Assembly, politicians 
frequently made reference to the position of "native 
courts" in Kenya, Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia and South 
Africa. These examples were cited for various reasons - 
as examples of success, to reassure opponents, and as 
reasons for caution.
We will also examine the early, formal moves by the 
government to integrate chiefs into the state structure, 
no longer simply on a ad-hoc basis as powerful 
individuals with sufficient local influence to deliver 
tax and labour, but now as officials. The new office of
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the colonial regime bestowed authority and power upon its 
holders. It would be dangerous to assume the new 
colonial Chiefs lacked all vestiges of authentic 
traditional authority. However, the Chiefs were eager to 
legalise their positions within the state while 
maintaining authenticity within African society. Within 
the Native Affairs Department it was expected that the 
chief's position could fulfil a legitimating role for the 
colonial government. Chiefs were politically adept at 
moving between state and non-state affairs and duties.
Some of these local potentates made use of colonial 
authority and power to enhance, and indeed, reshape their 
positions.2 By examining these issues we will be 
addressing directly one of the themes of this thesis - 
that of the co-option of chiefs through the integration 
of locally powerful institutions. As Richard Gray has 
stated, councils and courts permitted "chiefs and 
counsellors to begin to exercise a carefully controlled 
judicial and administrative initiative in matters 
concerning the Reserves."3
2 See Alexander and Maxwell (eds.), forthcoming.
3 Richard Gray, The Two Nations. London: 1960, p.155.
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The Native Affairs Act (1927)
As discussed in the last chapter, the challenge
posed by the Southern Rhodesian Missionary Conference to
the Native Affairs Department's authority over Africans
propelled the NAD to nurture support within African
society. This was done by courting a select group of
Africans: the "traditional" leaders.4 The Native Affairs
Act which followed was largely a formal statement of
Southern Rhodesia's "native" policy and the position of
the Native Affairs Department within the overarching
government structure.
The Native Affairs Act summarized the hierarchy of
offices within the Native Affairs Department from Headman
through to the Chief Native Commissioner, and beyond the
Department to the Governor. This Act outlined the state
duties of those appointed by the government to the
offices of Chief and Headman.
The chief in charge of a tribe shall be 
appointed by the Governor-in-Council and shall 
hold office during his pleasure and upon good 
behaviour and general fitness. He shall rank 
as a constable within his tribal area....5
The chief was held responsible for the "general good
conduct of the natives under his charge"; he was required
4 This is known to have been happening as early as 1924, 
when the CNC mentions it in his annual report.
5 Native Affairs Act, 1927, sec.23.
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to inform the Native Commissioner of crimes committed 
"within his tribal area" and to give warning of any 
threat of public unrest. Furthermore, he was required to 
apprehend offenders and to assist in the collection of 
taxes. Such diverse duties left chiefs in an unenviable 
position which was open to criticism from many fronts. 
These duties were accompanied by few powers. Some native 
commissioners felt it damaging to chiefs' authority and 
legitimacy to burden them with such onerous duties.6 In 
the period 1927-37 the chiefs may well have appeared as 
government lackeys more clearly than at any other time.
The Chief Native Commissioner was responsible for 
the appointment of headmen. But the Act states plainly: 
"In making these appointments the nominations submitted 
by the chiefs shall, except for good reasons to the 
contrary, be accepted."7 Thus the chief was given the 
power to develop local "administration" within the 
limitations set down by the Native Affairs Department.
Headmen also ranked as constables and had many of 
the same responsibilities as chiefs. Their position was 
much clearer, since they had fewer administrative duties 
than chiefs. However, a curious clause states, "Headmen
6 E.G. Howman to Native Affairs Advisory Committee, August
1931, p.195, S 235/486.
7 Ibid., sec. 27.
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shall prevent the settlement of fresh kraals or the
removal of existing kraals without proper authority."8
This clause gave headmen a degree of authority over land
which they are not known to have previously enjoyed. The
speed with which the headmen exploited this new power
remains unprobed.9
Native Messengers also ranked as constables. No
"traditional" authority was claimed for this position but
it was very important in the administrative structure.
Their duties were to convey messages between chiefs and
headmen and the Native Commissioner. They were also "to
warn natives of collection of native tax, to summon
parties to civil cases in Native Commissioners' Courts,
and to report to the Native Commissioner any
irregularities or crimes that may come to their
knowledge."10 Interestingly the Native Affairs Act
includes the following offence for Native Messengers:
Any native messenger who shall...give out and 
pretend that he has power and authority to
8 Ibid., sec. 31.
9 Jocelyn Alexander, working on land politics in two 
districts in Zimbabwe, has found that headmen came into 
prominence and power as a result of the Native Land Husbandry 
Act (1951), and it has been headmen, rather than chiefs, who 
have controlled land allocation. It appears that the roots of 
that control may have been in this clause of the Native 
Affairs Act.
10 Native Affairs Act (1927), sec.36.
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settle any dispute or undertake the settlement 
of any dispute... shall be liable to 
punishment. ...11
This suggests that native messengers were considered 
potential usurpers of Native Commissioners' jurisdiction. 
No similar clause referring to the chiefs and headmen is 
included in the Act.
As an extension of the Native Affairs Department's 
authority over African affairs, the Act gave NAD 
exclusive jurisdiction over civil proceedings involving 
only Africans. Previously, the magistrates had held 
concurrent jurisdiction. This change created a racially 
divided jurisdiction.
Native Councils Act (1937)
The Native Councils Act was passed in Southern 
Rhodesia as part of the neo-traditional project there.
The Councils were introduced as a refurbished version of 
the unofficial Native Boards which had been established 
early in the 1930s as consultative forums. The new 
Councils were "expressly designed to bolster 
'traditional' authority re-invented by the settler 
state. "12
11 Ibid. , sec .40 .
12 Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 
p. 197.
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The Native Councils Act stated clearly that the
initiative for such a forum must come from Africans
themselves.
No Council shall be established unless 
application for its establishment has been made 
by natives in the area concerned. Whenever 
natives in any area desire the establishment of 
a council they may apply to the Native 
Commissioner for its establishment....13
This appears to respond to a question raised by a Native
Commissioner in 1935:
Are we not doing too much and thinking too much 
for [Africans] and would they not be better men 
and women if they were forced to do and to 
think for themselves through their own 
organisations, communal or otherwise and not 
wet nursed by us as I am afraid they are to­
day .14
However, the Councils were effectively controlled by the 
Native Commissioners. Although the Act specified that 
all Chiefs and Headmen in the area were ex-officio 
members of the Council, the Native Commissioner was the 
President of the Council and had the power, through 
reference to the Governor, to appoint "so many other 
indigenous male natives residing within the area".15 
Although all Africans had the opportunity to nominate
13 Sec.3 (3), Native Councils Act (1937).
14 NC Mazoe, AR 1935, S 235/514, emphasis in the original.
15 Sec.4 (b) , Native Councils Act.
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"any suitable person to represent their interests", such 
nominees were vetted by the Native Commissioner, Chief 
Native Commissioner and the Governor!16
These Councils had the power, in a long list of 
duties, to undertake conservation work, road building,
"the provision of facilities for education" and 
agricultural management. But they had no ability to 
raise their own revenue and the Native Commissioner 
controlled the purse-strings, in most cases strictly.
The Native Affairs Act (1927) and the Native Councils Act 
(193 7) formed the legislative context within which the 
Native Law and Courts Act (1937) placed.
Extending Judicial Authority
In 1899 some Native Commissioners, appointed as 
special Justices of the Peace, had been granted the same 
jurisdiction similar to that of magistrates. This was 
largely due to the need to enlarge a judiciary. But this 
seems to have been only part of the explanation. It also 
entailed the expansion of and practical access to state 
institutions. Africans who might have wished to receive 
legal redress before magistrates were faced with 
travelling long distances. The empowerment of selected
16 Ibid.
121
native commissioners ostensibly addressed this perceived 
deterrent. However, we know that Africans rarely felt 
this compulsion and chose rather to settle disputes with 
reference to local African authorities. Thus, it appears 
that the motivation behind furnishing Native 
Commissioners with judicial powers at this time was more 
to assert local control than to wrest authority from the 
chiefs' courts as part of a concerted effort to exert 
state authority. In the first decade of this century the 
Native Department viewed its major responsibility as 
averting another serious conflict with Africans, and as 
such extending local control was consonant with this 
task.
In 1910 the post of native commissioner was the
judicial authority to hear civil proceedings between
Africans and criminal proceedings in which the accused
was an African.17 That same year the CNC Mashonaland,
W.S. Taberer, suggested that
the advisability of granting them [chiefs] 
power to settle petty disputes within their own 
districts should also be reconsidered, and, if 
approved, they would be allowed to charge a 
nominal fee for hearing the case.18
17 High Commissioner's Proclamation 55, 1910.
18 CNC Mashonaland, AR 1910, N 9/1/13.
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This was the first time the question of extending
judicial authority to chiefs had been raised in official
reports of the Native Department. However, the question
did not receive serious attention until the mid 1920s.
In 1926 the CNC, Herbert Taylor, wrote,
A considerable and growing demand on the time 
of Native Commissioners is made by law suits 
among natives, who become increasingly 
litigious as time goes on. I regard this work 
as an important part of the Native 
Commissioners' work.19
Although we are not informed by the CNC as to why the
judicial work was considered of such importance, others
do give us their views. From within Southern Rhodesia we
get some clues. In 1900 one Native Commissioner
reported, "the ready way in which the natives come in to
me to settle their civil disputes also show that they
recognise the government and are willing to abide by our
decisions".20 This is similar to the perception of the
early colonial administration in Nyasaland where it was
believed that its "beneficent justice would not only
establish its authority but make that authority more
acceptable."21 Despite the fact that in the first years
of colonial administration in Nyasaland the new courts
19 CNC, AR 1926, SRG 3.
20 Acting NC Umtali, AR 1900-01, N 9/1/7.
21 Martin Chanock, "Neo-traditionalism and the Customary 
Law in Malawi", African Law Studies. 16, 1978, p.87.
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enjoyed success, measured by the number of people eager 
to seek justice there, Chanock argues that they failed to 
fulfil their early expectations of establishing for the 
regime legitimate authority. It appears they were 
largely undermined by two factors. First, the 
inexperience of the young administrators allowed them to 
be manipulated by Africans who had established themselves 
in key positions in the new order and secondly, the 
courts were quickly overwhelmed with enforcing colonial 
ordinances in the spheres of tax and labour law.22
E.G. Howman, a senior Native Commissioner in the 
1920s who was clearly always interested in Shona law and 
disputing, considered hearing disputes the most effective 
way of 'keeping an ear to the ground',23 Writing of East 
Africa, Morris argues that the "native courts" there 
served to bring disputes into official light and were 
thus crucial to a two-way educative process between 
district officer and chief. A district officer acquired 
knowledge of social conditions and "customary" law 
through his supervision and control of the courts, and 
was also able to judge the chief's depth of understanding 
of "enlightened policies and progress".24 In East Africa
22 Ibid. , pp.86-87.
23 Roger Howman, Harare, 1 August, 1991.
24 H.F. Morris and James S. Read, Indirect Rule and the 
Search for Justice: Essays in East African Legal History.
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the control of dispute settlement and the "resurrection 
of African fora" was perceived as a means to extend and 
consolidate political control.25 The matter was 
administrative and political rather than professionally 
"legal".
In 1931 the issue of establishing some form of 
"native courts" was given official consideration in 
Southern Rhodesia's Native Affairs Advisory Committee.26 
Both Tanganyika and Kenya had recently established 
courts, while Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were 
considering such a step. In 1927 South Africa had passed 
legislation, the Native Administration Act, that 
regularised the extremely varied situation which had 
prevailed in that country regarding the administration of 
African affairs in general. Each province had pursued 
different policies regarding African courts prior to the 
Act of Union. Natal policy developed a role for chiefs' 
courts, unlike the other provinces. This was in response 
to pressures exerted by the presence of the large Zulu 
population in the colony and the need to govern them 
efficiently. In 1883, the Governor of Natal, Sir
Oxford: 1972, pp.132-33.
25 Morris and Read, Indirect Rule and the Search for 
Justice, cited in Chanock, Law. Custom and Social Order, p.60.
26 Native Affairs Advisory Committee, Aug. 10, 1931, S 
235/486.
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Theophilus Shepstone, declared "You cannot control
savages by civilized law", and argued, "Native Law gives
Government greater power of introducing civilized
ideas."27 This belief underlay the administration of
customary law in Natal, and as a logical extension the
limited role permitted to the chiefs' courts there. As
late as 193 6 the Southern Rhodesian CNC expressed similar
attitudes, but with less jarring language:
...we shall give an opportunity for the open 
growth of a native institution which may foster 
dignity, status and the re-integration of a 
half-shattered society. It may also be the 
means of helping towards a true advance, in so 
far as it should interpret Native law and 
enable it to broaden so as to cope with new 
conditions of life.28
It is interesting to note that Bullock here defends the
position against the very criticisms that Shepstone
suffered: that this policy "did nothing to encourage the
advancement of Africans".29
27 T.W. Bennet, Customary Law in Southern Africa, Cape 
Town: 1985, citing Shepstone's evidence before the 1883 Cape
Commission on Native Laws and Customs, f/n 28, p.43.
29 CNC, AR 1936, p. 10 .
29 Bennet, Customary Law, p.44.
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Native Law and Courts Act (1937)
The most striking characteristic of the Southern 
Rhodesian Native Law and Courts Act (1937) is its 
brevity. It comprises thirteen clauses, whereas the 
Native Courts Ordinance of Tanganyika has forty-one. Due 
to the very different structure of the relevant parts of 
South Africa's Native Administration Act (1927), it 
cannot be compared so simply, but it is clearer, much 
longer and more elaborate than the NLCA.
The Native Law and Courts Act (1937) of Southern 
Rhodesia was drafted within an ideological outlook very 
different from its counterparts promulgated in East and 
Central Africa. Although on the ground it is often 
difficult to distinguish between direct and indirect 
rule, it is important to keep in mind the views that were 
held by those who dominated the drafting of the 
legislation. In Southern Rhodesia, all those of 
consequence professed to be against indirect rule, indeed 
even the Union of South Africa had, for some, gone too 
far in granting chiefs' courts limited criminal 
jurisdiction.30
The idea of granting chiefs judicial authority had 
lingered in the Native Affairs Department for many years
30 Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs, Godfrey 
Huggins, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, vol. 17, col. 
2063 .
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before gaining prominence and being treated as a subject 
for serious consideration. In 1910 when the native 
commissioners were granted magisterial powers the CNC, 
Mashonaland, wrote, "To the native mind, the only person 
who can give him justice is his chief, for justice with 
him is a personal thing."31 Furthermore, he argued that 
the "advisability of granting them power to settle 
disputes within their own district should also be 
reconsidered, and if approved they should be allowed to 
charge a nominal fee for hearing the case."32 The Native 
Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1910-11, recommended that 
the unofficial courts that were operating at the time be 
recognised and brought under the official control of 
native commissioners.33
Thereafter the subject appears to have been ignored 
as the view that "tribal disintegration" was more 
conducive to "progress" came to be accepted in the Native 
Affairs Department. It was only after the clash between 
the Southern Rhodesian Missionary Conference and the 
Native Department in the early 1920s34 led to a 
rapprochement between the "traditional" leaders of the
31 CNC Mashonaland, AR 1910, p.4, N9/1/13.
32 Ibid. , p . 3 .
33 Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 
1910-11. p.8, para.49.
34 See Chapter One, pp. 99-101.
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African communities and the Department that the subject 
began to arise in official documents again.
At a Conference of Native Commissioners in 1925 L.C. 
Meredith, the NC Chipinga, argued that chiefs should be 
granted the right to try "minor civil cases", "[h]e saw 
no use in retaining the system of chiefs unless they were 
given work to do." In order to convince his sceptical 
colleagues, Meredith deployed the report of a recent 
Commission on the Cost of Administration and claimed that 
his proposal could relieve the native commissioners of a 
great deal of work.35 His colleagues clearly felt that 
granting such powers would only increase chiefly 
authority, an action better avoided. Since chiefs were 
already trying such cases, they argued it would be best 
to leave well alone. His superior, F.G. Elliott, the 
Superintendent of Natives, Umtali, was against the 
suggestion and cited the "Colony of Natal, Report of 
Native Affairs Commission, 1906-17, in support of this 
view."36 Ironically, within two years South Africa was to 
pass the Native Affairs Administration Act which provided 
for chiefs' courts there.
The outcome of the debate was a compromise 
resolution:
35 Conference of Native Commissioners at Umtali, 20-22
October, 1925, S 138/37.
36 Ibid.
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this Conference is of the opinion that Native 
Chiefs should not be discouraged from 
arbitrating in minor Native civil cases, and 
their judgements when found to be just should 
be upheld, and if necessary enforced by the 
Native Commissioner.37
Elliott abstained on the vote.
In early 1931 Native Boards were established. These
were formal meetings between native commissioners and the
Chiefs, Headmen and, depending on the area, a wider
circle of African men.38 The minutes of these meetings
document African demands for judicial authority.
Although all such demands were worded deferentially, they
are clear and persistent. Throughout the Boards'
existence, 1931-38, the subject was raised.
The first item on the agenda of one of the very-
first Native Board meetings was "The powers of Chiefs in
trying cases".39 The minutes of these meetings were
circulated throughout the hierarchy of the Native Affairs
Department, and the minutes of the Lower Gwelo Reserve
meeting were the first to reach the Minister of Native
Affairs, who was then Prime Minister, H.U. Moffat.40
37 Ibid.
38 NC Gwanda to SN Bulawayo, no. 977/30, 15/1/31, 
S1542/N2.
39 Minutes of the Advisory Board Meeting, Lower Gwelo 
Reserve, 5/2/31, S1542/N2.
40 H.U.Moffat to CNC, 1350/164, 23/3/31, S1542/N2.
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At a meeting held in March, 1931, in Gwaai Reserve,
an African by the name of Mhlatshwa proposed a motion
calling for the effective recognition of chiefs' courts,
and chiefs' judicial authority. The motion read:
In all Civil Cases the parties should go before 
their Chiefs first, before complaints are laid 
at the Native Commissioner's Office, and that, 
where necessary, the Chief - or his deputy - 
should attend, with the parties concerned, at 
the final hearing.41
This motion also clearly requested that native
commissioners support, rather than undermine, chiefly
office.
The NC Nyamondhlovu who had chaired the above 
meeting appears to have balked at this motion. The Asst. 
NC for Gwaai Reserve wrote to him requesting he consider 
the subject and argued that in East Africa Chiefs and 
Headmen had such responsibilities which relieved the 
District Commissioners of a great deal of work. 
Furthermore, the power of review ensured, the reins of 
control remained within the District Commissioner's 
hands.42 The Chief Native Commissioner, Col. Carbutt, 
forwarded notes on the motion to the Secretary to the 
Premier stating that the Native Commissioner's attention 
had been drawn to a circular letter of January that year.
41 Minutes of Native Board Meeting, Gwaai Reserve, 
27/3/31, S1542/N2.
42 Asst NC, Gwaai Reserve to NC Nyamondhlovu, no. 
201/37/31, 30/3/31, S1542/N2.
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The circular had outlined the authority which Chiefs and
Headmen could exercise,
They have no authority to try any criminal case 
under any circumstances whatsoever, nor have 
they any jurisdiction in civil Cases, except 
insofar as the parties to a Civil action may 
agree to accept the arbitration of a Chief or 
Headman.43
The CNC was keenly interested in applying some sort of 
uniform policy throughout the colony so as to avoid 
confusion and cases of extortion being brought against 
Chiefs or Headmen as occurred a number of times in the 
193 0s,44 and presumably earlier.
The Prime Minister, H.U. Moffat, expressed his 
attitude towards chiefs' judicial authority in a letter 
to the Governor. He was extremely uneasy about the 
informality of the courts and asked, "Would it not be 
well to have the matter put on a proper basis and for 
formal notice to the Chiefs to be issued on the lines of 
the C.N.C.'s Circular Letter?"45
Contemporaneous with the consideration of the Gwaai 
Reserve resolution, demands were made at other Native 
Board meetings for clarification of the authority of
43 CNC Circular Letter No., C. 600, 19/1/31, S1542/N2.
44 Emmet V. Mittlebeeler, African Custom and Western Law. 
London: 1976, pp.25-38.
45 Premier H.U. Moffat to Governor-General, 1778/164, 
20/4/31, S1542/N2.
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Chiefs and Headmen.46 The call for greater consideration
of this issue was coming from other quarters as well. In
April, 1931, the Asst. NC Wedza, L.V. Jowett, wrote to
his superior, the NC Marandellas, F.W.T. Posselt,
to suggest the possible expediency of granting 
to approved chiefs and headmen, a limited and 
strictly defined civil jurisdiction, under the 
simplest possible scale of fees, within the 
areas under their control.47
The most interesting aspect of Jowett's proposals, apart
from the actual recognition of courts, is that of giving
Chiefs and Headmen authority over land and grazing rights
disputes. The Native Affairs Department balked
consistently over this and only considered extending the
African Courts' authority to land and grazing rights in
the 1960s.
Jowett appears to have grasped very well the 
implications of greater integration of Chiefs' and 
Headmen's institutions into the Native Affairs 
Department. He summed up his proposals, stating that 
they would, first, clarify in Chiefs' minds their 
permitted authority; secondly,"in some small measure 
discourage premature detribalisation" ,* and finally, "form 
a definite basis in the administration of Native areas."48
46 See S1542/N2 passim.
47 "Judicial Powers: Native Chiefs and Headmen", Asst. NC
Wedza to NC Marandellas, 14/4/31, S1561/10, vol.13.
48 Ibid.
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This document was circulated amongst the members of the 
Native Affairs Advisory Board for consideration.
When Moffat addressed the 1931 Native Affairs 
Advisory Committee he made a substantial statement on the 
issue of the constitution of African courts. It is worth 
quoting at length as it provides insight into the 
politicians' thinking on the topic outside the Native 
Affairs Department.
The next item of importance [on the 
agenda] is..., "Judicial Powers of Chiefs".
The suggestion was the granting of civil 
jurisdiction to approved Chiefs and Headmen.
That is an innovation in our law and our 
methods in this colony. I do not like to say 
very much about it because I do not claim to 
have any special knowledge, any knowledge such 
as is possessed by you gentlemen, of the 
natives. I would point out, however, that it 
is a matter which has got to be handled very 
carefully. It is following the methods adopted 
in Tanganyika in particular, commonly known, I 
think, as the indirect rule. I will await your 
deliberation and findings on this matter also 
with very great interest. As I say, I urge 
extreme caution in the matter. It does mean 
departing from what has been the law and the 
policy of this colony ever since it was 
started.49
It is clear that the devolution of judicial power caused 
dissonance in official circles, members of the NAD 
asserting a policy and others, including the responsible 
minister, expressing scepticism and fear.
49 H.U. Moffat, PM and Min of Native Affairs, opening the 
meeting of the Native Affairs Advisory Committee, 10/8/31, 
S235/486.
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F.W.T. Posselt, who was later instrumental in the
drafting of the Native Law and Courts Act (1937) when he
held the position of Acting CNC, was an advocate of
chiefly authority. He was also ready to bring African
opinion into official light. In 1932 he told the
Superintendent of Natives in Bulawayo that,
one of the leading Chiefs in this District 
[Plumtree] .... urged that Chiefs be empowered 
to impose fines and corporal punishment to 
enable them to control their people who are 
getting out of hand. I state this to show how 
a native, who knows his fellow men, views the 
position and the remedies he suggests, in 
contrast to the remarks made by a high Judicial 
Functionary. My own observations gathered in 
this and other Districts I know, confirms the 
view that lawlessness among the natives is 
attributed by the thinking class of native as 
mainly due to our leniency, and the wholly 
unsuitable form of punishment our law 
provides.50
This further demonstrates that the "establishment" of 
"Native Courts" was not simply a project initiated by the 
Native Affairs Department in order to better administer 
their sphere, but that there were clearly African 
individuals lobbying for such powers.
These demands and lobbying did not simply mark the 
beginning of a trend to bestow upon Chiefs and Headmen 
more authority derived solely from the state, such as 
their positions as constables. Several native
50 NC Plumtree to SN Bulawayo, "Excessive Fines inflicted 
by Judicial Officers", 18 Nov. 1932, S 138/43.
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commissioners commented on the difficulty of the chiefs' 
position. A senior native commissioner, E.G. Howman, 
stated in the Native Affairs Advisory Committee that he 
did not think chiefs should be expected to collect taxes 
or "perform duties against his own tribe".S1 The 
authority that would flow from recognition of Chiefs' 
courts was qualitatively different from the constabulary 
power to arrest criminals without authority to try them 
because it would have been support for an indigenous 
institution.
The draft bill presented in 1934 to the Minister of
Native Affairs (now Godfrey Huggins) was accompanied by a
memorandum from the CNC, the conservative Col. Carbutt. 
The memorandum emphasized a number of issues:
The draft follows the lines of similar 
legislation which is operative in the Union of 
South Africa, Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika,
to which reference has been made in drafting
the bill now submitted. Similar legislation is 
in force also in Nyasaland and Bechuanaland.
We are thus surrounded by territories in which 
tribal authority is upheld.52
Col. Carbutt not only made an argument for Southern
Rhodesia not to be "left behind" in policy-making in the
region, but also appealed to the politicians to consider
51 Native Affairs Advisory Committee, August 1931, p.195, 
S235/486 .
52 CNC to Minister of Native Affairs, 10/11/34, No. C 
4470/34; S1542/C19, vol.3.
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the economic expediency involved. The fact that the
country was in the midst of an economic depression would
have compelled many of the most conservative politicians
to devolve power for this reason alone. Carbutt argued,
Another important reason for the devolution of 
authority, is that, owing to the increasing 
work of the Officer of the Native Department, 
means a relief must be found. A very great 
deal of their [i.e. the officers] time is 
occupied in hearing petty native cases, both 
civil and criminal. In order to maintain 
efficiency it is essential that we either 
delegate some of the work to Chiefs and 
Headmen, or increase the European Staff. I 
advocate the former expedient, as being likely 
ultimately to result in greater efficiency and 
certainly in economy.53
In annual reports the CNC hedged on the issue of
bolstering chiefly power. In 1931 he stated that civil
jurisdiction for chiefs was considered "partly with the
object of maintaining the authority and prestige of
chiefs"54 and again in 1934 it was suggested "it may be
desirable to strengthen the position of the Chiefs by
establishing duly constituted Native tribunals as has
been done elsewhere."55
Africans appear to have been vigilant in seeing that
the government recognise Chiefs' courts. In December
1935, eight months after Col. Carbutt had told Chiefs in
53 Ibid.
54 CNC, AR 1931.
55 CNC, AR 1934.
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Plumtree that they would be given "judicial powers [and
the] authority to punish for minor offences", Chief Mpini
wanted an update, especially since Col. Carbutt was no
longer in office.56 Charles Bullock, the Acting CNC,
responded to this question advising caution to his staff,
A Bill has been submitted to the Government, 
members of which find the position not without 
difficulty. While I am hopeful legislation 
will ensue, it is not yet advisable to give the 
Natives a definite promise.57
There was certainty in the NAD that, at a minimum,
Chiefs' courts with civil jurisdiction must be
recognised, but the Southern Rhodesian government was
hesitant. Roger Howman later criticised the NAD's policy
towards courts as "always very guarded, cautious, half
measures - always doomed from the start".58
Although there was full support for the
establishment of courts within the Native Affairs
Department, not all officials came to that conclusion by
similar reasoning. The views of F.W.T. Posselt are of
particular importance in highlighting another perspective
56 Minutes of Native Board meeting, Plumtree, 12/12/35, 
S1542/N2.
57 Acting CNC to SN Bulawayo, 3/1/3 6,
L .6217/N2/I/Plumtree, S1542/N2.
58 Roger Howman, 0ral/H03, p.47. He felt very strongly 
that even the African Law and Tribal Courts Act (1969) was out 
of date by the time it was passed. Roger Howman, 1 August 
1991.
!
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in the Department because, as Acting CNC in 1934, he was
responsible, in part, for the drafting of the Native Law
and Courts bill. Posselt believed in giving "scope to
the inherent capacity of a people to be controlled by
their own institutions and through their own recognised
leaders."59 Bullock was characteristically more pragmatic
in his approach to the African courts legislation:
...we shall give an opportunity for the open 
growth of a Native institution which may foster 
dignity, status and the re-integration of a 
half-shattered society. It may also be the 
means of helping towards a true advance, in so 
far as it should interpret Native law and 
enable it to broaden so as to cope with new 
conditions of life.60
In the same report, Bullock attempted to assuage the
fears of those in the government hesitant to support the
bill. He wrote that recognition would allow for
effective regulation and that the Chiefs were not to be
granted the powers enjoyed in East or Central Africa, or
South Africa.
By 1935 the Native Commissioners' Conference had
already expressed views which went beyond what the
Government was conceding in the draft Native Law and
Courts bill. Charles Bullock, then Acting CNC and
59 Roger Howman, in the Foreword to the reprint edition,
F.W.T. Posselt, Fact and Fiction. Bulawayo: 1978.
60 CNC AR 1936, p. 10.
Secretary of Native Affairs, wrote to the Prime Minister
and Minister of Native Affairs:
For the information of the Honourable Minister 
I may say that the principles of the Bill are 
largely those accepted by the Native 
Commissioners' Conference in 1931; but that, in 
the recent Conference, the majority were in 
favour of extending the jurisdiction to 
criminal cases.61
However, in 1937 members of the Salisbury Native Board
"expressed unanimous approval of the Bill."62 Discussion
of the bill was the main topic of this meeting. As early
as 1936 Bullock had felt sufficiently confident to
pronounce that "the provisions of the Bill are acceptable
to the Native Chiefs and people".63
Many of the Native Board meetings in 1937 focused
discussion upon the Native Law and Courts bill about to
go before the Legislative Assembly. For the most part
these meetings supported the principles of the bill. One
meeting in Victoria District was also attended by the
"Rhodesian Native Association" which also approved the
bill.64 One meeting displayed a desire for greater
61 Acting SNA to PM, 8/10/35, S1561/49.
62 NC Salisbury, AR 1937, S1563.
63 Ag. CNC, "Memorandum to Accompany the Native Courts 
Bill, 1936", 13 Feb. 1936, S1561/59. It is worth contrasting 
the process of consultation for the NLCA with that for the 
African Law and Tribal Courts Act (1969) when the Chiefs' 
Assembly was consulted. See p.387 below.
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control to be placed in the hands of the Chiefs and 
Headmen. Africans were adamant that they should have 
their civil cases tried according to Native Law and 
Custom. The Plumtree Native Board felt it made little 
sense if appeals were to be to Magistrates courts because 
they didn't believe these courts sufficiently understood 
Native Law and Custom. Chief Ndabakayena said, "we have 
our Native Commissioners, Supt. of Natives, and Chief 
Native Commissioner. To avoid the white man's law our 
civil cases should not be taken before a Magistrate."65 
Another man welcomed the clarification of powers and 
support the Act would bring and complained, "in the past 
many of our young men disregarded our trials."66 Chief 
Sipiwe also suggested "that we should undertake the trial 
of criminal offences committed by juveniles as there is 
only one way of punishing juveniles, and that is with a 
switch. "67
Interestingly, in Mrewa there was "firm agreement" 
that divorce cases should be tried by the Native
64 Minutes of Native Board meeting, Zimutu Dip Tank, 
Victoria, 23/7/37, S1542/N2.
65 Minutes of the Native Board meeting, Plumtree, 
Bulalima-Mangwe, 13/5/37, S1542/N2.
66 Headman Magcobafuta, ibid.
67 Ibid.
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Commissioner as the bill proposed.69 Throughout Southern 
Rhodesia, the subject of divorce was raised at meetings 
of Native Boards and many demands were made for native 
commissioners and the government to put a stop to it.
This probably gives us an indication as to why Chief 
Mangwende was eager to rid himself of such an onerous 
task.
When the Prime Minister and Minister of Native
Affairs presented the bill for the second reading in the
Legislative Assembly he played down the extent of the
change involved:
"The grant of legal recognition to the 
jurisdiction of native chiefs in civil cases 
will regularise an institution which has 
survived of its own strength, because it 
supplies a need in maintaining the equilibrium 
of the native social organisation."69
He even went so far as to assert that "As far as I have
been able to find out the judicial powers were given to
the chiefs at one time, and they have never actually
formally been removed."70 The message the Prime Minister
was now keen to convey was that this bill did not
represent a departure from prevailing practice. Finally,
68 Minutes of the Native Board meeting, Mrewa, 4/6/37, 
S1542/N2.
69 Memorandum quoted by the PM, Debates of the Legislative 
Assembly, 1937, vol. 17, col. 2063.
70 PM Godfrey Huggins, Debates of the Legislative 
Assembly, 1937, vol.17, col. 2066.
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Huggins assured the Legislative Assembly that it would be
"of very great advantage if we can build up the authority
of the chief and elders to a greater extent than it
exists at present."71 The undertone in this statement is
clearly that a close check would be kept on chiefly
authority and there was no reason for the white
population to fear another uprising like that of 1896-7.
In the period 1925-1935 native commissioners were,
in practice, anything but uniform in their approach to
chiefs and the powers they might wield.72 Not
surprisingly, the implementation of the NLCA was not
uniform, nor did it bring to the treatment of African
courts the uniformity top NAD officials had been eager to
achieve. The Act was passed in late 1937 along with the
Native Councils Act and in 193 8 native commissioners were
far more concerned with the establishment of the
councils. Only twenty courts were recognised that year.73
However these were reported to be running smoothly and
the NC Mrewa wrote,
It is noticeable how the usual prevarication of 
litigants so common in Courts presided over by 
European officials is practically eliminated in
71 Ibid.
72 R. Howman, 0RAL/0H3, pp. 4 6-47.
73 CNC, AR 1938, p. 10.
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the Native Court. It is further noticeable how 
promptly the Native Court judgements are met.74
Some native commissioners simply tried to ascertain
existing practice in the area was, and to bring those
courts under the official umbrella,75 while others
expected chiefs to take the initiative in applying for
formal recognition.76 Unlike the Native Councils Act,
this was not spelt out in the NLCA.
In at least one district the Native Commissioner
attempted to use the establishment of courts as a lever
to coerce the local people to accept measures they had
rejected. In Mtoko the Native Commissioner, Hassell,
asked at a Native Board meeting
how could he recommend to the Government that 
the Chiefs of this district be given more power 
when they had just showed, in the discussion on 
centralisation, that they were against all 
progress and the betterment of their people.77
Calling the Native Commissioner's bluff, "Chief Nyakuna
replied that he for one did not want a Court."78 The NC
Mtoko continued in a belligerent tone at the meeting.
74 Ibid.
75 SN Bulawayo to CNC, 28/7/38, 961/Nat.BCC, S1542/N2.
76 Minutes of Native Board meeting, Wankie, 17 & 18/5/38, 
S1542/N2.
77 Minutes of Native Board meeting, Mtoko, 3/5/38, 
S1542/N2.
78 Ibid.
I
i
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The following year the NC Mtoko reflected upon this 
discussion and made use of the opportunity to emphasize 
the quid pro quo that was involved in his recommending 
the recognition of chiefs' courts, a "privilege"79 he 
wished to grant sparingly. Hassell was rebuked for his 
actions when the CNC wrote to both him and the Prime 
Minister to point out that the establishment of Chiefs' 
courts was not contingent upon the acceptance of other 
schemes and "opportunities for advancement".80 The CNC 
appears to have been intent on encouraging the 
involvement of Chiefs in the day-to-day administration of 
African affairs. The NC Mtoko was not aiding this in any 
way. Despite these shortcomings in the implementation of 
the NLCA, by the end of 1939 108 courts had been 
recognised81, and in 1949 173 had gained official status.82 
Although not many more ever gained official recognition,
79 In the minutes of the Native Board meeting of 25/5/39 
it is noted that the previous year the NC had not been 
prepared "to recommend that their Chiefs should have the 
privilege of their own legally constituted courts, but he said 
that he now noticed a more helpful spirit abroad and that the 
three Senior Chiefs... should be given their own Courts.", 
S1542/N2.
80 SNA to Sec to the PM (Native Affairs), E.
8323/N2/1/Mtoko, 25/7/39; CNC to NC Mtoko, E .83 67/N2/l/Mtoko, 
28/7/39, S1542/N2.
81 CNC, AR 1939, p. 9.
82 CNC, AR 1949, p. 24.
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many more operated in full view of the native commissioners.
There were instances of official recognition running 
into problems. Roger Howman related one case in which he 
met a headman in Wedza in the late 1940s and asked how 
his court was functioning. Upon discovering that this 
man had no court, Howman investigated the case only to 
discover "that some earlier native commissioner made a 
mistake and appointed the wrong man as [headman] 
Chamburakira" and that the one legitimate in local 
people's eyes lived some miles away and heard cases.
Howman concluded that government recognition was not 
enough, the government "had legalised this man, paid him, 
looked after him, paid him for his business.... Well, he 
was quite happy to sit there knowing he was illegitimate 
and take all what government gave him, and nobody went 
near him."83
As suggested above, the influence of the early 
native commissioners and other Native Affairs Department 
officials who came to Southern Rhodesia with experience 
of the Natal Native Affairs Department had a fundamental 
impact on that outlook. Secondly, the NAD and the 
government were both keen to emphasize the distinction 
between Southern Rhodesia and the Colonial Office 
territories to its north. However, the Native Affairs
83 Roger Howman, 1 August 1991.
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Department, at least, often turned to the practices of
these Territories as well as South Africa when
considering new policy. This is probably true of most
levels of the Native Affairs administration.84 The South
African influence and the desire to assert distinct
policy, or at least appear to do so, contributed to the
drafting of African courts legislation in Southern
Rhodesia, which was largely out of step with the time-
scale of the "development" of Africans among its
neighbours, despite assertions of adhesion to just such a
policy. In 1937 the Prime Minister, Godfrey Huggins,
quoted Lord Lugard in the Legislative Assembly debate
concerning the Native Law and Courts Act:
"If our aim be to raise the mass of the people 
of Africa to a higher plane of civilisation, 
and to devote thought to those matters which 
most intimately affect their daily life and 
happiness, there are few of greater importance 
than the constitution of the Native Courts."
... I have quoted these extracts because I 
believe in them.85
In the same speech the Prime Minister stated,
"The measure of jurisdiction to be granted is 
less than that given in any part of British
84 NC Victoria referred to Kenyan "Native Councils" as 
well as Transkeian councils in AR 1927, S235/505; see also CNC 
to Minister of Native Affairs, 10/11/34, no. C. 4470/34, 
S1542/C19, vol. 3, re: courts legislation in the surrounding 
countries, and later on, R. Howman, Report on an inquiry into 
Native Courts. Salisbury:1952.
85 P.M. Godfrey Huggins, Debates of the Legislative 
Assembly, 1937, vol. 17, col. 2062.
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Africa - and in that term I include the Union 
of South Africa, where the government has now 
granted (in addition to civil jurisdiction) 
criminal jurisdiction in respect of offences 
punishable under Native Law. Our policy is 
conservative and does not necessarily imply 
this extension."86
The Government was willing to make use of the
intellectual justification provided by the theoreticians
of indirect rule but was also quick to distance itself
from the implications it held.
One direction that Southern Rhodesia most
emphatically did not follow was the codification of
customary law. Natal began codification as early as
1878, although this was not on an official basis, had no
legally binding power and was against Shepstone's
wishes.87 However, in 1891 this changed and the codified
customary law of Natal gained official status with Law 19
of that year. In Southern Rhodesia the development of
customary law followed a very different path. The first
attempt to compile a compendium of Shona law and custom
was made by Charles Bullock, then Native Commissioner, in
1913 when Shona Laws and Customs was published.88
86 Memorandum quoted by Prime Minister, ibid., col. 2063.
87 Bennet, Customary Law, citing E.H. Brookes, The History 
of Native Policy in South Africa from 1830 to the Present Day. 
Cape Town: 1924, p.219.
88 C. Bullock, Shona Laws and Customs. Salisbury: 1913.
However, this book appears to have gained little 
acceptance amongst his peers. Later, Bullock published a 
second book, The Mashona.89 This book gained much more 
credence within the Native Affairs Department, although 
some felt it was premature to publish this material and 
it has been alleged that all the material for the book 
was collected by E.G. Howman while stationed in Lomagundi 
District.90 The CNC, Stanley Jackson, reviewed it 
favourably and recommended it as.a text book for all in 
the Department. At least one Native Commissioner, who 
was very grateful for Bullock's book, said, "it is just 
as well a record of native custom exists, for if the 
present trends of thoughts and happenings continue there 
will be few happenings in our native life that can be 
said to be true and ancient custom."91 Clearly there 
existed a desire to crystallize custom, remove its 
characteristic fluidity, and formulate "customary" law.
In 1937 material from Bullock's The Mashona was used as 
evidence of customary powers of chiefs in an extortion
89 C. Bullock, The Mashona, Cape Town: 1928.
90 Roger Howman, 1 August 1991, stated that F.W.T. Posselt 
had disagreed vehemently with the writing of such a book. 
Posselt had felt that not enough was known to warrant 
publication. Howman went on to say that the material had come 
from his father's notes and from only a single district.
91 NC Makoni, AR 1939, S 235/517.
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case.92 Books such as those by Holleman,93 Storry,94 Goldin 
and Gelfand,95 and Child96 all contributed to an unofficial 
codification; indeed, Storry and Goldin and Gelfand may 
still be found on the shelves of at least one Community 
Court.97
The connection between Natal's administration and 
the Southern Rhodesian NAD was strong.98 But 
interestingly, in the debates concerning the Native Law 
and Courts bill in the Southern Rhodesian Legislative 
Assembly, reference is made more frequently to the 
policies of East Africa. More often than not, these 
references were cautioning against the adoption of 
indirect rule, as preached and practised by Sir Donald 
Cameron, the Governor of Tanganyika from 1925 to 1931.
92 Mittlebeeler, African Custom and Western Law, p.27.
93 J.F. Holleman, Shona Customary Law. London: 1952.
94 J.G. Storry, Customary Law in Practice. Cape Town:1979.
95 Bennie Goldin and Michael Gelfand, African Law and 
Custom in Rhodesia. Cape Town: 1975.
96 Harold F. Child, The History and Extent of Recognition 
of Tribal Law in Rhodesia. Salisbury: 1976.
97 Although I was told that these books were no longer 
used and simply a legacy of the colonial era, Storry and 
Goldin and Gelfand remained shelved alongside some South 
African law books at Guruve Community Court. Interview with 
Benson Kadzinga, Presiding Officer, Guruve Community Court,
July 29, 1991
98 See p. 72 above.
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However, it is clear that the simultaneous establishment
of Native Councils and Native Courts was perceived as
indirect rule. The NC Mazoe wrote in 193 6,
Will any system of indirect rule, and legal 
control of their own affairs and organisations, 
assist in bringing them from this slough of 
apathy? I trust it may but fear the struggle 
... will be a prolonged one."
Cameron had argued that the establishment of the
Native Courts in Tanganyika was a means of regulating the
Native Authorities:
Native Courts are constituted not only to 
uphold the authority of the Native 
Administrations, but also in order that the 
government may have ready means of ascertaining 
and testing the manner and measure in which 
those authorities exercise discipline over 
their people.100
The courts were established as the legitimate forum for
discipline. We can also hear in Cameron's words
resonances of Shepstone.
The Legislation
We shall now consider the legislation relevant to 
the establishment of Native Courts in five countries 
influential upon Southern Rhodesia's policy-making, South
" NC Mazoe, AR 1936, S 235/515.
100 Sir Donald Cameron, My Tanganyika Service and Some 
Nigeria. [original London:1939] Second edition, Washington 
n . d . , p .174 .
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Africa, Tanganyika, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland, as well as the legislation in Southern 
Rhodesia itself.101 The six different countries' 
legislation regarding African courts may be put into 
three groupings. The first consists of the South African 
Native Administration Act (1927). The second comprises 
the East and Central African ordinances, and the third 
the Southern Rhodesian Native Law and Courts Act (193 7) .
I have briefly sketched above the development of 
policy in South Africa leading to the establishment of 
African courts on a country-wide basis. The Native 
Administration Act (1927) regularised an extremely uneven 
situation. Chiefs and headmen, with the authority of the 
Minister of Native Affairs, were allowed to hear civil 
cases "arising out of Native custom" involving only 
Africans within their jurisdiction. Likewise, chiefs and 
headmen could be granted the authority to hear cases 
involving common-law crimes.102
101 Except where specifically stated the material in this 
section is derived from the Acts themselves. They are: South 
Africa, Native Administration Act (1927) ; Tanganyika, Native 
Courts Ordinance (1929); Kenya, Native Tribunals Ordinance
(1930); Nyasaland, Native Authority Ordinance (1933); Northern 
Rhodesia, Native Authority Ordinance (193 6), Native Courts 
Ordinance (1936) ; Southern Rhodesia, Native Law and Courts Act 
(1937) .
102 Bennet, Customary Law, p.48.
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The chiefs' and headmen's courts were directly- 
supervised by the Native Commissioners who had the 
authority, upon appeal, to "confirm, alter or set aside" 
any judgements made in those courts. A Native Appeal 
Court was established to hear appeals from the Native 
Commissioners' courts. These were to be constituted as 
follows: a president drawn from the public service and 
two other members "selected from magistrates, Native 
commissioners or other qualified persons." These courts 
also had the option of co-opting African advisors.
The only point at which the African judicial 
structure was formally linked with the judicial 
structure pertaining to the other citizens of South 
Africa was when an appeal against the Native Appeal Court 
was made. This was laid with the Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court. Such an appeal was only possible when 
the Minister considered that an important point of law 
was involved.
In the 1910s a Native Court system was developed 
throughout the East Africa Protectorate and Uganda under 
similar patterns. This was a reversal of the previous
! policy to gradually replace the African courts already
operating with protectorate courts that had no
I
"traditional" authority. In 1912, it was policy in the 
East Africa Protectorate "that 'only such councils of
I
i
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elders as are constituted under and in accordance with 
native laws and customs and are recognized by the 
Governor can exercise jurisdiction over the members of 
the native community.1"103
The historical background to the ordinances 
promulgated in East and Central Africa between 1929 and 
1936 is important, especially for comparative purposes 
with Southern Rhodesia. Initially, for reasons of 
administrative and economic expediency, the colonial 
regimes in East and Central Africa (including Southern 
Rhodesia) were willing to leave the existing African 
courts intact. The European presence without doubt 
affected the power relations within which these courts 
worked. In the East Africa Protectorate recognition of a 
limited number of chiefs was given in 1897; five years 
later the Native Courts Ordinance was amended to 
recognize all chiefs. In 1907 a further Native Courts 
Ordinance was enacted to consolidated the ordinances 
previously promulgated.104 In Uganda the constitutional 
history was very different. African courts continued to 
operate there by virtue of treaty agreements. The German
103 A. Phillips, Report on Native Tribunals (1945) p.14, 
cited by Morris and Read, Indirect Rule and the Search for 
Justice, p.141.
104 Morris and Read, Indirect Rule and the Search for 
J.usti.c.e, p.141.
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administration in Tanganyika adopted one policy for the 
coastal regions and another for the interlacustrine 
region. On the coast, government-appointed akidas 
administered judicial proceedings between Africans, while 
in the hinterland "the indigenous courts were recognized 
and operated under the supervision of the German 
administrative officers."105 Under the British mandate, 
an ordinance similar to that in effect in Kenya was 
adopted.106
When Sir Donald Cameron arrived in Tanganyika from 
Nigeria he set about introducing the policy of Indirect 
Rule to East Africa. Central to this policy was the 
establishment of Native Courts. In Cameron's view these 
had to be under the control of the Native Administration. 
Critical of the Tanganyika Native Courts Ordinance 
(1920), he wrote, "'native courts [were] regarded as part 
of the judicial machinery of the Territory instead of as 
an integral part of native administration.'"107 The 
Native Courts were not simply an integral part of the 
Indirect Rule system that subsequently was adopted
105 Ibid., pp.142-43.
106 Ibid.
107 Cameron to Secretary of State, Confidential Dispatch 
of 17th Feb. 1927, C.O. 691/88/18087 and D.S.A. 11126, cited 
in Morris and Read, Indirect Rule, p.145.
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throughout the British colonies East and Central Africa, 
they were essential. The courts gave the Native 
Authority, or chief, the power to enforce his authority 
and maintain his "traditional prestige".108 It was 
essential, also, that the provincial administration have 
exclusive responsibility for these courts to ensure that 
the native authorities developed along the correct 
lines.109 Developing the Native Authority meant ensuring 
that the court was on a secure footing as well as 
supervising the implementation of, and thereby shaping, 
"customary" law. The key alteration brought about by the 
legislation passed north of the Zambezi following the 
Tanganyikan example was the transference of exclusive 
responsibility for the Native Courts to the Native 
administrations in each colony.
In Southern Rhodesia the history of the courts was 
exceptional. Prior to the 1896-7 Rebellion the African 
courts were ultimately under judicial control. Following 
1898 these courts had no status in law, but de facto were 
under the Native Commissioners in regions of greater
j  government scrutiny and free in the remoter regions. The
I
I
I Law Department still attempted to exercise control over
1
108 Ibid. , p. 143 .
109 Ibid.
156
African courts, but the NAD achieved exclusive 
responsibility for the Native Courts by virtue of the 
Native Law and Courts Act (1937).
Tanganyika was the first country in East and Central 
Africa to put Native Courts on a new constitutional 
footing when the Native Courts Ordinance was passed in 
1929 as part of the overall framework of indirect rule as 
envisioned by Cameron. The extent to which the policy of 
indirect rule was applied throughout Tanganyika has 
recently been questioned, and it has been argued that 
"local circumstances very much affected" its 
implementation.110 However, the Native Courts Ordinance
(192 9) served as a model for the Kenyan Native Tribunals
Ordinance (NTO) which followed a year later, Nyasaland's 
Native Courts Ordinance (1933) and, to a slightly lesser 
extent, the Northern Rhodesia Native Courts Ordinance 
(193 6) . The Tanganyika legislation also had a clear 
influence on Southern Rhodesia's Native Law and Courts 
Act (1937), despite Southern Rhodesia's ostensible
| rejection of Indirect Rule.
j
| The Native Tribunals Ordinance reproduced much of
I
I .
I its Tanganyikan counterpart, 38 of its 43 sections are
110 Justin Willis, "The administration of Bonde, 1920-60: 
a study of the implementation of indirect rule in Tanganyika", 
African Affairs, vol. 92, no. 366, p.67.
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substantially the same and many are identical. However, 
the NTO made several explicit provisions for Muslims in 
the Protectorate of Kenya. Likewise, the ordinances 
promulgated in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia followed 
the Tanganyikan model very closely; many clauses were 
lifted from it directly and were adapted only to 
accommodate local variations in official titles. In 
Southern Rhodesia, the Native Law and Courts Act 
reflected the influence of certain clauses in the 
Tanganyikan model, but adopted none of them directly.
The East African model constituted courts within the 
indirect rule framework, the legal wording in Tanganyika 
being:
in accordance with the native law or custom of 
the area in which the court is to have 
jurisdiction and a native court purporting to 
be so constituted shall be deemed to be 
lawfully constituted in accordance with this 
Ordinance unless the contrary be shown. . . ,111
Furthermore, the Provincial Commissioners retained the 
power to "prescribe the constitution of any native 
court".112 But the governments in Nyasaland and Northern 
Rhodesia pursued greater control over the constitution of 
Native Courts and the legislation reflected this by
111 Native Courts Ordinance (1929), sec. 4. The Native 
Tribunals Ordinance (1930) sec.4 reads precisely the same,
substituting "tribunal" for "court".
112 Ibid.
removing from the relevant clause the words, "...and a
native court purporting to be so constituted...".113 As
Morris and Read put it,
...despite the emphasis, in the philosophy of 
indirect rule, upon the traditional nature of 
such bodies, their authority, in fact, rested 
upon statute, there being in each of the three 
[Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda] territories a 
Native Authority Ordinance.114
Still further regulation and control in the
establishment of Native Courts was exercised in Southern
Rhodesia where the principle of indirect rule did not
underpin the legislation. The Act could not have put it
more simply: a "'native court' means a native court
established under this Act".115 It later came to light
that unofficial courts persisted, and indeed in the 1960s
outnumbered the official ones.116 Interestingly, the East
and Central African Native Courts legislation all
included clauses making it an offence for anyone to
exercise judicial powers without legal authority.
113 See Sec. 4 of the Native Courts Ordinances of 
Nyasaland (1933) and Northern Rhodesia 1936).
114 Morris and Read, Indirect Rule and the Search for 
Justice, p.21.
115 Sec. 3, Native Law and Courts Act (193 7) .
116 Report of the Commission appointed to Inquire into and 
Report on administrative and Judicial Functions in the Native 
Affairs.., and District Court s. .Department s./ Salisbury: 1961, also 
known as the Robinson Report, para. 179, p. 56.
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Neither South Africa nor Southern Rhodesia included such 
provisions in their respective legislation in this 
period.
The colonial regimes in Tanganyika and Kenya clearly
believed that judicial authority was associated with an
authority-generating process whether the courts were part
of the state or not.117 Thus, the usurpation of judicial
authority was a potential threat and the legislation in
these territories included a clause to deal with such an
eventuality. The clause reads as follows:
Any person who shall exercise or attempt to 
exercise judicial powers within the area of the 
jurisdiction of a duly constituted native 
court, except in accordance with the provisions 
of any Order of His Majesty in Council or of 
any Ordinance, or who shall sit as a member of 
such court without due authority, shall be 
liable, on conviction before the high Court or 
before a Subordinate Court of the First Class, 
to imprisonment of either [i.e. with or without 
hard labour] description for a period not 
exceeding twelve months or to a fine not 
exceeding two thousand shillings, or to both 
such fine and imprisonment.118
Presumably, this was also connected with the political
frailty of some Native Authorities.119
117 This is the primary argument that is made by Andrew 
Ladley, "Courts and Authority: A Shona Village Court", Ph.D. 
London: 1985
118 Sec. 26 of both NCO (Tanganyika) and NTO (Kenya) .
119 See Willis, "The administration of Bonde 1920-60" in 
which he highlights several weaknesses and insecurity in the
The Native Courts in East and Central Africa, as 
well as South Africa, were empowered to hear both civil 
and criminal cases. However, there were limitations to 
their jurisdictions, both territorial and legal. These 
courts could deal with Muslim marriages and those 
governed by "native law or custom", but they could not 
hear cases in connection with Christian and civil 
marriages,120 "except where both parties are of the same 
religion and the claim is one for dowry only".121 Nor 
could these courts hear cases dealing with an offence 
that allegedly resulted in death, or "which is punishable 
under any law with death or imprisonment for life".122 
Finally, the courts were excluded from hearing any cases 
arising from offenses alleged to have been committed in 
municipalities or townships.123
In Southern Rhodesia limited civil jurisdiction was 
granted to the Native Courts; only such cases as could be
implementation of indirect rule in Tanganyika.
120 In South Africa this prohibition extended to "any 
question of nullity, divorce or separation arising out of a 
marriage". Sec. 12 (1) (b), Native Administration Act (1927).
121 Ibid., sec.12 (b) .
122 Ibid. sec. 12 (a) .
123 See sec. 12 (c) of both the Native Courts Ordinance 
(Tanganyika) and the Native Tribunals Ordinance (Kenya) for 
the slight variations.
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determined native law and custom.124 The exclusion of
criminal jurisdiction represented the most significant
departure by Southern Rhodesia's policy-makers from the
trends in the territories surrounding them. As Charles
Bullock, CNC, explained,
It is thought that circumstances and 
history are responsible for the fact that the 
majority of our Chiefs are not at present 
fitted to exercise such powers as have been 
granted both to the north and South of our 
Colony. Criminal jurisdiction and divorce have 
therefore been excluded.125
However, the resistance to conferring criminal
jurisdiction upon the Native Courts came from the
legislators, not the Native Commissioners who, in 1935,
considered the jurisdiction should be extended to include
criminal cases.126 The jurisdiction of Native Courts,
then, extended only to
the hearing, trial and determination of all 
civil actions and suits which fulfil the 
following conditions:-
(a) all the parties must be natives; 
and
(b) the defendant must be ordinarily 
resident and, at the time of issue of 
summons, actually residing within the 
limits of the jurisdiction of the 
court; and
124 Sec.4 (1) , NLCA (1937) .
125 CNC, AR 1936, p.10.
126 Ag. SNA to PM, 8 Oct. 1935, S1561/49. See p. 129 
above.
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(c) the action or suit must be 
capable of being decided according to 
native law and custom.127
Furthermore, the Native Law and Courts Act did not
proscribe urban Native Courts and indeed many were
considered by local native commissioners to be serving an
important social purpose, especially in places with
numerous migrant workers .128
The ordinances in force north of the Zambezi 
prescribed that the courts administer the native law and 
custom prevalent in their jurisdiction with the proviso 
"so far as it is not repugnant to justice or morality or 
inconsistent with the provisions or any order of the King 
in Council or with any other law in force in the 
Territory".129 But these courts were also required to 
administer other ordinances and as such implemented both 
codified "customary" law and colonial statute law.
Southern Rhodesia's Native Law and Courts Act included no 
repugnancy clause, but relied on the relevant clause in
127 Sec. 7, NLCA (137) .
12S
The only study specific to urban African courts is G.L. 
Chavunduka, A Shona Urban Court. Gwelo:1979. Despite its 
claims that the Makoni Court in St Mary's Township is 
unique, native commissioners for Wankie and Gatooma both 
noted courts operating in the 1950s.
129 Native Courts Ordinance, Tanganyika (1929) sec.13 (a).
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the Order-in-Council of 1898, nor did it provide for the 
administration of statute law by the Native Courts.
In both East and Central Africa the Native courts 
were empowered to impose fines and/or imprisonment with 
or without hard labour for offences "against native law 
or custom" with the repugnancy clause controlling the 
jurisdiction.130 However, only in the Kenyan legislation 
was it stated that "no native tribunal shall pass a 
sentence of corporal punishment."131 In Northern Rhodesia 
the Native Courts were expressly permitted to order 
corporal punishment in cases of a criminal nature.132 In 
neither Tanganyika nor Nyasaland was there any explicit 
comment on corporal punishment. Furthermore, the Kenyan 
Native Tribunals had the power above and beyond that of 
the Tanganyikan Native Courts to imprison any person who 
defaulted on the payment of fines.133 The Northern 
Rhodesian Native Courts had similar powers,134 but in that 
colony the Ordinance included much greater detail on the
130 Sec. 15 of both the NCO (Tanganyika) and the NTO 
(Kenya).
131 NTO (Kenya) sec. 15.
132 Sec.14 (1) (c) , Native Courts Ordinance (1936),
Northern Rhodesia.
133 NTO (Kenya) sec. 17.
134 Sec.14 (4), Native Courts Ordinance (1936), Northern 
Rhodesia.
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application of this power. No such powers were granted 
in Southern Rhodesia.
In both Tanganyika and Kenya the courts were 
supervised by the Provincial Commissioners in two ways. 
First, the courts were required to submit, on a regular 
basis, reports of all cases heard.135 Secondly, these 
officers had the right to sit as advisers in the courts 
or tribunals of his district. The Provincial 
Commissioners also had the authority to delegate this 
task to district officers.136 Furthermore, revisionary 
powers granted to Provincial Commissioners and District 
Officers allowed them to alter decisions made in the 
Native courts either on application of "any person 
concerned" or simply "of his own motion".137 The relevant 
clauses allowed these officers to revise the proceedings, 
both criminal and civil, of the Native courts: to "make 
such order or pass such sentence" as was allowed to the 
Native court; order retrials before the same court or 
"before any other native court of competent 
jurisdiction"; and to "transfer any cause or matter 
either before trial or at any stage of the proceedings,
135 Sec 23 of both NCO (Tanganyika) and NTO (Kenya) .
136 Sec. 25 of both NCO (Tanganyika) and NTO (Kenya) .
137 Sec.32 NCO (Tanganyika); Sec.30 NTO (Kenya).
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whether before or after sentence passed or judgment given 
to any subordinate court of the first or second class."138 
Thus a great deal of direct intervention was permitted in 
the judicial aspect of indirect rule. Indeed, the clause 
authorizing Provincial Commissioners to sit as advisers 
in Native courts permitted much more direct interference 
than did the South African legislation.139 In Southern 
Rhodesia the Native Commissioners were given powers of 
revision and intervention identical to those of 
Tanganyika; however, these were adapted to the limited 
civil jurisdiction enjoyed by the Native Courts.140
North of the Zambezi, colonial authorities 
maintained a tighter rein on the proceedings and 
practices within the Native Courts themselves. Although 
similar powers were granted in Southern Rhodesia,141 
"Little [was] done to formalize court procedure and there 
[were] no proper records kept."142 One example of this 
was that chiefs were allowed to keep 'customary' tokens
138 Ibid.
139 See Sec. 12 of the Native Affairs Administration Act, 
1927 (South Africa).
140 Sec.10, NLCA (1937) .
141 Sec.11, NLCA (1937) .
142 Palley, Constitutional History and Law in Southern 
Rhodesia, 1888-1965. p.538.
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paid to the court, unlike in other British African 
Territories.143
Another important difference between the powers of 
the Southern Rhodesian Native Courts and those of its 
neighbours was the power of a chief to enforce his 
decisions. In Southern Rhodesia this was non-existent. 
Indeed, if the chief's counsellors disagreed openly with 
his judgment he was required to report this case to the 
Native Commissioner.144 Chiefs had "no powers to punish 
for contempt of court."145 This was later noted as a 
serious deficiency of the Native Law and Courts Act.146 
In East and Central Africa the respective ordinances 
supplied the penalty for contempt.147 In Southern 
Rhodesia any failure by a defendant or witness to attend 
a hearing was treated as an offence and as such entered 
the preserve of the Native Commissioner's court.148
143 Ibid. , p . 539 .
144 Sec. 6 (4), NLCA.
145 Palley, Constitutional History and Law, p.539.
146 See the Robinson Report.
147 Sec. 19, Native Courts Ordinance (1929), Tanganyika.
148 Sec. 9 (2) , NLCA.
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The Appeal Structure
In Tanganyika and Kenya appeals from the Native 
courts were made to a further court presided over by an 
African appointed by the Provincial Commissioner and 
designated as an appeal court. In districts where such a 
court did not exist, the appeal lay "from the Native 
court of first instance to a District Officer."149 In 
Kenya, the Native Tribunals Ordinance also provided for 
the Provincial Commissioner of the Coast Province to 
"appoint any liwali or mudir in the Protectorate to be a 
court of appeal".150
Appeals from the Native courts of appeal lay to the 
District Officer or, in Kenya, to the liwali or mudir.
The next rung took the appeal to the Provincial 
Commissioner. Finally, in Tanganyika an appeal could be 
made to the Governor, in Kenya the appellant could "apply 
to the Provincial Commissioner to state a case for the 
consideration of the Supreme Court".151 This distinction 
between the Kenyan and Tanganyikan structure is 
significant in constitutional terms in that African court 
cases could, in theory, once reaching a required level in 
the appellate structure be transferred to the regular
149 Sec. 33 of both NCO (Tanganyika) and NTO (Kenya) .
150 Sec. 33 (c) NTO (Kenya) .
151 All from Sec. 34 of both the NCO (Tanganyika) and the 
NTO (Kenya), direct quotation from Sec 34 (4) NTO.
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judiciary of the colonial state. The Kenyan variation 
was followed in both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.
In Southern Rhodesia the appeal route led more 
quickly into courts presided over by whites. An appeal 
from a chief's court lay with the Native Commissioner's 
court where, in fact, it was treated as a re-trial.152 
This was similar to the procedure in South Africa. From 
there the appeal would go to the Court of Appeal for 
Native Civil Cases, and beyond that to the High Court.153
Courts and the formulation of "customary" law
In Southern Rhodesia, where "native law and custom" 
was never officially codified, the regulation of 
"customary" law was exercised by the appeal structure. 
This allowed for local variation but ensured that no 
value going too much against the interest of the colonial 
regime would be supported. The relationships between the 
courts bear further examination for this. The 
pedagogical role that the Native Commissioners' courts 
played in relation to the chiefs' courts is demonstrated 
by the way in which chiefs would follow the lead of the 
Native Commissioners' decisions.154 The desire on the
152 Sec. 11, NLCA (1937) .
153 Sec. 21, Native Affairs Act, 1927, Southern Rhodesia.
154 See Chapter 5 below in which this theme is dealt with 
in the case study.
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part of chiefs to avoid appeals against their decisions 
compelled them to tailor judicial decisions in accordance 
with superior authorities. Thus, Native Commissioners' 
perceptions of what was valid "native law or custom" 
shaped chiefs decisions. We also know that chiefs and 
important ('big') people of the community shaped Native 
Commissioners understanding of what constituted "correct" 
native custom.155 It is clear that the interaction was 
not simple. Native Commissioners did not simply impose 
an ideal customary law, followed by chiefs and headmen in 
their own courts. Rather, both levels of court 
influenced each other. However, on some issues such as 
commercial debt, discussed in Chapter 5, the current 
flowed very heavily from the Native Commissioner in the 
direction of the chief's court.
This interaction did not begin following the 
promulgation of the Native Law and Courts Act. It began 
with the occupation of the country in 1890. One case 
from 1898 concerning an assault upon a woman by her 
brother resulted in the accused being taken by the Native 
Commissioner to the Resident Magistrate for trial. The 
Native Commissioner reported "Makobere [the accused] was 
returned to me by the R.M. to be tried by Chief Chibi,
155 It is interesting to note the number of articles 
appearing in NAPA, especially in its first decade, concerning 
"customary" law.
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under my supervision according to Native Custom and Chibi 
ordered him to pay one head of cattle to Marudauda [the 
victim] .1,156
Also, directed by the Southern Rhodesian Order-in- 
Council to follow "native law so far as that law is not 
repugnant to natural justice or morality", Native 
Commissioners were compelled to learn about local 
customs. Consultations with "an array of 'legal 
experts', invariably chiefs, headmen and male elders",157 
were sifted inevitably through two filters. The Native 
Commissioners could first reject any custom they 
considered contrary to natural justice, and furthermore 
simply ignore that which they perceived as irrelevant.
But it was the "big men" who were informing the Native 
Commissioners of that which they perceived as important. 
"Customary" law was not simply "invented", but certainly 
it was produced or created by men with their own, 
sometimes contending, agendas.
The simple presence of the Native Commissioner's 
court in a district shaped chiefly authority, disputing 
procedure (a discourse) and events. One case which 
reached the Native Commissioner's court in Lomagundi in 
193 3 involved a couple married in the Church of England.
156 NC Chibi, AR 1898, N 9/1/4.
157 E. Schmidt, Peasants. Traders and Wives: Shona Women 
in the History of Zimbabwe: 1870-1939. London:1992, p.107.
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The husband disowned his wife and sent her back to her 
father on several occasions, a common way of stating that 
the husband no longer wished to be married to his wife.
In her testimony Cigareta stated, "He [the husband] said 
my father was mad to send me back, as he did not want me. 
He suggested that I bring a suit to Chief Bepura's 
Court."158 She instead brought the case to the Native 
Commissioner's court, by passing Bepura. Another case 
from the Native Commissioner's court at Sipolilo includes 
a statement from Chief Matsiwo informing the Native 
Commissioner of how he would proceed in his own court.159
Conclusion
One of the curious elements of the debate within 
official circles concerning the recognition of courts was 
the representation of the NLCA as simply acknowledging 
facts. Why then was the state interested in recognising 
the courts? On the one hand this could be presented as 
making no concessions to Africans at all, yet on the 
other hand the power of Native Commissioners to compel 
litigants to comply with chiefs' decisions made it 
beneficial to chiefs. Furthermore, it formally brought
158 CR 85/33, 22.10.33, Lomagundi, S306.
159 CR 1/44, 17.3.44, Sipolilo, S 2033. Unfortunately the 
advice that he gives is mostly illegible and therefore not 
worthy of quotation.
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chiefs into the state with a status they had not 
previously enjoyed. The courts gave chiefs (limited) 
executive powers within the state.
The legislation promulgated in Southern Rhodesia 
ostensibly steered clear of the indirect rule formula 
adopted by the territories to the north and in East 
Africa; however, in substance there sometimes was little 
difference. An aspect of Southern Rhodesia's Native Law 
and Courts Act (1937) which remains curious is the 
omission of any clause explicitly making it an offence 
for unauthorized persons to preside over judicial 
proceedings. It would be twenty-five years before the 
usurpation of judicial authority would be considered by 
those in the Native Affairs Department as a threat to 
wider authority.
We shall now turn to look at the relationship 
between chiefs and Native Commissioners, that is the 
relationship between the individuals who represented the 
state and those acknowledged by the state to represent 
African society.
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Chapter 3
The Relations between 
"Traditional” Leaders and Native Commissioners
Introduction
The struggle for control of dispute proceedings in 
Southern Rhodesia involved the 'big men' of the African 
communities - the chiefs and headmen - and the Native 
Commissioners. Because they are the two kinds of office­
holders that most influenced each other in our period, it 
is important to examine their relationship closely. In 
the first chapter we looked at the larger politics within 
which the struggle for the control of dispute proceedings 
was set; now we return to look at that early struggle in 
greater detail. It is crucial to keep in mind that this 
chapter is addressing the perception of African and 
European office-holders "on the ground". Thus, for 
example, where it is the state that takes over famine 
management, to the local African the key individual is 
the local Native Commissioner. He is a representative of 
the state, but he is also perceived as an individual.
This chapter considers the relations between the 
native commissioners and chiefs of both Mashonaland and 
Matabeleland. Although the Native Affairs Department 
considered Shona and Ndebele chiefs to be different in 
character, this difference appeared to be based more on 
the illusory image created by Rhodes at the indaba of 
1896; the working relations appear to have differed only
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slightly, if at all. What is important is that many 
native commissioners moved between the provinces in their 
careers and no significant cleavages of policy developed 
between the two. Local variations were based on local 
conditions, not ethnicity or provincial jurisdiction.
Also, it must not be forgotten that individual native 
commissioners had their idiosyncrasies, an issue the 
Native Affairs Department wished to address in the 1930s.1 
The debate within the NAD over uniformity of practice was 
not restricted to the exercise of judicial authority, but 
rather was a major theme in the 1930s.
This chapter aims to set out the sources of 
legitimacy for each of the protagonists as well as the 
sources of authority they were able to draw upon. The 
shifting balance of these over time was crucial to the 
relationship between the "traditional" leaders and Native 
Commissioners. In later nineteenth-century Mashonaland, 
African leaders drew their authority from several 
different sources. In the northern regions in this 
period, legitimate authority was restricted to a limited 
number of aspirants to the chiefly position in any given 
succession dispute. On the mundane level, their 
positions rested on their ability to keep the peace - by 
dealing with both internal conflict and external threats. 
In short, they were political and military leaders. Many 
were also backed by the larger confederal Mutapa state
1 See Chapter 2 above.
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centred in present-day northern Zimbabwe and many were 
affected by the Portuguese prazo-holders. The Ndebele 
state affected those as far north as Guruve with its 
raiding.2
In the 1880s; Beach reminds us, the Shona chiefs
still had control of significant gold fields as well as
access to much ivory. He points out:
Their political institutions and territories 
were small only by comparison with the few 
super-states of Southern, Central and East 
Africa. By comparison with most polities of 
that area many Shona rulers held quite big 
territories. Most of them owned superb 
defensive sites.3
These chiefly positions were also legitimated by
religious ceremony. The spirit mediums played a key role
in the accession of a chief.
When, in 1894, the Native Department and the office
of Native Commissioner was instituted, the BSA Co. had no
clear policy concerning African leadership. In the
previous year they had been at war with the Ndebele and
following the death of Lobengula in 1893 the Company
ensured that no Ndebele paramount succeeded him. The
dispersal of political power by supporting "smaller"
chiefs at the expense of paramounts was a technique the
Native Affairs Department employed up until the late
2 D.N. Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe. 900-1850. Gweru: 
1980, p.153.
3 D.N. Beach, War and Politics in Zimbabwe. 1840-1900. 
Gweru: 1986, p. 29.
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1940s as a means both to dilute that power and to gain 
new loyalties. When all chiefs were ultimately dependent 
upon the Government for their positions, those who saw 
their power thus eroded were seldom in a position to halt 
the shoring-up of others, but instances have been 
reported. It was only in the 1950s that the Native 
Affairs Department reversed these techniques and made a 
policy decision to concentrate power among fewer chiefs 
in order to give chiefs, as a group, a more forceful 
voice. This project also included the establishment of 
Provincial Chiefs' Assemblies in 1951,4 although it was 
not until the following decade that the Government spon­
sored the establishment of a National Chiefs' Council, an 
issue to be discussed more fully in Chapter 6.
The relations between native commissioners and the 
"traditional" leaders may be considered in three periods. 
The first period, running from the quelling of the 1896-7 
rebellion to the early 1920s, is characterised by the 
native commissioners' general disdain for African leaders 
or elders. The collapse of "tribal authority" often 
noted in native commissioners' reports of this period was 
considered a positive step towards the eventual 
civilisation of Africans through the work of the 
missionaries and work itself. This apparent collapse was 
considered to be "opening-up" African society. It was 
often attributed to the erosion of chiefly power.
4 NC Gwanda, AR 1951, S 2827/2/2/1.
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Chiefly power was not itself considered an integral part 
of that structure. It was not until F.W.T. Posselt 
offered an analysis of African society as a coherent 
whole in the 1920s that these views began to change in 
the Native Affairs Department. In this first period 
chiefly power was being displaced by other agencies.
In the early 1920s, disdain towards the 
"traditional" leaders, and the relationship that arose 
from it, was re-examined for a number of reasons. The 
chiefs and headmen had not simply faded away, as many 
native commissioners and other Native Department 
officials had expected, but rather had maintained some 
measure of authority and indeed independence. Although 
it would be an overstatement to say that the Native 
Department regarded chiefs as a force to be reckoned 
with, it had recognised that the chiefs represented a 
resource, with an element of authority, that could be 
exploited. The conflict between the Native Affairs 
Department and the Southern Rhodesian Missionary 
Conference in the 1920s, discussed in Chapter 1, required 
the Department to move towards an alliance with chiefs in 
order to maintain its exclusive jurisdiction over "Native 
Affairs". The maintenance of "tribal organisation" was 
fundamental to the organisation of the NAD. Free 
movement of Africans beyond the control of chiefs or 
lineage heads did not make sense to the Department's 
conception of the governance of Africans, and indeed
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officials' understanding of the natural order of things 
in Africa.
The second period, therefore, runs from the conflict 
with the SRMC to the late 1950s, when the intensification 
of the alliance between Native Commissioners and chiefs 
was a key issue. The late 1950s is marked by the 
persistent lobbying by NAD officials for the extension of 
limited jurisdiction to selected chiefs' courts and the 
passage of a new Native Councils Act (1957) to replace 
its moribund predecessor. The period as a whole may be 
characterised by the formalisation of the relationship: a 
great deal of attention was paid by both chiefs and 
Native Commissioners to the form of that relationship.
This second period in which chiefs were being built up 
with formal powers may be usefully subdivided into two 
further periods. The first runs up to the late 1940s and 
is characterized by the granting of increased formal 
powers to an increased number of Chiefs. In the sub­
period which followed immediately the Chiefs and Headmen 
hierarchy was more strictly imposed - one might say that 
it was rationalised - as many Chiefs were demoted to 
Headmen and chiefly powers granted by the government 
concentrated in fewer men. Also there was a shift away 
from formal relationships to greater ideological 
interchange as the relationships were consolidated. The 
growing nationalist challenge clearly sharpened the 
differences between chiefs who leaned towards greater
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involvement with the native commissioner and the state, 
and those who leaned towards involvement in nationalist 
politics.
The third period, from the late 1950s to the 1970s, 
saw this attention move to a much more ideological level. 
The chiefs were consulted in a new way, and in new 
forums. But those forums were created by the Native 
Affairs Department, hence the input was controlled.
This chapter will further explore important themes 
relating to the chief-native commissioner relationship 
that cannot be so easily periodized. Consideration is 
given to the relationship of space and authority 
regarding the chiefs. Secondly, one of the pre-colonial 
duties of chiefs was to be suppliers of relief in famine 
years. As the state took over this role in various forms 
throughout the twentieth century, this appears to have 
had a serious impact on the status of chiefs. John 
Iliffe has raised the issue as one for further study,5 and 
here I wish to draw attention to it.
The available evidence, particularly for the early 
years of colonial rule, is unfortunately largely provided 
by colonial administrators, especially the native 
commissioners. This does not discredit it, but it does 
require careful consideration and interpretation. For 
example, the native commissioners' comments regarding 
chiefly power reflects their assessment of chiefs as
5 John Iliffe, Famine in Zimbabwe. 1890-1960. Gweru: 1990.
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effective administrative tools, rather than any hard 
evidence as to the actual power of chiefs. Those 
perceptions are indicative of the relationship between 
chiefs and native commissioners. It is that 
relationship, and some of the factors affecting it, that 
this chapter is addressing.
Displacing the Chiefs
African society was in upheaval after the conquest.
In some areas the old order had collapsed, in others it
was under challenge while in some it persisted. The
impact of conquest was extremely uneven and in 1900 the
Acting NC Lomagundi, C.L.D. Monro, wrote:
The Native Laws and customs have more or less 
been ignored since the white men came to the 
country, but still in some outlying Districts 
one hears of cases in which some Chiefs 
exercise their authority by imposing fines on 
culprits for various offenses, and in cases of 
murder ordering the murderers to be killed.6
Beach has suggested that the wholesale re­
organisation of Shona political units which took place as 
a result of the BSA Co. conquest included Africans acting 
as independent agents exploiting a given situation for 
their maximum gain. In one long-established dynasty, in 
the north-east a southern branch "took advantage of the 
onset of Rhodesian rule and the geographical barriers
6 Acting NC Lomagundi, AR 1899-1900, N 9/1/6.
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[i.e. the Umvukwe Range] to found the independent
Chiweshe nzou dynasty."7
From the beginning, native commissioners were aware
that their presence had an important effect upon the
chiefs' position within the new state. In 1901 Alfred
Drew, NC Victoria, and later an outspoken critic of the
Native Affairs Department,8 included in his report for
Gutu District, for which he was also temporarily
responsible,
When the present [Chief] Gutu was appointed 
Chief in 1895 he would have been overcome by 
the other sections of the tribe if the 
Government had not supported him. The other 
sections were so much against him.9
The dispersal of authority amongst the chiefs had
contradictory effects depending upon the standing of the
chief. In 1898 Drew noted in Victoria District that the
pre-colonial political hierarchy had been considerably
compressed by the colonial overlords. Paramount chiefs
were reduced to a status virtually equal to that of
"small chiefs". When those "small chiefs" received
"considerable support" from the government, their
authority was nearly equal to that of the unsupported
paramount chiefs. Indeed, it appears that Native
Department officials further eroded the status of the
7 Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe, pp.146-47.
8 A. Drew, Articles on Native Affairs (2 vols.),
[Salisbury?: c.1920-25].
9 Gutu, AR, 1900-01, N9/1/7.
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paramount chiefs through exploiting "to a great
extent. . . their Sub-Chiefs . "10
It was also in 1898 that Hulley, the NC Umtali until
1918, remarked upon an entirely different element
undermining the chiefs' authority. The payment of
Government subsidies, he wrote,
has the tendency to deminish [sic] the power of 
the chief. The natives saying that now he is 
supported by the company there is no need for 
them to supply him with food etc. That now the 
Native Commissioner is applied to redress there
[sic] grievances and the chief is a mere
nonentity.11
The changing sources of status and wealth had a 
considerable impact upon the legitimacy and authority of 
chiefs. This report suggests that for many Africans 
tribute-labour had lost its meaning or context as part of
the 'social contract' of exchanging labour for famine
relief. The presence and the activities of the 
colonisers had already begun to distort the role of the 
chief towards the people who paid tribute to him in one 
form or another in Umtali, a town of very early 
settlement.
This report also provides us with further clues to 
the erosion of chiefly authority. In pre-colonial times 
it was a duty of African leaders to organise famine 
management. This was achieved largely by levying a
10 NC Victoria, AR 1897-98, N9/1/4.
11 NC Umtali, AR 1897-98, N9/1/4.
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tribute in grain or labour on the fields to ensure an
extra store of grain that could be used in drought or
famine years. The loss of authority to levy that tribute
resulted in the loss of the ability to supply a scarce
resource in time of need. The failure to fulfil
traditional duties consequently led to the loss of
legitimacy and the breakdown of the 'social contract'.
In 1910 the Native Commissioners were officially
granted magisterial powers by virtue of the Native
Regulations published under Proclamation 55.12 This
assigned to Native Commissioners still more of the rights
and duties of pre-colonial leaders, and indeed the use of
a chief's court was considered a form of tribute. The
new scheme by no means displaced the chiefs,* but it did
clearly present the Native Commissioner as an alternative
to the chief. The CNC Mashonaland saw the displacement
as a long-term process that would come about as Africans
came to prefer British-style justice to Shona justice.
Commenting upon the newly acquired powers, he wrote:
For natives to understand our idea of justice, 
it is necessary for the judicial officer to be 
in entire sympathy with them, and to understand 
their train of thought. Such knowledge can 
only be acquired by long intercourse with them.
To the native mind, the only person who 
can give him justice is his chief, for justice 
with him is a personal thing. Under the old 
regime it was not in his power to question his 
chief's decisions, it was the chief's personal 
opinion he asked for. The Native Commissioner
12 CNC Mashonaland, AR 1910, N9/1/13.
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is now the person who supplies the blank left 
through the taking away of the Chief's power, 
consequent on the removal of the tribal 
system.13
Although the CNC Mashonaland also suggested in 1910 that 
the issue of granting chiefs judicial powers be 
"reconsidered”, this appears to have been in order to 
give the Native Affairs Department time to develop policy 
and programmes that would "develop" African life. He 
wrote:
We are gradually breaking down their clan 
system and with it goes their religion and the 
restraint of the people; but it must be 
admitted, I think, that we have not given them 
any adequate substitute. The tribal system 
with all its faults was the most potent factor 
in controlling all human interests, and was a 
deterent [sic] to all crime, and by it alone 
was family life rendered inviolate.
As a consequence of the removal of the old 
system, the power of the Chiefs is waning and 
the women both married and unmarried are 
becoming loser [sic] in their morals....14
One Native Commissioner, T.B. Hulley, attributed the
"gradual decay of the tribal system" to the "spread of
education, the facilities for movement from one part of
the country to another and the feeling of security the
natives possess under a settled European Government".15
Civilization, in the eyes of many NAD officials, was
slowly but surely overcoming barbarism. The chiefs were
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 NC Umtali, AR 1910, N9/1/13.
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seen as part of barbarism. However, they also perceived
the chiefs as the only source of authority that could
prevent African life collapsing into anarchy. At this
time the Native Department tentatively supported
"barbarism" over anarchy.
Around 1910 the Native Commissioners had low
expectations of the chiefs in their districts. Indeed,
their reports sound as though they were not in very close
contact with the chiefs at this time. The NC Chibi,
Peter Forrestall, commented,
Chiefs have performed their work fairly 
satisfactorily, especially if there is taken 
into consideration the small amount of 
authority the Makalaka chief has over his 
people, and the fear of being bewitched by 
people he has reported to the Native 
Commissioner.16
E.G. Howman, a Native Commissioner who left a personal
mark on the Department, commented in a much more self-
critical tone:
It cannot be said that the Chiefs carry out 
their duties properly. It is not surprising 
that this is so, considering that for nearly 2 
decades it has been the one endeavour to do 
away with their power, they cannot be expected 
to regain their old power and acquire the art 
of ruling in a few short years.17
Over the next decade such comments appeared
regularly in the district annual reports. Different
Native Commissioners emphasized slightly different
16 NC Chibi, AR 1910, N9/1/13 .
17 Acting NC Victoria, AR 1910, N9/1/13.
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aspects of their relationships with the chiefs, but the 
tenor of the reports on chiefs was that their power was 
in decline and, in any case, it was not worth all that 
much. In 1915 the NC Hartley, L.C. Meredith, stated that 
the "Chiefs and Headmen have been fairly satisfactory 
since I have given them support in the management of 
their people,"18 while another remarked that the "average 
native...prefers... to seek redress if such is needed from 
the representatives of the Government."19 But in many 
areas, the Native Department was only too willing to 
marginalise the chiefs' influence.
While it is difficult to evaluate the general 
relationship between Native Commissioners and chiefs from 
this one-sided evidence, it does appear that it was 
usually less close than the Native Commissioners cared to 
admit to their superiors. The exaggeration of the demise 
of the chiefs, as evidenced in the NCs' Annual District 
Reports, suggests that the Native Commissioners injected 
a large dose of wishful thinking into their reports. In 
1917 the Superintendent of Natives (SN), Salisbury, and 
two other Native Commissioners made reports that further 
suggest the relationships were dependent upon the 
personalities involved. The SN Salisbury, Taberer, 
wrote:
18 NC Hartley, AR 1915, N9/1/18.
19 Acting NC Mazoe, AR 1915, N9/1/18.
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In the more remote districts they [e.g. chiefs 
and headmen] still hold a certain amount of 
power and authority over their tribes, but in 
other districts, more in touch with 
civilization, they are losing control of their 
following and individualism is creeping in.20
From the northerly district of Darwin it was reported
that "In the majority of cases their power has
vanished."21 Meanwhile the NC Lomagundi revealed a much
more sophisticated understanding of the existing
relationship between the chief and Native Commissioner
and the possibilities it held for the administration of
African affairs in Southern Rhodesia:
The new Dandawa has done excellent work. He is 
a power in the [Zambezi] Valley and in the 
absence of an Official at Urungwe his activity 
and influence has been of the greatest value.
The new Nematambo commands the respect of his 
tribe, and promises to be a useful Chief.22
This clearly displays that the criterion by which native
commissioners evaluated the "power" of chiefs was their
utility - for whatever reason - to the Native Department
itself and not the chiefs' ability to exert their own
authority over their "followers".
Roger Howman, later a Native Commissioner and
researcher with the Native Affairs Department, has
recently supported the view that the relationships were
highly individual and lacked policy directives. "It was
20 SN Salisbury, AR 1917, N9/1/20.
21 B.S. Terry, Acting NC Darwin, AR 1917, N9/1/20.
22 NC Lomagundi, AR 1917, N9/1/20.
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only in the 1940s that real kinds of principles of
administration appeared. Each NC [prior to this] had his
own particular method."23 But Howman also tells us that
the chiefs were actively involved in shaping the
relationships between themselves and the native
commissioners:
The first thing a chief had to do when a new 
man [NC] came was to go and meet and talk to 
him and weigh him up - and they're pretty good 
psychologists.24
The issue of controlling the African population, and the
related question of chiefs' ability to control "their
followers" was a persistent problem for the native
commissioners. As early as 1913 native commissioners
displayed an understanding that they were in some way
dependent upon the chiefs. One Native Commissioner
stationed in Matabeleland wrote,
Few of the chiefs or head-men exercise any 
control over the natives under them. They are, 
however, necessary as intermediaries between 
the Government and people.25
In 1916, F.W.T. Posselt, the Acting NC, Wankie,
elaborated upon this: "There is an increasing tendency to
break away from tribal control ....rendering efficient
control more difficult."26 While this was the attitude of
23 Roger Howman, 0RAL/H03, p. 6.
24 Ibid. , p . 48 .
25 NC Belingwe, AR 1913, N9/1/16.
26 Acting NC Wankie, AR 1916, N9/1/19.
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the Native Commissioners in Matabeleland it must also be 
kept in mind that the prevailing attitude in the Native 
Affairs Department was that "the Mashona Chiefs never had 
the power over their people that the Matabele Chiefs had 
over theirs, so they are not quite as useful as the 
latter are."27 In 1913 E.G. Howman, then the NC Hartley, 
commented that most of the chiefs in that district "have 
had the lesson that they are unfit to govern so impressed 
upon them, that all attempts to reach their people 
through them have had to be given up."28
Only in 1918 was the Native Department able to 
define a role for, and direct chiefs within the 
Department. In district annual reports for 1918 and 
1919, the participation of chiefs and headmen in the 
collection of taxes was often noted.29 The involvement of 
chiefs in this task appears to have built up the 
possibility of a long-term working relationship between 
the "traditional" leaders and the native commissioners. 
However, it was another ten years before the 
relationships were formalised in law.
Over this first period it seems that a number of 
factors may have acted as catalysts in what was widely 
perceived as the decline of chiefly control. First was
27 SN Victoria, AR 1914, N9/1/17.
28 NC Hartley, AR 1913, N9/1/16.
29 see District Annual Reports, 1918, N9/1/21 and 1919, 
N9/1/22.
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the increasing involvement of younger men and women in 
migrant labour systems. Secondly, the chiefs' 
"sovereignty" was brought into question by the very 
presence of the Native Commissioner and the opportunity 
of appealing to him in civil cases, which was being taken 
by more and more Africans. Thirdly, there was the loss 
of control of land. Fourthly, the famine in 1916 raised 
more acutely than ever the question of who best could 
mobilise emergency food supplies. Fifthly, the missions 
appear to have been disruptive of the old order,* and 
sixthly, native commissioners manipulated the institution 
of chieftainship in various ways, resulting in confusion 
and general erosion of legitimacy and authority.
Each of these factors affected the relationship 
between chief and native commissioners. The latter had 
been labour recruiters and tax collectors from the 
outset. Taxation, of course, was a primary reason for 
joining the wage-labour market, and Africans were likely 
to regard native commissioners as providing access to the 
new domains of the labour centres, largely beyond 
patriarchal lineage control. Furthermore, the Native 
Marriage Ordinance (1901) had undermined the control of 
lineage heads over women. Indeed, the Native Adultery 
Punishment Ordinance (1916) was a response by the NAD to 
"lobbying" by the "traditional" leaders to regain some of 
the lost control. Jeater has argued:
The 1916 NAPO had been instigated by...rural
patriarchs, even though it reflected a European
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concept of adultery. The following year, the 
1917 Native Marriages Ordinance appeared to 
consolidate their legal power in these matters 
with a law insisting upon the details of 
'customary marriage' .30
How closely tied the native commissioners and the 
missionaries were perceived to be is difficult to assess. 
However, it is clear that the chiefs considered native 
commissioners to be the most appropriate persons to 
approach in order to exercise some restraint upon the 
missions.
A specific area in which chiefly authority was 
eroded was that of famine relief management. Loss of the 
ability to be the providers in time of famine led to the 
erosion of chiefly legitimacy and authority. This role 
of provider was taken over, progressively, by the state.
In 1903 native commissioners played but a minor role in 
famine relief,31 but this changed rapidly over the next 
nineteen years. Iliffe considers the famine of 1922 to 
be the first in which the state clearly took on the 
responsibility of famine relief management.32 But the 
1916 famine was, perhaps, the one in which authority was 
most lacking in rural society. Famines acted, I would
30 Diana Jeater, Marriage. Perversion and Power:, the 
construction of moral discourse in Southern Rhodesia. 1890- 
1930. Oxford: 199, p. 308.
31 Iliffe, Famine in Zimbabwe, p.31.
32 Ibid. , p . 68 .
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argue, as crisis points in chiefly power. As such, the 
1916 famine is crucial for this study.
The 1916 famine coincided with a period in which 
chiefs received very little support from European 
agencies. The authority of chiefs and headmen appears to 
have been at a low ebb and one of the roles in which the 
legitimacy of traditional leaders was anchored had been 
seriously eroded. State intervention in this area was 
not yet particularly active, but the inability of the 
chiefs to provide was apparent. Increasing numbers of 
men went to work on the mines "voluntarily" as well as 
swelling the number of RNLB recruits in famine years,33 
further undermining the status of chiefs as community 
providers.
This source of legitimacy was clearly linked to the 
authority to demand tribute labour to work his fields 
that would then in turn reap a harvest that could be 
shared by the community in times of hunger.34 As the 
Southern Rhodesian government demanded that the chiefs 
deliver chibharo labour for the mines in the early 
decades of this century, the legitimate demands that 
chiefs were able to make on their followers appear to 
have worn thin, making it increasingly difficult to 
demand labour on their own fields. The consequent 
failure to provide in times of need further diminished
33 Charles van Onselen, Chibaro. London: 1976, p.109.
34 M.F.C. Bourdillon, The Shona Peoples. Gweru:1976 p.114.
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their credibility. When the state took an active role in
managing famine relief, individual Africans could see a
new individual, the Native Commissioner, providing where
the chief was failing.
Lan offers an important analysis of the matrix of
land, production and chiefly legitimacy. He writes:
The cycle of exchange which had for so long 
bound chief, ancestors and living men together 
in an unequal but flexible relationship finally 
broke apart. In the past, certain days of each 
month had been set aside for the followers of 
the chief to carry out agricultural tasks on 
his fields. This labour was given in return 
for access to land, the inalienable possession 
of the chief 1s ancestors. The grain that 
resulted from this labour was returned to those 
who produced it either directly, in times of 
famine, or indirectly in the form of beer 
contributed by the chief for consumption during 
the annual rituals at which the royal ancestors 
were requested to provide the rain. Now three 
separate cycles emerged. In the first the 
state exchanged cash with the chiefs for 
loyalty. In the second the chief's male 
followers, no longer able to rely on the royal 
granaries or on trade to support them in time 
of need, offered their labour power to the 
market in exchange for wages. And in the third 
exchange contributions of grain for the annual 
rain-bringing ceremonies were made, in Dande at 
least, by the heads of individual households.35
Although Lan may be criticised for presenting an
oversimplified picture, here his analysis is valuable.
However, he overlooks the role of the state in famine
management, especially from 1916 onwards. As it had been
the chiefs' obligation to distribute famine relief, the
35 David Lan, Guns and Rain. Harare: 1985, pp.137-38.
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state in assuming this role could have no other effect
but to weaken the chiefs' legitimacy and deepen a
developing cleavage between the average rural African and
the chiefs who were claiming a role of authority.
Other ways in which the Native Commissioners were
displacing the chiefs included the division of a "tribe"
between several established chiefs,36 the revival of
chieftainship and the demotion of chiefs.37 Long before
the rationalisation of African leaders in the late 1940s,
demotion was an option used against recalcitrant chiefs.
For example, in 1917 Chief Makoni was demoted.38 In
1920 he was deposed. That year the NC Makoni also
reported that
The Chiefs and Headmen have very little power 
and it is becoming increasingly necessary to 
deal with natives as individuals and not 
through Chiefs. The Chiefs are not desirous of 
retaining their power as it means responsi­
bility and they are not anxious for this.39
Presumably the responsibility was accompanied by very
little influence and was therefore not very attractive.
The use of legal instruments to impose the formal
hierarchy that began around 1920 may also been seen as an
early step to bolster and shape the "traditional" leaders
in such a way as to serve the Native Department's needs.
36 NC Umtali, AR 1917, N9/1/20.
37 NC Makoni, AR 1917, N9/1/20.
38 Ibid.
39 NC Makoni, AR 1920, N9/1/23.
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At the end of the decade headmen were prosecuted for the
first time under Proclamation 55, 1910, for failure "to
carry out the orders of their Chiefs",-40 similarly a chief
was "prosecuted and fined for impertinence to the Native
Commissioner" .41
In 1920 the NAD began to address the question of
what it actually wished the Chiefs and Headmen to do.
The minutes of the Conference of Superintendents of
Natives that year read,
Chiefs and their Powers: Adoption of uniformity 
of system throughout the territory as regards 
their duties and powers. Inducements to be 
given to Chiefs to engage their sons as 
messengers, if necessary the latter to be paid 
small salaries by the government and recognised 
as Special Constables.
This was already in practice in the Victoria Division,
and the Conference of the Superintendents of Natives in
1920 resolved, 'That the system adopted some years ago in
the Gutu district of paying Chiefs' messengers £1 per
annum in respect of their services be extended to other
districts as need arises.'42
Although the question was being addressed, it is 
questionable whether the NAD was having much impact in 
this respect. The following year the Asst. NC Buhera 
reported that it was increasingly necessary "to station
40 NC Selukwe, AR 1919, N9/1/22.
41 NC Umzingwane, AR 1920, N9/1/23.
42 Minutes of the Conference of S/Ns held at Salisbury, 
August 31 & September 1, 1920, p.2, S 138/37.
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Native Department Messengers in different parts of the 
Reserve to take the place of Chiefs and Headmen in 
enforcing observance of Laws and Regulations."43
In many respects, chiefs' powers had been displaced 
by the intervention of native commissioners, directly or 
indirectly. But in the early 1920s several factors 
brought into question whether this led to increased 
Native Affairs Department efficacy. First, the lack of 
organic connection the Native Department had with African 
society undermined the Department's authority and 
legitimacy both within African society and beyond. It 
was because of this that the Southern Rhodesian 
Missionary Conference was able to threaten the 
Department's dominance in all spheres of Native Affairs.44 
Secondly, the Native Department did not have Africans who 
could act in an intercalary position, interpreting 
Departmental policy. Thirdly, the economic depression 
that hit Southern Rhodesia from 1922 put a squeeze on 
government finances, including that of the Native 
Department, and "traditional" leaders offered cheap 
staff. The Department was short-staffed and simply 
needed more people to carry out its basic work. The 
displacement of chiefs primarily to preclude the 
emergence of powerful Africans did not serve any positive 
purpose for the Native Department.
43 NC Charter, AR 1921, N9/1/24.
44 See pp. 99-101 above.
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Another major element that filled the power vacuum 
in rural areas immediately after the 1896-97 rebellions 
were the missions. Missionaries exploited the window of 
opportunity opened when African resistance was broken, 
and over the next two decades expanded and consolidated 
their influence. For the missions, it was "a period of 
great power and influence during which they were, as sour 
Native administrators remarked, the real rulers of large 
areas of rural Mashonaland."45 The missions disrupted the 
old order through education which schooled children in 
Christianity, offered refuge to young women from 
patriarchal control and introduced an entirely new form 
of marriage that undermined some of the most basic forms 
of social control in African society.
Building the Chiefs
In response to the challenge from the Southern 
Rhodesian Missionary Conference in the 1920s, the NAD 
began to form an alliance with the "traditional" leaders, 
by bolstering the offices of chief and headman. The 
Native Affairs Act (1927) provided the strongest 
legislative framework to date, and this was followed by 
the Native Law and Courts Act and the Native Councils Act 
of 1937. These legislative measures put the native 
commissioner-chief relationship on a more formal footing.
45 T. 0. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia. 1896-7. 
London: 1967, p.338.
198
Despite these measures, individual relationships
determined the real terrain. In order to gain an
understanding of what was happening on the ground we must
go through the general trends as expressed in native
commissioners' reports.
In 1924 Col. Carbutt, the SN Victoria and later CNC,
proposed that the Native Affairs Department adopt his own
practice of putting new chiefs on probation with a
subsidy; should the chief prove himself worthy, he might
remain as chief with an increased subsidy. But
where an Acting Chief or Acting Headman 
repeatedly fails in his duty, it be competent 
to entirely withdraw his subsidy, and appoint a 
native Government representative through whom 
the duties usually performed by the local Chief 
are carried out.46
This early attempt to manipulate the selection of the
office holder, whatever that office might be, appears
also to have been the last, if not the only, proposal to
separate formally the "government representative" and the
"chief": Carbutt suggested that "while allowing the
natives to recognise the hereditary man for their own
purposes, it would be better for the Government to
appoint and pay its own representative."47 Discussion of
"chiefly succession" carried on for years afterwards as
officials tried to formulate policy regarding it; and
46 Proceedings of the Conference of NCs of Victoria
Circle, Oct 9-10, 1924, p.5, S 138/37.
47 Ibid.
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intertwined with succession was the role the chief could 
perform for the NAD. However, no uniform policy was ever 
adopted and native commissioners were left to treat local 
situations individually.
Despite the recognition given to chiefs by the 
Native Affairs Act, and the fact that many native 
commissioners were recognising chiefs' courts in 
anticipation of the NLCA, one native commissioner felt in 
1934 that it was still appropriate to note "the fast 
waning authority of Chiefs and Headmen".48 The perception 
of collapsing chiefly authority was uneven throughout the 
country, but it is not surprising that it was an 
Assistant Native Commissioner who ventured to report, 
against the grain of received wisdom in the Native 
Affairs Department, that "Chiefs and Headmen...appear to 
retain a surprising degree of authority over their 
tribesmen. "49
In anticipation of new legislation in the form of 
the NLCA and the Native Councils Act (1937) , and to 
address the problem of "waning authority", individual 
Native Commissioners took action locally. In 1935 the NC 
Charter, F. Hulley, vowed that "An attempt will be made
48 NC Nyamondhlovu, AR 1934, S 235/512. It is only in
1936 that any official displays any awareness that it is a 
pretty tired thing to claim. The NC Bubi wrote "It is almost 
cliche to say that their position with their waning authority 
and the gradual detribalisation of their people becomes yearly 
more difficult." AR 1936, S 235/515.
49 Asst. NC Que Que, AR 1934, S 235/512.
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this year to revive the Chiefs’ interest in civil
cases."50 That same year the NC Mtoko and future CNC, L.
Powys-Jones, urged in his annual report that
every effort should be made to foster the 
tribal and family control, and I hope that the 
proposal to grant increased powers to Chiefs 
will be approved and soon be an accomplished 
fact.51
These increased powers, of course, were conferred by the 
Native Law and Courts Act two years later. Over a period 
of twenty years the attitudes of the Native Commissioners 
regarding chiefly powers had been reversed. No longer 
were they expressing satisfaction at the perceived 
inevitable demise of the chiefs; rather, they were moving 
as quickly as possible to bolster those positions and 
accord them limited judicial powers. Indeed, there was 
even the desire to extend these powers to include 
adjudication over some petty crimes. The objective was 
to ensure that a "tribal" structure that could be useful 
to the NAD administration of Africans would be 
effectively established.
In 193 9 the NC Gwanda reported that the chiefs and 
headmen "welcomed the re-building of tribal control."52 
In other areas the effect of the NLCA was less obvious. 
From Makoni it was reported that the Native Commissioner
50 NC Charter, AR 1935, S 235/514.
51 NC Mtoko, AR 1935, S 235/514.
52 NC Gwanda, AR 1939, S 235/517.
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was appealed to from the headmen's decisions "almost as a 
matter of course - to seek some more favourable (to them) 
decision.1,53
The "re-building" largely manifested itself in the 
construction of tradition. The assertion of chiefly 
authority through legal apparatuses such as the Native 
Affairs Act and the NLCA in a sense made chiefs dependent 
upon the state for their positions beyond simply that of 
their appointment. Chiefs' authority now derived from 
the state. The NC Makoni, F. A. Phayre, reported in 1939 
that
it is just as well a record of native custom 
exists, for if the present trends of thoughts 
and happenings continue there will be few 
happenings in our native life that can be said 
to be true, and ancient custom.54
Since the Native Affairs Department itself never codified
African "customary" law in the sense in which this was
done in other British colonies, this "record" is
presumably the ethnography-cum-administrative textbook by
Charles Bullock, The Mashona.55
53 NC Makoni, AR 1939, S 235/517.
54 Ibid.
55 The Native Affairs Department Annual may also be 
considered a sort of record as this journal constantly 
published ethnographic writings by members of the Department. 
It is interesting to note that many of the articles dealt with 
"customary" law, displaying the belief of most people in the 
Department that this was a true expression of African custom.
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The "re-building" also took more concrete forms, as
in the construction of court houses solidly supported by
Native Commissioners throughout Southern Rhodesia as a
means of improving the chiefs' courts' "dignity, status
and effectiveness".56 Chiefs had been quick to make use
of such symbolic power from as early as 1937 to
legitimate and consolidate their positions.57 In Mtoko a
chief requested that the Native Commissioner, Phayre,
build a court house for him.50 One eager Native
Commissioner declared that the date of the opening of
such a building should be recorded as "A red letter day
in the history of the Reserve" and explained,
Such tangible evidence of the importance of the 
Chief, together with the facilities for modern 
judicial and administrative functioning of 
traditional power, should have incalculable 
influence, and that the Chief and his people 
appreciate such facilities is beyond doubt and 
expressed in many ways.59
In court procedure not everything was so simple and 
straightforward. The NC Charter, F. Hulley, displayed an 
ignorance of the structural weaknesses of the court 
structure when, in 1938, he reported that
56 Federation of African Welfare Societies, Report on an 
inquiry into Native Courts. Salisbury: 1952; Policy, Inferior 
Courts, Loc. 21.18.HR, box no. 100827, Records Centre.
57 CNC, AR 1937, p. 10.
58 NC Mtoko, AR 1939, S 235/517.
59 Asst. NC Wedza, AR 1948, S 1563.
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The chiefs, as a whole, have not made any 
progress in controlling their areas, nor are 
they capable of deciding any case where there 
is not agreement between claimant and debtor.60
The structure certainly made it easy for a disputant to 
use the chief's court simply to discover his opponent's 
arguments before going to a court that was competent to 
order a settlement. However, some native commissioners 
did see this weakness and made efforts to counteract it. 
The NC Victoria, Jackson, referred Africans from the 
Reserves to the chiefs' courts in order to reinforce the 
chiefs' authority.61 In the early 1960s this became a 
matter of policy both as a means of relieving the Native 
Commissioners' workload and bolstering the chiefs' status 
and authority.
The onset of the Second World War placed new demands 
on the relationship between chief and native 
commissioner. The conscription of African labour was 
intensified for the war effort. Such labour was used 
both for specific projects such as the construction of 
aerodromes,62 and as a means of boosting the flagging pro­
duction of the white agricultural sector.63
60 NC Charter, AR 1938, S 235/516.
61 NC Victoria, AR 1938, S 235/516.
62 NC Hartley, AR 1942, S 1563.
63 David Johnson, "The Impact of the Second World War on 
Southern Rhodesia, with Special Reference to African Labour, 
1939-48", Ph.D., London: 1989.
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In 1942 the NC Hartley made a most interesting
report which suggests that some chiefs, at least, were
very agile in making use of their state backing to
increase both their authority and their legitimacy:
In my opinion Chiefs have done well in this 
year of compulsory labour and rising prices.
Chivero started badly when called upon to 
produce labourers for the defence of the Colony 
(Norton Aerodrome) but was lectured and quickly 
realised that his big chance had come to regain 
the functions of a chief. The Chief's position 
in their tribes has appreciated considerably 
during the year, and their judicial work (only 
Mashanyangombe has actually been appointed) has 
been of considerable assistance to this office.
I estimate that they save the services of one 
full time A.N.C., a fact which might be taken 
into consideration when fixing their 
subsidies.64
Chiefs were not simply alienated, which would have been 
contrary to government aims rather the new demands placed 
on chiefs provided them with an opportunity to assert 
their authority. Moreover, it appears that control of 
civil disputing was at once a symbol of that authority, 
and a legitimating tool. In Gwanda the Native 
Commissioner reported that the "Native Courts have 
operated smoothly and tribal control is gradually being 
reclaimed."65 In another district, Sebungwe, the chief 
appeared to make no use of state support to assert 
himself. His position, we are told, was so bad that he 
"was deposed chiefly at the request of his people who
64 Ibid.
65 NC Gwanda, AR 1942, S 15 63.
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felt that the tribe was disintegrating under his 
mismanagement."66 In this case the Native Commissioner 
was clearly in close contact with a group of community 
leaders who may, as is often the case, have been self- 
styled .
We may observe further interaction between the 
Chiefs and the Native Commissioners through the medium of 
legal appeals for the retrial of cases heard in the 
Chief's court. In 1938 the NC Marandellas, Morkel, 
commented upon the "marked tendency" of unsuccessful 
litigants to simply try again at the Native 
Commissioner's court. He suggested that a deterrent fee 
of £2 be charged to prevent excessive appeals.67 In the 
main, Native Commissioners were eager to uphold Chiefs' 
decision, both to maintain the Chiefs' authority and 
prevent a flood of retrials at the Native Commissioners' 
courts. As early as 1947 the NC Shangani stated that all 
the civil cases in that district were first heard by the 
Chief.68 It was another fifteen years before this became 
prevalent practice in Southern Rhodesia.
Ten years after the passing of the NLCA, courts were 
still being granted formal recognition. The reports for 
1947 of two Native Commissioners make clear that the 
policy of supporting, and indeed extending, Chiefs'
66 Danson, NC Sebungwe, AR 1941, S 1563.
67 NC Marandellas, AR 1938, S 235/516.
68 NC Shangani, AR 1947, S 1563.
powers was still endorsed by the local administrators.69 
However, the NC Selukwe was frustrated by the elderly 
incumbent of the Ndema chieftaincy. "His judgements in 
Civil Cases can only on rare occasions be upheld by this 
Office and consequently his followers usually bring their 
cases direct to this Court."70 It appears that some 
chiefs, at least, became adept at making use of their 
relationship with the Native Commissioner and the court 
he presided over. The NC Belingwe commented upon this in 
1952 when he reported, "If a case is presented to a Chief 
and he is uncertain as to the most popular decision he 
will send the case on to the Native Commissioner and so 
avoid trouble himself."71 Although this particular case 
may simply reflect a changed attitude on the part of the 
Native Commissioner who suggests the Chief is taking an 
active decision, as opposed to his colleagues who had 
always stated that it was the litigants who made the 
decision to take the case further, it also indicates that 
chiefs are using the authority of the NAD to avoid their
own authority being undermined by the appeal process.
Rather than laying himself open to blame for an unpopular 
decision, the chief instead put the onus on the Native 
Commissioner who, unlike the Chiefs, had the authority to 
enforce his own decisions.
69 NC Bubi, AR 1947, S 1563; NC Selukwe, AR 1947, S 1563.
70 NC Selukwe, AR 1947, S 1563.
71 NC Belingwe, AR 1952, S 2403/2681
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It was also during the War that a renewed emphasis
was placed upon "development" in the African sector, in
both agriculture and trade. In 1944 the Native
Production and Trade Commission, also known as the Godl-
onton Commission, displayed great interest in the role
chiefs could play in promoting development.
Significantly, the Commission remarked on the "constant
stream of elderly, apathetic and ultra-conservative
chiefs who are most unlikely to insist on modern methods
of agriculture or...secure obedience to their orders".
It asked whether collateral succession could be abolished
in favour of primogeniture, in order to ensure the
appointment of younger, more "progressive", men who might
be trained in preparation for chiefly office. The
Commission asked, "would...the restoration of the
authority of the chiefs with strictly limited powers of
punishment for disobedience...be the best means of
ensuring better discipline among...Natives?".72
In testimony to the NPTC, a representative of the
Southern Rhodesian Native Association linked two issues
that would permeate the politics of the chiefs for at
least the next forty years: land and chiefly power.
We have another thing: we want land to be 
increased because there are many Africans in 
the Reserves and they are increasing more.
72 "Matters referred for the written memorandum by F.W.T. 
Posselt", Native Production and Trade Commission, vol. 1, 
p.138, 1944, ZBJ 1/2/3.
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Then the chiefs must have more power to control 
their own people in the Reserve.73
Aaron Jacha, a Bantu Congress representative, asserted
that although the chiefs had little influence, "if they
could be given power the people would follow them." The
commissioners were interested in the specific uses to
which such powers could be put. For instance, they asked
if this could be power to compel people to farm
particular crops in a particular way. The response was
disappointingly ambiguous: "Yes, if it is discipline it
is only persuading. It must be persuasion."74 However,
this may suggest the tightrope which "traditional"
leaders had to walk in order to maintain both authority
and legitimacy as well as satisfy the demands of both
government and their African "subjects". By 1946 the CNC
was reporting that
Several Native Commissioners comment on 
progress made in development and other work in 
native reserves where chiefs are of the 
progressive type; but the majority of officers 
report chiefs to be inefficient and of little 
value, due to old age and lack of education.75
In 1945 the NC Umtali, reported "All Chiefs are old
but command respect"76 but two years later the new Native
73 Bamingo to the NPTC, vol. Ill, p. 567, 1944, ZBJ l/l/l.
74 Aaron Jacha to the NPTC, vol. Ill, p. 53 6, 1944, ZBJ 
1/1/1 .
75 CNC, AR 1946, p. 13.
76 NC Umtali, AR 1945, S 1051.
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Commissioner took the view that this "District is cursed 
with ineffectual chiefs...[though]...generally their 
followers are not at all allergic to the authority of the 
Chiefs."77 Perceptions of chiefs' abilities clearly 
depended largely on the individual occupying the office 
of Native Commissioner.
By 1946 the NC Mtoko, S.E. Morris, considered that 
the Native Law and Courts Act was defunct and that the 
African social structure had collapsed due to the 
appointment of too many chiefs and the excessive 
multiplication of "tribes". This, he concluded, was 
making the administration of the Reserve still more 
difficult.78 In contrast, in 1948 the NC Gwanda felt that 
the only "traditional" leaders whose authority could be 
relied upon were the kraalheads.79 The Asst. NC Wedza 
also expressed support for devolving power to the 
kraalheads.80 Departmental officials were clearly 
divided, one group favouring increased centralisation of 
chiefly power; the other favouring decentralisation.
Rationalising and Consolidating the Chiefly structure
Following the Second World War the NAD began 
rationalising the hierarchical structure for Chiefs and
77 NC Umtali, AR 1948, S 1563.
78 NC Mtoko, AR 1946, S 235/518.
79 NC Gwelo, AR 1948, S 1563.
80 Asst. NC Wedza, AR 1948, S 1563.
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Headmen that had been created by the Native Affairs Act 
(1927). Again, the purpose was to increase the chiefs' 
authority and control over rural Africans. This process 
of reducing the number of chiefs, often by demoting an 
individual's status to Headman, was accompanied from 1951 
by the creation of a national structure of chiefly 
consultation. Building upon the feeble foundation of 
local councils, provincial assemblies were created in 
1951 and in 1961 the first national chiefs' council met. 
Thus a clearer delineation of those chiefs willing to 
engage with the state, on the state's own terms, and 
those inclined to disassociate themselves from it, 
emerged with the establishment of each new structure. 
However, in this chapter we will deal only with the local 
impact, Chapter 6 deals with the establishment of the 
provincial assemblies and the National Chiefs' Council.81
The legislative measures enacted between 1927 and 
1937 were commented upon in 1946 by the Native 
Commissioner for Darwin district, who gives us some 
insight into the perceptions of their impact on the 
ground.
During the year four petty chiefs were 
appointed as headmen under chiefs of more 
standing. This process of reducing the number 
of chiefs in the district from 24 will continue 
until some more cohesive order is achieved out 
of the present rather chaotic scene. The 
establishment of Native Councils and Native 
Courts, now in hand, should stimulate this
81 See pp.360-364 below.
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endeavour and restore a measure of authority to 
the chiefs. The older chiefs, however, are 
most vehement in decrying the institution of 
Native Councils in their tribal areas.82
The Second World War had clearly disrupted the 
implementation of policies. Councils and courts were 
introduced far more slowly than had been hoped. 
Furthermore, a vast array of social and economic factors 
was having a significant impact on rural society 
following the War and it is questionable whether the 
policy initiatives of the pre-War era had as much 
relevance after. The NC Darwin now recommended that the 
number of chieftainships in the district be reduced from 
25 to seven.83 Other districts planned less drastic 
"rationalisation” but the total number of chiefs was 
reduced from 328 in 194584 to 237 in 1969.85
In 1948 the CNC reported that the "petty chief­
tainships" were being brought under the control of the 
"important" ones as a means of increasing authority. 
Furthermore, the option of paying larger subsidies to the 
Chiefs was given consideration as a way of inducing 
"younger educated men to accept office where they are
82 NC Darwin, AR 1946, S 235/518.
83 NC Darwin, AR 1948, S 1563.
84 Southern Rhodesia Central Statistical Office, Official 
Year Book of Southern Rhodesia, no. 4, 1952, Salisbury: 1952, 
pp.107-8.
85 Rhodesian Parliamentary Debates, 1969, vol. 75, col.
1467.
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eligible."86 Clearly the CNC had been disturbed by the 
report from Gwaai which stated "Mpande a direct decendent 
[sic] of MZILIKAZI has declined to accept the Chief­
tainship at the present allowance offered."87 It was 
simply easier for young men to earn more money in wage 
employment.
At the end of the 1940s the chiefs' voices did begin
to appear in official documentation. In his report for
1949, the CNC stated:
Though some are ultra-conservative and quite 
unable to adjust themselves to the tempo of 
modern progress, the majority of chiefs and 
headmen have carried out their difficult duties 
well within the limits imposed by the loss of 
tribal authority and prestige arising from 
disruption of tribal controls, and with one or 
two exceptions have remained steadfastly loyal 
in the face of increasing pressure put upon 
them to dissociate themselves from unpopular 
Government measures. They realise the 
necessity for works of communal benefit and are 
anxious to assist, but justifiably complain of 
the lack of sanctions to enforce their orders, 
which in consequence they are reluctant to give 
when they know in many cases that they will be 
treated with contempt.88
In 1950 the CNC declared that the present policy was to
"revive the authority of the chiefs":
With this end in view, I am considering the 
whole present set up of Native Courts and 
Native Councils, and during the coming year it
86 CNC, AR 1948, p. 23.
87 Asst. NC Gwaai, AR 1948, S 1563.
88 CNC, AR 1949, p. 27.
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is hoped to submit proposals to the Government 
which will increase the judicial authority of 
Native chiefs in their courts....89
In order to place the duties of the chiefs on a more
contractual basis and thus strengthen the case for
granting them greater judicial powers, the CNC proposed
to the Minister of Native Affairs a revised scale of
subsidies. "If these are approved all native chiefs and
headmen will receive substantial increases and they will
be expected to play a greater part in the administration
of their areas."90 However, these were not approved.
By 1951 Native Commissioners had begun to report on
the impact of the rationalisation of chieftaincies. In
Belingwe the Native Commissioner considered the whole
policy a debacle.
The reorganisation of chieftainships has so far 
not proved a success and in some cases has 
produced a new problem. The deposed chiefs 
have drawn into their shells. The chiefs who 
have additional followers added take no notice 
of the fact, the general public will neither 
recognise their new chief or give up their old 
one.91
However, in Gwanda the chiefs were said to "appreciate 
their increased and more onerous duties"92 while the 
"people themselves" wholly accepted the new situation.
89 CNC, AR 1950, p. 6.
90 Ibid.
91 NC Belingwe, AR 1952, S 2827/2/2/1.
92NC Gwanda, AR 1951, S 2827/2/2/1.
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In Charter the Native Commissioner reported simply that
"Chiefs and headmen...are exercising their authority to a
greater degree."93
The Chief Native Commissioner expressed cautious
satisfaction with the results of the "re-organization".
It had enhanced the chiefs' position "and increased the
respect in which they are held in many cases".94 However,
in 1953 as the implementation of the Native Land
Husbandry Act (1951) drew closer, the CNC began to see
the changes in a new light. The chiefs' assistance in
this development scheme was considered crucial. But the
selection of young, educated men as chiefs, he wrote,
often lands the Native Commissioners with the 
more exasperating problem of coping with the 
influence of a man who 'is anything but helpful 
to the Administration', who has the subtle 
ability to manipulate threads behind the Native 
Commissioner's back, who easily degenerates 
into an autocrat with a swollen head.95
However, removal was clearly not a simple matter. The
Chief referred to in this report (in all probability
Chief Mangwende) was not dismissed at this stage. In
Darwin, the Native Commissioner regarded "the senior
chief Dotito" as an obstacle to development work, but
regretted that "sufficient cannot be proved against him
to support a recommendation for his removal from
93 NC Charter, AR 1952, S 2403/2681.
94 CNC, AR 1952, p. 33 .
95 CNC, AR 1953, p . 17 .
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office."96 Although chiefs had to exercise political 
agility to retain influence with "on the one hand their 
masters and on the other... their vassals", at least one 
Native Commissioner felt that the subsidies received by 
Chiefs and Headmen kept their loyalties sufficiently 
divided as to make the expenditure politically wise.97
The NC Lomagundi's report for 1952 demonstrates very 
clearly how the Native Commissioner and chief could work 
together.
Chief Zwimba's section appears to be settling 
down under his leadership. The well recorded 
judicial work he does in his Court is probably 
partly responsible for this. His people are 
being made to realize that his decisions are
not merely words, but are followed up by action
if the claim is not satisfied and this is 
increasing their respect. It was found 
necessary to call up one of the defeated 
claimants to the chieftainship in front of the 
principal men of the section and issue him with 
a public reproof and a written and verbal 
warning and order to refrain from attempting 
violence and stirring up antagonism against the 
Chief, since when this hopeful aspirant has 
gone to ground.98
At least some native commissioners had realistic
expectations of the Chiefs under their jurisdiction and
were willing to give them effective support. Many,
however, were inclined to credit Chiefs and Headmen with
some sort of "natural" authority and legitimacy despite
96 NC Darwin, AR 1951, S 2827/2/2/1.
97 NC Hartley, AR 1951, S 2827/2/2/1.
98 Hooker, NC Lomagundi, AR 1952, S 2403/2681.
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the fact that their positions had been transformed from
anything that might reasonably be termed traditional. At
least one Chief was keen to emphasize the natural or
supernatural aspect of chieftaincy. Chief Willie
Samuriwo was asked what led to his accession.
That I am not able to explain, it is the work 
of God. Even myself I did not expect to be 
appointed chief, I was just a commoner and I 
was preparing to open a farm."
In 1955 the NC Victoria, B.B. Fitzpatrick, advocated
a reversal of the rationalisation policy. This was due
to action by the "demoted" chiefs as well as to the way
in which they were seen by Africans.
All of those who were 'demoted' from Chief to 
Headman still act as though they were chiefs 
and will not submit to the control of the 
Government-appointed Chiefs of their respective 
areas. In the eyes of the people of these 
areas those headmen are accorded the status of 
chiefs.100
The following year the same Native Commissioner 
recommended a solution to the local power struggle that 
appears to have been a result of the rationalisation.101
The implementation of the Native Land Husbandry Act 
(NLHA) between 1954 and 1963 brought with it new 
government demands upon Chiefs. These included demands 
for labour in the Reserves and the enforcement of NLHA
" Willie Samuriwo (chief), 6 May, 1977, AOH 3, p.22.
100 NC Victoria, AR 1955, S 2827/2/2/3.
101 NC Victoria, AR 1956, S 2827/2/2/4.
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land divisions. Volunteer labour was not forthcoming and 
the chiefs were compelled by native commissioners to 
recruit chibharo labour for the agricultural development 
work.102 This led at least one Native Commissioner to 
state in 1955: "Many [chiefs and headmen]...fear that the 
implementation of the Land Husbandry Act will take away 
what little power they have left."103
The opportunity for extending the Chiefs' and 
Headmen's authority which the NLHA permitted is conveyed 
in the Native Commissioners' reports. In 1955, one 
reported "Four of the headmen were appointed this year to 
assist Chief Chinamora to exercise more control of the 
four zones established in Chinamora Reserve under the 
Native Land Husbandry Act."104 In Insiza District the 
chief used the opportunity to regain authority through 
vetting all applications for land. The Native 
Commissioner there lamented that the chiefs lacked 
criminal jurisdiction as, in his judgement, this would 
have facilitated the implementation of the NLHA.105 In 
Lomagundi District all the chiefs were able to produce 
chibharo labour as required for the Act.106
102 NC Lomagundi, AR 1955, S 2827/2/2/3.
103 NC Belingwe, AR 1955, S 2827/2/2/3.
104 NC Goromonzi, AR 1955, S 2827/2/2/3.
105 NC Insiza, AR 1955, S 2827/2/2/3.
106 NC Lomagundi, AR 1957, S 2827/2/2/5.
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One Native Commissioner, Caslam, noted that some 
chiefs ignored the opportunities for increasing their 
authority.
There was a slackening of co-operation by 
Chiefs in connection with the provision of 
labour for development work. It cannot be said 
that chiefs are real leaders, and their 
disinclination to take responsibility in 
judicial matters does nothing to enhance their 
standing with their followers.107
But the mid-1950s was a period of confused relations
between NCs and chiefs. The NLHA had had a strong impact
upon communities and some NCs considered it to have a
"detribalising" effect, and challenged many chiefs'
legitimacy. The exercise of authority by chiefs was
being more strictly monitored than before.108 The chiefs
were increasingly surrounded by demands and constraints.
In 1956 the NC Gwelo, D.C.H. Parkhurst, expounded this
with great clarity:
In the face of so much authority converging on 
the rural African from the Native Department, 
the Native Agricultural Department, the 
Veterinary Department etc., from the 
Messengers, the Demonstrators, the Native 
Development Fund staff etc., and the Native 
Councils, it is small wonder that the Chiefs 
inquire, "Where do we stand?" They are now 
barely symbolic of a tribal system which is 
fast receding.109
107 NC Mazoe, AR 1956, S 2827/2/2/4.
108 NC Umtali, AR 1956, S 2827/2/2/4.
109 NC Gwelo, AR 1956, S 2827/2/2/4.
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It is clear that although the NAD had made policy to
bolster the chiefs' authority - a new act to introduce
limited criminal jurisdiction was already being drafted -
individual NCs remained split on the issue. Indeed, the
governance of Africans contained a fundamental
contradiction and the NAD was not ready to deal with a
new dynamic which was apparent to at least some native
commissioners: the NLHA was overtly modernising; the
bolstering of "traditional" leaders was the opposite. In
1956 the NC Hartley, R.A. Webster, pointed out the
strains in pursuing these policies in the current
political climate:
Considering that detribalisation is being 
hastened with the implementation of the Land 
Husbandry Act, the Chiefs and Headmen can be 
said to have co-operated in about as high a 
degree as can be expected from these mainly 
illiterate and ancient types, trying to hold 
sway among a people rapidly developing a new 
nationalism of their own.110
The emerging African nationalism of the late 1950s 
compelled the NAD to seek greater mutual understanding 
with the chiefs and deepen the alliance. This included 
the development of the Chiefs' Assembly. In 1957 the CNC 
reported,
Chiefs are being drawn even into the 
complexities of today's modern administrative 
machinery which so often requires changes in 
policy. The Provincial Chiefs Assemblies 
fulfil a most useful and important channel of
110 NC Hartley, AR 1956, S 2827/2/2/4.
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direct communication between Government and 
people.111
Clearly the chief's question "Where do we stand?" had 
been legitimate. The NAD seemed unable to provide a 
simple answer. But we can see that the CNC believed, or 
wished others to believe, that the chiefs could speak 
effectively for the people to the Government. The 
chiefs' voices, now expressed in the Chiefs' Assemblies, 
were accorded prime legitimacy with the government. This 
was, clearly, to counteract the growing African 
nationalism.
In Buhera the Native Commissioner emphasized the
exclusive authority of the "traditional" leaders. In
response to an African National Congress (ANC)
representative in the district, he wrote:
This office...has made it known that it does 
not recognise any local authority other than 
the tribal representatives, though willing to 
lend a sypathetic [sic] ear when and where 
necessary.112
He also noted that the chiefs were compelled to "work 
effectively and amiably with European authority" in order 
to receive protection against "any tendency to usurp 
their functions by outside influences".113 In Charter the 
Native Commissioner felt it was necessary to organise a
111 CNC, AR 1957, p.28.
112 NC Buhera, AR 1958, S 2827/2/2/6.
113 Ibid.
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two-day meeting to instruct the "traditional" leaders "in 
their powers and duties."114
Nationalist politics infiltrated local lineage 
politics and relations between chiefs and native 
commissioners. In the Maranke Reserve, Umtali District, 
in 1958, a challenger to Chief Maranke's position was 
described as being inclined towards "the subversive 
activities of the African National Congress". Maranke, 
for his part, became "bitterly opposed to Congress" and 
endeavoured "to use his animosity towards Congress as a 
lever to force the administration into making irregular 
concessions and appointments of his own supporters."115 
The chief was demanding payment, as it were, for his 
loyalty. The three Chiefs in Buhera were convinced of 
the necessity to "work effectively and amiably with 
European authority (which in turn supports them as the 
duly appointed tribal heads against any tendency to usurp 
their functions by outside influences)...."116 As a 
result, it is asserted, their "traditional" support and 
respect was maintained. In 1959, in Lomagundi, the 
Native Commissioner asked that Chief Zwimba's request for 
four new headmen should receive attention at the earliest 
possible moment because his loyalty to the government in 
face of the African National Congress had been
114 NC Charter, AR 1958, S 2827/2/2/6.
115 NC Umtali, AR 1958, S 2827/2/2/6.
116 NC Buhera, AR 1958, S 2827/2/2/6.
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exemplary.117 One Native Commissioner, Staunton, opined 
that the general hostility of chiefs and headmen towards 
the ANC generally had been a matter of self-interest,
"due to the fact that they do not want to lose any of 
their power to Politicians."118
In 1961 Chief Chinamora made use of the Council of 
Chiefs to inform the Minister for Native Affairs that he 
was against the introduction of freehold tenure which 
resulted from the NLHA: "The Chief...can be the only 
person who has the right to allocate land to anybody who 
has no land."119 Most of the others present agreed with 
him. Chinamora went on to point out that the Government 
would have to rely upon the chiefs to deliver African 
support:
We Chiefs will greatly assist the 
Government....We elders, we pledge ourselves to 
the Government. Whenever he shall be in 
difficulties, we'll die with them,- not 
youngsters, they will never do it.120
The chiefs were beginning to take a much more prominent
role in shaping their relationship with government
officials. However, it must be kept in mind that this
Chiefs' Council, like the provincial assemblies, was a
117 NC Lomagundi, AR 1959, S 2827/2/2/7.
118 NC Wedza, AR 1959, S 2827/2/2/7.
119 Meeting of the Council of Chiefs held in the Federal 
Assembly, 18 May 1961, Records Centre 6.1.9F/84256, Internal 
Affairs.
120 Ibid.
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creation of the NAD and the chiefs admitted to it cannot 
be considered representative of the chiefs throughout 
Southern Rhodesia.
J.F. Holleman later attributed this changed view of 
chiefs to
the very pressure of the political tide, which 
not only widened the gulf between white and 
black Rhodesians generally, but also drove 
white government and tribal chieftainship 
closer together as comrades-in-arms against the 
common enemy of African nationalism.121
In the 1920s the alliance had begun when the NAD and
"traditional" leaders perceived a common enemy in the
missions and the mission-educated. By the early 1960s it
had become, with respect to those Chiefs willing to work
with the Southern Rhodesian Government, much more than an
alliance. Chiefs were part of the administrative
machinery in the localities and would soon meet as a
national body, first in the "Indaba" and later in the
Rhodesian Senate.
Space and Authority
In 1930 the Land Apportionment Act (LAA) established 
the system of African reserves which lasted until the end 
of the colonial period and survives today, in some 
respects, in the form of "communal lands". For our 
purposes its most important effect was to concentrate
121 J.F. Holleman, Chief. Council and Commissioner. 
London: 1969, pp. 341-2.
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African settlement in a way the 1914-15 Reserves Commis­
sion had not.
Prior to the Reserves Commission of 1914-15 native 
commissioners from across the country reported that as 
Europeans occupied farms, African communities were being 
broken up, contributed to the collapse of chiefly 
power.122 The Native Reserves Commission, and the BSA 
Co., considered this a positive step. The official view 
in that period was "that the reserves were for those who 
could not immediately be assimilated into European 
conditions" and that education would overthrow the 
"tribal system".123
Although official support for chiefly authority 
might at first appear to contradict Land Apportionment, 
the two strategies were in fact complementary, serving 
the interests of Native Affairs Department, and even that 
of the chiefs in regaining lost power. By the 1930s, 
when the Land Apportionment Act was implemented, chiefs' 
power was further circumscribed, and the NAD began to 
discuss how to develop African power within the "tribal" 
framework. For the most part this meant recognizing 
Chiefs' courts for limited types of disputes and
122 NC Mazoe, AR 1913, N9/1/16; NC Mazoe, AR 1914, 
N9/1/17; NC Umzingwani, AR 1914, N9/1/17; NC Matobo, AR 1915, 
N9/1/18.
123 Robin Palmer, Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia. 
London: 1977, p.108.
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expanding "local government" through the Native Boards 
and later Native Councils.
Many African communities had been dispersed as a 
result of the original occupation of land by European 
farmers. Any territorial integrity that had existed 
before the Occupation had largely vanished by 1915. This 
had a significant impact on chiefly powers. In 1913 the 
NC Mazoe, Alfred Drew, observed that "the system of 
chiefs has been considerably interfered with by the 
taking up of farms."124 Far to the south the NC Matobo 
remarked:
Only in large native reserves can the old 
system be fostered - where the natives are 
broken up into small communities on privately 
owned land etc. it is impossible for the Chiefs 
and Headmen to retain any power with the loss 
of their power their usefulness ceases. Every 
day it becomes more evident that we will have 
to deal with the natives individually and not 
collectively.
The gradual breaking up of the tribal 
organization means the end of all concerted 
union although it means very much more work it 
also means very much more safety.125
Following the passage of the Land Apportionment Act it
was reported that certain chiefs' authority was
restricted by the fact they continued to live on
privately owned land.126 The territorial demarcation of
chiefs' dominion was perceived to be fundamental to the
124 NC Mazoe, AR 1913, N9/1/16.
125 NC Matobo, AR 1915, N9/1/18.
126 Asst. NC Bulawayo, AR 1931, S 235/509.
assertion of their authority, since without it people 
could escape a chief's authority simply by leaving his 
territory.127 The rigorous establishment of the Reserves 
was the first step in this demarcation.
After the Second World War there was a further step 
taken towards shoring up the chiefs' authority by 
demarcating their jurisdiction. As early as 1940 it was 
noted that although all the people of a given "tribe", 
that is those under the authority of a single chief, 
might be in a reserve, his authority could remain weak 
due to the intermingled settlement of different groups 
respecting the authority of various chiefs.128 In 1943 a 
clear internal demarcation was made of the Sipolilo 
Reserve to accommodate an immigrant group under Chief 
Bepura. But in 1947 the demarcation of chiefs' areas 
within Reserves was carried out as a matter of policy.
The NC Shangani believed that "Tribal control and 
effective supervision should now be much easier."129 By 
1951 the chiefs in Gwanda were said to have felt their 
authority had increased partly as a result of the 
demarcation.130
Thus restrictions on settlement was perceived by 
both NAD officials and "traditional" leaders to be a tool
127 Bourdillon, The Shona Peoples, p. 112.
128 NC Chiweshe, AR 1940, S 1563.
129 NC Shangani, AR 1947, S 15 63.
130 NC Gwanda, AR 1951, S 2827/2/2/1.
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to increase control and authority. The Reserves 
spatially limited, but also concentrated, the exercise of 
chiefs' power, and those very Reserves were established 
and administered by the coercive power of the state. The 
Reserves cannot be argued to have been elements in the 
buttressing of chiefly power (indeed the overcrowding in 
the Reserves in the late 1950s and early 1960s became a 
challenge to chiefly power), but it is important to note 
that this was not a simple relationship.
Many issues surrounding the Native Land Husbandry 
Act had a direct impact on the chiefs' authority. These 
included registration of those living in reserves, the 
division of lands, destocking, demands for the expansion 
of the reserves, extension work and the sale of land 
rights. Chiefs were called upon by the NAD to conscript 
labour for the implementation of the NLHA,131 and land was 
allocated by NAD officials within the Reserves. These 
new allocations were made without reference to the 
authority of chiefs, headmen or kraalheads. However, 
these allocations were not strictly adhered to by the 
Africans working the land. Ploughing often went beyond 
allocations, into streams and boundary beacons were 
moved.132
131 For example, NC Lomagundi, AR 1957, S2827/2/2/5.
132 See for example, NC Charter, AR 1956; NC Marandellas, 
AR 1956; both S2827/2/2/4.
228
By 1959 land rights were exchangeable commodities. 
Prices ranged from £10 to over £500 for 8 to 10 acre 
holdings; grazing rights fetched £5 each.133 In 1961 the 
Chiefs raised strong objections to land sales in the 
Reserves and the so-called freehold tenure introduced by 
the NLHA because it was perceived to undermine chiefly 
authority. Chief Chinamora stated that only the chief 
might have the right to allocate land to those without 
and that land purchases usurped his authority.134 In 1963 
at least one chief was taking direct action and had 
allocated "some 200 acres... in his area in the grazing 
are."135 Chief Chirau "pointed out that the Land 
Husbandry allocations had led people to believe that the 
Chief was no longer an authority."136
New Authorities
As David Lan has observed, "the authority of the 
chiefs was presented as a natural rather than a social
133 See NC Ft Victoria, AR 1959; NC Insiza, AR 1959; NC 
Bubi, Ar 1959; all S2827/2/2/7.
134 "Meeting of the Council of Chiefs held in the Federal 
Assembly", 18 May 1961, Records Centre 6.1.9F/84256 Int. Aff.
135 DC Mazoe, AR 1963, S2827/2/1/3.
136 "Summary Report on chiefs Provincial Assembly 
Meetings: Mashonaland North and South", W.H.H. Nicolle, 20 
April 1964, Records Centre, 28.11.8F/98431. See Chapter 6 
below for a greater discussion concerning land in the 1960s.
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phenomenon.11137 But the use of the term "big men" becomes
particularly appropriate when the alternative authorities
that emerged are considered. As we have just seen, the
alienation of land to white farmers often had the effect
of eroding chiefly power. White farmers often became the
most immediate authorities, or "big men", and in some
instances disputes were taken to these men for
settlement. One Native Commissioner reported as early as
1913 that chiefs and headmen had lost power to the
European farmers "to whom the natives seem to think
themselves directly responsible."138 Missionaries also
adopted the role of "big men". At least one exercised
quite strict authority.139 Orlandini, the Dutch Reformed
Church missionary based in Gutu,
and his staff of African evangelists, teachers 
and messengers had judged cases, collected 
fines and 'taxes', recruited labour and 
accumulated huge numbers of cattle often 
defying the authority of the Native Com­
missioner .140
Orlandini was evicted in the mid-1930s because of the 
disruptive behaviour he had sponsored. Other churches
137 Lan, Guns and Rain, p. 173. See also Willie Samuriwo,
6 May 1977, AOH 3, p.22.
138 Acting NC Melsetter, AR 1913, N9/1/16.
139 Benjamin Davis and Wolfgang Dopcke, "Survival and 
Accumulation in Gutu: Class Formation and the Rise of the 
State in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1900-1939", Journal of Southern 
African Studies. 14, 1, pp.64-98.
140 Ibid. , p . 64 .
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also operated civil courts in a much later period.141 
African churches in northern districts, and perhaps 
elsewhere, also sought to resolve judicial disputes 
between their members within the church in the 1960s and 
1970s.142 However, these attempts were not always 
successful.143
The Native Commissioner was, of course, supreme 
among the new authorities, although his position differed 
considerably from the others. The post of Native 
Commissioner was formally placed in a hierarchy which 
included the chiefs and headmen below him. The farmers 
and missionaries were alternatives to the chiefs, not 
simply superiors. Throughout this century the authority 
of the "traditional" leaders in the rural areas was 
challenged by new social phenomena. Despite the fact 
that these men presented their positions as natural 
phenomena and their occupation of them as supernaturally 
legitimated, those around them with religious and/or 
economic power encroached on their authority.
141 NC Sipolilo, Civil Record 3/66, 10/1/66, Guruve 
Community Court.
142 Lan, Guns and Rain, p. 150.
143 Roger Gondari vs. Andrea Katuwa, CR 3/66. 10.1.66, 
Guruve Community Court.
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Conclusion
Neither the "traditional" leaders nor the Native 
Commissioners represented a monolithic group at any time 
before the 1960s, thus making comment on the way each 
interacted with the other extremely difficult. However, 
it is possible to identify certain phases in the 
relationship between them over the course of our period. 
These four periods may be dated 1897 to the early 1920s, 
the early 1920s to 1950, 1951 to 1959, and from 1959 to 
the 1970s. In the first period, Native Department 
officials rarely considered the "traditional" leaders a 
section of African society worthy of special attention.
In the early 1920s this perspective was fundamentally 
overturned by the Native Affairs Department's need to 
forge closer links with African society. The second 
period may be characterised by the formal integration of 
Chiefs and Headmen into the state along with institutions 
with some organic connection to African society, such as 
the Chiefs' courts and others without, such as the Native 
Councils. The third period was one of intense 
interaction. The Native Commissioners were demanding 
that Chiefs take part in the implementation of the Native 
Land Husbandry Act (1951) , the Chiefs were increasingly 
being ideologically integrated into the state and the 
government's fight against the nascent nationalist 
movement put the Chiefs and Headmen in an extremely 
difficult position. In the final period, the government
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actively constructed a national platform for Chiefs and 
Headmen. This was an attempt to legitimate the Rhodesian 
regime that is remarkably similar to the tactics deployed 
by the Native Department to legitimate itself in the 
1920s.
By 1961 many NAD officials were ready to agree with 
Roger Howman that interference with the chiefs had been 
extreme, "we have split tribes, moved them about, created 
chiefs, amalgamated them, deposed some + undermined their 
judicial and land powers - so we cannot pose too strongly 
as their supporters".144 The splitting and amalgamating 
of groups as the Native Commissioner saw fit may be 
considered as a form of political patronage. There are 
cases cited that show Native Commissioners both granted 
and withheld such patronage based on a chief's loyalty 
and political utility.
Chiefs were well aware that they were having to 
tread a tightrope. When the NAD did offer limited 
coercive power to bolster authority, this had to be used 
only judiciously because legitimacy had been so badly 
eroded due to many factors. Consequently few 
"traditional" leaders were able to make as much use of it 
as the Native Commissioners had wished. Indeed, some 
chiefs went so far as to reject the backing of coercive 
power, as in the case of labour recruitment in Lomagundi
144 Memorandum for Discussion on the Future of Chiefs: 
Native Affairs Advisory Board, 20-22/3/61, Salisbury, Records 
Centre 6.1.9F/84256, Internal Affairs.
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in 1945,14S thus increasing their legitimacy, and arguably 
their authority. But as noted above, there were 
different responses by different chiefs in different 
areas.
It is clear the perception of collapsing authority 
was, at least in part, a figment of the NAD's collective 
imagination, a wish that persisted beyond policy 
decisions, as well as a frustration with what was hoped 
for and expected of the "traditional" leaders. The 
persistence of this perception well into the 1960s is 
difficult to explain, although the civilising mission 
remained a fundamental part of the average Native 
Commissioner's way of thinking and this was in 
contradiction with the shoring up of "traditional" life.
Although the Native Affairs Act (1927) formed a 
legal relationship between the state and chiefs that, 
legally anyway, integrated the chiefs by making it part 
of their duties to report any potential unrest, and "to 
supply for the defence of the Colony and for the 
suppression of disorder and rebellion within its borders, 
and [the Governor-in-Council] may call upon chiefs 
personally to render such service", chiefs still 
maintained a legitimacy that appears to have been beyond 
the state and remains somewhat difficult to explain.
145 Johnson, "The Impact of the Second World War on 
Southern Rhodesia", p. 308, and NC Lomagundi, AR 1945, S 1563.
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State authority did not destroy chiefs' legitimacy before 
1965 .
In Chapters Four and Five we turn our attention to 
the study of a specific district, Sipolilo, in order to 
examine in close detail, the impact of the themes 
discussed both in this chapter and the preceding one. In 
Chapter Six we return to the national level and follow 
the development of relations between the "traditional" 
leaders and the state. There we will examine how, from 
the mid-1950s onwards, the Chiefs and Headmen were wooed 
both by the nationalists and the government and how the 
government offered ready-made and protected roles for 
them. Finally we examine the extension of judicial 
powers in the African Law and Tribal Courts Act (1969).
Chapter Four
Sipolilo District
Introduction
With this chapter we will now turn our attention to 
a single administrative district in order to focus upon 
the finer dynamics that play a part in the development of 
political and social power in the rural communities and, 
especially to provide context for an examination of the 
role of local courts in the following chapter. In order 
to give the reader a better understanding of these 
dynamics, the social, political and economic history of 
the district will be traced. This chapter introduces the 
district, Sipolilo, selected for the case study in this 
thesis. As this thesis attempts to make links between 
the political activity of rural communities and that at 
the national level, it is necessary to devote a 
substantial part of the discussion to the fine texture of 
local study.
The outline of historical developments and conflicts 
in Sipolilo district will provide the setting for the 
sharper focus to come in the next chapter. There we will 
examine the roles played by the courts, both those of the 
Native Commissioner and of the Chiefs, in mediating 
between the demands of new and old interest groups in the 
district. We will also consider how social norms are 
instituted. Furthermore, chapters 4 and 5 together will 
provide insight into the local dimension of the larger
II
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national political machinations to be discussed in 
Chapter 6.
Sipolilo District was selected for the case study
  due to a number of its unique features. Firstly, the
district remained on the periphery of the Rhodesian 
economy until after the Second World War. The 
comparatively late economic development of the district 
allows us to trace the social and political consequences 
of that development with greater clarity. The rapidity 
of the monetisation of the district economy has also 
facilitated analysis of its impact and made possible the 
use of oral sources. Secondly, the different ecological 
regions in the district have allowed for a study of the 
differential impact of the economic capabilities upon 
social institutions and the accumulation of power and the 
examination of the role of courts in these different, but 
associated, settings.
These distinguishing features are not sufficient to 
dismiss its comparative relevance. On the contrary, this 
case study gives us insight into other areas and, indeed, 
national trends precisely because the empirical data is 
far more obtainable than it is for other districts in and 
earlier periods. The pace of change in Sipolilo District 
in the period under examination brought much of that 
change and the response to it, into sharper relief, as 
Palmer noted in 1977,
the guerrillas initially obtained their
greatest popular support in the Centenary,
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Sipolilo, and Mount Darwin areas in the north­
east, where alienation of land to Europeans had 
taken place only in the past twenty years and 
the people's resentment was therefore of recent 
origin.1
This chapter aims to present the politics of the 
district, the role of Africans and representatives of the 
colonial state in that political activity, and the 
economic and social setting in which the case study 
material will be placed.
The District, the land and the people
Lomagundi District, created in 1897, was one of the 
original administrative districts and covered a huge 
portion of Southern Rhodesia.2 Sipolilo formed a part of 
it. A portion of what became known as Sipolilo was in 
the heartland of the pre-colonial Mutapa state;3 however, 
the rest of Guruwe, as the land was then known (hence 
its post colonial name - Guruve), ruled by "the 
soko/wafawanaka Nhova-Chingowo dynasty" may have been 
only a tributary to the Mutapa state, or may have 
maintained its independence.4 But it is clear that the 
Nhova-Chingowo dynasty existed in close political as well
1 Robin Palmer, Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia. 
London: 1977, pp.245-6.
2 See Map 1.
3 D.N. Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe. 900-1850. Gweru: 
1980 p.115.
4 Ibid., p .114.
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as geographical proximity to the Mutapa state. Beach
informs us that in the later 1880s when the Mutapa state
was in terminal decline,
the Chingowo dynasty had recently begun to 
suffer renewed Ndebele raids, and in 1889 the 
Chingowo ruler was willing to make a treaty 
with Ribeiro [a prazo holder] and the 
Portuguese government representative Vitor 
Cordon in return for guns.5
Thus we may observe that the Chingowo dynasty at the time
of European occupation was under attack and attempted to
remain self-reliant.
Until 1912, Sipolilo was administered as an integral
part of the Lomagundi district, after which it was
administered as a sub-district with an Assistant Native
Commissioner in charge. However, there had been some
colonial administrative presence there prior to 1912.
From 1904 to 1916 "an office was opened at Kanyemba on
the Zambesi",6 one of the most important points of entry
for Africans from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland seeking
employment in South Africa and to a lesser extent
Southern Rhodesia. The dates coincide with the decade in
which the mining industry was most reliant upon chibharo
for its labour sources and the Rhodesian Native Labour
Bureau had agents operating in the area.7
5 Beach, The Shona. pp.153-54.
6 "Kraal Appreciation Report: Sipolilo Reserve", Office of 
the Land Development Officer, Sipolilo, Ref. No. LAN.20/2/56, 
November 30, 1956, p.2. S 138.
7 Charles van Onselen, Chibaro. London: 1976, p.107.
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In 1954 Sipolilo was elevated to a full district 
with its own Native Commissioner. For the remainder of 
the colonial period the district gained in importance as 
it became increasingly involved in the central Southern
Rhodesian economy and later was one of the frontlines in
the liberation war. In 1965 Sipolilo1s name was altered 
to one considered more "authentic", Chipuriro, a more 
accurate orthography of the Shona pronunciation.
Following independence the name was changed again, to
Guruve, a pre-colonial name associated with the
soko/wafawanaka Nhova-Chingowo dynasty in the area.8
The southernmost tip of Sipolilo District is just 
over 100 km north of Harare, and west of the Umvukwes 
Range (see map). The major physical feature of the 
district is that it is bisected by the Zambezi Valley 
escarpment and is bordered by both Zambia and Mozambique. 
This has meant it has been the first port of call for 
many incoming migrant labourers, and was a point of entry 
for all the nationalist guerrilla armies which fought in 
the liberation war.9
The Valley comprises the northern portion of the 
district (also known as Lower Sipolilo) and lies some 
eight hundred vertical metres below the plateau - or
8 Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe, p.70 and p.114.
9 Basil Davidson, Joe Slovo, and Anthony R. Wilkinson, 
Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution.
Harmondsworth: 1976, Part Three, Chapter Four. See also David 
Lan, Guns and Rain. Harare: 1985, p.126.
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Upper Sipolilo.10 Forty years after the first "pilot 
track"11 was built, only four roads and one "track" cross 
this formidable barrier which stretches for nearly 80 km 
along an east-west axis within the district.12 A 
surprising number of people move up and down it by foot. 
But it undeniably remains a barrier and was still more of 
one in the past. Indeed, legends of the settlement of 
the area refer to it as the point beyond which the 
colonising people were not to look, much less travel 
beyond.13
The southern and eastern boundaries of the district 
follow the Umvukwes range. Again, these are boundaries 
not simply imposed by colonial administration, but that 
also have their place in local mythology.14 This mountain 
range forms the northern end of the Great Dyke and is 
laced with minerals,- mines both ancient and modern are 
dotted along it. However, in the main area of Sipolilo
10 See Map Sheet SE-36-1 Mhangura, 3rd edition. In his 
description of the region Lan writes that, "the road falls 
6000m into Dande in fewer than 15 km." (p.9) This is clearly 
wrong as Mt Kilimanjaro, Africa's highest peak, is only 5860m.
11 Asst. NC Sipolilo, AR 1951, S 2827/2/2/1.
12 See Map Sheet SE-36-1 Mhangura.
13 Files of the District Administrator, Guruve, PER 5. 
Subsequently referred to as DA PER 5
14 According to "official mythology", Chingowo and his 
followers decided to part company with Mutota at Mvurwi, 
Chingowo moving westwards over the Umvukwes range, Mutota 
travelling northward to the Zambezi Valley. DA PER 5.
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District there are only two gold mines, "Agatha and Ella" 
and "Eureka". "Eureka" mine is also prominent in local 
oral history. This will be elaborated upon later in this 
chapter.15
Ecological and consequent economic differences mark 
the dissimilarities between Upper and Lower Sipolilo.
The district is comprised of three different ecological 
zones.16 The plateau is described as an "intensive 
farming region" with moderately high, and more 
importantly reliable, rainfall. The Horseshoe Block of 
farms to the east and north of Sipolilo Reserve lies 
almost entirely within this region. The Nyakapupu 
Purchase Area and Sipolilo Reserve lie wholly within this 
zone. Intensive farming of crops or livestock is 
characteristic practice in this ecological zone. Many 
farmers combine agricultural production with animal 
husbandry to guard against years of severe drought to 
which the country as a whole is prone.
The second region is the escarpment. Although this 
area receives moderate rainfall, this is offset by 
generally high temperatures and the fact that the rain is 
sporadic and heavy, and therefore not always beneficial 
to crops. The Zimbabwe government comments that "the 
region is...subject to fairly severe mid-season dry
15 See p. 279 below.
16 "Zimbabwe 1: 1 000 000 Natural Regions and Farming 
Areas", Dept, of the Surveyor-General, Harare: 1984.
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spells and therefore is marginal for maize, tobacco and 
cotton production, or for enterprise based on crop 
production alone.1’17 Mixed farming, therefore, 
predominates. Approximately two-thirds of Kachuta 
Reserve lies within this region, the other portion in the 
plateau region. Bakasa Reserve is wholly within the 
escarpment region. Below the escarpment is the Dande 
area. This region endures the hardship of "fairly low 
rainfall", sporadic droughts, and generally unreliable 
rains. Only limited drought resistance crops are 
successfully cultivated in this region, and the presence 
of tsetse fly prevents cattle surviving in the area.
Despite these distinctions, there are significant 
similarities in the cultural sphere. People both above 
and below the escarpment speak the same dialect of Shona, 
Chikorekore. Many spirit mediums move through each area 
and senior ancestors such as Mutota and Chingowo are 
respected throughout.18 Also, there has been a regular 
movement of brides from the Valley to the plateau, just 
as there has been a movement of brides from Upper 
Sipolilo, over the Umvukwes into Chiweshe. Thus a 
significant level of constant interaction has taken place 
throughout this century. This pattern of bridal movement 
has been influenced largely by Shona concepts of incest 
and the different levels of bridewealth demanded. Due to
17 Ibid.
18 DA PER 5.
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the infestation of tsetse fly in the Zambezi Valley, 
plateau Korekore could have access to brides without 
losing cattle.19 It has had the effect of nurturing and 
maintaining close cultural links between Upper and Lower 
Sipolilo.
The Communal Lands (formerly Tribal Trust Lands and 
prior to that, Reserves) comprise by far the greatest 
area of Sipolilo district. Below the escarpment the 
Dande Communal Lands and the Dande Safari Area cover the 
entire valley area. But above the escarpment there are 
three Communal Lands: Bakasa, Kachuta and Sipolilo. The 
first two were created in 1960 by the Select Committee on 
Resettlement of Natives.20 Sipolilo Reserve dates from 
the immediate post-Rising period.21 There was a further 
block of land reserved for African settlement in the 
district, the Nyakapupu Native [African] Purchase Area on 
the eastern boundary of Sipolilo Reserve.
The number of Africans living in Sipolilo Reserve 
grew in the middle of this century, almost literally by 
leaps and bounds as forced removals under the Land 
Apportionment Act (1930) and its subsequent amendments 
corralled people into the Reserve. In 1932 Africans
19 Shadreck Chitsiga, Ruwinga, 9/12/91, Guruve Communal 
Lands.
20 "The Select Committee on the Resettlement of Natives", 
Second Report, Table 'H1, 1960, p.63, SRG 2.
21 Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p.65 and p.259.
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designated as "Chief Sipolilo1s people" living in the 
district, but on newly designated European Crown Land, 
were forced into the Sipolilo Reserve.22 That year 18 165 
Africans were estimated to live in the district. Only 6 
573 people lived in the Reserve, while 10 332 lived on 
Crown Land and 1260 on alienated land.23 In 1943 a 
further large-scale forced removal, this time of "Be- 
pura's people" from the Damba region to the west of 
Sipolilo Reserve in Lomagundi district, increased the 
population of the Reserve. This also involved removals 
within the Reserve in order "to make room for Chief 
Bepura and his Vandamba people".24
By 1947 the African population of the district had 
more than doubled its 1932 level, reaching 40 424. Of 
these, 21 656 were on the Reserve, and 17 589 on 
unassigned land, i.e. the Zambezi Valley.25 Thus in the 
space of less than a generation, the population density 
of Africans in Sipolilo Reserve increased more than 
threefold. The restricted availability of arable land 
literally squeezed the peasant producers and forced them 
to seek further options. In 1957, 26 954 people lived in 
Sipolilo Reserve; 23 433 were on the unassigned lands of
22 "Kraal Appreciation Report: Sipolilo Reserve, 30th 
November 1956", S 138/43.
23 NC Lomagundi, AR 1932, S 235/510.
24 Ibid.
25 NC Lomagundi, AR 1947, S 1563.
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the Zambezi Valley while 20 were settled on farms under 
Labour Agreements. The total population had reached an 
estimated 51 979, a 28% increase over ten years.26
The removal of "Bepura's people1 in 1943 followed 
the successful eradication of tsetse fly - a campaign 
the colonial administration had involved them in - from 
the Damba region they inhabited, making the area suitable
for white settlement. The CNC's office hinted at the
inequity of this, but it also served its purposes to an 
extent:
For many years past Chief Bepura and his 
tribe have resided in a Tsetse Fly area on 
unoccupied Crown Land in the Lomagundi 
District, and from time to time at the request 
of your department this Chief and his people 
remained in the area in question as their 
services were required for anti-Tsetse Fly 
operations undertaken by the Entomological 
Department.
The area is now deemed to be free of Fly,
and the land is required, I understand for
post-war European settlement. It is now 
therefore necessary that this Chief and his 
tribe should be removed elsewhere.
Arrangements for this removal have been 
made by the Native Commissioner, Sinoia 
[Lomagundi], who has ordered these people to 
enter the southern portion of the Sipolilo 
Native Reserve where there is only sufficient 
land for a portion of the tribe. It is desired 
that the balance of these people enter No. 2 
Area [Nyakapupu] adjoining the native Reserve, 
thus preserving the entity of the tribe.27
26 NC Sipolilo, AR 1957, S 2827/2/2/5.
27 CNC's Office to the Secretary, Dept of Agriculture and 
Lands, "Removal of Chief Bepura", 14.8.43, S 2806/1996.
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Maintaining the "entity of the tribe" was considered by 
the Native Affairs Department to be of prime importance.
In an earlier communication the NC Sinoia wrote to the 
CNC,
If allowed to do so Bepura and his people 
would scatter and squat on farms and Crown Land 
outside the 'Doma' area with the result the 
tribe would cease to exist. An example of this 
is Chief Nyabira and his people. He has 
neither Chieftainship nor chief nor tribal 
area.
What has been done for Bepura is quite the 
best thing under the circumstances.28
In this case we have a clear example of how the Land
Apportionment Act was a tool applied as and when
required. It may also be seen that by this time the
Native Affairs Department was interested in bolstering
"tribal" integrity as a means of bolstering the chief's
own power. Ironically, the people who had lived in the
Damba area were actually resettled in two distant
reserves, Sipolilo and Rengwe thus demonstrating that the
Native Affairs Department's notion of "preserving the
entity of the tribe" owed more to ensuring that Africans
remained under some form of "Native Authority" than the
maintenance of any organic notion of community.29 The
28 NC Sinoia to CNC, 21.4.43, S 2806/1996.
29 This view persisted into the 1960s when a programme of 
Community Development was instituted, but the definition of 
"community" applied was on the basis of what African 
authorities were recognised communally. See A.H.K. Weinrich, 
Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia. London: 1971.
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real fear by the 1950s - and this had become the basis 
for the Reserves - was that Africans might simply 
"scatter" and become collectively uncontrollable.
T h e  E c o n o m y
Informants still speak of a time when there was 
trade with the Portuguese. However, the trade in ivory 
which was at its height "from the 1850s until the end of 
the 1870s"30 was of little consequence in the local 
economy by the turn of the century, while the cattle 
trade with the Tete Portuguese had also lost its 
significance; indeed, Portuguese traders were no longer 
active in Upper Sipolilo. In the nineteenth century the 
district had been considered crucial to the ivory trade 
between the Ndebele state and the prazos.31 Indeed, it 
appears that the man known as Chipuriro who succeeded the 
Unhova in the 1890s and was recognised as the chief (i.e. 
Chief Sipolilo) by the Southern Rhodesian government was 
a well-known elephant hunter.32 This trade was moribund 
by the 1910s.
30 Ian Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe. 
1890-1945: capital accumulation and class.struggle. London: 
1988, p.14.
31 D.N. Beach, "The Shona and Ndebele Power, 1840-1893" in 
War and Politics in Zimbabwe. 1840-1900. Gweru: 1986, p. 34.
32 "Notes on Some of the Mhondoros (Spirit Mediums) in the 
Sipolilo District of Rhodesia", 13/10/65, p.9, in DA PER 5.
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The new trading focus that began to develop from 
this time was increasingly oriented towards the south, 
namely Salisbury, Bulawayo and further afield to South 
Africa and its ports.33 As a result Sipolilo became 
increasingly peripheral to the Southern Rhodesian state 
and economy. It remained so for several decades.
Indeed, Lan claims that the Southern Rhodesian state, 
imposing taxation and re-organising chieftaincies, did 
not reach the Valley until 1920,34 although official 
documentation reports an office at the Zambezi River 
crossing of Kanyemba,35 probably for the purposes of 
labour recruitment.
As Phimister has noted, the "consequences of 
merchant capital's advance were as contradictory as the 
spread of commodity relations was uneven."36 I would also 
argue that, especially prior to the Second World War, the 
"advance" of merchant capital and the spread of commodity 
relations was tentative, included several retreats, and 
involved the abandonment of areas by itinerant traders in 
times of recession. This was particularly true in 
outlying or remote districts such as Sipolilo.
33 Lan, Guns, and,.Rain, p.i8.
34 Ibid.
35 "Kraal Appreciation Report: Sipolilo Reserve", Office 
of the Land Development Officer, Sipolilo, Ref. No.
LAN.20/2/56, November 30, 1956, p.2. S 138.
36 Ibid. , p . 15 .
The penetration of merchant capital bolstered 
dominant classes by aggravating social differentiation; 
on the other hand the developing commodity relations 
undermined existing social relations and upset "the 
balance within and between indigenous class forces."37 
Some people took positive advantage of the changes this 
wrought. Women and men took the opportunity to escape 
some of the patriarchal structures that dominated their 
lives. Others used them to enhance their position in 
African society by adapting to the new situation and by 
incorporating elements of the pre-colonial social order 
into the colonial one in new and innovative ways for 
their own benefit,38 e.g. the inclusion of a cash element 
in roora that appears to have emerged in the 1920s. The 
introduction of cash allowed elders to demand cattle and 
cash for their own daughters, and it also allowed them to 
offer cash to fathers and guardians in the Zambezi 
Valley.39
37 Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, p.
15 .
38 See Diana Jeater, Marriage. Power and Perversion: the 
construction of a moral discourse in Southern Rhodesia. 189Q- 
1920. Oxford: 1993, especially Chapter 8, and Elizabeth 
Schmidt, Peasants. Traders and Wives: Shona Women in the 
History of Zimbabwe. 1870-1939. London: 1992.
39 Shadreck Chitsiga (24/11/91) and Amai Muzurura 
(11/12/91). Diana Jeater's book, especially Chapter 8, 
"'Tradition' and Power: Transformation of African Marriage, 
1914-1926" is also very important on the role of developing 
commodity relations in changing forms of African marriage in 
central Southern Rhodesia.
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Throughout the twentieth century the local economy 
of Sipolilo District has been based on agriculture. 
Pastoralism was limited in the early twentieth century 
due to the presence of tsetse fly above the escarpment at 
this time. Tsetse fly infested the northern reaches of 
the plateau into the 1910s. Before the Second World War 
there was no mining and little commercial farming 
anywhere in the district. Early prospecting in the 
district yielded low expectations of gold, and chrome 
mining did not become a serious concern until the Second 
World War when its strategic significance made its 
extraction a potentially profitable enterprise. White 
commercial farmers began colonizing the district in 1946, 
although the neighbouring districts of Mazoe to the east 
and Lomagundi to the south offered employment 
opportunities.
It appears that Africans in this district held 
slaves into the present century. One informant told me 
that when his father was required by "the British" to 
account for the men at his homestead during tax 
registration, he made out that his own slave was his son- 
in-law. This slave reportedly had come from Tanganyika.40 
This may say as much about the position of sons-in-law in 
Korekore society in the period of early Rhodesian contact 
as about slaves in the territory. At least one source
40 Interview with Shadreck Chitsiga, Ruwinga, Guruve 
Communal Lands, 24/11/91.
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considered the mugarira41 to be effectively bonded 
labour.42
The monetisation of the economy in Sipolilo District 
was slow and uneven. Cash was often scarce, and there 
was no consistent flow of money into the district before 
the Second World War. There was little to attract 
capital into the district, with only one mine, far from 
the railhead, and little government support to settle 
Europeans in the district. One possible indicator of 
early involvement in wage labour and the cash economy 
generally is the payment of taxes. Taxes were paid, in 
cash, by the people of Upper Sipolilo from the first 
decade of this century,43 (though not until 1920 in the 
Valley).44 But the Native Affairs Department had 
difficulty collecting those taxes over the next two 
decades and by 1918 chiefs and headmen were pressed into 
service on behalf of the Native Affairs Department in the
41 Mugarira: son-in-law in service-marriage. The verb 
from which this noun is derived, kugarira, has an interesting 
series of meanings including, "Lie in wait for"; "Work for 
father-in-law in lieu of paying roora"; and "Sit decently". 
All of these are taken from the Standard Shona Dictionary.
42 File of Rev. T.D. Samkange, "Rovora Inquiry, 1932-34", 
in the possession of Prof. T.O. Ranger who I thank for 
allowing me access to this file.
43 D.N. Beach, Mapondera. 1840-1904. Gweru: 1989, p. 30.
44 Lan, Guns and Rain, p. 18.
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collection of taxes.45 In 1929 it was reckoned that tax 
collection in the Sipolilo sub-district was slower than 
in most others, though by no means the worst.46 But this 
may have been due as much to the deficiency of the Native 
Affairs Department in collecting taxes in outlying 
regions as to the scale of African participation in wage 
labour.
Two mines dating from the pre-colonial period have 
been found in the district: the 'Eureka' and the 'Agatha 
and Ella' mines. The first has been worked 
intermittently since pre-colonial times and in the 
current century has produced between 1000 oz and 5000 oz 
of gold.47 It is situated in the Reserve lands, three 
kilometres from Guruve town. In 1965 the District 
Commissioner considered it not to be "a successful 
undertaking",-48 however, 'Eureka' was a working mine again 
in 1991. The 'Agatha and Ella' has not produced at all 
this century.
Although the District Commissioner, Sipolilo, 
claimed in his 1965 annual report that the 'Eureka' mine
45 See the District Annual Reports, 1918 and 1919, N 
9/1/21 and N 9/1/22.
46 Sipolilo ranked as the thirty-first slowest "payer" of 
forty-five districts. CNC Circular Letter No. C. 480/29, 25th 
October, 1929,
S 235/452
47 R. Summers, Ancient Mining in Rhodesia. Salisbury:
1969, p.45.
48 DC Sipolilo, AR 1965, Records Centre.
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was the only mine in the district,49 other sources make 
frequent reference to chrome prospecting and chrome mines 
on both sides of the Umvukwes.50 For the most part the 
chrome seams are small and poor but they did offer 
Africans an opportunity to earn cash close to home. 
Africans in Sipolilo District appear to have prospected 
independently in the 1950s, sold their mining rights,51 
contracted out and taken on contract work.52 William 
Zwitete, for example, was promised £1000 by a local white 
farmer "for the sale of my mine".53
In 1937 farm labour wages ranged from 9s. to 15s. 
per thirty-day ticket in the Lomagundi District, of which 
Sipolilo formed a part. Similarly, mine labourers 
received 12s. 6d. to 25s. per ticket. Labourers in both 
sectors were provided with "accommodation, food and 
attention during sickness" by the employer.54 By 1955
49 Ibid.
50 Interview with Tom Blomefield, 8/12/91; William 
Marazini Zwitete v. Weston Mucherwa, CR 34/61, 6.3.61.
51 William Marazini Zwitete v. Weston Mucherwa, CR 34/61,
6.3.61.
52 Mawani Philip X2477 v. Ravu Keniyadi, CR 84/61,
12.5.61. GCC, claiming "£5-10-6d....For 3 tons of chrome dug 
for Defendant". See also CR 256/60, 25.11.60 and CR 123/61, 
not heard, both in GCC.
53 William Marazini Zwitete v. Weston Mucherwa, CR 34/61,
6.3.61.
54 NC Lomagundi, AR 1937, S 1563. No statistics for 
Sipolilo alone were available.
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farm labourers were receiving £2.5s. to £3 per ticket 
while their mining counterparts received £4.10s. per 
ticket.55 Not surprisingly, farm labourers were keen to 
supplement their wages with sideline enterprises. These 
included the raising of small livestock such as poultry 
or rabbits for personal consumption and for sale in the 
compound. These sidelines were clearly important to the 
workers' livelihood. One farm worker demonstrated this 
when he took out a civil action demanding compensation 
for the killing of his rabbits and guinea pigs by a 
colleague's dog.56
The viability of peasant production in Southern 
Rhodesia as a whole has been studied by several scholars 
and the debate continues as to when, if ever, it 
collapsed. Palmer asserts "By 1939 virtually all 
vestiges of African economic independence had been 
shattered".57 However, Africans continued to exploit the 
peasant option. Many were forced by economic circum­
stances to take a growing part in the wage and cash 
economy, but did not abandon agricultural production. In 
Sipolilo it was only after the Second World War that such 
opportunities arose locally.
Although more specific information is not available, 
it is apparent that in the Lomagundi district in the
55 NC Lomagundi, AR 1955, S 2827/2/3.
56 Romondo v. Koloni, CR 91/62, 21/6/62, GCC.
57 Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p.13.
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1920s and 1930s a significant investment was made in ox-
drawn ploughs. In 1927 353 ploughs were owned amongst
the 12 654 taxpaying men of the district.58 By 1937 the
number of ploughs in the district numbered 2674, owned
amongst 15 499 taxpaying men.59 This is a change from a
plough being owned in every other village, to three
ploughs being owned in each village! In that decade the
number of cattle in the district nearly doubled,
increasing from 17 232 to 33 154. However, estimated
yields did not make any comparable increase, rising only
by a meagre 5550 bags, from 119 100 to 124 650.60
The Maize Control Act (1931), designed to benefit
"small white farmers against both large-scale growers and
peasant producers",61 quickly had its effect in Sipolilo.
In 1932 the Asst. Native Commissioner reported,
The cost of hired transport and the lack of 
native-owned transport makes the disposal of 
maize through the Maize Control Board an 
impossibility. The local market for all kinds 
of grain (including mealies) is both limited 
and confined to trading for goods, 
exclusively.62
58 General Statistical Returns, 1927.
59 General Statistical Returns, 1937.
60 General Statistical Returns for 1927 and 1937.
61 Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, p.
174.
62 Asst. NC Sipolilo, AR 1932, S 235/510.
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The inability to obtain cash for their crops served to 
further debilitate producers who needed to pay for bags 
and transport in cash.63 In this time of economic 
hardship, the outlying district of Sipolilo was 
marginalized.
Following the promulgation of the Amended Maize 
Control Act (1934), a law more protectionist than its 
predecessor and favouring small-scale white producers, 
the Asst. Native Commissioner noted "a considerable 
quantity of unsold maize in the Sipolilo Reserve" and 
could foresee no promise of future improvements in the 
local market. The market for African produce had quickly 
atrophied. The Asst. Native Commissioner remarked, "in 
fact one farmer, who in the past has traded comparatively 
large quantities of maize, has stated his intention to 
grow [only] his own requirements."64
The 1940s was a decade in which Africans increas­
ingly sought part-time wage labour.65 Clearly, Africans 
had been forced out of many markets by the discriminatory 
legislation. As a result, many Africans were compelled 
to supplement their meagre income through wage labour. 
Although the NC Lomagundi noted the uneven development of 
markets across Southern Rhodesia in 1941, he failed to
63 NC Lomagundi, AR 1932, S 235/510.
64 Asst. NC Sipolilo, AR 1934, S 1563.
65 "Select Committee on the Resettlement of Natives, 
Second Report", 1960, para. 52, p. 17.
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comment on why production had collapsed in the remoter 
areas which previously had good production records. He 
claimed, rather naively, that "[t]here is little 
difficulty in marketing produce and stock in the southern 
part of the district. In the more remote parts there is 
not a great deal to market."66 In 1942 white farmers were 
guaranteed 12s. 6d. per bag by the government, while 
Africans were receiving only 8s. per bag. This price was 
"'better than [in] previous years.1"67
In 1942 an average of 308 Southern Rhodesian 
Africans were in employment in Sipolilo district.
However, "the majority of farmers [were] as a rule short 
of labour.... [Furthermore,] A shortage was reported on 
the Chrome mines on the Umvukwes".68 A contributory 
factor had been the reduction in the food rations in a 
year of scarcity which had led many Sipolilo residents to 
seek work further afield. Labour recruitment caused 
"great difficulty" that year and men refused to work in 
the labour gangs.69 This was despite the fact that "'the 
more remote Mashonaland districts' [had been] identified
66 NC Lomagundi, AR 1941, S 1563.
67 S 961/1, Minutes, 13/3/42, cited in Johnson, "The 
Impact of the Second World War on Southern Rhodesia".
68 Asst. NC Sipolilo, AR 1942, S 1051.
69 Ibid.
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as targets to increase the supply of chibharo labour.70 
Within African society in Lomagundi district, those with 
relatively good harvests took advantage of the scarcity 
of maize in 1942. The Native Commissioner commented that 
this opportunity "solved the marketing problems in 
certain areas."71
Despite the pressures of falling yields, increased 
marketing restrictions imposed by the government, and a 
decrease in available arable land in the Reserve due to 
the resettlement of "Bepura's people", the local people 
in Sipolilo broadly maintained a viable land base in the 
Reserve following the Second World War. In Southern 
Rhodesia as a whole, the late 1940s was a period of 
relative rural prosperity due to destocking, the sale of 
vegetables and maize.72
In 1946 white settlers, many of them Europeans, 
arrived in the district: they settled the Horseshoe Block 
of farms that border the Sipolilo Reserve to the east.
The farms offered local Africans new opportunities for 
wage labour closer to home. These farms grew tobacco and 
maize, as well as raising beef cattle. For many years 
Africans were able to find work on these farms, simply
70 D. Johnson, "The Impact of the Second World War on 
Southern Rhodesia", p.232.
71 NC Lomagundi, AR 1942, S 1563.
72 D. Johnson, "The Impact of the Second World War on 
Southern Rhodesia", pp.260-268.
259
clearing the land, or "stumping" as it is called locally.
The new settlers were followed the next year by the first
permanent stores in the Reserve.73
The years 1946 and 1947 presented an interesting
conjunction of political and economic forces in Sipolilo.
The settlers had brought new capital to the area, while
Africans capitalising on the wartime boom moved out of
the urban wage labour sectors to establish stores of
their own in the district. The precise period of the
establishment of the stores appears either to have been
opportunistic, or fortunate. For these were drought
years, and grain distribution for famine relief relied on
private traders.
In towns these were often Indians, while 
African storekeepers controlled trade in remote 
districts like Mount Darwin, but in rural areas 
European traders generally had the largest 
share of business.74
Sipolilo appears to have followed the pattern of
neighbouring Darwin district.
In Sipolilo it is possible to chart the growing
prosperity which accompanied the development of the
district after the Second World War. In 1942 only 3213
bags of maize were sold, and the majority of these to
73 Maj. Shadreck Chitsiga, Ruwinga, Guruve communal Lands, 
9 December, 1991.
74 John Iliffe, Famine in Zimbabwe. 1890-1960. Gweru:
1990, p.100.
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farmers near the Reserve.75 However, in 1947, a drought 
year, the Asst. Native Commissioner reported 32,000 bags 
of maize were sold.76 In 1952, 33,000 bags were sold, 
which was said to be a "record".77 This number was 
surpassed in 1953,78 1954, and 1955 when 46,635 bags were 
sold.79 In 1956, when there was small decrease in the 
number of bags sold (44,021), the Native Commissioner 
reported,
Not many years ago the Sipolilo district had an 
adequate quantity of grain in store. But the 
ease with which a native can now dispose of his 
crops has altered this. Invariably there is 
now a slight pre-harvest scarcity of maize.80
The land base maintained in Sipolilo Reserve made it
possible for local Africans to demand semi-skilled labour
as ploughmen and later as tractor drivers on the newly
settled, nearby commercial farms.81 Local Africans also
took contract work that would allow them to earn cash
without abandoning their own fields. Contract work was
75 Asst. NC Sipolilo, AR 1942, S 1563.
76 NC Lomagundi, AR 1947, S 1051.
77 Asst. NC Sipolilo, AR 1952, S 2827/2/2/2, vol. 1.
78 CNC Form l.b., Sipolilo, Year ending 1/12/53, S 2404/4.
79 NC Sipolilo, AR 1955, S 2827/2/2/3.
80 NC Sipolilo, AR 1956, S 2827/2/2/4.
81 Tom Blomefield, Tengenenge Sculpture Community, 8 
December, 1991; and Willie Karambwe, Ruwinga, 12 December, 
1991.
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obtainable in both the agricultural and mining spheres.82 
As a consequence of this comparatively strong land base, 
migrant labour from north of the Zambezi, especially 
Nyasaland, became more attractive to many white farmers.83 
This organisation of labour is indicative of the weakness 
of commercial farmers in the district as well as the 
relative strength of the local people.
In 1951 the Asst. NC Sipolilo made interesting 
remarks concerning the recruitment and retention of 
labour in the district:
Labour in the district is not plentiful 
but one receives very few complaints.
Employers seem more philosophical than they 
used to be and obviously realise there is 
little they can do to get more labour.
The majority of employers go to great 
lengths to keep their labour but their 
ignorance of the Pass Laws and laws of Masters 
and Servant makes the settling of their 
problems a difficult matter.84
That same year the Economic Survey of Southern Rhodesia
commented that nationally labour remained scarce "because
a large part of it is inefficiently used."8S By 1955 the
farmers' position had strengthened to some extent and the
82 CRs 49/60, 1.2.60; 256/60 25.11.60; 45/61 n.d.; 123/61 
n.d.; 22-25/62, 16.3.62; 27-31/62, 21.3.62; 40-45/62, 27.3.62; 
48-52/62, 6.4.62.
83 Tom Blomefield, Tengenege Sculpture Community, 8 
December, 1991.
84 Asst. NC Sipolilo, AR 1951, S 2827/2/2/1.
85 "Economic Survey of Southern Rhodesia", March 1951, 
para. 428, p. 86, S 2811/3.
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European farms in the district mostly had sufficient 
labour, an average of 75 Africans working on each farm. 
However, retaining this labour required farmers to act 
tactically. Consequently, "large amounts of 
credit...[were]...advanced to native employees"86 thus 
creating a risk of non-payment should a worker decide to 
leave. The following year, the Native Commissioner 
reported that European farmers had sufficient labour.87
By 1956 3,524 indigenous Africans, men, women and 
"juveniles", were employed in the district. The 
following year this number decreased to 3,106. Although 
this decrease is largely accounted for in the number of 
juveniles and women employed, the total number employed 
remained relatively constant. The mines could attract 
labour but, as the Native Commissioner noted, "just over 
a third of farmers in the district report a shortage of 
labour. Another 344 adult males would put them right."88
In 1956 the Native Commissioner reported that the 
average number of employees on the farms was 66, and in 
1957, 71. Foreign men accounted for 25 and 30 
respectively of these averages. Indigenous men at the 
same time accounted for 17 and 20 of the total,89 women 
and juveniles making up a third of the workforce. How
86 NC Sipolilo, AR 1955, S 2827/2/2/3.
87 NC Sipolilo, AR 1956, S 2827/2/2/4.
88 NC Sipolilo, AR 1957, S 2827/2/5.
89 Ibid.
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many of these were local to the district is very 
difficult to determine. Both women90 and men sought 
refuge in the new domains, and they were eager to find a 
distant farm or mine where they could settle, at least 
temporarily.91
Africans also sub-contracted labour. The number of 
disputes this practice gave rise to is probably not 
indicative of the frequency with which it was used to 
obtain labour or goods and it would be dangerous to 
attempt any such extrapolation. Such contracting appears 
to have been most prevalent on tobacco farms and in 
brick-making.92 In 1948 Ndziradzokufa was offered £10 to 
assist Min making and burning 100,000 bricks". Ndzirad­
zokuf a expected meals to be supplied (as we have seen, a 
common practice in other forms of labour); his employer, 
Zinyama, did not.93 In 1961 a man named William was
90 see Diana Jeater, Marriage. Perversion and Power, 
pp.117-121; and Elizabeth Schmidt, "Negotiated Spaces and 
Contested Terrain: Men, Women, and the Law in Colonial 
Zimbabwe, 1890-1939", JSAS. vol. 16, no. 4 (1990), pp. 622- 
648. Both studies highlight how women made use of the new 
domains that emerged on the farms and mines to escape 
patriarchal control.
91 Willie Karambwe, Ruwinga, 11 December 1991; and in 
discussion with Colleen Karambwe. See also van Onselen, 
Chibaro. p.123.
92 Asst. NC Sipolilo CR 12/48, 26.7.48, S 2033; NC 
Sipolilo CRs 49/60, 1.2.60; 45/61 n.d.; 22-25/62, 16.3.62; 27- 
31/62, 21.3.62; 40-45/62, 27.3.62; 48-52/62, 6.4.62. GCC.
93 Asst. NC Sipolilo CR 12/48, 26.7.48 S 2033; the 
subsequent case, CR 13/48, was brought by Ndziradzokufa 
against a fellow employee Chimukuzumbo.
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contracted to make and burn bricks at 32s. 6d. per 
thousand. He subsequently subcontracted the work to 
another man, Joseph, at 30s. per thousand.94
Some idea of the wages paid on the tobacco farms for 
contracted workers may also be obtained from the disputes 
that arose in the civil courts. In 1958 one Jimi, a sub­
contracted labourer pruning tobacco on the farm of Mr. A. 
S. Ford, was to be paid 2s. 3d. per day.95 In 1959 group 
leaders were paid 25s. per week, while "older girls" were 
paid 15s. per week and a girl too young to give a sworn 
statement received 12s. 6d.96 In 1962 Mr. Thompson of 
Deall Farm offered a contract for "suckering". This 
contract paid 30s. per acre. For the individual worker 
this amounted to 25s. per week, and for two workers 4s.
2d. per day each. One of these workers put in a total of 
46 days, the other 44. Again, the issue that brought 
this to the attention of the courts was the inclusion of 
rations in the contract.97 Most of those engaged on 
contract by tobacco farmers received five to six weeks of 
work. It is quite clear from the civil case records that 
those engaged on short-term contracts expected rations to
94 NC Sipolilo, Joseph v. William CR 45/61, n.d., GCC.
95 NC Sipolilo, Jimi X15163 Sip v Kaseke Zowa, CR 49/60,
1.2.60, GCC.
96 NC Sipolilo, CR 58/59, 4.4.59, GCC.
97 NC Sipolilo, CRs 23 and 24/62, 16.3.62, GCC. See also
CRs 22 and 25/62, 16.3.62; 27-31/62, 21.3.62; 40-45/62,
27.3.62; 48-52/62, 6.4.62.
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be supplied. However, the contractors appear to have
considered full-time employment as so significantly
different a form of labour that they did not include
rations as a matter of course. Perhaps this was
following the logic that a six- or seven-week contract
did not disrupt seriously the food production cycle on
the employee's own lands in the Reserve. This post-
Second World War development in Sipolilo District must
also be seen as part of the transition to "free" labour.
Maize farmers also used contracted labour. In one
case, in 1961, it appears that the farmer was uncertain
as to whether labour was most efficiently employed on
piece-work or on weekly terms. One worker, Chudeni,
outlined the conditions.
Sometime this year I was employed by the 
defendant [Paurosi] on his contract with Mr.
Hoskins for plucking and threshing mealies.
First def. said he was to pay me 8d per bag of 
plucked mealies, then he said it had been 
altered by Mr. Hoskins and that I was to get 
£1.5.- per week. I worked for 7 weeks and at 
the completion of the contract the def paid me 
only £2.15.0. I am therefore claiming the 
balance of £6.
Paurosi responded,
I promised each of them 8d a bag of threshed 
mealies. Mr Hoskins was paying me lOd a bag of 
threshed mealies so on each bag I was receiving 
2d. "98
98 NC Sipolilo, Chudeni J 12531 Sip v Paurosi X4610 
Sipolilo, CR 132/61, 8.8.61, GCC.
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By the 1950s, the people of Sipolilo district were
becoming increasingly accustomed to the use of cash for
many purposes - employment, tax, bridewealth and loans.
Wage labour opportunities existed on the farms and the
few mines in the district. Many seeking work also went
into the neighbouring Lomagundi district. The Sipolilo
stores provided a ready outlet for the cash income.
Despite these conditions, barter persisted in the area at
least as late as 1956." This was due, in part, to the
fact that many inhabitants of Sipolilo Reserve had
sufficient land to remain largely independent of wage
labour.100 The contract work also gave rise to men
earning money as contractors, sub-contracting labour to
perform the work itself. In the neighbouring district to
the east, Darwin, the Native Commissioner reported that
the inflow of much money following on the 
tremendous increase in agricultural production 
is percipitating [sic] an unbalanced impact on 
the lives of the people.
A nattily dressed man and his primitively 
dressed wife struggling to get an inner spring 
mattress into a hut, the construction and 
materials which have not changed in centuries; 
a recent model vehicle being bludgeoned along a 
track which less than a decade ago was a game 
trail; four modern native-owned tractors 
operating in one reserve where there are only 
two master farmers, neither of whom own a 
tractor; a schoolboy of about 14 happily 
kicking a football whilst his lobolaed wife is
" Shadreck Chitsiga, 9 December, 1991.
100 Tom Blomefield, Tengenenge Sculpture Community, Guruve 
District, 8 December, 1991.
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left at the kraal nursing a baby; these are 
examples, extreme perhaps, which lean near the 
macabre.101
A range of new wants and needs had clearly developed by 
this time, even in the more remote districts like Darwin 
and Sipolilo. However, wealth and social stratification 
had not followed the idealised meritocratic path 
envisioned by many in the Native Affairs Department as is 
demonstrated above by the fact that those who owned the 
tractors were not the "master farmers".
Economic activity in the District was not solely 
agricultural. Some Africans earned part of their living 
through other skills, though these were very few in 1931 
when eight such men were counted.102 In the 193 0s African 
artisans operating in the district included bootmakers, 
builders, plasterers and thatchers. Despite 
fluctuations, by 1939 there were 30 artisans practising a 
greater variation of trades.103 By 1951 African business 
included stores and more than thirty had opened since 
1947. The Dikita Store, which began bartering maize for 
commodities for which previously cash was needed, even 
though it was very scarce,104 was described as a "very 
wealthy organisation; besides having the monopoly on
101 NC Darwin, AR 1955, S 2827/2/2/3.
102 Asst. NC Sipolilo, 1931, S 235/509.
103 NC Lomagundi, AR 1939, S 235/517.
104 Shadreck Chitsiga, Ruwinga, 9 December 1991.
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transport in the district they also run stores and grain
sites in the Miami area.11105 New business opportunities
were taken up on the Reserve and in 1954 trader-producers
were buying over 57 000 bags of maize produced there.106
In 1955 there were 11 millers and 42 general dealers,
but, the Native Commissioner remarked, "only ten stores
are any good. The remainder carry little stock and are
often closed."107 The Land Development Officer judged
only five to be doing "reasonably well" in 19 5 6 .108 These
stores were owned and operated by Africans; only two were
owned by Europeans in 1956.109 By 1957 there were 61
general dealers, fourteen of which also operated mills.
The extent of new wants was also commented upon.
The buyers, especially the women, are becoming 
more discerning. Better quality cloth and 
garments are being bought. Blue 'limbo1 is 
definitely out. Gayer frocks are seen 
everywhere, and while I am not suggesting that 
the 'H' line has caught on, at least larger 
hats and silk stockings have been observed.110
105 Asst. NC Sipolilo, AR 1951, S 2827/2/2/1.
106 NC Sipolilo, AR 1955, S 2827/2/2/3.
107 NC Sipolilo, AR 1955, S 2827/2/2/3.
108 "Kraal Appreciation Report: Sipolilo Reserve", 
November 30, 1956, Office of the Land Development Officer, 
Sipolilo, p. 12. S 138.
109 NC Sipolilo, AR 1956, S 2827/2/2/5.
110 NC Sipolilo, AR 1957, S 2827/2/2/5.
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Credit and Boxes
Van Onselen has argued that the extension of credit, 
in different forms, was a strategy deployed by mine 
owners to extend the average employment period of African 
workers.111 In Sipolilo Reserve, as in the mine stores of 
an earlier period, the so-called Box system as well as 
more orthodox forms of credit were extended to customers. 
The Box system was simple. A customer selected an item 
from the store,- it was then placed in a box designated as 
the customer's, and that article was paid for in part or 
the payment was deferred altogether. When the contents 
of the box were fully paid for it would be released.112 
Although there is no evidence that the excesses 
associated with the mine stores' use of credit occurred 
in the Reserve, the system was basically the same.
It would be wrong to consider that the new Reserve 
stores introduced the concept of commercial credit to the 
people of Sipolilo; that was surely an experience of the 
mine compounds and farm stores. But the Reserve stores, 
with the Native Commissioner's and Chiefs' courts, were 
probably responsible for institutionalizing commercial- 
style debt in the Reserve. It is important to note that 
the stores made great use of commercial notions of debt, 
and in the coming chapter we will see how it altered 
local concepts of deferred payment and debt.
111 van Onselen, Chibaro. pp. 161-66.
112 Ibid, p . 163 .
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The rapid expansion of the general dealerships and
other businesses in Sipolilo in the mid-1950s was soon
accompanied by an explosion of debt cases at the Native
Commissioner's Court from 1954. In 1958 the NC noted,
Native storekeepers receive and give credit 
freely; much too freely. Disputes about debts 
account for the majority of the 215 mercantile 
civil law cases heard at the Native 
Commissioner' s office.113
However, Central Africa had begun to slip into economic
recession in 1957, due in large part to the collapse in
copper prices. Already by 1958 seven general dealers'
stores had been forced to close. From 1957 through 1960
the people of Sipolilo Reserve became increasingly
reliant upon credit. The recession generally, and the
decreasing crop yields of 1959 and 1960 in particular,
left the area with very little cash in circulation. The
Native Commissioner reported in 1959 that "The small
maize crop meant very much less money in circulation and
for native storekeepers and traders 1959 was a very poor
year."114 The storekeepers' response to the harsh
economic climate was to rely upon credit. The Native
Commissioner blamed this practice for the number of debt
cases appearing before his court. The severe shortage of
both cash, and the main item of barter in the district,
113 NC Sipolilo, AR 1958, S 2827/2/2/6.
114 NC Sipolilo, AR 1959,
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maize, left the storekeepers and their customers with 
little choice.
White commercial farmers were also feeling the 
effects of the economic squeeze and passed on their 
difficulties to their employees through the same 
mechanism: extended credit for work done, rather than 
paying wages. They thus played a significant part in 
slowing down the circulation of cash in the local 
economy. The white farmers were the only people in the 
district with sufficient economic power to attract any 
capital from the Rhodesian economic centre. This was the 
very time at which commercial farmers in the district 
increased the amount of contract labour they employed for 
casual labour.
The salient feature of the economy of the district 
is that it remained overwhelmingly tied to the 
agricultural cycle. Thus, for most people, there were 
seasonal influxes of cash, and in between there were long 
seasons without cash. It was imperative for the 
storekeepers to minimise the impact of this cycle on 
their businesses. As mentioned, bartering persisted 
until 1956, largely confined to the exchange of maize for 
clothes. But some storekeepers began extending credit. 
Commercial debt cases soon found their way into the 
Native Commissioner's court. Whereas in 1951 only one 
such case appears in the records, by 1955 93 commercial 
debt cases were heard, representing 79.5% of the total.
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For the six years, 1955-60, commercial debt cases 
remained the majority of cases being heard in the Native 
Commissioner's Court.115 During this period Chief 
Sipolilo's court also began hearing commercial debt 
cases. The impact of this will be discussed in greater 
detail in the following chapter.
Land and Cattle Distribution
There had been rapid change in land settlement 
patterns in Sipolilo District between 1930 and 1960. The
Land Apportionment Act (1930) had resulted in forced
removals into the Reserve,- in 1943 the Doma people were 
resettled in the Reserve and in the mid-1950s the Native 
Land Husbandry Act began to be implemented, resulting in 
61% of the Reserve being placed under individual tenure 
by 1959.116 Also in the mid-1950s Africans on the
designated European Crown Land in Sipolilo district north
of the Reserve were forcibly resettled in Urungwe 
district.117 In the light of this turbulence in land 
settlement patterns, the material on land distribution 
collected in 1957 may act only as a benchmark, but it is
115 These figures are compiled from District Annual 
Reports; files S 2033, S 2404/4; and Civil Records held at 
Guruve Community Court.
116 NC Sipolilo, AR 1959, S 2827/2/2/7.
117 NC Sipolilo, AR 1957, S 2827/2/2/5.
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an important one. We have already noted the resentment 
caused by the alienation of land in the district.118
The distribution of land indicates how wealth was 
stratified in the Reserve and also suggests why many 
people were compelled to seek wage labour. This is 
crucial to understanding the effects of the Native Land 
Husbandry Act (NLHA) of 1951 and the local response to 
it. The data for Sipolilo is sketchy, but better than 
for most districts. The information is confined to 
reports connected to the implementation of the NLHA, and 
the Working Party ' D 1 established by the Robinson 
Commission.119
As early as 1951 the Asst. NC Sipolilo noted that 
"[t]his sub-district is overpopulated and a considerable 
number of natives are still residing on European farms as 
there is no land for them in Sipolilo Reserve."120 The 
following year the NC Lomagundi expressed his view that 
Zwimba Reserve was in a better position than Sipolilo to 
settle the remainder of "Bepura's people" from the Doma 
area, as Sipolilo was deemed to be both overpopulated and
118 See Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, pp.245-6, 
cited above, p.23 7.
119 see Kraal Appreciation Report: Sipolilo Reserve,
Office of the Land Development Officer, Sipolilo, S 138; 
Minutes of Assessment Committee, 12th March, 1957, S 2824/7; 
NC Sipolilo, AR 1958; Working Party 'D', Robinson Commission, 
District Survey - Sipolilo (1962), W/P D/3/12, Loc: 5.2.8R, 
Box No 827525 .
120 Asst. NC Sipolilo to NC Sinoia, 15/10/51, S 2806/1996.
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overstocked.121 This was only nine years after the forced 
resettlement of some 3000 of "Bepura's people".122
In 1957 an analysis of cultivation practices in 
Sipolilo Reserve (see Figure 1) revealed that of a total 
of 3027 male cultivators, 705 cultivated less than four 
acres; 998 between four and eight acres; and 1324 more 
than eight acres. Of the 1324 cultivating over eight 
acres, their "average holding...[was]...approximately 16 
acres and quite a few are farming plots about 24 acres in 
size."123 Not surprisingly, " [t]hese 1,324 oppose the 
suggestion that they should reduce their holdings to 8 
acres"124 in accordance with recommendations made by the 
Assessment Committee of the Native Land Husbandry Act 
(1951).12S The average acreage cultivated in 1957 was 9.8 
acres.126 Thus we see a pattern in which 1324 (43.7%) 
small farmers cultivate an average of c.16 acres, 1703 
(56.3%) cultivate less than 8 acres. To put this into 
perspective, it must be noted that 1876, or 38.3% of 
taxpayers of the Reserve were not classified as
121 NC Lomagundi, AR 1952, S 2403/2681.
122 NC Lomagundi, ARs 1941 and 1947, S 1563.
123 NC Sipolilo, AR 1958.
124 Ibid.
125 "Minutes of Meeting of Assessment Committee, appointed 
by the Minister in terms of Section 4 of the Native Land 
Husbandry Act, for Sipolilo District", March 12, 1957, p.l. S 
2824/7.
126 Ibid.
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landholders at all in 19 5 6.127 In 1951 the Asst. NC 
Sipolilo reported that a "large number of Sipolilo 
taxpayers live in the reserve but have no farming 
land."128 By 1962 the number of "persons demanding land 
now" was estimated to be about 2000.129
The economy of this land distribution is made 
evident by the fact that only 2480 of the 4914 (50.5%) of 
the taxpayers registered in Sipolilo Reserve were 
resident in the Reserve.130 Furthermore, 18.4% of the 
male "landholders" were not resident on the reserve,131 
but most likely were supplementing income through wage 
labour outside the Reserve.
The crops grown included maize, groundnuts, rupoko, 
munga and beans, although maize was the pre-eminent 
crop.132 From time to time tobacco was also grown and 
marketed.133 In 1957 maize bought by traders in the
127 "Kraal Appreciation Report: Sipolilo Reserve", Land 
Development Officer, Sipolilo, 30th November, 1956, S 138.
128 Asst. NC Sipolilo to NC Sinoia, 15/10/51, S 2806/1996.
129 Working Party 'D', Robinson Commission, District 
Survey - Sipolilo, Loc 5.2.8R, Box No 82725.
130 Kraal Appreciation Report, Land Development Office, 
Sipolilo, november 30, 1956. S 138.
131 Ibid.
132 "Minutes of the Meeting of Assessment Committee... for 
Sipolilo", 12th March 1957, S 2824/7; NC Sipolilo 1957.
133 DC Sipolilo, AR 1965, Mashonaland North file,
Location: 6.5.1R, Box no. 84260, Request no. 8320/81, Records 
Centre; "Sipolilo Tribal Trust Land, Second Crop Forecast,
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reserve amounted to 38 096 bags, whereas traders bought 
only 653 bags of rupoko.134 In 1956 rupoko transported to 
Raffingora was fetching £4.10s. per bag.135 In 1957 maize 
was sold to stores in the reserve for 25s. per bag.136 
The robust cash economy that was developing increased 
trading in many spheres.
By 1957, tractors, rather than ploughs, were the 
indicator of new technology and capital investment in the 
peasant sector. In 1958 the NC reported "[tjhere are now 
seven privately owned tractors in Sipolilo Reserve and 
three in Nyakapupu Native Purchase Area."137 It was also 
in 1958 that the sale of farming rights achieved a record 
price.
Mr Canaan Chindowe, who has been a master 
farmer in the Sipolilo District for 10 years, 
has sold his farming right for £200 recently to 
Mr Isaac Kawara. Mr Chindowe has bought a farm 
in the new Nyakapupu Native Purchase Area.
This is the highest deal on record for farming 
rights in reserves.138
1974-75 Season", March 17, 1975; "Sipolilo T.T.L., Second Crop 
Forecast, 1977-78 Season", April 10, 1978. Held at the 
Agritex Offices, Guruve.
134 NC Sipolilo, AR 1957
135 Dzepasi X1596 and Mutero Z1590 v. Dick Nyamadzawo, CR 
87/59, 23/7/59, GCC.
136 Matambanadzo Dickson X4720 Sip v. Benura Agrippa, CR 
20/60, 21/1/60, GCC.
137 NC Sipolilo, AR 1958, S 2827/2/2/6.
138 i»price of Reserve Stands is Rocketing", African Daily 
News, December 10, 1959.
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The sale was for a ten-acre arable farming field. In 
1960 and 1961 two sales of farming rights fetched the 
more modest prices of £65139 and £70.140
The changing distribution of livestock ownership in 
Sipolilo Reserve has proved impossible to determine. The 
only source of information in respect of this 
distribution is a report141 made in 1956 after the forced 
destocking sales of the late 1940s and early 1950s.142 
The extent to which ownership was nominally transferred 
in order to maintain large herds is indeterminable. 
However, the distribution of livestock that is 
demonstrated (see Figure 3) suggests that despite the 
limitation of large stock equivalents to 6 head per 
person with grazing permits, a significant number, 23.7%, 
had seven or more head.
Livestock ownership may also be used as an indicator 
of wealth distribution. From the figure appended below 
we can get a picture of how many head of cattle the 
average family owned. We may also see the extent to 
which the wealthiest farmers had far greater resources 
than the average. Although little may be concluded 
regarding the absolute wealth of the farmers in Sipolilo
139 Shamu X817 v. Madzotso, CR 180/61, 21/11/61, GCC.
140 Chitauro X429 v. Usawi X882, CR 144/61, 18/8/61, GCC.
141 "Kraal Appreciation Report: Sipolilo Reserve", Ref.
No. LAN.20/2/56 S 138.
142 See p.293 below.
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Reserve, we are afforded some information concerning the 
relative wealth of the residents. The average owner held 
5.2 head of large stock equivalents, while the largest 
number held by a single owner was twenty four.
A Political history
The political history of the Sipolilo chieftaincy is
centred around the arrival of Europeans in the area,
probably sometime in the 1890s.143 A Delineation Report
prepared in 1965 reads,
During those early days, long before the advent 
of the white man, the term chief (that is ishe, 
mambo or changamire) was not used. Instead, in 
the country of Guruwe the term Nova was 
attached to each successive supreme ruler.
Thus, Chingowo was nova and Swembere took the 
unova after him.144
This report also claims that "[i]t was customary for each
Nova to choose his successor during his life-time".145
This would set it apart from present Shona chieftaincies
and very possibly it was peculiar in the pre-colonial era
as well. Beach has shown that it is dangerous to
143 This episode has not been fully investigated by any 
one historian and there remains some confusion about the 
actual murders. But for some of the information see Beach, 
War and Politics, pp.32-3 and The '96 Rebellions. (Originally 
published as "The British South Africa Company Reports on the 
Native Disturbances in Rhodesia, 1896-97"), Bulawayo: 1975,
p . 61.
144 "Notes on Some of the Mhondoros (Spirit Mediums) in 
the Sipolilo District of Rhodesia", 13/10/65, p.8, DA PER 5.
145 Ibid. p. 9.
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generalise about succession practices in either the pre­
colonial or colonial era and that colonial power was 
often unwittingly drawn into the succession disputes or 
the establishment of break-away chieftaincies.
There are varying accounts of the establishment of 
the Sipolilo chieftaincy, but the main outline is clear. 
In, or about, 1890 Nyamondoro was Nhova, or perhaps the 
heir to the unhova, when a group of European prospectors 
arrived in the area searching for gold. Nyamondoro was 
approached by his sons, sons-in-law and a well-known 
elephant hunter, Sipolilo, who requested Nhova's 
permission to murder the prospectors with the intention 
of dividing up the spoils. Nyamondoro stalled for time, 
saying he must consult the ancestors. In his absence the 
prospectors were murdered at the "Eureka" mine on the 
Dande River.146
Within a week soldiers from Ft. Salisbury arrived. 
Sipolilo was approached initially. He directed the 
troopers to continue their investigation with the unhova, 
Nyamondoro. Nyamondoro informed the troopers of the 
perpetrators, including his sons. At this point accounts 
differ, but a number of men were taken to Ft. Salisbury 
to stand trial. The prisoners may have included 
Nyamondoro. Whether he was taken captive to Ft.
146 Ibid.; Nkosaya Chitsiga, Ruwinga, 1 September, 1991, 
GCL, related elements of the written account. Also Shadreck 
Chitsiga, Ruwinga, 24 November, 1991, and Mahka Kugotsi, 
Shinje, 2 September, 1991, GCL.
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Salisbury, or followed his sons of his own accord, the 
salient point is that he died there. Some accounts 
relate that he was executed, others that he died on a 
hunger strike in captivity and another that he conducted 
his hunger strike as a free man.147
The BSA Co. officials subsequently returned to the 
area and
called on everyone to choose themselves a man 
who would be their chief. Chipuriro was the 
choice of everybody - it was a one horse race!
People roared: "Chipuriro! Chipuriro! the great 
elephant hunter must be our chief in Guruve". 
Chipuriro was duly installed and given the 
simbi (badge of office) .148
The new chief, referred to as ishe or mambo in 
Shona, did not simply displace the unhova but brought 
into being a second parallel office. It is unclear what 
happened to the office of unhova following the 
appointment of the first Chief Sipolilo; it may have been 
transformed or lain dormant but in 1963 it was claimed 
that the unhova had more power than the chief.149 There 
is some suggestion that this was a fantastic invention of 
tradition for political purposes coming, as it did 
shortly after the greatest conflict Africans of the area 
had yet had with the colonial authorities in the form of 
protests against the Native Land Husbandry Act (1951).
147 Ibid., and papers in DA PER 5.
148 Ibid.
149 Report by Native Messenger Marufu, 15/1/63 in "Chief 
Chipuriro", DA PER 5.
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Sipolilo District does not appear to have become involved
in the fighting of the Chimurenga of 1896-97 except to
give "rather reluctant sanctuary" to the medium of Kagubi
in his last days of freedom.150 It continued to be the
wild borderlands of Southern Rhodesia as Mapondera, the
guerrilla fighter, continued his resistance to the young
colonial state, making the escarpment region west of the
Umvukwes one of his bases until 1901.151 But the Sipolilo
chieftaincy appears to have remained neutral.
The chiefs of the twentieth century have been
Sipolilo, Kugotsi, Charedzera, Mabaranga, Mbairatsunga,
Ganda, Chimundera and Tapfuma.152 Informants all
expressed the tensions of the succession struggles that
produced each chief. Succession struggles are inherently
political events. As Bourdillon writes,
Although theoretically the Shona system 
involves clear rules to be followed and 
enforced by the spirit mediums, in practice 
succession to the chiefship is very flexible.
The complexity of the rules provides for an 
element of choice.153
150 T.O. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia. .18.96-97, 
London: 1967, p.307.
151 Beach, Mapondera. 1840-1904. pp.30-34.
152 Nkosaya Chitsiga, Ruwinga, 1 September, 1991; Mahka 
Kugotsi, Shinje, 2 September, 1991, and Shadreck Chitsiga, 
Ruwinga, 24 November, 1991. All in GCL. Though only an acting 
chief, Ganda was always listed with the substantive chiefs.
153 Bourdillon, The Shona Peoples, p. 108.
The best-documented succession dispute of the 
Sipolilo chieftaincy is that which took place in 1963. 
Ganda, an acting chief, was compelled to make way for a 
substantive chief. He had been acting chief effectively 
for five years. The succession took place in an 
atmosphere of intensifying Zimbabwean nationalism. The 
succession dispute was preceded by the first aggressively 
nationalist politics in Southern Rhodesia: Sipolilo 
Reserve had been the most militant area in the rejection 
of the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951. Twenty-eight 
of the 101 internal exiles arrested in 1959 came from 
Sipolilo Reserve.154 Ganda was one of the central figures 
in the chiefly selection process as well as the emergent 
nationalist politics. As such he found himself under the 
strain - physical rather than ideological - of having to 
attend ZAPU meetings in Salisbury at crucial stages of 
the chiefly succession process taking place in Sipolilo. 
Furthermore, the man who became Nhova was also entwined 
with the nationalist struggle. His eldest son was, in 
1963, already in exile for his involvement in the NDP, 
his second was soon to be ZAPU's representative in 
London, and his third son was later to join, and die in, 
the armed struggle.155 The District Commissioner made
154 NC Sipolilo, AR 1959, S 2827/2/2/7.
155 Interviews with Christopher Chitsiga, Ruwinga, 1/9/91 
and Shadreck Chitsiga, Ruwinga, 24/11/91, Guruve Communal 
Lands.
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certain he received police reports on the selection 
process itself.156
From these reports we get a picture of the process 
followed in 1963. Although it is doubtful157 whether it 
represents a fixed procedure used throughout the 
twentieth century there are many notable elements. As in 
any such political situation the key actors influence the 
procedure as well as the outcome. In this case those 
actors were the representatives of the "royal" houses, 
the senior spirit mediums, Matare and Chingowo, and the 
District Commissioner. Of course not all of these were 
involved at any one time.
Three police reports survive describing the events 
of the selection of Tapfuma Naisi as Chief Sipolilo in 
1963.158 The police began by reporting that a night was 
chosen when the mhondoro Matare was to be possessed.
Many people attended the possession, but only selected 
persons were invited into the Matare medium's zumba 
(house). Other mediums may have been present and 
involved in the process. Those invited into the zumba 
deliberated over the selection, each putting forward the
156 Several reports are contained in "Chief Chipuriro" DA 
PER 5 .
157 It is reported that "Mhondoro Matare said to those 
people who were in the Zumba.... Long ago Europeans are the 
ones who are electing Chiefs but this year I am the one who is 
going to do it." unattributed report, 12/1/63, "Chief 
Chipuriro", DA PER 5.
158 All in "Chief Chipuriro", DA PER 5.
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case for their house to accede to the chieftaincy, until 
Matare rejected them one by one. Some seven houses were 
involved, including the house of Gweshe represented by 
Ganda once he had returned from the ZAPU meeting in 
Salisbury. Even Ganda made a weak attempt to convince 
Matare he should continue as chief. It is clear that 
informal alliances emerged as unlikely houses backed 
those with a better chance. One report says the mhondoro 
Matare chose two houses but "seeing that people were not 
pleased of those two houses....He chose two houses 
again.... And he asked from the people in the Zumba to 
choose the house they liked" to receive the chieftaincy. 
Those present referred the matter back to Matare, duly 
submitting:
You Grandfather you are the only person who can 
say out the one who has right to become Chief.
If you choose one to be a Chief nobody can 
blame him. Because we all know you have the 
power to choose anybody you want.1S9
The mhondoro Matare finally selected a single house, 
that of Kachuta. At this point the senior male of the 
house asked the spirit's permission to decline the 
chieftaincy due to age and confer it upon his son Tapfuma 
which was granted. Just before the final confirmation of 
the choice, Ganda is said to have had words with the 
mhondoro, telling him not to choose "one who is going to 
agree to what District Commissioner would say."
159 Unattributed report, 12/1/63, "Chief Chipuriro" DA PER
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When Ganda made his argument for the chieftaincy, he 
was flatly rebuked. But he was told "if you want to ask 
you can ask about the (HUNOVA)", that that was the only 
office available to the Gweshe house. Here an extremely 
interesting process began. The office of unhova, which 
is peculiar to Sipolilo, appears to have been filled for 
the first time in many years, if not since the 1890s.
The current holder of the office, Shadreck Chitsiga, who 
was made unhova in 1963, cannot recall a previous holder 
of the position.160 This may have been a case of 
indigenous invention of tradition, which tinges the whole 
selection process due to the extremely rare overlap of 
people and mediums from one selection dispute to the 
next. But this resurrection of unhova certainly had 
political, indeed anti-colonial if not nationalist, 
elements to it. Ganda had argued with the mhondoros that 
Chitsiga, a Salvation Army teacher, should be made nhova 
"because he is the one who knows how to speak things that 
help the country."161 Ganda was backed by others.
A plan then appears to have emerged that 
Chimanikire, the dunzwi or official in charge of the 
ritual investiture of the new chief, was to present both 
the unhova and the new chief, that is Chitsiga and 
Tapfuma, to the District Commissioner, apparently to
160 Shadreck Chitsiga, Ruwinga, 24 November and 9 
December, 1991.
161 Report by Native Messenger Marufu, 15/1/63, "Chief 
Chipuriro", DA PER 5.
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place the DC in an awkward position, i.e. to recognise 
the autonomy of African elders to choose their leader(s) 
or force him to overrule them in accordance with Ministry 
of Internal Affairs policy. It was claimed that "Nhova 
has more power than Chief Sipolilo on ruling or garging 
[sc. - judging] cases."162 However, when the day of 
confrontation with the District Commissioner arrived, 
Chimanikire and Tapfuma are said to have arrived at the 
DC's office early and seized the opportunity to make 
Tapfuma the sole recognised African leader.163
Tapfuma's position was clearly consolidated by the 
official recognition received. However, he does not 
appear to have become a lackey of the colonial 
government. Indeed, he seems to have developed as an 
extremely independent chief who resisted conflicting 
demands placed upon him. In 1970 he was made a member of 
the Council of Chiefs and was issued with a revolver164 
but later he was also to resist the imposition of the 
infamous "protected villages". However, such public and 
politically ostentatious acts as receiving the 
"President's Medal for Chiefs" in 1974 may well have 
tainted his public perception in Sipolilo. On December
162 Mukwenya speaking to NM Marufu, Report of NM Marufu, 
15/1/63, in "Chief Chipuriro", DA PER 5.
163 Mahka Kugotsi, Shinje, 2 September, 1991, and Shadreck 
Chitsiga, 24 November, 1991, GCL.
164 Secretary of Internal Affairs to DC Sipolilo, March 
25, 1970, Ref. FA/Sipolilo, PER 5 Sipolilo/70.
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31, 1978 he was murdered. There is disagreement as to
whether this was done by Rhodesian Forces agents, ZIPRA
fighters, ZANLA fighters, or whether the murder was the
result of a purely local hatred between the District
Commissioner and Tapfuma. His son, Eckem, was appointed
acting chief, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs
emphasised strongly to the people of Sipolilo Reserve
that this was in accordance with "custom".165
The Bepura chieftaincy appears to be, even more than
that of Sipolilo, a product of the colonial
administration. In 1946 the NC Lomagundi wrote,
Bepura seems to have no tribal claim to the 
chieftainship. Just after the rebellion he was 
a Native Messenger here and for some unrecorded 
reason was given the chieftainship, he is not 
even a native of the tribe. Murisa is 
apparently the recognized tribal chief of the 
area by native custom.
As Bepura is the gentleman we have put in 
the saddle I agree that all parties be called 
together and advised that they must support 
him. Bepura has not long to go; when he does 
go the position can be regularised according to 
native custom.166
Documents in this file suggest that he didn't "go" until
1951 and in October 1954 an acting chief was appointed.
The substantive appointment followed a year later. The
procedure for the selection is not spelt out: we are told
165 Secretary of Internal Affairs to Provincial 
Commissioner, Mashonaland Central, April 24, 1979, Ref. PER 
5/Chipuriro/20.
166 NC Sinoia to PNC, 22/11/46, Ref. no. 546/46 in "Chief 
Bepura", DA PER 5.
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only that Mufunga succeeded and one man, Dzukamanja, 
dissented, claiming the chieftainship for himself. He 
received no support.167 Eleven days later a "meeting to 
choose the Chief" was held in the presence of the Native 
Commissioner. Mufunga won the election then by 51 votes 
in favour, one against with six abstentions.168
The political relationship between the Chiefs Bepura 
and Sipolilo is clearly a colonial construct. Not only 
were the two brought into a much closer relationship by 
the forced removal of the Bepura people, but it was the 
state that defined Chief Sipolilo as the paramount in the 
district. This position meant, in practice, that Chief 
Sipolilo received a higher subsidy than Bepura and 
disputes heard in Bepura's court occasionally were 
reheard in Sipolilo1s, while they never moved in the 
opposite direction. More often than not, however, 
"appeals" from Bepura's court would move directly to the 
NC's court, by-passing Sipolilo altogether. In fact, the 
case was that the Assistant Native Commissioner 
considered, in 1947, that the establishment of a Native 
Court for Bepura's area "a very distant prospect" and as 
a result he "requested all natives of this [Bepura1s]
167 "Ceremony of the late Chief Bepura", n.d., "Chief 
Bepura", DA PER 5.
168 no title, n.d., "Chief Bepura" DA PER 5.
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tribe to bring their cases direct to the [Native 
Commissioner's] office."169
Missions, Religion, Education and Political Activity
The 1950s was a decade of lively activity in the 
sphere of civil society in Sipolilo District. Both 
independent and mission church activity was to be found 
there, although only one mission, St Philip's Anglican 
Mission, was located in Sipolilo Reserve. The two 
others, Hunyani and Msengedzi Missions were, and continue 
to be, located deep in the Valley. Both of these are 
stations of the Evangelical Alliance Mission of 
Chicago.170
There appear to have been numerous independent 
churches in Sipolilo Reserve, and followers of more 
outside the district. These included Watch Tower, the 
Rhodesia Apostolic Faith, Hamba Kuku, Mukayera, Yohane 
and Mai Chaza. All of these are reported to have held 
meetings regularly in the late 1950s. Sipolilo was the 
"headquarters" of the Rhodesia Apostolic Faith and by 
1973 it could claim some 500 adherents in Sipolilo 
district alone.171
169 Asst. NC Sipolilo to NC Sinoia, 304/Chief s/47, 
December 5, 1947. District Administrator's files, Guruve.
170 NC Sipolilo, AR 1958, p. 17. S 2827/2/2/6.
171 "Religious Missions and Sects: Sipolilo District", 
file on Spirit Mediums in Sipolilo District, May 1973, Guruve 
District Administrator's files.
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Amongst the white community there was a definite 
perception that the independent churches were somehow 
political. The Native Commissioner wrote in 1959 that 
they had once been "described to me (by an Anglican 
missionary who has since retired) as 'incipient mau-mau' 
the Apostori have joined Congress and take an active part 
in its affairs."172 The "Vapastori" further demonstrated 
their independence of the state by rejecting very 
specifically state courts. Lan tells us, "All matters of 
law are settled by their own leaders in their own 
religious courts. "173
In the Reserve itself there were 16 schools operated 
by the Salvation Army (9), the Anglican church (6) and 
the Roman Catholic church (1). A further four schools 
were established in the Valley area. As in other 
Reserves,174 education emerged as an important social and 
political issue.175 By 1957 the average daily school 
attendance was 2,946, an increase of more than 500 over 
the previous year. It appears that Congress lobbied hard 
to put the expansion and control of schools on the agenda
172 NC Sipolilo, AR 1959.
173 Lan, Guns and Rain, p.41.
174 See J.F. Holleman, Chief. Council and Commissioner. 
Assen: 1969, especially Chapter 4 which outlines how Upper 
Primary Schools became the focus of political demands 
following a Government decision to spend £45,000 to meet half 
the costs of school building programme, the other half to be 
met by the Native Councils' funds.
175 NC Sipolilo, AR 1959, p.17.
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of the Native Council.176 Contemptuously, the native 
commissioner, H.L. George, reported, "Congress leaders 
continue with a loud demand for upper primary schools 
based on the false premises that an educational 
qualification (Standard 6!) is a passport to success."177
The Native Land Husbandry Act and the local response
In 1951 the Southern Rhodesian legislature enacted a 
bill aimed at "revolutionising" African agriculture in 
the Reserves. Throughout the 1940s commercial 
agriculture in Southern Rhodesia had been in crisis and 
had failed to reach expected levels of production, 
despite state assistance in various forms including the 
Compulsory Native Labour Act (1942, repealed in 1945) 
which provided commercial farmers with access to chibharo 
labour gangs. The Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) 
attempted to achieve many aims. Primarily it aimed to 
create two, distinct and stabilised workforces. The 
first constituted the peasant producers in the Reserves, 
while the second constituted the industrial workforce in 
the towns. The industrial boom in Southern Rhodesia 
following the Second World War needed a workforce that 
was efficient, which meant it was required to be 
sufficiently settled to acquire skills, however limited.
176 "African National Congress: Sipolilo", INV.4/29/59.
177 Ibid.
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But the development of an urban industrial workforce is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.
In the rural sector, the aim to increase African 
peasant production was conceived as a technical exercise 
by the draughtsman of the Native Land Husbandry Act,
Arthur Pendered.178 It was argued that through 
conservation and "good husbandry", African producers were 
to increase their harvests by fifty percent over five 
years.179 This would have alleviated the difficulties of 
food supply which Southern Rhodesia experienced through­
out the 1940s.180 The Food Production Drive, an apparent­
ly short-term measure to increase productivity implement­
ed through the Native Affairs Department, operated in 
1951 to overcome those difficulties while the enormous 
preparatory tasks associated with the NLHA were carried 
out over the following years prior to the Act's imple­
mentation. But clearly the most far-reaching proposition 
of the entire NLHA was the effective creation of freehold 
tenure for a limited number of Africans in the Reserves. 
Africans unable to secure "farming rights" as a result
178 See W.R. Duggan, "The Native Land Husbandry Act of 
1951 and the Rural African Middle Class of Southern Rhodesia", 
African Affairs, vol. 79, no. 315 (1980), and M. Drinkwater, 
The State and Agrarian Change in Zimbabwe's Communal Areas. 
London: 1991. Also Roger Howman, Harare, 1 August, 1991.
179 NC Sipolilo, AR 1955, S 2827/2/2/3.
180 D. Johnson, "The Impact of the Second World War on 
Southern Rhodesia, with Special Reference to African Labour, 
1939-48", PhD., London: 1989, p.157.
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would be excluded from access to land in the reserves and
thus compelled to remain within the domain of wage
labour. Holleman has noted,
The African...could hardly escape the 
impression that what the Act generously offered 
as something special to a qualified number, his 
own laws had always accepted as the obvious 
birthright of all.181
As The Sunday Mail put it, the NLHA "means, in short,
that a capitalist economy is to embrace people who for
centuries have known no other than the communal one."182
As early as 1953 organised resistance to the state
regulation of agricultural production had begun in
Sipolilo with the formation of the Rhodesian African
Association. In Sipolilo the RAA was concerned with
resisting the destocking programmes, drawing attention to
the fact that the Provincial Assembly of Chiefs had
fallen into disuse and ensuring that the people's views
were adequately represented. There had been forced
destocking sales in 1948 and 1951, and a further two were
held in 1954 and 1955.183 Although it appears to have
been unsuccessful in achieving any of these aims, the
181 J.F. Holleman, Chief. Council and Commissioner, p. 63.
182 "It Marks the End of An Era", 22/5/55, The Sunday
Mail.
S 2825/4.
183 "Kraal Appreciation Report: Sipolilo Reserve", 
November 30, 1956, Office of the Land Development Officer, 
Sipolilo.
S 138.
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Rhodesian African Association was the first "civic 
institution" of its kind in the district and is notable 
for that alone. The Native Commissioner ridiculed the 
organisation, commenting that it had become readily 
apparent that it was effectively fraudulent after 
collecting membership fees and delivering nothing.184 Yet 
within three years the people of Sipolilo Reserve were 
willing to join another organisation, this time the 
Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (SRANC).
In Sipolilo Reserve the response to the NLHA was 
earlier, more intense and had wider repercussions than 
actions elsewhere in the country. The SRANC appears to 
have scored its greatest successes concerning the NLHA in 
Sipolilo; its infamy spread as knowledge of the "Sipolilo 
situation"185 spread. More detentions took place in this 
district in the 1959 Emergency than any other, and all 
this political activity laid the foundation for the early 
guerrilla activity in the region in the later 1960s and 
early 1970s.
The 1950s and early 1960s are of special interest 
for the political history of the district, and indeed the
184 Confidential Report, "African National Congress: 
Sipolilo", NC Sipolilo to Secretary for Native Affairs and 
Provincial Commissioner, Mashonaland West, April 30, 1959. 
INV.4/29/59. An original copy of this document was kindly 
sent to me by its author, Mr. H.L. George.
185 Under Secretary for Native Agriculture and Land 
Husbandry to Secretary for Native Agriculture, March 3, 1959. 
Records Centre, Box 6.5.66R/84266.
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country as a whole. Therefore it is worth briefly
looking at the leaders of the resistance to the Act in
Sipolilo, and their social bases: who followed them and
why. The repercussions of this resistance will also be
looked at briefly.
It is first worth reminding ourselves of the profile
of land distribution which was provided above. The
government was intent on redistributing land in eight-
acre parcels to those granted farming rights in the
reserve. As we have seen, eight acres was barely an
economic unit as considered by the peasant producers
themselves. The majority of peasant producers cultivated
more than 9.8 acres. Thus the limit to 8 acres was a
real cut in available arable land to many, and "quite a
few" who cultivated about 24 acres were being severely
cut. The leaders of the resistance to the Act came, not
surprisingly, from the group of producers who had
previously controlled more than eight acres. Indeed, the
NC Sipolilo's report of April 1959 on Congress activity
in the District states that
16 of the 25 [local Congress leaders] now 
detained have between 10 to 28 acres each.
From their point of view it was necessary to 
reject the Native Land Husbandry Act and they 
got the rank and file to do so also - but on 
the grounds that the Act catered inadequately 
for children and made insufficient provision 
for the future.186
186 Ibid. , p . 4 .
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However, one woman informant told me that she and her 
husband had cultivated about four acres but that they had 
opposed the NLHA because it deprived them of the right to 
choose the land they wanted to till. In essence they 
were resisting government impositions. Furthermore, 
there was a fear that in years of shortages, men would 
still be compelled to find wage labour beyond the Reserve 
and the untilled land resulting from a shortage of labour 
would be confiscated by the colonial authorities in an 
attempt to settle more people in the reserves.187 
Throughout the country the implementation of the Act had 
been notorious for disrupting village settlement 
patterns, to the extent of having caused the displacement 
of whole villages.188
In 1955 the Native Commissioner, H.L. George, 
expressed misgivings concerning the NLHA and foresaw a 
number of problems it might cause. First, he questioned 
the credibility of the "Five Year Plan that will 
Revolutionise African Agriculture" and the increase in 
production it projected. Secondly, he asserted that the 
extension and conservation work taking place in the 
reserve was already achieving these aims; any new scheme 
could only be upsetting.
187 Amai Muzurura, 11 December, 1991, near Ruwinga, GCL.
188 Jocelyn Alexander, "The State, Agrarian and Rural 
Politics in Zimbabwe: Case studies of Insiza and Chimanimani 
Districts, 1940-1990", D.Phil., Oxford: 1993.
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The increase sale of maize from 30 000 in 
1950 to the record 57 333 bags in 1954 can be 
attributed to extension work: better seed 
selection, more compost used, better weed 
control, better crop spacing. The development 
plan must include both extension and 
conservation work and I believe that since the 
re-appointment of the Land Development Officer 
in 1953 that balance was properly maintained.189
Finally, George recognised the possible political
consequences.
The recentralisation of Sipolilo Reserve 
will involve a very considerable amount of 
work....
Farmers' average holding in the reserve is 
12 1/2 acres - a sale of up to 50 bags is not 
uncommon. These landholders are concerned 
about the intended reduction in size of their 
lands. I am told that by reducing their land 
to six acres (or whatever the assessment 
committee decides) I will be depriving them of 
land allotted to them by the chief or 
rightfully inherited, into which they have put 
much labour and which they had intended to 
divide and assign to their children.190
But George's successor as the NC Sipolilo in 1959
displayed the conventional view of the Native Affairs
Department that more land would mean more satisfaction.
It is pertinent to point out that a large 
proportion of landholders now have an increased 
holding having previously held half or less 
than their present acreage,- the extent of their 
holdings previously depended on the good will 
of the kraal head. I have questioned 40 males
189 NC Sipolilo, AR 1955, S 2827/2/2/3.
190 Ibid.
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at random, almost all of whom now have more 
land than previously.191
This understanding of the land distribution in Sipolilo
did not take into account the extensive studies carried
out by the Land Assessment Committee.
Those who led the resistance to the NLHA at the
local level had included Ganda, effectively the acting
chief in this period, who is credited by many still
living in the communal lands as the man who "brought
politics to this district",192 and Jairos Katanda, a large
peasant producer. Ganda later became a member of ZAPU.
Another leader was Christopher Chitsiga, SRANC publicity
secretary in the district and the eldest son of Major
Shadreck Chitsiga, later to be appointed to the
resurrected position of nhova. The newly arrived Native
Commissioner, Sherlock, noted, "It is significant that
some Congress leaders had large lands e.g. John Chikoya
(18.4 acres), Jakalasi (22.8 acres), Muchemwa (20 acres)
and Tinarwo (27.4 acres) .Ifl93 These men were prominent in
the local community prior to the attempted implementation
of the NLHA, and following its repeal they had gained in
local power, suggesting that the campaign as a whole was
legitimated within the local community.
191 NC Sipolilo, AR 1959, S 2728/2/2/7.
192 Nkosoya Chitsiga, 1/9/91, Ruwinga, and Amai Muzurura, 
11/12/91, near Ruwinga, GCL.
193 NC Sipolilo, AR 1959, S 2827/2/7.
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Native Councils and Congress activity
One immediate consequence of the anti-NLHA sentiment 
in the Reserve was the invitation of the SRANC into the 
district and the targeting of the Native Council, not as 
a symbol of colonial government which had to be 
destroyed, but as an effective institution which could be 
used to resist government pressures. A Native Council 
had been established in Sipolilo Reserve in 1946 and it 
met regularly over the following thirteen years, unlike 
its counterparts in many other parts of the country. In 
1958 it was reported to have met nine times. "Congress" 
apparently instructed the Council to apply for a school 
that year.194 In the same year the SRANC had at least one 
member on the Council and was preparing to put a full 
slate forward for the Council elections scheduled for 
1959. Those elections returned all the Congress 
candidates, and they were able to secure the position of 
Vice-Chair (the chairmanship being held ex-officio by the 
Native Commissioner) but the Council met only once as the 
Emergency declared in January 1959 resulted in no further 
meetings being held that year.
The SRANC established a branch in Sipolilo in 
October 1957 after John Chikoya, previously an active 
branch member of the defunct Rhodesian African
194 "African National Congress: Sipolilo", INV.4/29/59. 
Also a report by the NC Sipolilo entitled "Congress instructs 
Council apply school", SBV.2/4/58, Sept. 8, 1958. I have not 
seen this report.
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Association, approached George Nyandoro, the SRANC Vice- 
President, and invited him to a meeting in Sipolilo.195 
Those elected to the executive of the Sipolilo branch of 
the SRANC were "virtually the same people" who had been 
active in the local Rhodesian African Association. Their 
objectives remained roughly similar, but some interesting 
new complaints were voiced. Congress appears to have 
been more critical of the Chiefs' Assembly than 
previously, but strikingly, especially for this thesis, 
it was reported that complaints included "Too much delay 
in being attended to at the Native Commissioner's office 
especially in dealing with civil cases."196 This was 
noted in a report listing only six of the major 
complaints voiced by Congress.
George appears to have responded very conclusively 
to the establishment of the Congress branch:
The situation was such that by the end of 
1957 I was able to recommend either Congress 
and kindred associations be banned or 
recognised, then they must be strictly 
controlled. No action was taken.197
By the end of 1958 the Native Commissioner estimated that
its local membership had reached 1200 and the donations
made in that period amounted to £2000. Over the same
195 NC Sipolilo, AR 1957, S 2827/2/2/5 and the 
Confidential Report entitled "African National Congress: 
Sipolilo", INV.4/29/59, in my personal possession.
196 "African National Congress: Sipolilo", INV.4/29/59.
197 "African National Congress: Sipolilo", INV.4/29/59.
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period Congress held twenty "major meetings" in Sipolilo, 
six being attended by national executive members based in 
Salisbury. In November 1958 the President, Vice- 
President and Secretary-General of Congress (Joshua 
Nkomo, George Nyandoro and James Chikerema) visited 
Sipolilo together. These men either stayed in Sipolilo a 
number of days or made a further visit two days later. 
Whatever the case, the formerly "remote" Sipolilo was 
gaining national attention.198
The legitimacy enjoyed by the campaign in Sipolilo 
appears also to have been transferred to the 
organisations allied to it, the SRANC, the NDP and ZAPU. 
Although it appears that the resistance to the Act 
originated locally, and was an organic resistance to 
local circumstances, the nationalist groupings were soon 
invited into the district to give it more weight.
Congress appears to have lent organization to the 
widespread campaign against the NLHA in Sipolilo. The 
Native Commissioner commented in his report on Congress 
activity that following the detention of "26 active local 
Congress leaders" there was no decrease in sympathy for 
Congress, and to permit any of the detainees "to return 
to the reserve would be highly dangerous; they would most 
certainly cause a clandestine revival of as great, in 
not greater, influence than before the emergency."199
198 NC Sipolilo, AR 1958, pp.29-30. S 2827/2/2/6.
199 "African National Congress: Sipolilo", INV.4/29/59.
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Conclusion
The history of the African people of Sipolilo 
district has been one of essentially remaining peripheral 
to the Southern Rhodesian state prior to the great influx 
of European settlers following the Second World War.
This influx brought with it the need for the Government 
to open up new land for European settlement, and 
government surveyors were working in Sipolilo shortly 
after the cessation of hostilities in Europe. Capital 
brought into the district by these settlers, African 
entrepreneurs (mainly storekeepers but also bus owners), 
and the increasing number of people involved in wage 
labour prompted the economic development of the area.
The strong land base enjoyed by those in the Reserve 
resulted in increased peasant prosperity in the decade 
1947 - 1957. The introduction of the Native Land 
Husbandry Act threatened, or at least was perceived to 
threaten, that new-found prosperity. As a result the 
resentment towards it was great and the Act was met with 
growing resistance as one organisation after another was 
established in the Reserve to fight the government 
impositions.
This period marked the consolidation of the cash 
economy in the district as a result of two parallel 
processes. First, the establishment of the permanent 
stores in Sipolilo following the Second World War 
provided the basis for a local cash outlets for Africans.
The colonisation of the Horseshoe block farms resulted in 
capital investment in the area and a rapid increase in 
local employment opportunities initially to open those 
farms, and later to keep them running. However, the 
onset of the recession in 1957 was felt sharply. Peasant 
producers cut back on their production because of 
marketing difficulties. At the same time they felt under 
attack as the Government sought to implement the Native 
Land Husbandry Act. The previous decade had consolidated 
the local cash economy but in the recession cash was very 
scarce. The prospects of recovery appeared to be cut off 
by the NLHA. It is little wonder that by late 1958 the 
nascent nationalist struggle was vibrant in Sipolilo 
district.
As we shall see in the following chapter, the social 
and political conflict of this period was the general 
backdrop to a dramatic increase in the use of the local 
courts. The focus of judicial disputing also shifted in 
this period and both Chiefs and Native Commissioners were 
compelled to be nimble in order to satisfy the demands of 
the litigants.
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Chapter. .5.
"Money breaks blood ties":1 
From Lineage Debt to Commercial Debt
In action, each local bridewealth system 
is precisely adjusted to specific political, 
social and economic conditions.2 
Introduction
This chapter will examine how a new legal concept, 
commercial debt, was introduced, how that concept may be 
transferred from one field of law, commercial law, to 
another, family law, and consider the process by which 
that legal concept became a norm in Sipolilo society over 
the period 1945 to 1965. In order to follow this process 
it is important to have an understanding of the 
bridewealth system and the implications this had for the 
concept of debt in the area under study. The role of the 
storeowners of Sipolilo and their use of the lower courts 
in the 1950s and 1960s will be examined. The use of a 
legal principle originating in one field of law but 
applied in a new one is explored and finally some 
consideration is given to the relationship between 
scarcity and disputing.
This district study will provide an important 
insight into the value of controlling dispute proceedings 
and provide finer texture to my larger thesis. I will 
argue that the changing economy and its ramifications as
1 Chenjerai Hove, Shadows. Harare: 1991, p. 26.
2 A. Kuper, Wives for cattle. London: 1982, p.170.
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interpreted by the lower courts controlled by Native 
Commissioners and chiefs affected roora, or bridewealth, 
but also the concept of debt current in African society 
in Sipolilo. It was the courts that mediated the 
transition from lineage debt to commercial debt through 
the most difficult period. The legitimacy and organic 
connection that the chiefs' courts provided was of 
paramount importance in the development of the new norms. 
This whole process was overtly ideological and involved 
both the colonial administrators and the African chiefs.
All of this, of course, took place within a specific 
social, political and economic framework. To summarize, 
in the 1950s the Sipolilo district was being opened up to 
the cash economy largely through the colonization and 
settlement of the area by European and white South 
African immigrants. The introduction of the Native Land 
Husbandry Act (NLHA), 1951, was dispossessing many 
Africans in Southern Rhodesia of their land and 
attempting to force all Africans into single-sector 
employment - largely either peasant production or 
industrial wage labour. It was an attack on the 
migration between the two sectors and an attempt to 
stabilise both workforces. In the late 1950s, 
particularly in 1958, Southern Rhodesia as a whole 
suffered a recession, and the related "credit squeeze"3
3 NC Mazoe, AR 1958, S 2827/2/2/6; and NC Buhera, AR 1959 
S2827/2/2/7.
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affected many in Sipolilo. Finally, throughout the 1950s 
and into the 1960s the Native Affairs Department was 
increasing its support for African "chiefs".
Chanock has commented,
While historians may perceive the 'destruction' 
of peasantries and the process of 
proletarianisation, it is far from easy for 
people affected to understand the nature of the 
broad processes which are changing their lives, 
and far easier for these changes to be 
understood in terms of their nearest and most 
obvious manifestations. Both subjectively and 
objectively people found themselves engaged in 
conflict not with economic forces, not just 
with white colonial government,but with each 
other.4.
This is a phenomenon also touched upon by Mann and
Roberts in their recent volume.5 It is through the window
of civil disputes and records that we may perceive, in
Sipolilo district, the social tensions involved in the
processes noted by Chanock. It is worth returning to his
work here for further comparative insights. Writing of
indirect rule as experienced in Northern Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, he comments,
The disputes with which colonial courts and village 
courts found themselves dealing were in increasing 
numbers new conflicts caused by new demands being 
made of old relationships, or caused by the 
formation of new relationships which people tried
4 Martin Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order: The 
Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia, London: 1985, pp.12- 
13. Emphasis in the original.
5 Kristin Mann and Richard Roberts (eds.), Law in Colonial 
Africa, London: 1991, pp. 3-4.
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to regulate with concepts and claims appropriate to
a passing social formation.6
The new tensions could no longer be resolved by the old 
methods.
Abel has pointed out that the lower courts in Kenya 
developed a "rule-orientation", but not of their own 
initiative.7 I would argue that the rule-oriented 
paradigm within which the Native Commissioners' courts 
operated served as a model for the chiefs' courts which 
sought to avoid appeals being made to their decisions. 
Thus the chief followed the example of the NC's court and
remained within the vaguely defined limits which were
suggested through the conduct of the NC's court adopting 
the rule-oriented paradigm. This is observable 
particularly in the commercial debt cases which were very
new to the chiefs and whose outcome at the NC's court had
been very clear.
The recently developed modus operandi in the chiefs' 
courts of the latter half of the 1950s was in response to 
the new demands placed upon them. Chanock has termed 
this rule-oriented process "legalism". It is the 
adoption of a procedure for the application of rules. It 
has been adopted "because it is instrumentally 
effective", and Chanock describes it as "more of a
6 Chanock, Law. Custom and Social Order, p.22.
7 Richard Abel, Customary Law of Wrongs in Kenya: An Essay 
in Research Methodology. New Haven: n.d., cited in Chanock,
Law. Custom and Social Order, p.66.
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mechanism than an ideology."8 The social acceptance of a 
newly emerging norm, in this case the necessity to pay 
commercial debts with relative speed, required a process 
which made a break from the past. Legal coercion was 
used to institute the new norm, and that new norm had 
ramifications throughout the legal world. Once legal 
coercion was able to produce a consensual acceptance of 
that norm, that norm was fit to be transferred to other 
fields of law. For example, I intend to show in this 
chapter how commercial debt came to predominate over 
lineage debt and how, once this concept had been 
incorporated into the local concept of debt, the 
underlying principles were transferred into the sphere of 
family and matrimonial law.
The period central to the discussion in this chapter 
was, without doubt, a time of rapid change characterised 
in the judicial field by a surge in civil litigation 
between Africans, and in particular in commercial debt 
cases. It appears quite clearly that during this period 
- as Fallers remarked in his study of Busoga - the "legal 
subculture differed sharply from the popular culture".9 
This is observable in the resistance to the emergent 
norms. Commercial debt was a new "trouble spot", as is 
observable from the sudden and dramatic increase of such
8 Martin Chanock, "Writing South African Legal History: A 
Prospectus", JAH. 30 (1989), p.268.
9 Lloyd A. Fallers, Law Without Precedent: Legal Ideas in 
Action in the Courts of Colonial Busoga. London: 1969, p. 16.
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cases. The graph plotting commercial debt cases and non­
commercial cases (Figure 4) makes this clear. 
Interestingly, this "trouble spot" was also one that 
quickly disappeared, suggesting that commercial debt 
gained social acceptance and became a norm to be 
respected within African society. Newman has argued in a 
theoretical and comparative study of preindustrial 
societies that
Where stereotypical kinds of disputes 
prevail...there are underlying strains in the 
social relations of production, patterned 
inequalities in access to crucial resources, which 
are surfacing as disputes and which are addressed 
by prescriptive legal rules. It is in this sense 
that law should be viewed as regulating the social 
relations of production.... [L]egal behaviour is 
oriented toward and straining to accomplish the 
containment of structurally generated conflict.
Thus, if the tensions generated within particular 
modes of production can be isolated, recurrent 
disputes and substantive rules should be 
interpretable as manifestations of these tensions.10
Equally, the emergence of new types of disputes and new
rules to contain them may be interpreted as a
manifestation of new tensions caused by weaknesses in the
old order of class forces to respond to new factors and
changing class forces.
The regulation of social relations by the powerful
interest groups in Sipolilo society, both the state as
embodied by the Native Commissioner and the African
10 Katherine S. Newman, Law and Economic Organization: a 
comparative study of preindustrial societies. Cambridge: 1983, 
p.137.
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elders, was conducted through the means of distributing 
"crucial resources", i.e. the courts.11 I would go 
further and argue that in conditions such as Newman 
posits in which certain types of cases occur with great 
frequency, not only is the existence of "underlying 
strains in the social relations of production" brought to 
light, but also a new technique of gaining access to 
those resources has been made available. In our case the 
presence of the colonial state allowed individuals access 
to a resource, the Native Commissioner's court and its 
form of justice, which offered many a means of obviating 
the barriers found in Chiefs' courts and the justice they 
meted out. Indeed, as we have seen earlier, the colonial 
government attempted to abolish all African-run courts 
and impose the colonialists' interpretation of "native 
law and custom" as the only legitimate form of African 
law.12
The territorial spread of law concomitant with the 
political and economic processes of colonialism was met 
with differing forms of resistance, according to district 
and period.13 Chanock writes,
11 See Andrew S. Ladley, "Courts and Authority: A Shona 
Village Court", Ph.D. thesis, London: 1985, in which he argues 
that the courts are a key instrument for the distribution of 
crucial resources.
12 See Chapters One and Two.
13 Diana Jeater's book, Marriage. Perversion and Power: 
the construction of a moral discourse in Southern Rhodesia. 
1890-1930. Oxford: 1993, demonstrates some processes
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[The] dominant form [of commodity relations and 
law], spread by capitalism and imperialism has 
reshaped and re-formed modes of social control at 
all levels. This is not to say local levels 
eventually simply reflect the dominant mode, for 
there are resistances and adaptations, but all have 
been changed by its power. It is from this 
perspective that there is an advantage in 
identifying the differences between the newly 
dominant form and those of the societies which are 
now its subject.14
Thus the emergent form of commercial creditor-debtor
relations becomes predominant in an area, but not without
resistance. The interaction between the emergent and
declining forms reshapes each, the specific outcome
dependent on their relative strengths.
Lonsdale has remarked that in a time of acute social
disorder when old authorities are weakening and new
statuses are still insecure "'men cannot so easily detach
themselves from old identities and associations in so
uncertain a world...they were ...tugged at every step by
all the cultural symbols with which their elders had
taken such pains to endow them.'"1S In Sipolilo society
in the post-Second World War period, as the cash economy
was consolidated there, it was not a simple adjustment
remarkably similar to those being presented here, but in an 
urban and periurban environment, close to major markets, some 
thirty or more years earlier.
14 Chanock, Law. Custom and Social Order, pp.222-223.
15 Ibid., p.18, citing John Lonsdale, "States and Social 
Processes in Africa: A Historiographical Survey", African 
Studies Review. 24, 1981.
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for the people to adopt a fully capitalist economy, and 
the social relations that accompany it, and dispose of 
anomalous cultural practices. Indeed, the "tugging" 
created social strife. Both the Chiefs' and the Native 
Commissioner's courts played an important role in 
managing the transition from lineage debt to commercial 
debt in the most difficult period in Sipolilo.
In the mid-1940s Sipolilo District was still on the 
periphery of the cash economy, but by the early 1960s the 
portion of the district which lies south of the Zambezi 
Escarpment was firmly integrated within the Southern 
Rhodesian economy. This rapid economic change was 
compelled by many factors, and it clearly had 
ramifications throughout society. As we shall see the 
lower courts controlled by the Native Commissioners and 
the Chiefs had been instrumental in consolidating the 
cash economy in the district. This went beyond simply 
the use of currency, including support for credit exten­
sion and the local development of contractual agreements 
and relations.
Lineage Debt
In order to begin the analysis of the transformation 
of debt we must begin with the dominant form of pre­
capitalist debt, lineage debt. Central to lineage debt 
was marriage, so I will begin by setting out a typology 
of the roora system operating before the Second World War
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and consider the post-War economic changes within this
frame of reference. Roora involves the collateral
transfer of resources, for example, eight head of cattle,
six head of goats and a cash element, from the family, or
lineage, of the son-in-law to the father-in-law in return
for a wife. I would argue that it is important to
conceive of it as a collateral transfer or exchange,
rather than a payment, which is how most anthropologists
have tended to characterise it.16 This is due to the fact
that the return of the cattle, goats and cash were at the
centre of disputing over divorce throughout the period
under consideration. Kuper has stated of southern
African bridewealth systems that
the payment of bridewealth cattle gives the husband 
legal rights to the children his wife bears. As 
Jeffreys summed up the jural situation, 'Lobolo is 
child-price1 (1951). More precisely, the transfer 
of bridewealth cattle is necessary to the birth of 
a legitimate person.17
At the core of a successful marriage is the birth of 
healthy children. Thus the transfer of livestock may be 
conceived of as collateral against a successful marriage. 
The failure of marriage, depending on various factors, of
16 Michael Bourdillon, The Shona Peoples. Gweru: 1987,
J.F. Holleman, Shona Customary Law. London: 1952, Adam Kuper, 
Wives for cattle. London: 1982, all write about "payments". 
Although this may appear to be a very minor point, I believe 
it does help to dispel the concept of "purchasing" wives and 
furthermore takes into account the role that bridewealth plays 
in divorce disputes.
17 Kuper, Wives. p. 22.
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which the most important was the number of living
children (who remained in the husband's family), resulted
in the return of the pfuma18, or collateral livestock.
For example, a divorce case brought before the Asst. NC's
court at Sipolilo in 1947 provided the following
testimony. The plaintiff, Tarupiwa, stated he had "paid
£9.10/- lobola" and his wife had given birth to a boy in
1945. Subsequently the marriage broke down and Tarupiwa
was claiming "custody of the child and return of my
lobola less £3 dowery [sic] for the child and £2 raising
fee."19 Kuper has found that this is common to all
Southern Bantu bridewealth systems.
The fundamental bridewealth rule was that marital 
rights in a woman were transferred against the 
payment of cattle. The Southern Bantu emphasized 
particularly rights to a woman's children. Should 
a wife be childless, or should she die or desert 
her husband before bearing children, then either 
the bridewealth cattle had to be returned or her 
family had to replace her with another wife.
The transfer of rights in children was 
permanent. Children could not be claimed by the 
wife's relatives in the event of divorce or in any 
other circumstances.20
However, there were some court cases in Sipolilo that 
contested the permanency of rights to children, 
demonstrating that the court was a milieu in which
18 The Standard Shona Dictionary defines this as "2. 
Cattle consideration handed over as main part of roora.", 
p.525.
19 Tarupiwa v. Arutura, CR 9/47, 30.6.47, S 2033.
20 Kuper, Wives. p. 26.
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negotiation over social norms took place. Although these 
courtroom negotiations were between Africans, the norms 
were also partly defined within the parameters of, and 
therefore by, the superior legal structures of the 
colonial state.
Some court cases concerned disputes over whether it 
was the correct cow or bull that was being returned in a 
given divorce. In one case, in 1954, the defendant 
offered money in lieu of the cattle but the plaintiff 
insisted "'I want my cattle.'"21 That 1954 was a 
destocking year in Sipolilo Reserve may explain in part 
why, in this case, the plaintiff, and implicitly the 
defendant, considered cattle more valuable than cash. It 
may also explain why the plaintiff insisted his cattle 
were returned: if those defendant's cattle were more 
likely to be forcibly culled, and the prices received 
would be below market value, there was little point in 
the plaintiff accepting them.
Kuper's analysis may be interpreted in support of this 
proposal to conceive of bridewealth "payments", in the 
sense of collateral transfers which only gained 
permanence upon the success of the marriage. Bourdillon 
argues in a similar way with special reference to the 
Shona, "Roora is associated with rights over children
21 Muzira X427 v Matiyapa (asst, by Dzinyanda 979), CR 
25/54, Sipolilo, 1.10.54, S 2033.
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born to the woman"22 and remarks astutely, "there is no 
clear point at which the couple can say they are now 
married whereas they were not married before."23 
Furthermore, the transfer of livestock occurred over many 
years, sometimes extending beyond the lifetime of the 
husband, in which case his son was held responsible for 
its completion.24 I would argue that this had a 
functional purpose and was not simply the result of 
families not having the wherewithal to complete the 
transfers sooner. It created interdependent 
relationships and strengthened social ties. The changes 
wrought in bridewealth arrangements reflected the impact 
of developing commodity relations in Sipolilo district.
Marriage amongst the Shona "is essentially a contract 
between two families."25 But as we have seen, it was 
often the case that this was between unequal families.
In a kinship-oriented society this has important 
ramifications. A marriage increases the social ties both 
horizontally, i.e. through the same generation, and 
vertically, i.e. across different generations. It 
creates a whole new set of affinal relations for the
22 Bourdillon, The Shona Peoples, p.41.
23 Ibid. , p . 40 .
24 Ibid., p.42, and see also the civil records for 
Sipolilo District in S 2033 where these issues arise several
times in cases.
25 Ibid. , p . 36 .
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families involved. The new relation is expressed through
the terms used. As Bourdillon explains,
Thus a tezvara (the father-in-law of the 
groom or any male of the bride's family) 
is tezvara to the whole of the groom's 
family, all of whom should give him the 
appropriate service and respect. The 
whole family adopts a new relationship 
terminology, which is dropped by all if 
the marriage is dissolved.... For some 
purposes, the head of the family of the 
groom is regarded as the principal 
mukuwasha (normally translated as son-in- 
law) rather than the husband of the 
bride.26
Kuper argues that this is not the only set of 
relationships affected by the marriage. He asserts that 
the husband becomes indebted to the relative or patron 
from whom he acquires the initial livestock or cash.
This person, for obvious reasons, tends to be older than 
him, with a herd of a sufficient size to spare a few 
head. The father was usually responsible for providing 
the bridewealth for at least his eldest son, but even 
then sometimes the father had to draw on the resources of 
elder brothers or patrons. However, it was not always so 
simple. As a member of a powerful house in Sipolilo 
Reserve stated, "I did not receive any cattle from my 
father to marry my wife. I paid my own lobola, except
26 Ibid. , p.37 .
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for three head which he [my father] borrowed from the 
mondoro [the ancestral spirit or spirit medium]."27
In a typical, rural, pre-Second World War lobola 
marriage, the father could expect, in turn, to receive 
the cattle that his son received for his first daughter.28 
This had two effects. First, it extended the patron- 
client network; the father gained another client as his 
granddaughter's husband effectively transferred the 
cattle, indirectly, to the grandfather. Secondly, it 
highlights how long debts associated with roora transfers 
remained outstanding. Both have binding power upon the 
individuals and lineages involved.
Another means of obtaining the required livestock was
through the use of those cattle acquired through the
marriage of a sister. This creates a special link
between those two siblings. The importance of this is
that it illustrates how the raising of the roora created
debts between the wife-receiving and the wife-providing
families as well as within the wife-receiving families,
that is between the father-son or sister-brother. Kuper
emphasises this:
The basic rule of reciprocity operated 
whoever raised the bridewealth, kinsman 
or patron, man or woman.
The transactions involved in raising 
bridewealth were strictly comparable to
27 Mufidziki X6699 Sip v Kugotsi Chirata, CR 122/60,
7.6.60, GCC.
28 Kuper, Wives. p. 26.
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1944,
the great public transaction in which 
bridewealth was directly exchanged for a 
wife. All were governed by the same rule 
of reciprocity. The payment of 
bridewealth gave a claim to the wife.
Each bridewealth payment consequently 
formed part of a chain of transactions, 
not only between the immediate 'wife- 
givers' and 'wife-takers' (however they 
might be defined) but between a series of 
debtors and creditors, related in a great 
many possible ways.29
The time-factor involved in the quittance of these debts
is of paramount importance here. We may perceive a type
of debt that creates bonds, making affines out of
unrelated families, and reinforces those between members
of the same family. Shona people see it as such. While
giving testimony to the Native Production and Trade
Commission in 1944, one man stated, "Lobola is a kind of
binding relationship.... it binds the relationship between
the father-in-law and the son-in-law together".30 The
debts create tension and interdependence both between the
husband's and wife's families as each waits for children
and cattle to arrive, and between the husband and his
pfuma provider. The persistence of the debts maintains
the interdependence. Bourdillon's analysis of the
extended debts is as follows. The husband is reluctant
to make the complete transfer before the marriage is
proven a success. The wife's family's interest lies in
29 Ibid. , p.27 .
30 Nhlanga to the Native Production and Trade Commission, 
p.583, ZBJ 1/1/1, vol. III.
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that they may demand favours from the husband as long as
the debt is hanging over him. As Bourdillon and one of
my informants both note, "Mukuwasha mukuyu haupere
kudyiwa" ("A son-in-law is like a fruit tree: one never
finishes eating from it.").31 This is not to deny that
the system creates and reinforces hierarchical
relationships, the wife-providers lower than the wife-
receivers32 and the pfuma providers, husband's father
and/or uncles higher. Kuper summarises it as follows,
The system of marriage and bridewealth 
rested on a simple and ineluctable 
principle of reciprocity....This rule 
applied not only as between a man and his 
wife's family, but at every step between 
those who contributed to bridewealth 
payments, and those who exchanged 
bridewealth directly for wives.33
To supplement this model of roora and Shona marriage 
we may turn to the analysis advanced by Weinrich 
concerning the impact of capitalism upon roora 
transactions.34 She argues that the introduction of cash 
"acquainted people with new forms of property" and 
concludes that the resulting "transformation of
31 Bourdillon, The Shona. pp.42-43. The translation is 
also Bourdillon's. The Shona is from Maj. Shadreck Chitsiga, 
Ruwinga, GCL, 9 December, 1991.
32 Ibid. , p . 37 .
33 Kuper, Wives. p. 39.
34 A.K.H. Weinrich, Women and racial discrimination in 
Rhodesia. Paris: 1979, see especially Chapter 4 "The Changing 
Function of Bridewealth".
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bridewealth into a commercial transaction [was] a natural 
consequence" of this change.35 Weinrich ignores the fine 
texture of the process which led to this change when she 
makes her assertion that the "transformation" was 
"natural". In fact, it was a highly complex 
transformation which in different districts involved many 
different factors, and it would be dangerous even to 
suggest, as Weinrich does, that the transformation was 
inevitable.
The major characteristic of cattle prior to the
penetration of capitalism was their use-value; of cash,
its accumulative power. Weinrich argues that
cattle were pre-eminently lineage property and 
intended for the perpetuation of the lineage; as 
the lineage lost its relevance, cattle, too ceased 
to be an important factor in a marriage 
transaction.36
However, the cash economy had weakened the lineage-based
economy directly, a factor Weinrich fails to emphasize.
The cash-earning powers of young men provided for them
opportunities of relative freedom from dependence upon
their lineage 'big men' in order to accumulate sufficient
wealth to make the required roora transactions. However,
Schmidt notes cases of 'big men' controlling the earnings
of migrant workers. She writes:
This they did through the manipulation of the 
bridewealth system; increasingly large amounts of
35 Ibid. , p . 94 .
36 Ibid.
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cash, as well as cattle, were demanded as lobola.
Thus, bridewealth became less of a symbol 
representing a bond between kin groups and more of 
a commercial transaction, in which women were the 
bartered goods.37
We may conclude from this that the struggle over a new
resource, cash, undermined the pre-existing structure of
kinship relations. The timing of this struggle depended
upon the specific conditions of a given district,
primarily the emergence of the cash economy. The cash
economy was extended to Sipolilo district most forcefully
in the period immediately following the Second World War
as was demonstrated in the previous chapter.
From the 1920s through the 1940s cattle transactions
were at their height in Southern Rhodesia. But in the
1950s, a period of industrial expansion and also of
large-scale destocking, cash transactions were on the
increase.38 In Sipolilo there had been, previously,
little local need for cash and few local outlets. As
young men gained the ability to find their own
bridewealth, the elder kinsmen's control of bridewealth
allocation diminished. The ability, or freedom, on the
part of young men "has as its consequence marriages that
no longer link together different lineages".39
37 Elizabeth Schmidt, Peasants. Traders and Wives: Shona 
Women in the History of Zimbabwe. 1870-1939. London: 1992,
p.86.
38 Weinrich, Women and racial discrimination, p. 96; also 
see below in the case study.
39 Ibid. , p . 108 .
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Furthermore, Weinrich found that bridewealth cash
transactions, perhaps legitimately referred to as
payments, were used for a variety of new purposes ranging
from school fees to establishing businesses and paying
medical bills rather than towards expanding the lineage
through extending lineage credit. This is a significant
variation upon the models outlined above. As Weinrich
states clearly,
the uses to which bridewealth payments are put show 
the extent to which this custom has been 
commercialized. Bridewealth provides old men with 
a unique opportunity of acquiring wealth which can 
be used for whatever purpose they wish. This is 
totally different from the role of bridewealth in 
the past.40
The fact that the lineages were undermined is very
important. Not only could an individual find the roora
but "it is no longer the extended family as a whole which
receives marriage payments".41 This change had an adverse
impact upon women's positions as they became
almost exclusively dependent on their husbands. In 
the past, if a husband seriously maltreated his 
wife, she could appeal not only to her own family 
but also to her husband's family [which stood to 
lose all or part of the roora] ; today these have 
little influence in restraining their son even if 
obviously abuses his authority at home. This means 
that wives are becoming more vulnerable as their 
position loses some of its traditional 
safeguards. "42
40 Ibid. , p.112.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid. , p . 96 .
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On the wider, national, scale Weinrich has argued that 
money had broken blood ties and a lineage based economy 
was supplanted by a commercial one. She has discussed 
some of the large-scale factors in this transition, such 
as industrialization and government destocking 
programmes, but we are given none of the fine texture of 
how this transition, centred around the 1950s, manifested 
itself in the local community. Jeater, however, has 
provided a splendid, fine-textured, analysis of the 
impact of capitalism on African marriage and social 
relations in an urban area in the first thirty years of 
this century.43 In conjunction with the study below, it 
demonstrates the importance of the material context for 
bridewealth arrangements. Now we turn to a case study to 
make a more detailed examination.
Disputing and Norms in Sipolilo District
Sipolilo District, throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century, was a region of scarcity. Below the 
escarpment, and indeed in many areas above it, tsetse fly 
created an adverse environment for cattle, compelling 
bridewealth transactions to assume another form. One of 
the main forms was the labour option, known as kugarira44
43 Jeater, Marriage. Perversion and Power.
44 M. Hannan, Standard Shona Dictionary, p.185. It is 
also interesting to note the primary meanings of this verb 
which include, to lie in wait for; watch over or for, and; sit 
on.
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or brideservice.45 In such instances the father-in-law 
demanded that the son-in-law reside with, or near, and 
work for the wife's family for an undetermined period. A 
case heard in 1945 indicates that the son-in-law had to 
wait a considerable time for his emancipation. Nyahonodo 
married Mbarika in 1923. He had paid £3 to his father- 
in-law and was also "bondsman" and remained so in 1945.
His wife had borne three children, two of whom survived.
He now claimed a divorce and the custody of both 
children, stating he was willing to offer a further 
£2.10/- for them.46
Variations and additions on the use of cattle for 
pfuma appear to date from at least the colonial period.
For example, a man named Mapondera received from one son- 
in-law "7 head of cattle, 3 guns + £5" during E.G.
Howman's period of office as Native Commissioner at 
Lomagundi, that is 1919-1926.47 The cash element 
persisted, and indeed later overtook the cattle element, 
although the value may have continued to be expressed in 
terms of head of cattle. Indeed, in the 1950s it became 
standard on the marriage registration forms to record the
45 Jeater has shown that the rinderpest epidemic of the 
late nineteenth century had a similar impact on the form of 
marriage transactions. See Marriage. Perversion and Power, 
p.98.
46 Nyahonodo v. Mbarika, CR 10/45, Sipolilo, 16.5.45, S
2033 .
47 Nyande v Ndimu (unassisted), CR 106/33, Lomagundi, 
10.1.34, S 306.
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pfuma as the number of livestock and amount of cash, "or 
the equivalent". Although it would require extensive 
statistical research to make any definitive statement, it 
does appear that the cash element fluctuated quite widely 
especially in the pre-Second World War period. In one 
case, dating from 1933, it was testified that £17 was 
demanded in addition to nine head of cattle. After a few 
years the husband opted for divorce as he was unable to 
make the transfers as quickly as the father-in-law 
wished.48 This case is not unique. In an early
example of the courts being used to enforce pfuma 
transfers in a manner similar to commercial debt 
payments, Gupa, in 1933, brought his sister's husband, 
Kanyuchi, to court, demanding from him further transfers 
of cash and cattle or else the dissolution of his 
sister's marriage. Kanyuchi states simply, "I have no 
relatives on whom I can call to pay this lobola for me.
I can only earn 10/- a month."49 Having initially paid 
the substantial amount of £8, it appears that Kanyuchi 
believed he had a period in which to effect further 
transfers. However, Gupa had visited him five times over 
seven months demanding further transfers, finally taking 
him to the Native Commissioner's court after only seven 
months of marriage! This was unique. The NC ordered
48 Rusere v Chirata, CR 15/36, Sipolilo, 23.10.36, S 2033.
49 Gupa 8040 Sinoia v Kanyuchi 11808 Sinoia, CR 70/33, 
Lomagundi, 15.8.33, S 306.
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Kanyuchi to pay. The ways in which Kanyuchi and Gupa 
understood the debt appear to have been at variance, and 
the same may be said of the case involving Rusere and 
Chirata.50 This is crucial and must be kept in mind as we 
now begin to trace the transition from lineage debt to 
commercial debt. It should be noted that both these 
cases occurred in 1933 in the middle of a period of 
scarcity and depression.51 The role of scarcity in 
disputing will be considered later in this chapter.52
A Litigation Explosion and the Management of Debt
In the mid-1950s there was a dramatic increase in the 
amount of civil litigation in Native Commissioners1 and 
African Chiefs' courts in Southern Rhodesia. This 
explosion of litigation may be perceived both nationally 
and in the Sipolilo District, although each has a 
distinctive profile. The rapid increase can be clearly 
dated as beginning in 1952-53. There is no indication 
that this is simply the result of differences in the 
means of counting or admitting cases to the court such as 
occurred in the 1960s. Instead the increase in cases 
must be analyzed as a distinct phenomenon with national 
implications. To do so I have analyzed the cases prior
50 Rusere v Chirata, CR 15/36, Sipolilo, 23.10.36, S 2033.
51 See John Iliffe, Famine in Zimbabwe. 1890-1960. Gweru: 
1990, p.82.
52 See pp.345-346 below.
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to this rapid increase, and those during the surge 
period, 1954-63. The Sipolilo court records were taken 
as the case study, using the crude statistical returns 
included in various reports for the country as a whole as 
a means of verification of these trends. The disputing 
will then be set within a larger context and specific 
factors will be considered. Finally, the social, 
economic and political implications of these will be 
discussed.
An analysis of cases heard by the Assistant Native 
Commissioner and later the Native Commissioner of 
Sipolilo District for the period 1932 to 1970 shows that 
a distinct periodization may be made of the types of 
cases which came before the courts. This periodization 
also fits remarkably neatly with the quantitative profile 
produced. Three periods may be observed: the initial 
period dates from 1932 to 1953, the second 1954-63, and 
the final period 1964-70. The statistics and information 
available for the chiefs' courts suggest a similar 
periodization, but delayed. That is, the initial period 
extends to'1958, the second extends from 1958 to about 
1973. Thereafter, the impact of the war on the district 
makes information erratic, unreliable and very difficult 
to analyze.
In the initial period, 1932 to 1953, the cases in the 
Native Commissioner's court were overwhelmingly concerned 
with matrimonial issues. These included divorce,
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custody, roora transfers, adultery and seduction. In 
this period spanning twenty-one years, these accounted 
for 316 cases, while other cases amounted to only 17.
A sudden surge in disputing, and in particular in 
commercial debt cases, characterises the second period.
In the decade 1954-63 the NC Sipolilo recorded 2056 civil 
cases, more than six times that of the previous two 
decades combined. There were 1106 commercial debt cases, 
830 matrimonial cases and 120 other cases. Expressed in 
percentage terms, commercial debt cases accounted for 
53.8% of the total. Thus it is clear that commercial 
debt cases, previously unknown in the court, came to 
dominate its proceedings. Before proposing an 
explanation for this, let us complete the periodization.
The third and final period in this analysis, 1964- 
1970, was characterised by a rapid decline both in the 
number of commercial cases and in the total cases heard 
in the NC Sipolilo's court. From a peak in 1960 of 348 
cases, surpassed only in 1956, litigation fell away to 
only 24 cases in 1963. This is largely due to the 
district commissioners adopting a policy of upholding the 
authority of the chiefs' courts through a variety of 
means, including the refusal to hear re-trials without 
due cause. It also appears that the chiefs were actively 
seeking greater judicial powers. In a submission to the 
Working Party 'C ' of the Robinson Commission the chiefs 
argued that if commercial cases were put beyond their
330
jurisdiction, "it would derogate from their authority".53 
Not surprisingly the surge that occurred in the chiefs' 
courts from 1959 in Sipolilo district did not fall off 
again until the 1970s when very different factors 
affected them.
The surge of cases in the mid-1950s is our main 
concern here. In the previous chapter we looked at the 
social, economic and political setting in which this took 
place. The circulation of cash in the district had 
recently increased: not only were there increased oppor­
tunities for wage labour, but with the establishment of 
stores in 1947 there were more outlets for that cash.
The cash element in roora agreements was increasing and a 
radical land reform programme had been initiated by the 
central government, under the Native Land Husbandry Act. 
Social relationships appear to have been going through a 
period of rapid reconsideration, if not change.
Few of the new stores were viable, full-time 
businesses. As late as 1958, of the 54 stores in the 
reserve, only ten were "well patronized."54 Of those that 
were more successful, all of them appear to have adopted 
a similar strategy of making use of the Native 
Commissioner's court to recover debt. However, not all 
of those that used the courts were successful businesses. 
The extension of credit had been of fundamental
53 No accession number.
54 NC Sipolilo, AR 1958, S 2827/2/6.
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importance in an economy based on the agricultural cycle. 
Such credit was necessary for the stores to overcome the 
irregular incomes of their clients. By the mid-1950s 
pre-harvest scarcity had become a regular occurrence due 
to the quick sale of produce as early in the season as 
possible. The small farmers likewise depended upon it to 
cope with their own irregular incomes and as a means to 
keep workers dependent upon them in a period when 
shortages of labour in the agricultural sector were 
acute. Thus commercial credit and debt became a 
difficult and unwieldy element in the life of Sipolilo 
District.
Typically, in a single year an individual storekeeper 
brought anywhere between five and forty civil summonses 
demanding payment for "goods delivered". Each summons 
demanded payment on goods valued at between 7s.6d. and 
£2 0 . 55 Indicative of the Native Commissioner's attitude 
towards such actions, the civil records rarely contain 
any testimony and for the most part there are not even 
any dockets, judgments simply written over the summons.
Storekeepers were perceived not only as the people 
with goods in the district, but also as a source of cash. 
One case from 1960 for which there is testimony merits 
extended quotation. The plaintiff was a man named Bonda.
I am storekeeper of Mbare River, Sipolilo. I claim
the following money for goods supplied 1957. I
55 See S 2033 and the civil records that remain in Guruve 
Community Court.
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lent Magaya £4 in 1957 for tax. He returned 2 
sacks of maize (£2-6-0) leaving balance of £1-14-0.
I also supplied goods that year to his wife 
Kelesiya. 1 Shirt 6/-, 1 Dress 6/- 3/6 for new 
sack, and 2/- for beef.
[cross-examined] Magaya died in 1957 and he 
bought the dress.
Keresiya responded,
I am widow of Magaya. I am looked after by 
Magaya's family. I know about the £4 lent to 
Magaya and the 2 sacks grain returned. I admit the 
shirt 5/- not 6/-, and beef 2/-, but don't know 
about the dress. Pltff has brought no books to 
prove the other articles he alleges bought.56
The court found in favour of the plaintiff in all the
claims above and included another of Is. 6d. for stamps,
making a total of £2 6s. that Keresiya must find.
The stores that made most use of the courts to recover
debts were Nyakapupu Store in the Native Purchase Area
adjacent to Sipolilo Reserve owned by V.K. Machipisa, and
Muzika Store owned by Taiwanika and located in the north
of the Reserve. At least eight stores made use of the
courts in this way and perhaps more than twice that
number. However the court records do not always indicate
which actions were on behalf of stores, or whether "goods
delivered" refers to retail purchases or the delivery of
craft goods.
Some individuals maintained an array of commercial 
interests and were both artisans and dealers. One such
56 Bonda X1843 Sipolilo v. Kelesiya (unassisted), CR 
18/60, 18.1.60, Guruve Community Court.
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man was Mapfumo Baingira of Matswitswi Business Centre in 
Sipolilo Reserve. Baingira was, at various times, a 
carpenter, shop owner and small commercial farmer. In 
the period 1959-61 he brought 28 commercial debt cases to 
court, at a value of nearly £163 .57 The fixed time- 
element appears to have been present in creditor-debtor 
relations by 1960 and one case brought by Baingira 
indicates this. This summons, delivered in December 
1960, concerned goods obtained on credit the previous 
December.58
As we have seen, stores were perceived as suppliers of 
cash that could be called upon, much like pawnshops. At 
least one store went so far as to operate as a 
rudimentary banking institution. Its business activities 
come to light as the result of four actions brought 
against its former manager, Makwawa. The store's name 
was Machipisa, also located in Nyakapupu Native Purchase 
Area, and it may have been the same one mentioned above 
as being owned by V.K. Machipisa. The plaintiff,
Chipisa, explained how the store-cum-bank treated 
customers, "When I wanted money, I went to the store I 
asked Defendant for money. He gave me money from the
57 See CRs 254-270/59; 23.12.59, 271/59, 19.1.60; 27- 
54/60, 25.1.60; 123/60, 10.6.60; 6/61 17.1.61; 7/61, 18.1.61 
and 200/61 8.12.61. All at Guruve Community Court.
58 Mapfuma Baingira v. Nicholas Chipangura, CR 7/61.
18.1.61, GCC.
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store safe." Makwawa explained that the money deposited 
with him
was used in the store to by [sic] goods + other 
necessities. My father [V.K. Machipisa] knew of 
this and agreed to it. But now he denies it, which 
surprises me.
It is the store which should return this 
money.
Maka, the new store manager, was another of Machipisa1s
sons. He testified, "I know nothing of this savings bank
at the store." Machipisa also denied knowledge of "this
savings bank" as he also referred to it.
He [Makwawa] did not tell me about it. He did not 
ask my permission. If he had asked I would have 
refused because I have a store, I do not want a 
company. I do not want other money used in the 
store.
Makwawa claimed he had raised over £2 000, in addition to
the ordinary profits, that could be used for investment
in the store through this strategy. However, there is no
indication over what time-span that took place.59
Individual loans were also being recovered through the
courts in this period. The case put forward in January
1961 by one plaintiff states the issue simply:
The Def. borrowed £9-10-0 from me in 1955. He was 
buying a motor-car. He has not returned any of 
this to me.
I have asked him many times but he always 
replies 'I have not yet found the money'.
I am tired of waiting.60
59 CRs 143-146/59, 9.11.59, GCC.
60 Nyamadzawo XI56 v. Makoronga Kunguma, CR 3/61, 10.1.61,
GCC.
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In December 1961 Sangare Webster issued a summons to 
Naison Musandakwira for £73, "Being money lent to you 9 
years ago which you have not repaid". In December 1962 a 
Warrant of Execution was issued to recover the 
outstanding £42.61 It is clear, from these and other 
cases, that the legal route for debt recovery was being 
used increasingly, both for different types of debt and 
for older debts. The storeowners had led the way; now 
others were making use of the path that had been opened.
However, the storeowners didn't have it all their own 
way. Other traders were just as willing to use the 
courts to enforce payment when the stores themselves were 
the defaulters. Weston Mucheriwo was the defendant in 
two consecutive cases concerning debt he owed. The first 
was a claim for £24 5s. made by William Marizani Zwitete 
for repairs done to a store in Karoi, and the second for 
a £9 loan made by Pukeni to Mucheriwo.62 In the 
neighbouring district of Urungwe, 1958 was also a 
difficult year, but "despite the drop in turnover," 
commented the local Native Commissioner, "none of the 
general dealers went out of business although three are 
always on the receiving end of civil summons."63
61 Sangare Webster X86 v. Naison Musandakwira, CR 204/61,
14.12.61, Guruve Community court. The Warrant of Execution 
was dated 13.12.61.
62 CRs 34-35/61, 6.3.61, GCC.
63 NC Urungwe, AR 1958, S 2827/2/2/6.
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The legitimacy of commercial debts began to gain 
acceptance in the chiefs' courts in this crucial period 
1955-62. The example of the Native Commissioner's court 
played a significant pedagogical role in this. Whereas 
previously Chief Sipolilo had considered his court 
incompetent to hear commercial debt cases, it was in this 
period that the court began accepting them. It is 
indicative of the chief's perception of the power 
devolved to him by the example of the Native 
Commissioner's court that his court soon began treating 
an individual's debt to a store more harshly than debts 
between individuals.64 Through a process taking seven 
years in which the Native Commissioner's court was used 
to collect this new form of debt, and the storekeepers 
were given overwhelming support through decisions and the 
issuing of warrants of execution, resistance to this new 
concept of debt was overcome. The chiefs in turn sought 
to extend their jurisdiction to cover issues of 
commercial law. The chiefs were in a position in which 
if they had attempted to deal with cases of commercial 
debt very differently from the Native Commissioner, they 
would have simply been met by the storekeepers exploiting 
the avenue that would most benefit them. It would have 
jeopardized their already threatened political power. In 
order to maintain their political authority, the chiefs 
needed to keep the support of the increasingly powerful
64 Sturben Gweshe, Ruwinga, 1 September, 1991, GCL.
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new "class" in the Reserve. Thus the chiefs were 
attempting to extend their jurisdiction and maintain 
their alliances.
Initially, clients reacted with hostility to the 
storekeepers' insistence on rapid repayment of credit.65 
Clients attempted to treat the new commercial indebted­
ness within the idiom of more traditional notions of 
indebtedness. In that idiom, debt persisted over a long 
period but all parties profited thereby. Outstanding 
debts were to be recalled in periods of need and 
scarcity. Furthermore, they played an important role in 
defining pre-capitalist social relations.
The advent of the chiefs' dare (court; pi. matare) 
hearing such cases and consistently finding in favour of 
the storekeepers is fundamental to the transition. As 
long as the new stores were supported only by the Native 
Commissioner, these remained things of the "muRungu" 
world, and in a sense alien.66 The involvement of the 
chiefs' dare provided the internal, organic connection 
that legitimated this new concept of debt, and indeed 
provided the capitalist economy with the support for
65 Sekuru Makha Kugotsi, Shinje, 2.9.91, GCL.
66 I would like to thank Dr. Peter Fry for pointing out to 
me this dichotomy in the Shona world of "things African" and 
"things foreign". Hannan, Standard Shona Dictionary, defines 
muRungu as "1. Person of Caucasian descent. 2. Wealthy person. 
3. Employer (African or non-African)." p. 403.
1969
338
deeper social penetration than ever before in this 
previously (economically) peripheral district.
The role chiefs played in supporting capitalist 
penetration, as shown in this study of Sipolilo District, 
had distinct implications for their position in the 
state. The muRungu association between the storekeepers 
and the Native Commissioner was already established when 
the chiefs' matare began taking commercial cases. The 
idiom of commercial debt may be described as being 
muRungu in character. Consequently, as the chiefs took 
on these cases they were drawn ever more into the muRungu 
world. Their independence was compromised and their 
African identity blurred. This was important groundwork 
for the co-option that was to follow in the 1960s when 
the chiefs' positions were radically transformed, as 
Holleman puts it, "from that of a 'non-political', 
fragmented and subservient part of an administrative 
structure, to that of a nationally organized body of very 
considerable political force."67
In Sipolilo District, the period 1958 to 1962 was 
characterised by contradictory behaviour on the part of 
the chief and acting chief. By this time the man with 
power in the Reserve was Ganda. He presided over the 
dare of Chief Sipolilo and was acting chief from 1960 
until the selection and accession of Tapfuma Naisi in
67 J.F. Holleman, Chief, Council and Commissioner, London: 
p.356.
339
1963. He was instrumental in "bringing nationalist 
politics to the district".68 Not only did he lead 
resistance to the Land Husbandry Act, but he was also a 
member of the Zimbabwean African People's Union (ZAPU), 
noted by someone in the District Commissioner's office as 
a "Red hot Nat."69 His position in ZAPU was prominent 
enough to take him to Salisbury for a meeting when his 
presence was required at an important meeting to select 
his successor, the substantive chief, on January 13,
19 6 3 . 70 Through the control he exercised over the dare he 
was also instrumental in the consolidation of the cash 
economy in Sipolilo Reserve and the parallel development 
of capitalist social relations there.
The extent to which the new creditor-debtor relations 
affected African society is apparent in that more 
traditional forms of debt came to be treated within the 
new idiom. Thus we return to that central social 
institution, roora. Contemporaneous with the surge in 
disputes in Sipolilo district we find a new element 
making its way onto the marriage certificates. It gives 
them a more contractual nature. As I will argue, the
68 Sekuru Mahka Kugotsi, Shinje, 2.9.91, GCL.
69 This is a marginal note on p.11 of "Notes on Some of 
the Mhondoros (Spirit Mediums) in the Sipolilo District of 
Rhodesia", a report prepared as part of the Delineation 
exercise, dated 1965, PER 5, Guruve District Offices.
70 Report by Native Messenger Marufu, 15.1.63, in "CHIEF 
CHIPURIRO PER 5", District Administrator's files, Guruve 
District Offices. Also see p.284 above.
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period of payment was shortened substantially and the new 
time limits were enforced by appeals to the courts.
In the early 1950s marriage registration forms 
typically recorded how much of the roora had been 
exchanged, expressed in cash, heads of cattle and goats, 
and how much remained outstanding. From 1955, with 
increasing frequency, these registration forms began 
including under the section "Terms:", deadlines by which 
all the pfuma must be transferred. These deadlines were 
typically set at two years from the time the marriage was 
"contracted" (rather than from the date of registra­
tion) .71 These deadlines were included for legal purposes 
and evidence that the time limit was enforced, at least 
in some cases, is found in the civil records of the 
Native Commissioner's court.72 Such cases appear to have 
peaked in 1960 in Sipolilo District.
In 1962 Manyika used the courts to enforce the 
transfer of outstanding pfuma. He claimed "4 head or £2 0 
being lobola outstanding in respect of marriage with my 
daughter". The defendant, Kapomba Makorichi, admitted 
both the debt and liability, promising it would be paid.73
71 This was gleaned from piles of marriage certificates 
for the 1950s onwards that remain loose in Guruve Community 
Court.
72 See Figure 4. Data for this graph taken from S 2033 
and CRs held at Guruve Community Court.
73 Manyika v Kapomba Makorichi, CR 117/62, 15.8.62, Guruve 
Community Court.
This was not unique. In an extreme case, the terms of 
contract made the transfer of pfuma due within three and 
a half months of marriage registration, and not more than 
five months after the marriage was contracted.74 At this 
point, perhaps more than previously, the roora transfers 
may be considered payments. It also indicates the 
increasing acceptance of legally enforceable deadlines 
for pfuma transfers. The years of intense contestation 
over this were coming to an end. No longer could it be 
argued that "new demands [were being] made of old 
relationships",75 but in fact new relationships were being 
consolidated. The "prescriptive legal rules" had been 
imposed and contained the structural tensions that had 
arisen. Consonance was returning in the fields of legal 
and popular culture.
Without doubt registration became a means to 
strengthen one's case for a rapid, complete transfer of 
pfuma which, with the force of law as applied by the 
courts, made the retrieval of such debts a near 
certainty. The timing of many registrations makes this 
clear. One marriage contracted in 1965 was registered on 
January 17, 1966 with the condition that the pfuma 
transfer of "8 Cattle, 8 Goats" be completed "in February
74 Stanley Gora RC No. X15878 v Jane a/b Muzinde, CR 1/69, 
3.3.69, GCC. The marriage certificate contained therein
states the marriage was contracted in 1966, registered on 
9.3.66 and that the pfuma was due "in May 1966".
75 Chanock, Law. Custom and Social Order, p.22.
1966".76 Another case displays this still more clearly. 
The marriage was contracted in 1950 and registered only 
in August 1957 with the terms that transfers be completed 
"By August 1958". Fifteen pounds cash and £20 in lieu of 
4 head of cattle had already been transferred, the wife- 
providing family awaited the remaining "4 Head and 5 
Goats".77 Many marriages that show up in the civil 
records as divorce or roora disputes were not registered 
until three to five years after the marriage was 
contracted.78 Clearly registration was used, in this 
case, to hasten or ensure the final transfer. A case 
brought to the Sipolilo Native Commissioner's court 
claimed "£3 0 outstanding lobola, plus 4 goats mbudzi 
dzomai, on marriage of my daughter". Although the case 
was eventually postponed sine die, the use of the court 
as a coercive mechanism is evident.79 In Chinamora 
Reserve, twenty kilometres north of Salisbury, Chief 
Chinamora was, in 1963, hearing cases to enforce such 
transfers. In one such case the plaintiff was claiming 
the "Balance of lobola which has taken too long. £18, 9 
herd [sic], an overcoat + hat and £8 for the mom[be ?]."
76 Hildah a/b Sirewu v Phineas Muhloga Murambiwa X24915 
Victoria, CR 15/71, 9.9.71, GCC.
77 Harusi (asst, by) Masonda v. Zwenyika X8824, CR 2/68, 
5.2.68, GCC.
78 CRs 14 and 15/63, 6.6.63, and 2/68, 5.2.68, all 
relating to marriages in the 1950s. Guruve Community Court.
79 Ndawa v. Mutochi, CR 128/62, 27.9.62, GCC.
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Unable or unwilling to complete the transfer, the dare 
instructed: "Motsi is to take his daughter and to be 
given his balance after 3 months. The daughter Lucia has 
pregnance [sic] of 4 months."80
It is frustrating that the dockets for the Sipolilo 
Native Commissioner's Court for the years 1956-58 have 
not been traced. However, an analysis of the cases in 
the preceding and subsequent years does suggest that 
disputes over the transfer of roora were at their peak in 
the key transitional period I am proposing here. A curve 
similar to, but much less dramatic than, the surge in 
commercial debt cases may be seen in the profile of the 
use of the Native Commissioner's court to enforce the 
speedy transfer of pfuma, although the peak is clearly 
later.81 Commercial cases peaked in Sipolilo District in 
1958 and, according to the available evidence, nation­
wide the following year. The sudden disappearance of 
these (and virtually all other cases) in 1963 is att­
ributable to a change in policy concerning the admission 
of cases to the District Commissioners' courts, rather 
than a change in disputing patterns. From 1963 onwards 
the vast majority of cases were referred back to the
80 CR 45/63, 27.7.63, Chief Chinamora's Case Record Book, 
S2932/2.
81 All data for Figure 4 are from a combination of files 
and sources, namely Chief Native Commissioner Annual Reports, 
District Annual Reports, files S 2033, S 2404/4, and the Civil 
Records at Guruve Communal Court.
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chiefs' matare, by accepting only re-trials and referring 
litigants to the local chief. However, if we leap 
forward to 1976 and 1977 and use as evidence the only 
surviving chief's case record book for Sipolilo District, 
that of Chief Bepura, we do find that commercial cases 
comprised 8.3% and 6.1% of the cases in the respective 
years.82 Thus the chiefs' matare took on these cases, but 
commercial debt was no longer an issue for dispute (or 
"trouble spot") in either the Native Commissioner's court 
or the chief's dare. It may be - but this is only 
speculation - that the more traditional forms of debt 
were being recalled in order to pay commercial debts due. 
There is evidence, however, suggesting a link between 
scarcity and disputing. This in turn suggests that 
commercial debt cases as well as those enforcing the 
completion of roora agreements and even an increase in 
divorce rates may be attributable to a need to 
redistribute scarce resources. The graph (Figure 4) 
depicts the dramatic rise in commercial debt cases in 
Sipolilo District from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s. 
These cases reached their peak in 1958. This is an 
extremely important date as Southern Rhodesia was in the 
middle of a recession and Sipolilo Reserve's agricultural 
output had been very poor.83 In an interesting, and
82 Chief Bepura's Case Record Book, 1976-77, GCC. 
Translation by Actor Tapfumaneyi.
83 NC Sipolilo, AR 1958, S 2827/2/2/6.
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perhaps cynical comment, one Native Commissioner in 1958 
stated
The demand for divorce by women is, of course, 
encouraged by the present law regarding the non­
return of lobola in excess of £20. As most lobola 
paid exceeds £20 and the fault is generally the 
wifes [sic] , an equitable award is often illegal 
and the woman and her father profit unjustly.84
Although the commercial debt cases begin to fall off
after this date, the non-commercial debt cases, largely
divorce, increase very quickly over the next two years.
This may, in some part, be accounted for as a means of
transferring resources from one sector, i.e. matrimonial,
to finance another, namely commercial debts incurred
earlier.
Scarcity and Disputing
The link between disputing and scarcity has long been
suspected. In 1912 the Asst.NC Chibi reported,
One noticeable effect of the famine was the number 
of civil cases it brought with it. In their 
desperate need to find something to trade for food, 
they raked up every conceivable case from the past 
in vain hope of being awarded something. They 
themselves admit candidly that they are so old that 
they ought not to be brought, but always end up 
with the unanswerable question 'what can we do'.85
84 NC Mtoko, AR 1958, S 2827/2/2/6. Mtoko had an 
extremely uneven year with regards to agricultural produce. 
The Native Marriages Act (1950) attempted to limit roora to a
£20 ceiling.
85 Mr Forrestall, Asst. NC Chibi, AR 1912, N 9/1/15.
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Not every famine year brought such comment, but three of
the seven major famine years since 1912 covered by
Iliffe86 did result in some mention linking the two and
civil records suggested a link as well.87
Iliffe has argued that in the 1950s the patterns of,
and responses to, scarcity changed. The famine of 1960
revealed that the settler capitalist economy could 
no longer handle famine without assistance, because 
it could no longer absorb the available labour and 
thereby enable the hungry to purchase food.88
One response to the new conditions appears to have been
an intensification of litigation. Not only did
storekeepers demand that debts be repaid with cash
(bartering having nearly disappeared, there being a
shortage of grain and destocking and the NLHA limiting
cattle herds), but others were demanding their due pfuma
through the new commercial idiom of divorce. These
cattle could then be sold and foodstuffs bought with the
cash. Not all had the ability to recall such debts and,
as Iliffe points out, for a variety of reasons there
emerged a more clearly marked "category of marginal
people who were the chief sufferers during scarcity".89
86 John Iliffe, Famine in Zimbabwe. 1890-1960. Gweru:
1990.
87 NC Charter, AR 1916, N 9/1/19; Mr. Franklin, NC Chibi, 
AR 1933, S 235/511; see also Sipolilo CR 91/60, 4.4.60 Guruve 
Community Court, for evidence.
88 Iliffe, Famine in Zimbabwe, p.11.
89 Ibid. , p.103 .
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The monetization of disputes concerning non-commercial 
issues in times of scarcity is particularly highlighted 
by a case of makunakuna, or incest, in Sipolilo District 
in 1960. In the case of makunakuna the svikiro, or 
spirit medium, is to be given a head of cattle in order 
to propitiate the mhondoros, or ancestors. This 
particular case, on appeal from Chief Sipolilo's dare, 
the plaintiff (appellant) is instructed to pay the 
mhondoro [sic] £5.90 The impact of destocking and 
therefore the general availability of cattle in the 
region is clear.
Conclusion
Through the use of the lower courts, initially that of 
the Native Commissioner, followed by the chiefs', the 
predominant form of debt in Sipolilo changed from that of 
lineage debt, characterised by an extended period for the 
final transaction to take place, to that of commercial 
debt, characterised by a demand for relatively speedy 
repayment. Lineage debt was perceived as having a 
binding function in society and was set deeply within the 
kinship system in which it operated. Commercial debt did 
not have the same role, and indeed may have gone some way 
to eroding kinship ties. The increasingly capitalist 
social relations made it possible to "avoid the build-up
90 Chanzi X11398 Sip v. Matambo X7301 Sip, CR 96/60, 
11.4.60, GCC.
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of a series of potentially burdensome reciprocal 
obligations".91 The development of commercial debt and 
contractual relations went hand-in-hand and these new 
forms of relations radically transformed the central 
social institution of the Shona, roora. The courts 
played a crucial role in transferring the new concept of 
commercial debt from the field of commercial law to that 
of family law and thus was the critical mechanism for its 
imposition.
The courts were, by no means, the only factors shaping 
social ethics. The chiefs were clearly interested in the 
expansion of their jurisdiction to include cases of 
commercial law and thereby put their courts in a position 
to service the increasingly powerful storekeepers in the 
Reserve. Those bypassed by this important group would 
have threatened the chiefs' political authority. The 
storekeepers were the 'big men' of Sipolilo Reserve and 
their power was clearly extensive. In one case a 
storekeeper claimed land-allocating powers and favoured 
those who shopped at his store.92 This most coveted power 
represents the power of the 'deepest' lineage heads - the 
chiefs. With such blatant threats to their authority the 
chiefs were clearly interested in keeping the storeowners 
on their side.
91 N. Long, Social change and the Individual. Manchester: 
1968, p.222.
92 "People Troubled by Givoze" to District Commissioner, 
Sipolilo, July 24, 1964, Chief Chipuriro, PER 5.
Specific economic factors influenced the surge in 
commercial debt cases at this particular historical 
moment. These included the insecurity created by the 
destocking program and the implementation of the Native 
Land Husbandry Act. The 1958-60 economic recession 
further exacerbated the situation upon which were placed 
increasing tax burdens and ever more expensive technology 
in the farming sector. These all combined to make roora 
transfers increasingly a means of raising cash when 
"other sources of income dried up."93 In Sipolilo, the 
courts were used to ensure the transfers were paid in 
full. This is very different from the situation Jeater 
has postulated for Gwelo district in the 1920s.94
This chapter has shown the role that the law and 
courts played in a deep social transformation and the way 
in which chiefs' attempted to gather support. The 
following chapter will look at how the involvement of the 
chiefs' courts in this process affected the chiefs' 
position politically at the national level.
93 Jeater, Marriage. Perversion and Power, p.219.
94 Ibid.
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Chapter 6
Chiefs, the Rhodesian Order 
and the emergence of the nationalist challenge: 
the new context for African courts
Introduction
The last chapter focused, at the local level, upon 
the role of disputing in the local courts, looking at the 
impact this had upon various social, economic and 
political institutions. In this chapter the perspective 
is broadened to consider the implications of the 
increasing integration, both formal and ideological, of 
the Chiefs' courts into the colonial regime with emphasis 
upon the political aspect. In the late 1950s and 1960s 
such integration included a substantial bolstering of 
Chiefs at the local level by the state, the construction 
of a "national" voice for the Chiefs, support for the 
state given by the Chiefs and an alliance of Chiefs and 
the Rhodesian state against growing nationalist demands. 
On the part of both the Chiefs and the state the process 
was a multifaceted endeavour that was a combination of 
planning and patchwork in response to internal and exter­
nal pressures.
Internally, the nationalists were challenging the 
continuation of white minority rule. This alarmed the 
government. In the period 1958 to 1962 the personnel 
employed by the British South Africa Police, the Native 
Affairs Department and the Ministry of Justice nearly
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doubled, while there was an increase in police stations 
from 102 to 134.1
The challenge of the African nationalists was also per­
ceived by many to be a challenge to the privileged posi­
tion held by "traditional" leaders under the colonial 
regime. Accordingly the Native Affairs Amendment Act 
(1959) prohibited Africans from doing anything that might 
undermine the authority of chiefs or headmen. External 
pressures were manifested in the moves towards majority 
rule in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the consequent 
break-up of the Central African Federation, and Southern 
Rhodesia's demands for independence from the United King­
dom. The United Kingdom was seeking assurances that 
independence was along the lines of a constitution 
adopted by Southern Rhodesia's population as a whole, not 
simply the white electorate.
The changing official view of chiefs in this period 
is of crucial importance. Despite legislative reactions 
to African nationalist pressures in the late 1950s, 
Holleman later reflected that real change began in the 
early 1960s.2 These changes included the adoption of 
"community development" as government policy,3 the
1 J. Alexander, "The State, Agrarian and Rural Politics in 
Zimbabwe: case studies of Insiza and Chimanimani Districts, 
1940-1990", D.Phil. thesis, Oxford: 1993, especially Chapter 
3 .
2 J.F. Holleman, Chiefs. Council and Commissioner. Assen:
1969, pp.341-2.
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implementation of informal policy regarding Chiefs' 
courts and the development of the "Chiefs1 voice" through 
the establishment of the National Council of Chiefs. The 
high-profile "Dombashawa Indaba" of 1964 was, in large 
part, staged to impress the white electorate. The press 
was fed copious releases, and duly obliged. On the first 
day of the Indaba, five articles concerning it appeared 
on the front page of the Rhodesian Herald. One was 
headed "Chiefs 'strongly disagree' with the U.K.'s new 
attitude". At all levels of government, chiefs were 
sought to provide an African contribution to the 
decision-making processes. However, this was mere 
tinkering when compared with the democratic option 
demanded by the African nationalists.
New Protagonists, old Alliances
So far, I have argued that in the 1920s the Native 
Affairs Department gave the "traditional" leaders new 
prominence in the administration of Africans in order to 
resist a challenge posed by the Southern Rhodesian 
Missionary Conference and its African counterpart. This 
admittedly weak coalition gained some formality in the 
1920s and 1930s with the passage of the Native Law and 
Courts Act (193 7) . The contemporaneous passage of the 
Native Councils Act (1937) was at odds with aims of the
3 See A.K.H. Weinrich, Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia. 
London:1971.
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traditionalists in the Native Affairs Department, 
bringing as it did opportunities for democratically 
elected members. Nonetheless, the NLCA was an important 
step towards the inclusion of the "traditional" leaders 
in the Rhodesian administrative structure (as were the 
Councils which made Chiefs ex-officio members) and 
allowed for more effective supervision by the Native 
Affairs Department of those positions than had hitherto 
been the case.4
The 1950s and 1960s paralleled the earlier period in 
many respects, but on a very different scale. The 1950s 
and 1960s were decades of growing conflict and deepening 
entrenchment of positions. The Native Land Husbandry 
Act, circumscribed chiefly powers (both formal and 
informal) to regulate access to land; the Native Affairs 
Department gave increasing support to Chiefs' courts; the 
nationalist movement gained in strength; and the 
Rhodesian order hardened in its opposition to African 
aspirations. As all these pressures converged, the 
pressures on Chiefs became more intense than at any other 
point in the colonial period. The Chiefs were trying to 
establish space for themselves at the same time that the 
Government was seeking their explicit support and the 
nationalists were seeking to involve Chiefs in the
4 Local comment regarding the importance of supervision 
was provided by the Native Commissioner, Sipolilo in 1958. 
See p. 3 00 above.
movement.5 The Chiefs, as yet to coalesce as a body in 
any politically meaningful way, were under threat of 
appropriation by both the protagonists in the emerging 
conflict. However, in the early 1960s a point was passed 
after which Chiefs were generally perceived to have been 
co-opted by the government, and no longer available to 
the nationalists, except for a few individuals. In 1959 
the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress was 
banned. Nationalists reacted to the banning "by accusing 
government of 'stealing' the Chiefs from the people."6 
But as the struggle developed between nationalists and 
the Government, the Chiefs asserted a degree of 
independence. As we shall see, this was in the form of 
an independent agenda, rather than a "third way" for 
Southern Rhodesia. It was, in fact, a parochial agenda. 
As such it fitted well enough within the Southern 
Rhodesian constitution or the Native Affairs Department's 
policy of upholding "tradition". However, the Government 
could only perceive it as an excessive demand for African 
participation in government. Roger Howman later 
commented that the African Law and Tribal Courts Act 
(1969) was a case of far too little, far too late. It
5 "Memorandum for Discussion on the future of Chiefs", 
Native Affairs Advisory Board, March 9, 1961, 44.11.8F/90496 
CD/LG 1964, Records Centre; also Jeremy Brickhill, "The Turn 
to Armed Struggle", seminar paper presented at St. Antony's 
College, Oxford, March 10, 1992.
6 A.H.K. Weinrich, Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia. 
London: 1971, p.17.
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had taken more than fifteen years for this transfer of 
judicial powers to be passed into law. Upon his 
retirement in 1969, Howman criticised the overemphasis on 
Chiefs as African representatives in the Rhodesian 
Senate, asking, "'Why overdo it by having only Chiefs to 
speak for Africans in a Senate whose credentials have a 
political party bias?'".7 By the late 1960s, Howman had 
come to believe that the nationalists needed to be 
involved in the democratic political process in some way.
During the 1950s, the state made a concerted effort 
to "rationalise" the economy and imbue the entire country 
with capitalist values. Storekeepers were supported 
through the courts, while capitalist forms of landholding 
and the development of a permanent industrial labour 
force were encouraged through the provisions of the 
Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) .8 Up to 1958, it was 
also a period of economic prosperity.
Although during the 1950s the Government had been 
concentrating its efforts regarding African society upon 
the technical schemes, especially the Native Land 
Husbandry Act, there was an awareness of resistance, and 
emerging nationalist resistance to the schemes and 
government in general. Already there were moves within 
the Native Affairs Department and Government to make
7 "Smith plan for chiefs attacked", Times of Zambia.
9/7/69.
8 See Chapter 4 for a brief discussion on the Native Land 
Husbandry Act (1951), pp.291-293.
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institutional changes that would diminish the likelihood 
of resistance. Roger Howman, then the native Affairs 
Department senior researcher, had produced a comparative 
study entitled "African Local Government in British East 
and Central Africa, 1951-53". This study later gave rise 
to the African Councils Act (1957) which was intended to 
permit the ventilation of such African grievances as were 
considered by the government to be legitimate.
In the same period the Native Affairs Department 
devoted a great deal of time to studying the African 
courts, considering the extension of jurisdiction to 
petty criminal cases and comparing policy in Southern 
Rhodesia with that of all the British colonies in East, 
Central and Southern Africa.9 The emerging theme was that 
the courts that had been formally incorporated into the 
Southern Rhodesian state through the Native Law and 
Courts Act (1937) now had to be integrated ideologically. 
Henceforward, Chiefs would be more involved in the 
governmental administrative terrain both through the 
Councils and through activities which would later be 
lumped together as "Community Development". More 
importantly, the status of Chiefs was enhanced as their 
intercalary position between government and Africans 
became ever more crucial. As state intervention in the 
rural economy increased, so too did the administrative
9 Report on an Inquiry into Native Courts. Salisbury:
1952 .
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role of Chiefs, while they were given a platform to speak 
out against African nationalists.
The NAD re-considers the value of Native Courts
The inquiry into the Native Courts in 1952 
considered that the "repugnancy" clause of the Order-in- 
Council, (which stated that in civil cases involving only 
Africans the courts were to be guided by "Native law...so 
far as that law is not repugnant to natural justice or 
morality",10) was no longer adequate or appropriate to 
control African justice. Instead, the inquiry 
recommended that African courts be developed along 
correct lines by providing "more adequate supervision and 
guidance", "training ...Chiefs, Headmen and Clerks in 
legal work, procedure and laws of evidence", and 
generally improving "the dignity of Court proceedings".11 
The new policy was to be far more assertive in 
controlling the process of African law and courts, and 
thus the ideological realm in which these operated. The 
ideological control was represented on several levels 
through this new policy. First, the "supervision and 
guidance" that was provided underscored the view that 
state law was correct, and must be accompanied by the 
procedure of Roman-Dutch law. Secondly, the dignity and
10 Emmet V. Mittlebeeler, African Custom and Western Law. 
London:1976, p.17. See also Chapter 2, p.163 above.
11 Report on an Inquiry into Native Courts.
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authority of African courts must be increased, as courts
must be held in esteem by the community that uses them.
The symbolic power of the courtrooms may be seen from
their actual layout, which was clearly designed to
improve the dignity of judicial proceedings.12 Further
support was given to the construction of brick court
houses.13 Chiefs had been quick to make use of such
symbolic power since as early as 1937 to legitimate and
consolidate their positions.14 One eager Native
Commissioner declared that the date of the opening of
such a building would be recorded as "A red letter day in
the history of the Reserve" and explained,
Such tangible evidence of the importance of the 
Chief, together with the facilities for modern 
judicial and administrative functioning of 
traditional power, should have incalculable 
influence, and that the Chief and his people 
appreciate such facilities is beyond doubt and 
expressed in many ways.
12 See the appended photographs. This are broadly 
representative of the development of "courtrooms" in Central 
Africa this century. The introduction of the table, and the 
tendency for the Chief or President and all counsellors to 
crowd behind it is remarkably reminiscent of Foucault's 
description of the symbolic role of the table in the courts of 
revolutionary Paris. For a theoretical discussion, see Michel 
Foucault, "On Popular Justice", especially pp. 8-12 in 
Power/Knowledge. Brighton: 1980. For other illustrations of 
this use of the table see "Free From Fear", Central African 
Film Unit, 1960 and "The Thief", Central African Film Unit,
n . d .
13 Report on an Inquiry into Native Courts.
14 CNC, AR 1937, p. 10.
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It was felt amongst the Native Affairs Department
officials in the 1950s that the political issue had been
successfully addressed; there simply remained technical
improvements such as giving "the judicial system a sound
clerical basis".15 This also furthered the aim of greater
ideological consolidation.
The general standing of Chiefs within the Native
Affairs Department by the 1960s owed much to their
following the Native Commissioners' lead in court
decisions dealing largely with "mercantile" law in the
1950s, and thereby promoting "modernisation". Likewise,
the success of the Provincial Chiefs Assemblies in the
1950s encouraged the government to establish the National
Chiefs Assembly, and later Council, through the
promulgation of the Council of Chiefs and Provincial
Assemblies Act (1961). The Provincial Chiefs Assembly
was perceived as an elaborate sounding-board. The Acting
NC Shangani in 1952 reported
The establishment of a Chiefs' Assembly has 
done much to assist the District Officers. For 
the natives it means that they have a channel 
through which they can communicate their views.
With this facility the necessity for 
Associations and Societies has fallen away and 
they should very soon become moribund.16
These "Associations and Societies" had been perceived by
the Government as nationalist, or at least proto-
15 Asst. NC Wedza, AR 1948, S 1563.
16 Acting NC Shangani, AR 1952, S 2403/2681.
nationalist, organisations that threatened the status of 
the "traditional" leaders. One of these had been the 
Rhodesian African Association which, as we have seen, 
demanded that the Provincial Assembly be listened to more 
closely.17 The fact that such an organisation was calling 
for greater support for the government-constructed 
institution appears to have lulled the government into a 
false sense of security. The provincial assemblies both 
buttressed the "traditional" leaders and tested them. A 
decade of acceptable behaviour in this forum had to pass 
before the Government permitted (or felt the need for) 
the National Chiefs' Assembly to be established. Both 
Chiefs and the Government recognised the "double-edged"18 
character of the Assembly, which may largely explain why 
Chiefs pursued a politics of compliance, extracting from 
the Government concessions through the threatened use of 
the new tools.
Following the strengthening of the Chiefs' voices 
through the establishment of the National Chiefs' Council 
in 1961, the main issues pursued by the Chiefs were the 
abolition of the ceiling on lobola transactions, the 
raising of salaries and allowance for Chiefs and Headmen, 
greater judicial authority for Chiefs and Headmen, and 
the return of land allocation powers. All these measures 
extended the means of control at the disposal of Chiefs.
17 See p. 2 93, above.
18 Holleman, Chief. Council and Commissioner, p.368.
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The Chiefs pursued their politics of compliance by- 
lending their support to the proposed new constitution.
The state provided the resources for Chiefs to extend 
their authority through ceding land to accommodate those 
who lost rights to occupation as a result of the Native 
Land Husbandry Act. This served several functions. It 
prevented the nationalists claiming total victory in the 
struggle over land and resistance to the Land Husbandry 
Act. The nationalists may have forced the repeal of the 
Act, but it was the Chiefs who were presented as having 
"secured" redress. It also shifted a politically 
delicate issue out of the hands of the Native Affairs 
Department.
It was clear to many Chiefs that the road to power 
for them was through supporting the state, not attacking 
it. The state had aided the formation of the Chiefs as a 
"national force" in opposition to the African 
nationalists whose influence many Chiefs wished to 
overcome.19 After a period from the mid-1950s into the 
early 1960s, when both the Government and nationalist 
organisations had attempted to woo the support of the 
Chiefs, the nationalists perceived that they had lost the
battle. As Holleman writes, the Chief's "attitude
towards the maintenance of law and order and towards the
new African political leadership in many respects
19 Ibid.
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coincided with that of the European government."20 Having 
become so close in many of their directions, the 
"traditional" leaders and the state had developed a 
"political interdependence ... so complex that the 
distinction between the Chiefs’ position as hereditary 
rulers and that of their being subservient civil servants 
eludes precise definition.1,21
The increasing proximity that developed between 
Chiefs and officials of the Native Affairs Department in 
the 1950s formed the basis of the alliance that emerged 
in the 1960s. That alliance had its foundations in the 
integration of Chiefs’ authority into the state, a 
process begun in the 1930s with the recognition of the 
"traditional" courts as selectively recognised by the 
Native Law and Courts Act (1937). Those foundations were 
extended in the 1950s through discussion within the 
Department concerning the addition of limited criminal 
jurisdiction to selected Chiefs’ courts, as well as 
through local action, that is Native Commissioners 
encouraging Chiefs to hear new types of cases.
By the early 1960s, the Southern Rhodesian state was 
compelled to invigorate its alliance with the 
"traditional" leaders to counteract growing African 
nationalism. This
20 Ibid. , p . 345 .
21 Ibid.
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was largely brought about by the very pressure 
of the political tide, which not only widened 
the gulf between white and black Rhodesians 
generally, but also drove white government and 
tribal chieftainship closer together as com­
rades-in-arms against the common enemy of 
African nationalism.22
The direction this took was spelt out at the Indaba of 
1961. It was through this conference that the state 
sought to strengthen the Chiefs' voice by consolidating 
the many into a unified, more coherent whole. Holleman 
later commented, "Rhodesian chieftainship, a splintered 
institution until then, had found its collective unity 
and strength and a cohering structure."23 It must be 
emphasised that this structure was entirely the construct 
of the colonial government.
The Chiefs ably exploited the government's depend­
ency upon them, pursuing their demands for greater judi­
cial powers and the exclusive right to allocate land in 
the reserves. In the 1950s the Chiefs' courts emulated 
the Native Commissioners' courts they took on, in stages, 
both the form and content of the courts wholly controlled 
and staffed by the government. The introduction in 1952 
of the Provincial Chiefs' Assemblies, and its national 
counterpart in 1961, resulted in the Chiefs speaking with 
a clearer voice in order to obtain their demands, but
22 Ibid. , pp. 341-2 .
23 Ibid. , p . 342 .
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speaking from a platform constructed by the white govern­
ment .
From the beginning the National Chiefs' Council 
pursued a politics of compliance. In 1963 its first 
president was forced to resign by fellow council members 
due to his open and strong support of African nationalism 
and their fear that this would discredit their organiz­
ation.24 However, this politics of compliance also demon­
strated the white government's dependence upon the 
Chiefs' support. This interdependence between many of 
the Chiefs and the government tied these Chiefs ever 
closer to the Rhodesian cause.
The Robinson Commission was appointed in 1960 to 
inquire into the administrative and judicial functions of 
the Native Affairs Department and district courts. The 
remit of this Commission was widened significantly to 
encompass four areas. Four working parties were subse­
quently established to study the proposals it put for­
ward. These were: 'A' Judicial District Administration
and Revenue; 'B' Agriculture, Economic Markets, Co-ops, 
Credit Facilities and the Native Development Fund; 'C ' 
Chiefs' Courts; and 'D' The Tribal Authority and the 
Land. Regarding the Chiefs' courts, the government 
accepted virtually all the Commission's recommendations.25
24 Weinrich, Chiefs and Councils, p.2 1.
25 Andrew S. Ladley, "Courts and Authority: A Shona 
Village Court", Ph.D. thesis, London: 1985, p.196.
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Some were accepted prior to the Commission's report, as 
witnessed by the Native Affairs Advisory Board stating in 
March 1961 that the Native Affairs Department should 
"press for judicial evolution of Chiefs on both a civil + 
a criminal basis."26
The two working parties that have relevance here are 
'C ' and 'D' as both were entwined with Community Develop­
ment and the strengthening of chiefly authority. Roger 
Howman sat on both working parties and brought to them 
his ideas concerning sources of authority available to 
the "traditional" leaders and would carry those ideas on 
to the enactment of the African Law and Tribal Courts Act 
(1969). Working Party 'D' was detailed "to propose 
measures... to retain the loyalty of chiefs."27 Its recom­
mendation led to the removal of the economic goals and 
the aim of individual land tenure embedded in the Native 
Land Husbandry Act. Ironically, Arthur Pendered, the 
draughtsman of the NLHA, was also the chairman of Working 
Party ' D ' .28
Working Party 'C' considered the control of dispute 
proceedings to be an important, and potentially danger­
26 "Memorandum for Discussion on the Future of Chiefs", 
Native Affairs Advisory Board, 20-22 March, 1961, Records 
Centre, 6.1.9F 84256 Internal Affairs.
27 Box no. 6.1.9F/84256, Minutes of the Native Affairs 
Advisory Board, 27-28 June, 1961.
28 Alexander, "The State, Agrarian and Rural Politics", 
Chapter 3.
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ous, source of power. One memorandum stated "It will be
necessary to prohibit and penalise any usurption [sic] of
judicial powers by unauthorized persons".29 Elsewhere
there was emphasis on
the considerable dangers involved, especially 
in regard to security, when unofficial tribu­
nals are permitted to operate, for subversive 
elements easily set up their own 'courts' and 
usurp the function of Chiefs and magistrates.30
The Government was now willing to act against these 
threats to Chiefly and state authority. When Working 
Party 'C ' reported, it made many recommendations that 
would, it was believed, bolster chiefly status through 
the control of dispute proceedings. These included a 
devolution of authority to the Chiefs' courts. Previous­
ly, any case heard in such courts could be reheard in 
toto in the Native Commissioner's court. It was recom­
mended that this cease: a court of first instance must 
have authority. Litigants would be free to choose 
between "tribal" and magisterial courts, but an end would 
be put to the practice of "forum shopping". Accordingly, 
appeals from Chiefs' courts would go to a new Chiefs' 
Appeal Court consisting of three Chiefs. Furthermore,
29 "Tribunals Presided over by Kraalheads, Headmen and 
Chiefs, and the Chiefs' Appeal Tribunal", Working Party 'C ', 
Robinson Commission, 1961, 1369/91.
30 Report of Working Party 'C' as cited in Ladley, "Courts 
and Authority", p.195.
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the Chiefs' courts were to be empowered to award damages 
for breaches of communal rights and local bylaws.31
To further underline this effort to contain African 
civil proceedings within an African-dominated sphere, 
Working Party 'C ' recommended that Native Commissioners' 
courts be abolished as soon as possible.32 Although this 
never took place33 it is clear that the District Commis­
sioners accepted many fewer cases following publication 
of the Robinson Commission Report, referring many cases 
to, or back to, Chiefs' courts, thus signalling an 
increased appreciation of the authority of the Chiefs and 
refusing to undermine chiefly authority in judicial deci­
sion-making .
Accompanying this containment of litigation was a 
recognition of the extent to which unofficial courts were 
in fact operating. The Robinson Commission reported,
"The statutory native courts are outnumbered by the cus-
31 See Report of Secretary for Internal Affairs, 1962, 
p.31, and "Tribunals Presided..."
32 SIA, AR 1962, p.31.
33 There appears to be some confusion over this. My own 
research indicated many of the cases heard by the District 
Commissioner were previously heard in the Chiefs' courts of 
Sipolilo after 1962, as they were before. See also Harold 
Child, The History and Extent of Recognition of Tribal Law in 
Rhodesia. Salisbury: 1965, p.113. Passmore, The National 
Policy of Community Development in Rhodesia. Salisbury: 1972 
p. 159, provides a different interpretation stating that 
appeals from chiefs' courts went direct to a Tribal Court of 
Appeal.
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tomary African courts which have continued to try cases 
and settle disputes between Africans...."34 Similarly, 
"attempts to limit jurisdiction appear to have been 
largely unsuccessful".35 It is probable that the unoffi­
cial courts to which the Robinson Commission referred 
operated with the approval of a 'nod and a wink' from the 
local Native Commissioner as they had done since 1898.36 
The recommendation arising from this was that all such 
courts should be granted formal recognition. In a period 
of rising nationalist activity it was clearly the objec­
tive of senior members of the Native Affairs Department 
to incorporate these 'loose cannons' into the state 
structure so that they might be regulated and those 
operating the courts properly supervised.
The Commission found that Chiefs balanced their 
authority and the legitimacy of their position against 
the judicial decisions made in the Chief's court. The 
presence of the Native Commissioner's court had always to 
be taken into account as "the authority and status of 
Chiefs and Headmen in their community is lowered when 
their judgements are upset on a re-hearing by the native 
commissioner".37 Some Native Commissioners had already 
adopted a position in which they were extremely reluctant
34 Robinson Report, p. 56.
35 Ibid. , p . 58 .
36 C. Bullock, CNC, AR 1936, p.10.
37 Robinson Report, p. 58.
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to upset any chief's decision.38 In Sipolilo one docket 
had entered as judgment "Case sent back to the Court of 
[Chief] Sipolilo for final Judgment to be given."39 It is 
also clear that Chiefs would refuse to give a decision if 
they expected the litigants to reject that decision.40
In May 1961 the first National Assembly of Chiefs 
was held at Gwelo, which "some 500 Chiefs and senior 
headmen" attended. Apart from being another, and very 
important, step in the development of the Chiefs as a 
"national force", it also indicated that the Government 
was prepared to give the Chiefs freer rein in the
38 Ibid.
39 Gondora X14702 Sipolilo Nyakapupu NPA Farm 30 vs 
Herbert Chimbumu, Shinje Business Centre, CR 159/62, 6.11.62, 
GCC. This case is all the more remarkable for the fact that 
Gondora did not live on the Reserve and complainants were thus 
given the greater powers of choice in which court their case 
should be heard. The claim was £20 damages for the seduction 
of Gondora1s daughter.
40 Lloyd Fallers comments on this, "The chief whom I knew 
best, for example, once boasted: 'Thirty cases so far this 
year, and not a single appeal!'", Law Without Precedent. p.73. 
One of my informants, Sturben Gweshe, former secretary to the 
chief's court in Sipolilo Reserve, commented that the chief 
would be insulted if his decision was appealed against, but at 
the same time was happy to send cases on to the Native 
Commissioner because a harsher penalty was often given there. 
He also claimed that the appellant never won at the Native 
Commissioner's court because he or she appeared to the Native 
Commissioner as "argumentative and anti-authority who needed 
strict control". (Interview, Ruwinga, 1.9.91) Benson 
Kadzinga, Presiding Officer, Guruve Community Court, also 
supported the view that chiefs regarded appeals as insults. 
(Interview, Guruve Community Court, 29.8.91) See also 
Robinson Report, p.58.
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discussions held. The agenda was determined, in large 
part, by the Chiefs themselves. On that agenda was 
placed the demand "to review the position of Chiefs in 
relation to their courts".41 The Chiefs emphasized that, 
in their opinion, their prestige was eroded considerably 
by Native Commissioners overturning judicial decisions.
The two clear demands regarding Chiefs' courts that 
emerged from this assembly were first, that Chiefs' 
"judgments should be final and not subject to either 
appeal or rehearing"; and second, "that their 
jurisdiction was far too restricted and that they should 
be permitted to adjudicate all matters concerning tribal 
law. "42
Although it appears the Government and the Chiefs 
may simply have been discussing the same issues 
contemporaneously, Holleman (who was deeply involved in 
the whole process, having been a prominent member of the 
Mangwende Commission) gives us some insight into the 
political bargaining that was involved.
The most urgent matters that the 
government wanted the Chiefs to take over were 
the control of tribal land and the problem of 
those rendered landless by the Land Husbandry 
Act. The latter problem had become an 
explosive political issue which Nationalist 
leaders were not slow to exploit. The Chiefs 
were prepared to handle this tricky situation
41 "Tribunals Presided...", Working Party 'C', Robinson 
Commission, 1961.
42 Ibid.
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provided they were given more land and more
power.43
In his 1961 report the NC Lomagundi noted that Chiefs did 
not like the NLHA "because it deprived them of their 
customary powers over the land."44 The Chiefs of that 
district were exceptionally clear in their intentions.
The sale of land holdings was arrested by the Chiefs' 
refusal to approve any such transactions. The Chiefs 
were prepared to grant free land but were "not prepared 
to sanction the purchase of land from someone else."45 
Chief Zwimba, at least, was intent on maintaining a 
resource/power base by channelling all land allocations 
through his own hands. Chiefs do not appear to have been 
opposed to the occupation of land, but rather to its 
alienation. Under the Native Land Husbandry Act any 
transaction concerning land or land rights bypassed the 
chief, thus undermining his power. The action taken by 
Chief Zwimba was in harmony with the demands to have 
allocating powers returned to the Chiefs. It is there­
fore clear that the Chiefs were exploiting the political 
situation and the failure of the NLHA in order to gain 
authority and avoid being perceived simply as doing the 
government's dirty work.
43 Holleman, Chief. Council and Commissioner, p.343, 
emphasis in the original.
44 NC Lomagundi, AR 1961, p.23.
45 Ibid.
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With political pressure coming from two fronts, the
Chiefs and the nationalists, the Rhodesian government was
compelled to support the Chiefs. Thus the Chiefs were
"turned into a political power",46 or more precisely, the
office of Chief increased in significance on the national
stage. The Government's aim had been
to increase the power of the tribal authorities 
sufficiently to strengthen its own powers of 
control over the majority of black citizens, 
but not to the extent of creating a force that 
might challenge Government's own authority.47
However, Chiefs were generally intent upon increasing
their own powers and used the enhancement of their
positions by the Government to speak out independently.
Many Chiefs avoided serving the Government, but also
avoided the nationalists. Holleman has commented,
"Obviously the Rhodesian government hoped and trusted
that it [Government support for Chiefs] would be used for
the protection of the basic political status quo."48 It
does appear that few used their strengthened positions to
challenge the state. They made demands upon the state,
but did not challenge its basic legitimacy as the
nationalists were doing.
Although the Chiefs had not yet in 1961 acquired a
great deal of national political power, and thereby the
46 Holleman, Chief. Council and Commissioner, p.366.
47 Ibid. , p . 362 .
48 Ibid. , p.368 .
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ability to make demands on the government, they were
clearly in the ascendant and continued to do so. As the
Rhodesian government required more "vocal" support
against the nationalists, and against the British
government over the emerging constitutional issue, the
Chiefs were in a position to make ever more direct
demands. In the protracted posturing that culminated in
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), the
Rhodesian Front government of Ian Smith organised in 1964
another Indaba - a consultation with the Chiefs and
Headmen that recognised the "traditional" leaders as the
legitimate voice of all Africans in Southern Rhodesia.
Again, there is evidence that this "consultation"
involved negotiation in which the Government did not
simply listen, nor the "traditional" leaders address only
the issue at hand. Holleman has commented that UDI
was brought about not least because of the 
loyal support of the tribal authorities. This 
obviously imposed the obligation on Government 
to redeem its promises upon which this had, to 
a considerable extent, been conditional. Among 
these had been the granting of 'greater powers' 
to the Chiefs.49
Five weeks following UDI the Council of Chiefs met in
informal session with the Minister of Internal Affairs in
attendance. At this meeting £500,000 which had been made
available to the Council were allocated: £100,000 was
allocated to assist local councils with building schools,
49 Ibid. , p.357 .
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an issue highlighted several years earlier in the
Mangwende Reserve50 and on the agenda of many councils;
and £25,000 was allocated for a school "for sons of
Chiefs and Headmen". Furthermore, at this same meeting
the government agreed to the reduction of local taxes
from £2 to £1, ostensibly due to "crop shortages" that
year.51 Crop shortages as recently as 1960 had prompted
no such action on the part of the government. Another
possible reason why money was earmarked for the schools
was the awareness that it was in the mission schools,
especially Methodist ones, that African nationalist ideas
were being spread.52
The Council of Chiefs was ensuring that Chiefs could
be seen to be having a significant beneficial impact on
the day-to-day lives of the people in the Reserves. The
Government was clearly acquiescing in its demands. At
the Dombashawa Indaba an unnamed chief is recorded as
having said
Should we be given independence and these 
strings that tie us with Britain were cut we
would be extremely happy. After this is done
our Government should not forget us whenever
there are important matters to discuss, and 
furthermore in the Parliament that makes the
50 See Mangwende Report (1961), and Holleman, Chief. 
Council and Commissioner, which is substantially the report 
with added commentary.
51 "Chiefs and Headmen", AR 1965, in ACC/8, Annual Reports 
Internal Affairs, 16.6.3F; Box No. 100327, Records Centre.
52 NC Marandellas, AR 1959, S 2827/2/2/7.
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laws of this country we ask that we should have 
representation, because I understand that 
according to the present Constitution this is 
not possible. I am sure that if we then go 
forward and work together with the Government 
that we will be able with Government to put 
down all this trouble in the tribal areas.53
Furthermore the Chiefs at Domboshawa demanded
"powers...to punish people in our reserves...[and]...to
be represented in the central Parliament."54
Pressured by the British Government to consult
Africans meaningfully before pushing ahead with
independence, the Rhodesian government considered
including kraalheads in the consultative forum. This
would have added a further 28 000 men to the
approximately 700 Chiefs and headmen who made up the
Domboshawa Indaba.ss The Rhodesian Government was
initially attracted to this option because it would help
counter the criticisms the British Government was
levelling at them. However, the Chiefs and headmen moved
decisively to exclude the "kraalheads" and to reserve the
decision-making powers for themselves.
53 "The Domboshawa 'Indaba': The Demand for Independence 
in Rhodesia: Consultation with the African Tribesmen through 
their Chiefs and Headmen", Salisbury: 1964, pp.18-19
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid. , p . 7
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Community Development
Community development, as it was shaped for Southern
Rhodesia, was distinct from its namesake in other parts
of Africa and the world. The pursuance of the policy was
seen to intensify the segregation of Africans and Whites
in Rhodesia. It acquired racial overtones and was seen by
many to be a Rhodesian version of South Africa's
apartheid policies.56 This emerged largely during the
election campaign leading to the Rhodesian Front victory
in December, 1962.57
The Community Development administrators were keen
on channelling development, as defined by the government,
through institutions perceived as being organic to the
community itself. This was indicated in the statements
made by Community Development officials.
The existence of the dare-procedure provided a 
traditional means of decision-making and 
problem-solving in which consensus influenced 
to a large degree the action that was taken.
It was only after ascertaining the feeling of 
those present at the dare that a conclusion 
would be reached and it was seldom if ever that 
such decision did not reflect the general 
viewpoint. The decision, however, was made by 
the chief or other tribal leader, as the 
recognised decision-taker and voice of the 
people.58
56 Passmore, The National Policy of Community Development, 
p.167.
57 Ibid. , p . 137 .
58 "Aspects of Development in Tribal Organization", 
Community Development and Local Government Bulletin. 15 March,
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It is notable that this was the first time that anyone
associated with the NAD or MIA had commented other than
negatively upon consensus decision making.
The Senior Delineation Officer, C.J.K. Latham,
defined a community as
'a locality (geographic entity) whose 
boundaries are defined by the people living in 
it and recognised by them as an entity, and in 
which there are a number of institutions 
(family, economic, educational, religious, 
etc.) serving the basic needs, a sense of 
togetherness within the locality which exceeds 
any sense of togetherness with outsiders that 
they may have, and a potential to work together 
in matters of common need.'
This definition has been found after a 
considerable amount of research in tribal areas 
to be defined best as those villages which 
comprise a unit of common judicial authority,59
The emphasis upon courts is a little surprising,
considering how many cases simply found their way to the
Native Commissioners' courts in the first instance.
However, it throws light on the belief of Chiefs in the
authority of African courts and may explain to some
extent why Chiefs were keen to have their courts
recognised by the Government.
1965, Salisbury, mimeo., p.18. It should be noted that in 
this quotation the author is using the term "dare" to refer to 
a body with executive authority. See Hannan, Standard Shona 
Dictionary. 1984.
59 C.J.K. Latham, General Introduction to: B.P. Kaschula, 
"Delineation of Communities: Sinoia District", July - 
November, 1965, p .i .
In justifying the adoption of the Community 
Development policy the CNC, in 1959, presented a 
"traditionalist" argument, stating that the Native 
Affairs Department had pursued the introduction of 
community development principles as early as 1929 with 
the Native Development Act.60 There was some truth in 
this argument. In 1950 Roger Howman made a policy survey 
for the Native Affairs Department in which he remarked 
that since
[d]emocratic ideas are... entirely alien to 
African tradition....[t]he development of local 
self-government as a step towards greater 
political responsibility is therefore 
inevitably a slow process requiring much 
patience and education.61
This statement would become very resonant of the
officially proclaimed policy that was to follow more than
a decade later. However, therein lies a significant
difference: Howman's study was a survey of policy in
action whereas Community Development was an explicit
policy. Weinrich has argued that by making such an
explicit policy "and by implementing this policy through
indirect pressure, the Rhodesian government eliminated an
essential element of the philosophy: its voluntary
character.1,62
60 Passmore, The National Policy of Community Development. 
73 .
61 Survey of Native Policy. 1950, p.28, S 520.
62 Weinrich, Chiefs and Councils, p.168.
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In the period 1950 to 1962 the position of Native
Commissioners changed substantially. It is worth quoting
Holleman at length here as he illuminates the view of
Native Commissioners. The "African mental [i.e.
political] climate had changed", the Native Affairs
Department came under increasing criticism for its
implementation of "oppressive legislation".
Unavoidably it was the local commissioner who 
became the focal point of this turbulent 
change. As he perforce became more remote and 
estranged from the people, his traditional 
image as a stern but often helpful and 
understanding ’father' faded from the public 
eye. Instead, he...had become regarded as the 
local symbol of a restrictive if not 
'oppressive' white government.... Comparatively 
few had understood what was happening to 
them....the great majority battled on...in the 
mistaken belief that they were indispensable to 
the welfare of the people. Not realizing the 
ties of dependency had actually slackened and 
that, in the eyes of many Africans, they had 
become rather an obstacle to the fulfilment of 
growing needs and ambitions, many commissioners 
felt themselves betrayed by the people whose 
interests they had tried to serve....not under­
standing the cause of frustration and sometimes 
violent resentment on the African side, many 
district officials felt deeply frustrated 
themselves. Harassed and unable...to find 
fault with their own hard efforts, they looked 
for scapegoats elsewhere.... from head office 
downwards to recalcitrant Chiefs, headmen and 
commoners. But the most bitter reaction was 
aimed at the 'political agitators', those who 
were attacking the very system of government to 
which the commissioner himself owed his 
ultimate loyalty.63
63 Holleman, Chief. Council and Commissioner, p.42.
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This frustration led many Native Commissioners to 
implement community development coercively, which was, of 
course, entirely at odds with the theory of it. Their 
paternalism became insistent, although, as we shall see, 
other factors were involved.
Community development was officially adopted in June 
1962 by the Whitehead government.64 At the governmental 
level, the new approach included a restructuring of 
several ministries as a result of the outcome of several 
Commissions in the early 1960s.65 The Native Affairs 
Department was succeeded in many of its functions by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA). However, anomalies 
persisted. The judicial functions of the NAD had been 
transferred to the Ministry of Justice, but the 
administration of Chiefs' courts remained within MIA, the 
appeals from Chiefs' courts going, officially, to the 
Tribal Court of Appeal and on to the High Court.66 The 
District Commissioners were civil servants under
64 Ibid. , p. 129.
65 The key commissions leading to the reorganisation of 
ministries were "The Commission appointed to Inquire into and 
Report on the Administrative and Judicial Functions in the 
Native Affairs and District Courts Departments", Chairman Sir 
Victor Robinson; "The Commission of Inquiry into the 
Organisation of the Southern Rhodesian Public Services", 
Chairman T.T. Paterson; and "Report of the Advisory Committee 
on the Economic Development of Southern Rhodesia with 
particular reference to the Role of African Agriculture", 
Chairman John Phillips.
66 Passmore, The National Policy of Community Development, 
p. 159.
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different ministries, and the Chiefs were "traditional 
leaders" and civil servants but their amalgam of 
responsibilities straddled logical ministerial 
boundaries.
Over a period of twelve years the key "institution- 
building" legislation of Community development was 
passed. These were the African Councils Act (1957), the 
Tribal Land Authority Act (1967), and the African Law and 
Tribal Courts Act (1969). The Councils Act was an 
attempt to revive a vent for "legitimate" African demands 
without involving Africans in national politics: to 
contain African politics on the periphery and at the 
level of local government. The Tribal Land Authority Act 
had its genesis in the failure of the Native Land 
Husbandry Act. The strenuous efforts to impose the NLHA 
and the stiff, broad resistance to it reflected the fact 
that it had alienated many Chiefs and "traditional" 
leaders who had formerly controlled land allocation. The 
NLHA had severely disturbed the pattern of land 
allocation through redistribution, centralization and the 
removal of entire villages. Following the collapse of 
the NLHA, many "traditional" leaders and Chiefs reassumed 
the power to allocate land. But at the same time, others 
were attempting to assume such authority, for example the 
storeowner in Sipolilo who claimed land-allocating 
powers.67 Thus by 1967 the Tribal Land Authority Act was,
67 See p.348 above.
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in many ways, merely regularising the existing situation; 
it brought nothing new on the ground.
The African Law and Tribal Courts Act, likewise, 
sought to regulate a situation that already went beyond 
the legal boundaries. The Robinson Commission reported 
in 1961 that unrecognised courts continued to outnumber 
those officially sanctioned.68 This Commission went on to 
recommend that all such courts be brought into the 
official domain. The 1969 legislation made only a 
limited, and indirect, attempt to address this subject by 
outlawing unofficial courts. It differed from the 1937 
Act in four ways: by granting criminal jurisdiction, 
allowing Africans to try cases involving non-Africans, 
introducing 'customary' procedure and introducing some 
'customary' penalties.69 The first three, at least, 
simply acknowledged the existing situation. Community 
development policy also reflected a "clear perception of 
the central role of local courts in local rule" and the 
ALTC Act was the formalisation of this.70
This triad of councils, Tribal Courts and the Tribal 
Land Authority, was fraught with tension. As Weinrich 
has shown, the councils were perceived as an extreme
68 Robinson Report, para. 179, p. 56.
69 H.J. Magan, "The Criminal Law of Rhodesia - Its 
Development and Administration", Ph.D. (Laws) Thesis, London: 
1972, p.90.
70 Ladley, "Courts and Authority", p.200.
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threat by some Chiefs, rejected out of hand by the 
"commoners" in some areas, and the chief seldom had the 
strength of character to impose the council on his 
people, or the political skill and/or will to balance the 
diverse demands required in order to make the council a 
success.71
Under Community Development the community was 
"delineated" or defined as that group of people who took 
their cases to the common court. The Robinson Commission 
found that
A chief has been appointed in the eastern 
districts whom a large number of Africans do 
not regard as the proper incumbent and the man 
who thought he should be appointed the chief 
crossed the border and lives in Portuguese East 
Africa, and that is the man to whom some 
Africans of the tribe go to have their civil 
disputes settled.72
Roger Howman conceded that there were instances in which
the Government appointments were impolitic, if not wrong,
but observed that the community would simply continue to
take their cases to the leader they deemed the most
legitimate. Some of the appointments were corrected.73
African Law and Tribal Courts Act (1969)
The African Law and Tribal Courts (ALTC) Act 
represents the final legislative attempt on the part of
71 Weinrich, Chiefs and Councils, in particular Chapter 5.
72 Robinson Report, pp. 57-58.
73 Roger Howman, Harare, 1 August, 1991.
the colonial regime to bolster chiefly authority by 
strengthening the vestiges of traditional institutions.
It was an attempt not only to regulate and augment the 
authority of the acceptable Chiefs, but to actively debar 
others from a source of social authority74 that could be 
channelled to the benefit of the nationalist cause. By 
the time the Act was finally passed, nationalism had long 
since resorted to armed struggle and Rhodesia was on the 
verge of severing all ties with the UK and declaring 
itself a republic. The Act was a long time in the 
making: some of its principal elements gaining currency 
in the Native Affairs Department as early as 1948. The 
legal draughtsmen had already dealt with the bill by 
1962, but, as noted above, other matters were given 
higher priority. Tensions between the Law Department and 
the Native Affairs Dept/Ministry of Internal Affairs75 
caused further delay, and the Act was not passed until 
1969 .
The origins of the ALTC, and the judicial context in 
which it was set, can be traced back to the publication 
in 1952 of the Report on the Inquiry into Native Courts 
by Roger Howman. However, as early as 1932 the NC 
Bulalima-Mangwe, F.W.T. Posselt, had urged his superiors 
to consider a request from "one of the leading Chiefs in
74 For an extended discussion on courts as a tool for 
generating social authority see Ladley, "Courts and 
Authority", passim.
75 Roger Howman, Harare, 1 August 1991.
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this District" that Chiefs "be empowered to impose fines
and corporal punishment to enable them to control their
people".76 The 1952 Report used the phrase "when criminal
jurisdiction is granted" in Southern Rhodesia, suggesting
that this was expected by others besides the author of
this report. But there is no evidence that the issue
touched anyone outside the Native Affairs Department.
The first alterations in the judicial organization
came in the late 1950s and concerned the appeal
structure. This step was an attempt to bring the appeal
court "closer" to fast-changing customs, and provide a
clearer framework for the "gradual convergence of native
and European Law."77 This concern reflected an awareness
of the need to adapt law to contemporary innovations in
agriculture.
The new Native Appeal Court consisted of
a president, who must be a retired judge or 
advocate of not less than twelve years 
standing, sitting with two assessors selected 
by the president...who are or have been Native 
Commissioners or District Commissioners.78
The inclusion, for the first time, of a qualified,
professional lawyer in the court reflected an
understanding of the changing situation and indicated the
76 NC Bulalima-Mangwe to Superintendent of Natives, Bulaw­
ayo, 18 November, 1932, S 138/43.
77 CNC, AR 1958, p. 6 .
70 Palley, The Constitutional History and Law of Southern 
Rhodesia 1888-1965 with special reference to Imperial Control. 
Oxford: 1966, p.541.
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course which the Government sought to pursue. In 1958
the CNC reported,
The original task of the Court - that of 
unravelling the texture of many different kinds 
of Native Law and Custom, and trying to respect 
the values, sentiments and beliefs of the 
people - has been undermined by such factors as 
a money economy, changes in the basis of 
relationships, struggles to adapt tribal ways 
to a commercial environment and an increasing 
number os cases unknown to Native Law, for 
which the only remedy is Roman Dutch or commer­
cial Law.79
This was a critical time for the position of Chiefs. The 
Native Affairs Department was beginning its push to boost 
Chiefs1 status, but the reconstitution of the Native 
Appeal Court was primarily a response to rapid changes. 
The intention of assimilating "Native Law" to its 
European counterpart was abandoned four years later when 
Community Development definitively redirected policy. An 
informal policy of "convergence" was abandoned in favour 
of one more starkly segregationist in nature.
The appeal structure established under the ALTC 
(1969) comprised Tribal Appeal Courts staffed by "three 
Chiefs who are presidents of tribal courts".80 No longer 
was there a white official to oversee the administration 
of African civil law in a formal sense. This marked the
79 Ibid.
80 African law and Tribal Courts Act (1969) section 21
(1) .
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importance attached by the Government to confining 
African litigation to African jurisdiction.
The draft of the African Law and Courts bill was 
ready by the end of September, 1962, only four months 
after the first National Chiefs' Assembly. Consultations 
continued with the Chiefs and Headmen and this piece of 
legislation was discussed at the provincial assemblies in 
1964. This consultation procedure was in sharp contrast 
to the process followed thirty years earlier when the 
Native Affairs Department officials, more paternalistic 
than in the 1960s, did not feel the need for any formal 
consultation; it was enough for the provisions of the 
Native Law and Courts bill to be believed to be 
"acceptable... to Native Chiefs and people".81 This is 
another example of the Chiefs' and Headmen's closer ties 
to the Rhodesian Government, and the form of the growing 
interdependence between the two. The Government was 
increasingly willing to consult, and likewise the 
"traditional" leaders were increasingly willing to aid 
the Government.
The African Law and Tribal Courts bill was designed 
to provide recognised Chiefs and headmen with increased 
authority and power. These provisions were, as discussed 
above, the result of negotiation and discussions between 
the Government and the "traditional" leaders. The ALTC
81 Charles Bullock, Acting CNC, "Memorandum to Accompany 
the Native Courts Bill, 1936", 13 February, 1936, S 1561/59.
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bill sought to achieve the aim of increasing Chiefs' and 
headmen's authority by confining African litigation to 
African jurisdiction, as evidenced by the appeal 
structure it created. Furthermore, in 1963 the caseloads 
of District Commissioners fell off dramatically in most 
districts, while the caseloads of Chiefs' courts corre­
spondingly increased. This was due, in part, to the 
informal implementation of measures contained in the 
bill.
In 1970, when the ALTC Act was implemented 
nationally, the caseloads of Chiefs' courts began to 
decrease and those of the district commissioners' to 
increase.82 This is in contrast to Ladley's findings 
that in rural district commissioners' courts the caseload 
"declined markedly."83 In Sipolilo District the caseload 
of Chief Sipolilo's court declined from 1966 until his 
death in 19 7 7 . 84 In the District Commissioner's court the 
caseload reached a low of 14 in 1969, but by 1972 it had 
reached 175 cases in the first nine months of the year. 
Although this may have been unusually high, it also 
marked a new use of the courts by the local schools and 
councils to collect fees and taxes.85 Thus, one aim of
82 Based on data from SIA annual reports.
83 Ladley, "Courts and Authority", p.217.
84 Interview with Actor Tapfumaneyi, Guruve, July 31,
1991.
85 Analysis of cases held at the Guruve Community Court.
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the Act was at least partially fulfilled in the period 
1963 through 1970, that is before the liberation war 
became intense in Sipolilo, in which the policies 
contained in the Act were being informally implemented. 
However, following 1970 the trends reversed. The extent 
to which the liberation war played a role in this, and 
the wider changes of chiefs' authority is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.
Confining cases to the jurisdiction of African- 
operated courts had three effects. First, it addressed a 
demand which Chiefs had been making for decades and was a 
partial reward for their support for Rhodesian Front 
policies, including UDI. It is notable that the first 
draft of the African Law and Tribal Courts bill was ready 
only four months after the first meeting of the National 
Chiefs' Assembly in September, 1962. Second, it enhanced 
the authority of those perceived to need it most at the 
time, namely the recognised Chiefs and Headmen. Third, 
it reduced the workload of hard-pressed District 
Commissioners. The ALTC Act further secured exclusive 
access to the authority derived from operating courts for 
those Chiefs and Headmen the Government considered fit.
It did so in two ways, first by allowing very few courts 
to exercise the limited criminal jurisdiction granted to 
African courts in the Act,86 and secondly by making it an
86 See papers in PER 5, Guruve Administrative Offices.
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offence to "adjudicate without authority or to 
impersonate a tribal court".87
The criminal jurisdiction conferred on Tribal Courts 
by the 1969 Act was limited primarily to "certain types 
of theft and malicious injury to property."88 But it also 
included many statutory regulations made at various times 
under the Native Affairs Act (1927), the Native Beer Act 
(1953), the Native Councils Act (1957), the Land 
Husbandry Act (1951) and several conservation-related 
acts pertaining to the Tribal Trust Lands. Here again 
there is evidence that the ALTC Act had been anticipated, 
some courts were hearing such cases as early as 1965.89 
However, despite the apparent transfer of judicial 
authority, white administrative supervision persisted as 
African courts were required to submit records to the DC 
for his perusal, and he had the power to annul any 
decision he felt to be beyond the competency of the 
court.90
There was a further departure from past policy. 
Hitherto, "native law and custom" had been restricted to
87 Ladley, "Courts and Authority", p.201.
88 Magan, "The Criminal Law of Rhodesia", pp.90-91.
89 Chief vs Jairos, CR 33/65, 18.12.65, S 2932/2. In this 
case the Chief in Mawanga Township had attempted to punish 
Jairos for "ploughing illegally". Interestingly the DC 
dismissed the case because Jairos had an alibi, not because 
the Chief had no business bringing a public civil suit against 
him.
90 Magan, "The Criminal Law of Rhodesia", pp.99-100.
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that which was considered by colonial administrators to 
be "traditional". Subjects not previously known to have 
been adjudicated by Chiefs' courts had been dealt with in 
the Native Commissioner's court. Such tight control was 
formally relaxed with the Act, although once again there 
had been some anticipation of this in the 1950s. The Act 
formally expanded the competency of the Tribal Courts to 
include "cases where no express rule is applicable" by 
simply applying "the principles of justice, equity and 
good conscience."91 These courts were also allowed to 
deal with compensatory claims arising from criminal cases 
even when such cases had yet to be adjudicated by other 
courts. (The regular procedure had been that the criminal 
action should be completed first.92) This allowed the 
Chiefs to deal with such matters openly, whereas 
previously they had to deal with them clandestinely and 
in breach of the law.
The final impact of the African Law and Tribal 
Courts Act is difficult to assess due to the increasing 
intensity of the war at the time of its implementation, 
especially in the Sipolilo and Darwin regions. But the 
aims of the policies that in practice pre-dated, and were 
enshrined in the Act are clear. The political terrain in 
which the "traditional" leaders were operating changed
91 Goldin and Gelfand, African Law and Custom in Rhodesia.
Cape Town: 1975, p.73.
92 Ladley, "Courts and Authority", p.200.
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rapidly over the period 1958-1972, making it impossible 
to assess whether the courts were indeed a generator of 
social authority. Any consideration of that would be 
highly speculative due to the incalculable variables 
during that period. What remains clear is that both the 
Rhodesian government and the compliant and defiant Chiefs 
considered them an important institution to control, 
indeed at least as important as the power to allocate 
land.
Conclusion
Following years of loose, though growing, 
association between the government and the "traditional" 
leaders the 1960s marked a period formalizing those ties 
more intensively than at any other time since the 1920s 
and 1930s. Circumstances were parallel in that in both 
periods there was a third party threat: in the 1920s the 
Southern Rhodesian Missionary Conference and mission 
educated Africans; in the late 1950s and the 1960s, the 
nationalists. This factor compelled the government to 
construct legitimate, and legitimating, support amongst 
Africans. It chose to ally itself with the powerful men 
of the communities, the "traditional" leaders, thus 
calling upon a traditionalist agenda, and sought to 
maintain the local community as the main focus of African 
politics through the policy of Community Development.
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The implication of such a policy was to exclude Africans 
from the politics of the nation-state.
The Chiefs, on the whole, reacted to the policy of 
Community Development relatively disapprovingly. Few 
councils were ever supported, and the restoration of 
land-allocating powers and extended judicial jurisdiction 
was more a matter of the Government recognising the 
status quo than gaining active support from the Chiefs. 
The Chiefs' involvement in the two latter areas by no 
means implied that they embraced the policy as a whole.
In her analysis of Community Development, Weinrich 
declined to give any emphasis to the role that the 
African courts played in community development politics, 
concentrating almost exclusively on the councils. The 
belief of community development officers that courts were 
central community institutions dovetailed neatly with the 
Chiefs' bargaining position for more powers as set out in 
the early 1960s; it was also crucial to securing an 
instrument of social control in the hands of the Chiefs. 
However, the Chiefs' compliant participation, perhaps 
more charitably described as working from within the 
system, in the National Chiefs' Council and the 
Dombashawa Indaba made it clear to the nationalists that 
these men were supporting and being supported by the 
white government. The Chiefs' position in the late 1950s 
had been, for a moment when both the nationalists and the 
Government had been wooing their support, one of
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"ambiguous dependence".93 By the mid-1960s the 
interdependence between Government and the Chiefs was 
clear, if complex.
The African Law and Tribal Courts Act (1969) marked 
the last extension of jurisdiction for the Chiefs' courts 
in the colonial period. Its major component was the 
granting of limited criminal jurisdiction courts presided 
over by selected Chiefs. Thus the Chiefs supportive of, 
or at least compliant with, government policy could be 
given a tool to maintain and extend their authority where 
necessary. The Act also made holding unofficial courts 
an offence. This was aimed at securing for Government- 
recognised Chiefs exclusive access to the social 
authority derived from the control of dispute 
proceedings.
These numerous threads tied many, though by no means 
all, Chiefs tightly to the government's fortunes. It was 
not simply the state-level politics that led so many 
Chiefs to follow such a path; rather, this course had its 
roots in the local politics of the courts analyzed in 
detail in Chapter Five. The deep social transformations 
of the period 1945-60 in Southern Rhodesia, some of which 
were mediated by the local Chiefs' courts, demonstrated 
that these courts and Chiefs could play an important role 
as agents for change: indeed, the extension of the cash
93 See Shula Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence in South 
Africa: Class. Nationalism and the State in Twentieth-Century 
Natalr London: 1986.
economy was considered "development" by the Southern 
Rhodesian government. Despite the traditionalist 
discourse adopted in the 1960s, the Southern Rhodesian 
government did not shun change, but attempted to control 
it. Equally, Chiefs were agents of change and the 
institutions they controlled were deployed to assist in 
key changes. Where interests coincided with the 
Government, many Chiefs were willing to exploit that 
situation. Likewise, where interests coincided with the 
nationalists, Chiefs exploited this position. In short, 
in the increasingly polarized political climate of the 
1960s, Chiefs developed strategies, both individually and 
collectively, to achieve their own specific aims. Many 
remained their own men, and exploited that climate.
Their means varied enormously, from those pursuing the 
politics of compliance epitomised by the National Chiefs 
Council, to those who openly aligned themselves with the 
nationalist parties.
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Conclusion
*
Law is a reflection and a source of prejudice.
It both enforces and suggests forms of bias.1
Between 1930 and 1970, the powerful men of African 
society in Southern Rhodesia sought to claim a legitimate 
position within the state for one of their most powerful 
instruments of social control: the courts. Equally, the 
Government was aware of its failure to stamp out the 
functioning of African judicial bodies from the time of 
the High Commissioner's Proclamation in 1898 and sought 
to control these hitherto 'loose canons'. Legislation in 
193 7, the Native Law and Courts Act, marked the initial 
step to achieve this end, and others.
The demands of the powerful African men gained 
acceptance with the Native Affairs Department when it 
became apparent that bolstering these leaders would 
benefit the Department as well. Thus the NAD began to 
pursue a neo-traditionalist agenda involving 
"traditional" leaders, courts and councils. Although the 
councils soon fell into disuse, the courts, now 
recognised, thrived. A further purpose served by the 
"Chief"- court complex was that it provided for the 
government a local, organic connection in African 
society. At the same time the decisions by the courts
1 Diane B. Schulder, in Robin Morgan, Sisterhood is 
Powerful. p. 13 9, from Tony Augarde (ed.) The Oxford 
Dictionary of Modern Quotations, p.193.
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were supervised by the local representative of colonial 
authority, the Native Commissioner, whose court also 
acted as a court of appeal to that of the Chief. Through 
the powers of supervision and the appellate position of 
his court the Native Commissioner was able to regulate a 
Chief's power and authority both positively and in 
reaction to Africans dissatisfaction. At the same time 
the Native Commissioner was in a position to deploy 
coercive power against individuals he regarded as 
recalcitrant when they challenged the Chief's authority.
Following the rebellions in 1896-7, the Southern 
Rhodesian state attempted a "crackdown" as a means of 
dealing with potential African rebellion in the 
territory. This included the removal of official 
recognition of Chiefs' judicial powers. More generally 
there was an attack on Chiefly power. But what is most 
important in this period is that the government refused 
to bolster the status of African "traditional" leaders 
and was happy to see their power erode where it did. 
However, by the early 1920s this policy began to be 
reconsidered with greater sophistication and 
contemplation given to more imaginative roles for 
Africans to play within the Southern Rhodesian regime.
The initial motivation to cede legitimate judicial 
power to local African potentates emanated from the 
challenge raised by the Southern Rhodesian Missionary 
Conference to the exclusive privileges enjoyed the Native
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Affairs Department with regard to the governance of 
Africans. The coalescence of interests that emerged 
between local African potentates and the NAD in response 
to this challenge led to the Government increasing formal 
support for these men. The office of "Chief" was defined 
through the Native Affairs Act (1927) and additional 
duties and powers conferred upon recognized Chiefs by 
virtue of the Native Law and Courts Act (1937) and the 
Native Councils Act (1937). Each of these were modest 
steps in the formalization and institutionalization of 
the relationship between the NAD and the "Chiefs".
The revival of structures (e.g. chiefs and courts) 
which the colonial regime perceived, or at least 
presented, as "traditional" in the 1920s and 1930s marked 
the beginning of the neo-traditional agenda the Native 
Affairs Department pursued to the end of the Rhodesian 
era. However, the genuinely traditional nature of these 
institutions was undermined by the various ways in which 
they were manipulated: through the exclusivity and 
symbolic power of brick court houses; the support of 
decisions in accordance with state interests in the 
Native Commissioner's court over others; the option of 
the Native Commissioner's court; and the limitation of 
Chiefs' legitimating practices, e.g. famine management. 
Furthermore, in Southern Rhodesia the changing economic 
setting upset pre-colonial social relations to such an 
extent that relations remained in a state of flux for
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many decades. The impact of capital penetration in the 
region was experienced extremely unevenly, according to 
district and time. All these factors influenced the 
change of norms in a given community. The civil courts 
were one of the major forums in which the contestation 
and formation of new norms took place, and those courts 
sought to implement those norms. Thus, those who 
controlled the courts believed they had a significant 
impact upon the development of society itself.
The courts were of particular importance in the 
maintenance and development of local political bases.
The Native Boards of the 1930s failed to fulfil this role 
for several reasons. First they met only once a year, 
secondly they comprised all important men from the 
administrative district, and thirdly the Native 
Commissioner chaired these meetings. To all 
participants, the time lag between a demand being made 
and a (sometimes only initial) response being made 
rendered them ineffective. The Native Councils created 
in 1937 never really succeeded either, nor did the 
attempt to reform and revive the idea in 1957. It would 
be dangerous to generalise for the country as a whole on 
the reasons for failure but tensions between strong- 
willed Chiefs and Native Commissioners, and between 
"backward looking" Chiefs and "modernizing" members of
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the councils have been blamed, in some instances, for 
their failure.2
Control and responsibility for the Chiefs’ courts 
lay, to a great extent, in the hands of the Chiefs 
themselves. Although Native Commissioners supervised 
these courts, it was far more in a "hands off" manner. 
Rather than intervening in disputes, appeals were made to 
the Native Commissioner's court. The differing dynamics 
of intervention and appeal are key to the development of 
even the slightest hegemony, which was crucial to the 
maintenance of the Southern Rhodesian state.
The Southern Rhodesian government began its attempts 
to involve Chiefs in the administration of localities in 
the 1950s, establishing Provincial Chiefs' Assemblies and 
later attempting to revive the councils. However, in 
that same decade the government attempted to force Chiefs 
to implement the despised Native Land Husbandry Act 
(1951). The fact that this would expose them on the 
front line of redistributing insufficient land made many 
wary of the operation. Furthermore, it became a highly 
politicised issue and in Sipolilo district the leaders of 
those rejecting the NLHA were those with the most land 
under plough, with even those likely to gain out of the
2 See the Mangwende Report, or J.F. Holleman, Chief. 
Council and Commissioner. Assen: 1969, and A.H.K. Weinrich, 
Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia. Salisbury: 1971.
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redistribution firmly in support. Within the Native 
Affairs Department there was a drive to grant the Chiefs 
greater authority through the granting of criminal 
jurisdiction. The Law Department contested such a move.
In the early 1960s the NLHA was suspended, Chiefs 
were being courted by the government as representatives 
of the African population and deployed in the demands for 
independence from the United Kingdom. For their part, 
Chiefs were demanding more land, more powers of land 
allocation and increased judicial powers. Although the 
first was not achieved, the others were. In 1969 the 
African Law and Tribal Courts Act was passed, conferring 
criminal jurisdiction upon a limited number of Chiefs' 
courts.
The dynamics apparent at the local level reveal a 
much finer texture than it is possible to perceive at the 
country-wide level. At the local level it is possible to 
observe the process by which the courts, having first 
been incorporated into the state institutionally, can 
undergo an ideological incorporation through the shaping 
of decisions in accordance with state interests. This 
allowed the colonial state to ensure that its own 
interests were bolstered in African society.
Thus in the 1950s, once the courts had been securely 
established and Chiefs for the most part bolstered 
sufficiently, these institutions were in a position to 
further the interests of the state far beyond relieving a
great deal of the judicial burden from the Native 
Commissioners. As the cash economy extended into areas 
in which it had not previously taken hold, Chiefs and 
their courts were able to reinforce the process. The 
Africans in Sipolilo Reserve did not simply move in and 
out of the cash economy according to need, as they had 
done previously, but became fully paid-up members of that 
economy. Commercial debt became part of the district's 
life in the 1950s and bridewealth payments were adjusted 
to fit into the emerging scheme of debtor-creditor 
relations. This process of consolidation of the cash 
economy in outlying areas was not unique to Sipolilo; 
however, there remained many remote regions, including 
the areas in Sipolilo bordering Mozambique and Northern 
Rhodesia, that remained beyond the frontier.
The fact that the Chiefs were actively boosting 
"modernisation", following the Native Commissioners' 
lead, through court decisions dealing largely with 
"mercantile" law in the 1950s gave them greater 
credibility with the Native Affairs Department in the 
1960s. Following the strengthening of the Chiefs' voices 
through the establishment of the Chiefs' Council in 1961, 
the main issues pursued were the abolition of the ceiling 
on bridewealth payments, the raising of salaries and 
allowance for Chiefs and Headmen, and greater judicial 
authority for Chiefs and Headmen. All these extended the 
means of control in the hands of the Chiefs, who in turn
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supported the government's proposed constitution. The 
state provided the resources for Chiefs to extend their 
authority through ceding land to accommodate those who 
lost rights to occupation as a result of the Land 
Husbandry Act. This served several functions. It 
prevented the nationalists claiming total victory. They 
may have forced the repeal of the Act, but it was the 
Chiefs who "secured" redress, and it also shifted a 
political predicament out of the hands of the Native 
Affairs Department.
It was clear to many Chiefs that the road to power 
for them was through supporting the state, not attacking 
it. The state had aided the formation of the Chiefs as a 
"national force" in opposition to the African 
nationalists whose influence the Chiefs wished to 
overcome. As Holleman writes, the Chief's "attitude 
towards the maintenance of law and order and towards the 
new African political leadership in many respects 
coincided with that of the European government."3 Having 
become so intertwined in their directions, the 
"traditional" leaders and the state had developed a 
"political interdependence ... so complex that the 
distinction between the chiefs' position as hereditary 
rulers and that of their being subservient civil servants 
eludes precise definition."4
3 Holleman, Chief. Council and Commissioner, p.345.
4 Ibid.
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The increasing proximity that developed between 
"Chiefs" and officials of the Native Affairs Department 
in the 1950s formed the basis of the alliance that 
emerged in the 1960s. That alliance had its foundations 
in the integration of Chiefs' authority into the state, a 
process begun in the 1930s with the recognition of the 
"traditional" courts as selectively recognised by the 
Native Law and Courts Act (193 7). Those foundations were 
extended in the 1950s through discussion within the 
Department concerning the addition of limited criminal 
jurisdiction to selected Chiefs' courts, as well as 
through local action, that is Native Commissioners 
encouraging Chiefs to hear new types of cases.
By the early 1960s, the Southern Rhodesian state was 
compelled to invigorate its alliance with the 
"traditional" leaders to counteract growing African 
nationalism. The direction this took was spelt out at 
the "Indaba" of 1961. It is clear that it was through 
this conference the state sought to strengthen the 
"Chiefs'" voice by consolidating the many into a unified, 
more coherent one.
This thesis has shown how the neo-traditional 
institutions of Chiefs and Chiefs' courts have been 
employed as mechanisms with organic connections to 
implement law and policies in accordance with state 
interests. It is of special interest that in Southern 
Rhodesia this strategy was pursued not only in the 1920s
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and 193 0s to govern the country more economically, as in 
the Colonial Office territories around it, but also in 
the 1950s and 1960s to counteract growing nationalist 
pressure.
From the point when African "big men" or 
"traditional" leaders began to regain formal access to 
the state we are informed clearly that they demanded 
recognition for the courts they already operated. We 
must ask why this was so. It appears that the Native 
Affairs Department was correct in its belief that the 
control of judicial proceedings, when used judiciously, 
lent the "judge" social authority that could be deployed 
elsewhere in the social and political domain. This 
broadly confirms Ladley's thesis.
The control of judicial proceedings implies many 
things, including the power to shape or reject certain 
practices and values. However, this is not a total 
control. It is highly unlikely that anyone involved in 
the debt cases before the local courts in Sipolilo in the 
1950s had any notion that those concepts would move into 
the sphere of roora transactions. Yet the courts did 
play a role in this. This is but one example in the 
shaping of "customary" law achieved by the courts.
This thesis has shown how judicial authority was an 
integral part of Chiefs' political authority in Southern 
Rhodesia in the period 1930 to 1970. The gaining of 
official recognition for their courts in 1937 was
followed by increasing political authority locally, and 
following the Second World War, nationally. The 
harmonious operation of the Chiefs' and Native 
Commissioners' courts in the 1950s, on both the 
institution and ideological levels, and the decision of 
the National Chiefs' Council to pursue a politics of 
collaboration, led to greater political involvement for 
(some) Chiefs on the national stage and the government 
meeting some important demands regarding land and 
judicial authority. For other Chiefs their rejection of 
the collaborationist politics boosted their political 
standing, which had been built around a base of judicial 
authority. Here, we have seen that Africans considered 
judicial authority to be worth controlling throughout 
this period. The Native Affairs Department recognised 
its potential power but was not always in a position to 
make use of it. The national governemnt showed little 
interest in building a strong base amongst the Chiefs, 
rather appealing to them only when needed to legitimate 
decisions already made. Consequently, Chiefs' demands 
were not given the priority that even the Native Affairs 
Department, and later the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
wished. But it remains clear that Africans asserted a 
degree of control over dispute proceedings in Southern 
Rhodesia, and this remained central to African political 
authority throughout the colonial era and indeed beyond.
Afterword
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In this afterword I would like to provide the reader 
with a brief overview of the history of the struggle over 
dispute proceedings from the passage of the African Law 
and Tribal Courts Act (1969) up to 1992. It has been a 
difficult and unpredictable course for anyone claiming 
jurisdiction at the lower levels of dispute proceedings 
during the final years of the Rhodesian regime, and 
indeed in independent Zimbabwe. Broadly speaking, it may 
be said that this period has been marked by increased 
attempts by the state to centralise institutions of power 
and authority. However, on occasion, concessions have 
been made.
In the decade following the promulgation of the 
African Law and Tribal Courts Act (1969), all Rhodesian 
life was dominated by the increasingly intensive 
liberation war. The war had a great impact on the locus, 
or loci, of authority in the community. In some spheres, 
though not all, the liberation fighters and the state 
competed for authority. Judicial authority was one such 
sphere.
In Sipolilo District, an important war zone for all 
armies (see Chapter 4), the incidence of disputes brought 
before Chief Sipolilo's court, decreasing moderately from 
1966, fell off dramatically in the years following 1973
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to the point that by mid-1975 there were virtually none.1
In another part of Sipolilo Tribal Trust Lands there was
a much more direct attack on judicial authority. Ladley
informs us that,
In southern Guruwe [sic], one of the first and 
most symbolic of the guerrilla attacks against 
the structure of local administration was 
against the dare of Chief Bepura...the 
impressive brick court house was razed to the 
ground.2
However, in Salisbury Chief Makoni was hoping, as late as 
1979, that the government would supply him with the 
"funds to build a proper courtroom soon."3
In an attempt to strengthen the Chiefs as government 
agents, further authority was devolved to the courts in 
an amendment to the African Law and Tribal Courts Act 
(1969) in February, 1977. The amendment was introduced 
to give the Tribal courts the authority to seize property 
in lieu of fines. However, more importantly it made the 
"tribal land authorities and provincial authorities 
subject to the jurisdiction of tribal courts."4 The 
social authority of those presiding over courts was thus 
institutionally augmented.
1 Actor Tapfumaneyi, Guruve, 31 August 1991.
2 Ladley, "Courts and Authority: A Shona Village Court", 
Ph.D. thesis, London: 1985, p.339.
3 "People's Court", Rhodesian Herald. May 14, 1979.
4 "Tribal Courts", Rhodesian Herald. Feb. 16, 1977, p. 2.
In 1978 the Tribal Courts numbered only 175, down 
from over three hundred in the 1950s. Of these, 132 had 
been granted criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the 
ALTC Act. This contrasts dramatically with the situation 
some by 1982 when, according to Ladley, that "nearly 
fifteen hundred village courts [were] scattered all over 
the country."5 This sudden burgeoning of courts suggests 
several possibilities. First, the strict regime of the 
colonial period successfully limited judicial authority, 
if not to the stated 175 courts, at least to something 
under four hundred. Secondly, that with the coming of 
independence in 1980 there was a "power vacuum", 
primarily in the rural areas, that was quickly filled by 
many who claimed authority and were quick to get a 
dispute settlement mechanism in place. The confusion 
brought with it conflicting claims of legitimacy. Former 
guerrillas claimed that their achievements entitled them 
to continue to exert social authority in the post- 
independence era. Thirdly, the Customary Law and Primary 
Courts Act (1981) successfully devolved and democratized 
judicial authority.
Independence
Without guidance from the past, how can we know 
what has changed, what has stayed the same?
...if there can be revolution with continuity 
then I think that the term is fully appropriate
5 Ladley, "Courts and Authority", p.47.
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for describing the replacement of the chiefs by 
the village committees as the source of 
ancestral authority and law.6
With these words David Lan summed up the comprehensive
change perceived to have taken place with the creation of
the newly independent state of Zimbabwe in April 1980,
and the far-reaching legislation that followed. One of
the pieces of legislation relevant to the themes of this
study is the Customary Law and Primary Courts Act (1981)
which removed judicial powers from the hands of the
Chiefs and Headmen, much as the High Commissioner's
Proclamation of 1898 had done following the quashing of
the rebellion in 1896-97, and placed judicial power in
the hands of "presiding officers" who were in some part
elected officials.7
The Customary Law and Primary Courts Act (CLPC) was
also aimed at instituting formal local courts to
counteract the judicial role of the political committees
operated by the guerrillas,8 previously known as "kangaroo
courts", or "comrades' courts". Indeed, Ladley asserts
that one specific goal of the CLPC was "to wrest back to
the central state the authority which had been assumed by
6 David Lan, Guns & Rain. Harare: 1985, p.226.
7 Simon Coldham, "Customary Law and Local Courts Act, 1990 
of Zimbabwe", Journal of African Law, vol. 34, no.2, 1990, p.
163 .
8 Ladley, "Courts and Authority", pp.13-14.
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these vibrant local democracies."9 This dynamic of the 
state seeking to displace or integrate local courts 
acting autonomously in order to exert comprehensive 
control ran throughout the period this thesis has 
considered. It clearly continues today. The Act also 
separated administrative and judicial functions.
Ladley considers that the period when "the political 
committees superseded the guerillas"10 and before they 
were absorbed by ZANU (PF) village committees marked the 
most significant level of public participation in the 
judicial forums. Without using the terms, Ladley has 
analyzed the process as civil society institutions 
prevailing over state institutions. It is likely that in 
such a fluid situation many felt that they could have 
influence, or at least that they were not limited any 
more than anyone else.
Ten years after independence it was all change in 
the lower courts, again. The Customary Law and Local 
Courts Act (1990) repealed the CLPC Act (1981) and, most 
significantly, formally reinstated Chiefs and Headmen as 
"judges" in local courts. This followed a period in 
which the primary courts established by the CLPC had 
collapsed. By 1987 the Zimbabwe Herald reported that 
corruption and inefficiency due to lack of supervision 
was undermining the local courts. Some sixty presiding
9 Ibid., p.14.
10 Ibid. , p . 253 .
officers had been suspended or dismissed between 1985 and 
1987. Furthermore, the article reported that "In some 
areas where the primary courts have not been established, 
chiefs' courts may...still be operating."11 In Guruve 
District the presiding officer of the Community Court 
said that virtually all the village courts had "lost 
quorum" by 1988 and none ever regained it. Furthermore, 
he complained of the preponderance of petty cases 
arriving at his court to be dealt with, cases he felt 
could be better dealt with at a more local level.12 
Although Ladley asserts that the elections for presiding 
officers following the enactment of the CLPC produced a 
"general pattern...[in which]...chiefs and headmen were 
not chosen,"13 Alexander argues that such posts were 
occupied by "traditional" leaders in the districts of 
Insiza and Chimanimani from relatively soon after 
Independence.14
It remains unclear precisely how and when the shift 
towards the reinstatement of Chiefs in connection with 
judicial authority gained momentum leading to the
11 "Corruption, inefficiency threaten credibility of 
primary courts", Zimbabwe Herald. May 5, 1987, p.4.
12 Benson Kadzinga, Guruve, 29 August 1991.
13 Andrew Ladley, "Changing the courts in Zimbabwe: the 
Customary Law and Primary Courts Act", Journal of African Law. 
1982, p.85.
14 Jocelyn Alexander, "The State, Agrarian and Rural 
Politics in Zimbabwe: case studies of Insiza and Chimanimani 
Districts, 1940-1990", D.Phil. thesis, Oxford: 1993.
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Customary Law and Local Courts Act (CLLC). This would 
certainly be a field for fruitful research. But we can 
hazard a guess that by 1985 the primary courts were being 
eroded by inept staff, lack of supervision and the lack 
of government commitment to training staff and replacing 
those dismissed.
Writing in 1985 Lan stated,
At present, the likelihood that the mediums 
will actually transfer their allegiance, and 
that of the ancestors, away from ZANU/PF and 
the government is slight, though the 
possibility that if they did so the chiefs 
might be the beneficiaries is perhaps one of 
the reasons that the chiefs' old relationship 
of subservience and dependence on the state has 
been perpetuated from the previous government.15
At the time Lan did the fieldwork for his thesis (October
1980 to May 1982) the village committees (also referred
to as party political committees) had displaced many
Chiefs in their political functions, the allocation of
land and the administration of law. Lan could even claim
confidently that "the chiefs have gone".16 In Upper
Guruve, in 1993, there was indeed "no recognition,
respect, [or] honour for the Chiefs at all."17 At that
time, they had not yet assumed any judicial powers.
However, in Lower Guruve, that is Dande where Lan
15 Lan, Guns and Rain, p.221.
16 Ibid. , pp.230-31.
17 Personal communication with Actor Tapfumaneyi, March 3,
1993 .
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concentrated his fieldwork,13 the people "have full 
respect for the Chiefs and headmen."19
Despite the recognition of the judicial authority of 
the Chiefs and Headmen in the CLLC Act (1990), the state 
has placed greater emphasis on education as a means of 
controlling the judicial sphere. Before being granted 
formal recognition, the "traditional" leaders were given 
training by magistrates in the proper way to apply 
"customary" law. The attempt to control the content if 
not the form is not, however, an innovation of the 
independent government. As early as 1945 "It was found 
necessary to give native Chiefs some training before 
allowing them to try... cases".20
The Chiefs and headmen of Zimbabwe are obviously 
still energetically fighting for the right to control 
disputing proceedings at the lower levels. It may be 
that in the coming years they will demand the extension 
of their jurisdiction to include petty crimes, and issues 
more likely to be hotly contested such as the dissolution 
of marriages, child maintenance and custody rights. The 
government has attempted to keep these issues within the 
field of the less manipulable statutory law administered 
by the assistant magistrates in the former "community
18 Ibid.
19 Personal communication with Actor Tapfumaneyi, March 3,
1993 .
20 NC Chipinga, AR 1945, S1051.
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courts" (also referred to derisively by men as
maintenance or women's courts) rather than relinquishing
them to the conservative "customary" law administered by
the Chiefs and Headmen in their courts.
Let me end by noting that the contest over law and
courts in Zimbabwe has taken on religious idioms in an
attempt to instill in people the authority of the state.
A ZANU (PF) sticker on the wall of the court office in
Guruve Community Court in 1992 reads:
The whole law is summed in one word, 
love ...It was given in love for us, 
and love is the fulfilling of the law 
- love in action.
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